advaita-siddhi - 9 (Partial redundancy? No way!)
Anand V. Hudli
anandhudli at HOTMAIL.COM
Thu Sep 23 15:18:10 CDT 1999
MadhusUdana set the sAdhya, what is to be established, as the mithyAtva
of duality, the unreality of duality. In defining mithyAtva, one of the
definitions taken up was the one from the panchapAdikA of PadmapAda.
MithyAtva is defined here as anirvachanIya, that which cannot be
categorized as sat or asat. More specifically, this was defined to be
sadasadanadhikaraNatva, which was clarified by MadhusUdana to be the
absolute absence of sattva and the absolute absence of asattva.
The opponent had raised the objection of arthAntara against the definition
of mithyAtva or sadasadanadhikaraNatva, not being a substratum of
either existence or non-existence. MadhusUdana refuted these objections.
He also offered an alternative definition of sadasadanadhikaraNatva,
namely the absolute difference from existence and the absolute difference
from nonexistence which rules out any possibility of arthAntara (proving
something other than what is intended).
The opponent could, however, level another charge against MadhusUdana's
definition. By defining sadasadanadhikaraNatva as the difference from
existence and difference from nonexistence, there is at least a defect
of proving something a part of which has already been proved. For
example, if you seek to prove A AND B, when you know that one of the two,
say B, is already proved, your proof will have the defect of partial
siddha-sAdhana, ie. aMshataH siddha-sAdhana. Your proof will be
partially redundant and one of the worst mistakes a logician can commit
is being redundant! Here, the opponent claims, the partial siddha-sAdhana
arises from the fact that the realists, including the navya-naiyAyikas
and the mAdhvas, already have accepted the world's absolute difference
from nonexistence, in the sense that the world is absolutely real. So
the part of the advaitin's proof which establishes absolute difference
from nonexistence is redundant.
But, MadhusUdana explains, the sAdhya in this case CANNOT be split
into two terms A and B, such that each can be independently proved. We
HAVE to consider the combined difference from existence and nonexistence.
Why? Because, the hetu, dR^ishyatva (perceptiblity), in this case is the
hetu for the CONJUNCTION (or combination) of absolute difference from
existence AND absolute difference from nonexistence. (Recall that the
sAdhya is to be inferred from the invariable concomitance of the hetu
with the sAdhya.)
Without further ado, let us hear the unassailable reply of MadhusUdana:
nacha - asattvavyatireka-aMshasya-asadbhedasya cha prapaJNche
siddhattvena-aMshataH siddha-sAdhanamiti - vAchyam.h | "guNAdikaM
guNyAdinA bhinnAbhinnaM samAnAdhikR^itatvAt.h" iti bhedAbhedavAdiprayoge
tArkikAdyaN^gIkR^itasya bhinnatvasya siddhAvapi uddeshya-pratItyasiddher-
yathA na siddha-sAdhanaM, tathA prakR^ite .api militapratIteruddeshyatvA-
nna siddha-sAdhanam.h | yathA tattvAbhede ghaTaH kuMbha iti sAmAnAdhi-
karaNya-pratIteradarshanena militasiddhiruddeshyA, tathA prakR^ite .api
sattvarahite tuchchhe dR^ishyatva-adarshanena militasya tatprayojakatayA
militasiddhiruddeshyeti samAnam.h |
(And you) cannot charge that there is the defect of partial siddha-sAdhana
(aMshataH siddha-sAdhana) because the part (of the proof) consisting
of (establishing) the absence of asattva (nonexistence) and the
difference from nonexistence (in the alternative definition) is already
established regarding the world. The (mAdhvas) hold that a quality
and the substance that possesses that quality are different AND
non-different from each other. In arguing with the tArkikas (the
naiyAyikas, sAnkhyas, the bhATTas, etc.) who accept the difference
(of a quality from the possessor of the quality), they (the mAdhvas)
say: "the quality and its possessor are different
and non-different from each other because they can be cognized to be
related by a relation of non-difference." (So, they say,) there is no
siddha-sAdhana because the intended cognition (CONJUNCTION of difference
and nondifference of a quality and its possessor) is NOT proved , even
though the difference (of a quality from its possessor) is already proved.
