advaita-siddhi 13 (Madhusudana's reply)

[Charles Wikner]

On Tue, 7 Mar 2000, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at HOTMAIL.COM> wrote:

> Yes, but in the ultimate analysis advaita has to reject all categories
> except Brahman or sat, together with the pramANas.

One can only marvel at the compassion that moves the wise to expound
the Truth in terms that the saMsArin can grasp!

>> and verbal testimony. The prAbhAkara-mImAMsakas hold that abhAva
>> is not a category in itself, nor is there a pramANa such as
>> anupalabdhi.
>
>Why subsequently take this non-advaita position ?????

[...]

> On this issue, it is clear the advaitin cannot take sides either with
> the MAdhvas, naiyAyikas or bhaTTas who say negation is a category by
> itself, nor with the PrAbhAkaras who say there is no category for
> negation and that negation is nondifferent from the substratum.

Ah!  You have taken the prAbhAkara position to avoid the pitfall of
assuming a second "reality" (category or pramANa) in demonstrating the
pAramArthika aspect of negation. OK, I follow.

> Let me explain by giving meanings of specific phrases in the text.
> Then it should be clear. prapaJNchanishhedha - negation of the world,
> adhikaraNIbhUta-brahma - Brahman which is the substratum of (the
> negation of the world), abhinnatvAt.h - due to being non-different from,
> nishhedhasya tAtvikatve .api - even if the negation is (absolutely)
> real (pAramArthika), na-advaitahAnikaratvam.h - it does no harm to
> advaita (non-duality), na cha - And there is no, tAtvikAbhAva-
> pratiyoginaH - of the counter-positive (pratiyogin) of the real
> negation (ie.) , prapaJNchasya - of the world,  tAtvikApattiH -
> conclusion that it is real, tAtvikAbhAva-pratiyogini - in the
> counter-positive of the real negation, shukti-rajatAdau - in such cases
> as silver-in-nacre, kalpite- in illusions (literally imaginations),
> vyabhichArAt.h - due to the exception.

I found that word-by-word translation particularly helpful in mediating
between the Sanskrit and English.  Perhaps you would consider including
it in subsequent posts (at least for MadhusUdana's text) ?

> vyabhichAra, as per nyAya terminolgy, is specifically the case where
> a paxa (subject) has the hetu (reason) but not the thing to be inferred
> (sAdhya). For example, if we are trying to come up with a rule that says

[...]

> The third part
> deals with the nyAya terminology and concepts that keep recurring
> in the arguments.

Part three (or four) did not mention vyabhicAra :-(

You had earlier suggested Ingalls's "Materials for the Study of Navya
Nyaya Logic" -- I see that it is available from Amazon at $14.00.
I shall invest in a copy in order to better follow the argument.

Thanks for so generously clarifying and enlarging on your explanation
of MadhusUdana's argument.  I look forward to the ongoing series.

Regards, Charles.

--
bhava shankara deshikame sharaNam

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