[Advaita-l] [advaitin] Does SSSS subscribe to drsti-srsti vada?

[V Subrahmanian]

On Tue, May 13, 2025 at 6:06 PM Michael Chandra Cohen <
michaelchandra108 at gmail.com> wrote:

> some keen insights from ABD Smt Manjushree Hegde, Sankara's Two Truths as
> Pedagogy, 11 May 2026 in J. of Hindu Studies, OUP
> This assertion, articulated from the stance of the sākṣin, is
> categorically different from the same assertion if/when articulated from
> the stance of an individual, embodied and embedded in the
> vyāvahārika-world. Comans claims that SSS (absurdly) asserts that the
> vyāvahārika-world—a shared, public domain—is intrinsically linked to myy
> [an individual’s] waking state. Such an assertion leads to the
> (undesirable) conclusion that the external world, like the world of dreams,
> is private, subjective and idiosyncratic to each individual. This is the
> doctrine of dṛṣtisṛṣti—the creation of the world is concomitant with its
> perception—which Śaṅkara (certainly) does not subscribe to (Comans 2000, p.
> 262). Doherty makes the same accusation: ‘[dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭivāda] is, however,
> consistent with the rest of Satchidānandendra’s thought. Even if he had not
> named it, dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda is the inevitable consequence of several of his
> views…’ (Doherty 1999, p. 123). SSS does not, in fact, assert that the
> ‘common world of experience’ ‘vanishes when a person is in dream or sleep’.
> To say that a person is awake/dreams/sleeps within a common world of
> experience is the lokadṛṣṭi. From this stance, SSS asserts the reality of
> the dualistic world, its continuance through the three states, etc;
> uncompromisingly, he upholds the logic of the vyāvahārika. It is from the
> śāstradṛṣṭi—as awareness only—that SSS discusses the sublation of the
> waking state—and with it, the waking world—in dream/deep sleep. From the
> stance of the sākṣin/awareness, the “shared” world of experience is, in its
> entirety, simply contents/objects presented to awareness; its
> consistency/intersubjectivity—features that appear intrinsic to it—are no
> evidence of its independence/autonomy. *SSS’ argument is echoed in
> Dalal’s observation: ‘The world is independent of mind, but dependent on
> the witnessing observer. Thus, he [Śaṅkara] is able to collapse the
> contents of experience into witnessing consciousness without necessarily
> reducing the external object to mere cognition and as being wholly created
> by cognition’ (Dalal 2022, p. 411).*
>

The above highlighted observation is contradicted by Shankara and Gaudapada:

https://adbhutam.wordpress.com/2017/07/29/the-world-is-mind-alone-shankaracharya/
 (the details of the bhashya are there in this post)

In both the Mundaka Upanishad bhashya and the Mandukya Karika bhashya,
Shankara asserts that the world is dependent on the mind by default and
even reasons: when the mind is active, the world is cognized and when the
mind is not active, in deep sleep and samadhi, the world is not cognized.
Hence, cognition is creation - dristi sristi vāda - is explicitly accepted
as the śāstra dristi by Shankara and Gaudapada. The loka drishti is denied
by them as avidya kalpita and the shastra drsti is accepted as the one
contradicting the loka dristi.  In fact in the Bh.Gita verse 2.69 bhashya
says it all: the distinction between the loka drsti and sastra dristi, that
is, the sastra dristi contradicting/negating the loka dristi. There are
many more instances of such a view of Shankara.

warm regards
subbu








> Doherty observes, ‘[SSS’ argument] is all true, of course, from the
> absolute standpoint (pāramārthika-dṛṣṭyā) and Satchidanandendra’s opponents
> would not contest this’ (Doherty 2005, p. 227). The key point is that SSS’
> sākṣin-stance is different from the PSA’s pāramārthikadṛṣṭi; the latter is
> achieved post-gnosis, and is not immediately accessible. The PSA posit the
> sublation of the phenomenal world as a future “event” of “awakening” to the
> ultimate reality (Hirst 2005, p. 92). In contrast, to take the sākṣinstance
> is to notice what is available in direct experience—the irrefutable absence
> of the waking world in the dream (svapne vipratipadyate) and deep sleep
> states—to understand its ultimate reality (tasmādādyantavatvena mithyaiva
> khalu te smṛtāḥ) (GKB 2.7). It is therefore that SSS argues—that
> Śaṅkarācārya argues—that the world is incontestably real from the
> vyāvahārika perspective; from the sākṣin standpoint, on the other hand, the
> vyāvahārika-world is illusory for its sublation (in dream/deep sleep) is
> directly cognised (Saraswati 2009b, p. 90). From the perspective of
> absolute non-dual reality, there is nothing to be said at all. SSS is clear
> that the śāstradṛṣṭi does not undermine the lokadṛṣṭi: it is an epistemic
> standpoint to understand the ultimate reality. Comans’ (and Doherty’s)
> criticism conflates the two.
> This conflation/confusion stems from a very valid concern: how is the
> examination of the contents of awareness of the waking state—as experienced
> by the (contemplating) individual—not constrained by their subjectivity;
> how, in other words, a clearly subjective starting point of inquiry can be
> called as a universal, trans-personal perspective; for indisputably, it is
> an individual who must undertake the inquiry— the epistemic shift from
> lokadṛṣṭi to śāstradṛṣṭi—to examine the contents of awareness—of ‘their’
> waking/dream/deep-sleep states—as the disinterested Witness. SSS argues
> that the stance of the Witness is a heuristic tool of inquiry that allows
> us to see that despite the appearance of the immediate point-of-access to
> awareness as subjective, awareness itself is prior to the I-notion, and
> also ‘subjectivity’, and is therefore, trans-subjective.41 The critical
> move from lokadṛṣṭi to śāstradṛṣṭi allows the critical insight that the
> very notion of individuality, the sense of ‘my’ experience, is itself a
> content of awareness. By rigorously analysing our ‘subjective’ experience
> from the standpoint of awareness, we are forced to re-evaluate
> ‘subjectivity’ itself; the inquiry progressively unravels the limitations
> of our habitual, individualised perspective and points towards a more
> fundamental reality; it employs our ‘subjective experiences’ to show their
> limitations.
>
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