Similarly, in (our) present case (of establishing absence of sattva AND the
absence of asattva) too, the cognition that is intended (to be proved)
is CONJUNCTION (combination of absence of sattva and absence of asattva).
So (we) cannot (be charged with) siddha-sAdhana (redundancy in reasoning).
(You may say that the CONJUNCTION of ours is not justified. But we say,
no!) In the case of identical things such as a "pot" and a "jar" (which are
terms that stand for the same thing), there is no cognition of difference
and nondifference of the form "The pot is the jar." (Therefore,) the
conjunction of difference and nondifference is intended to be established.
(This is your stand.)
Similarly, in the present case (ie. of absence of sattva and absence of
asattva), perceptibility is not (a characteristic of) a totally nonexistent
thing that lacks existence (sattva). (Therefore,) conjunction (of absence
of sattva and absence of asattva, or equivalently, difference from sattva
and difference from asattva) is a prayojaka (a necessary factor) for
dR^ishyatva, perceptibility (which is the hetu) and (so) the establishing
of that CONJUNCTION is what is intended.
ViTThalesha describes that the hetu dR^ishyatva is an invariable
concomitant (vyApya) of ubhayatva ("both-ness" or conjunction) of
sadbheda and asadbheda.
dR^ishyatvasya sadbheda-asadbhedobhayatva-avachchhinnaM vyApyatvam.h
The vyApyatva (invariable concomitance) of perceptibility (the hetu
in this case) is delimited (characterized) by the conjunction of
difference from sat and difference from asat (or equivalently the
absence of sattva and absence of asattva, in which case the proper
term would be "sattva-abhAva-asattva-abhAvobhayatva-avachchhinnaM").
And as BrahmAnanda explains, such "ubhayatva" is the prayojaka
in establishing dR^ishyatva:
tatprayojakatA- ubhayatva-vishishhTasya dR^ishyatvopapAdakatA
Here the argument runs as follows:
We may make a charge or partial siddha-sAdhana against you, the
advaitin, because the establishing of absence of sattva and absence
of asattva has a part, the establishing of absence of asattva with
regard to the world, that is already established by others.
Well, in that case, we can make the same charge against you
because your establishing of the difference and nondifference of a
quality from its possessor has a part, the establishing of difference
of a quality from its possessor, is already established by others such
as the bhATTas, naiyAyikas, sAMkhyas, etc., who admit the difference
of a quality from its possessor.
Not so. You cannot establish such difference and nondifference
independently of each other. You have got to establish the conjunction of
the two conditions, namely difference and nondifference of a quality
from its possessor. The hetu here is "samAnAdhikR^itatva", which is
explained as being capable of being the content of a cognition of a
relation of nondifference in the same substratum where there is
difference. Or, we can explain the hetu, samAnAdhikR^itatva, as being
capable of being cognized as a qualifier (visheshhaNa) of the possessor
of the quality. In the cognition, "the pot is blue", (ghaTo nIlaH),
the blue color of the pot is cognized as the qualifier, visheshhaNa of
the pot which is the qualificand, visheshhya. The particular instance of
blue color of the pot is different and nondifferent from the pot
(although the generic character of blue color is accepted to be only
different from the pot.) If we split the sAdhya into bheda (difference)
and abheda (nondifference), then we run into the following problem.
The sAdhya abheda in itself CANNOT be a necessary factor (prayojaka)
of the (sole) hetu. For example, there is no cognition of the form "the
pot is the jar", where the terms "pot" and "jar" are synonyms and the
hetu samAnAdhikR^itatva is present. Therefore, even though there is
abheda between "pot" and "jar" here, there is no hetu. And in the case
of the (erroneous) cognition "the pot is the cloth", there is bheda
between the pot and the cloth but again there is no hetu, samAnAdhi-
kR^itatva. Therefore, we need the conjunction of bheda and abheda
as the sAdhya so that the sAdhya becomes a prayojaka of the hetu.
