[Advaita-l] Does SSSS subscribe to drsti-srsti vada?

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

some keen insights from ABD Smt Manjushree Hegde, Sankara's Two Truths as
Pedagogy, 11 May 2026 in J. of Hindu Studies, OUP
This assertion, articulated from the stance of the sākṣin, is categorically
different from the same assertion if/when articulated from the stance of an
individual, embodied and embedded in the vyāvahārika-world. Comans claims
that SSS (absurdly) asserts that the vyāvahārika-world—a shared, public
domain—is intrinsically linked to myy [an individual’s] waking state. Such
an assertion leads to the (undesirable) conclusion that the external world,
like the world of dreams, is private, subjective and idiosyncratic to each
individual. This is the doctrine of dṛṣtisṛṣti—the creation of the world is
concomitant with its perception—which Śaṅkara (certainly) does not
subscribe to (Comans 2000, p. 262). Doherty makes the same accusation:
‘[dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭivāda] is, however, consistent with the rest of
Satchidānandendra’s thought. Even if he had not named it, dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda
is the inevitable consequence of several of his views…’ (Doherty 1999, p.
123). SSS does not, in fact, assert that the ‘common world of experience’
‘vanishes when a person is in dream or sleep’. To say that a person is
awake/dreams/sleeps within a common world of experience is the lokadṛṣṭi.
>From this stance, SSS asserts the reality of the dualistic world, its
continuance through the three states, etc; uncompromisingly, he upholds the
logic of the vyāvahārika. It is from the śāstradṛṣṭi—as awareness only—that
SSS discusses the sublation of the waking state—and with it, the waking
world—in dream/deep sleep. From the stance of the sākṣin/awareness, the
“shared” world of experience is, in its entirety, simply contents/objects
presented to awareness; its consistency/intersubjectivity—features that
appear intrinsic to it—are no evidence of its independence/autonomy. SSS’
argument is echoed in Dalal’s observation: ‘The world is independent of
mind, but dependent on the witnessing observer. Thus, he [Śaṅkara] is able
to collapse the contents of experience into witnessing consciousness
without necessarily reducing the external object to mere cognition and as
being wholly created by cognition’ (Dalal 2022, p. 411).
Doherty observes, ‘[SSS’ argument] is all true, of course, from the
absolute standpoint (pāramārthika-dṛṣṭyā) and Satchidanandendra’s opponents
would not contest this’ (Doherty 2005, p. 227). The key point is that SSS’
sākṣin-stance is different from the PSA’s pāramārthikadṛṣṭi; the latter is
achieved post-gnosis, and is not immediately accessible. The PSA posit the
sublation of the phenomenal world as a future “event” of “awakening” to the
ultimate reality (Hirst 2005, p. 92). In contrast, to take the sākṣinstance
is to notice what is available in direct experience—the irrefutable absence
of the waking world in the dream (svapne vipratipadyate) and deep sleep
states—to understand its ultimate reality (tasmādādyantavatvena mithyaiva
khalu te smṛtāḥ) (GKB 2.7). It is therefore that SSS argues—that
Śaṅkarācārya argues—that the world is incontestably real from the
vyāvahārika perspective; from the sākṣin standpoint, on the other hand, the
vyāvahārika-world is illusory for its sublation (in dream/deep sleep) is
directly cognised (Saraswati 2009b, p. 90). From the perspective of
absolute non-dual reality, there is nothing to be said at all. SSS is clear
that the śāstradṛṣṭi does not undermine the lokadṛṣṭi: it is an epistemic
standpoint to understand the ultimate reality. Comans’ (and Doherty’s)
criticism conflates the two.
This conflation/confusion stems from a very valid concern: how is the
examination of the contents of awareness of the waking state—as experienced
by the (contemplating) individual—not constrained by their subjectivity;
how, in other words, a clearly subjective starting point of inquiry can be
called as a universal, trans-personal perspective; for indisputably, it is
an individual who must undertake the inquiry— the epistemic shift from
lokadṛṣṭi to śāstradṛṣṭi—to examine the contents of awareness—of ‘their’
waking/dream/deep-sleep states—as the disinterested Witness. SSS argues
that the stance of the Witness is a heuristic tool of inquiry that allows
us to see that despite the appearance of the immediate point-of-access to
awareness as subjective, awareness itself is prior to the I-notion, and
also ‘subjectivity’, and is therefore, trans-subjective.41 The critical
move from lokadṛṣṭi to śāstradṛṣṭi allows the critical insight that the
very notion of individuality, the sense of ‘my’ experience, is itself a
content of awareness. By rigorously analysing our ‘subjective’ experience
from the standpoint of awareness, we are forced to re-evaluate
‘subjectivity’ itself; the inquiry progressively unravels the limitations
of our habitual, individualised perspective and points towards a more
fundamental reality; it employs our ‘subjective experiences’ to show their
limitations.