But, in your (advaitin's) case, things are different. You claim that
the world is unreal (mithyA) or has the absence of sattva and the
absence of asattva (or the difference from sattva and the difference
from asattva), because of the hetu, dR^ishyatva, perceptibility.
(What is perceptible or cognizable is mithyA.) Now, perceptibility
is a characteristic of everything other than Brahman, as per your
view. And Brahman is "sat". All you need to prove is absence of
sattva or difference from sattva with regard to the world. Proving
the absence of asattva (or difference from asattva) is redundant.
Hence the charge of partial siddha-sAdhana.
What you say is not justifiable. Just as in your case,
the conjunction of bheda and abheda is a necessary factor (prayojaka)
of the hetu, so in our case too the conjunction of absence of
sattva and the absence of asattva (or equivalently the conjunction
of difference from sattva and the difference from asattva) is the
prayojaka of the hetu, dR^ishyatva (perceptibility). Here is why.
If we make just the absence of sattva the sAdhya, then we run into a
problem in the case of a fictitious entity (a chimera). A fictitious
entity, such as the horn of a hare, has absence of sattva only. But
here the hetu, dR^ishyatva is NOT present. A fictitious entity is never
perceived. Again, if we make just the absence of asattva the sAdhya,
then we run into a problem in the case of Brahman. Here, we have
absence of asattva, but again the hetu, dR^ishyatva is NOT present in
Brahman. Therefore, we need to have the conjunction of absence of
sattva and absence of asattva as the sAdhya in order to make the
sAdhya a necessary factor (prayojaka) of the hetu. The charge of
siddha-sAdhana against us cannot be made.
The thrust of the argument is that the hetu for the sAdhya in the
mAdhva's case as well as for the advaitin has to be a prayojaka,
a necessary factor of the hetu. In other words, the hetu must occur
exactly wherever the sAdhya occurs, no more no less. This is more
restrictive than the general form of vyApti, as may be recalled from
the introduction to nyAya in the third part of this series. When
the mountain has the hetu, smoke and we infer the sAdhya, fire, the
vyApti is less restrictive in the sense that we may allow the sAdhya
fire to occur without smoke, although the smoke must always be
accompanied by fire in order for the inference to be valid. But in the
present discussion, we cannot allow the sAdhya to occur where the
hetu is not found. The occurrences of sAdhya and hetu must exactly
coincide. Here, the sAdhya for the advaitin is sadbheda and asadbheda
and the hetu is dR^ishyatva. By defining a "tight" form of vyApti,
what the advaitin is saying is:
Whatever is perceptible (cognizable) is different from sat AND
different from asat.
The converse also holds.
Whatever is different from sat AND different from asat is perceptible
Symbolically speaking, if H is the hetu, and the sAdhya is the logical
conjunction (AND) of S1 (sad-bheda) and S2 (asad-bheda), we may write:
H -> S1 AND S2
S1 AND S2 -> H
where "->" means "implies"
2) The mAdhvas' view here regarding the bheda-abheda of a quality from
the possessor of the quality is used here by MadhusUdana as an example
only. It does not necessarily mean that MadhusUdana endorses this view
of the mAdhvas in a broader context, as for example, with respect to
an exegetical context. Indeed, the mAdhvas seem to come under some
heavy attack from the VishishhTa-advaitins for not recognizing the
bheda (difference) between dravya and adravya as RAmAnuja holds.
In his fourth volume titled "History of Indian Philosophy", Dasgupta
outlines the criticism of the mAdhvas by the vishishhTa-advaitin,
ParakAla Yati in his VijayIndra-parAjaya. Parakala Yati points out
how several texts in the upanishads become absurd if the mAdhva
position on dravya and adravya is held. Another major disagree-
ment between the two schools of Vaishnavism is the Ananda-tAratamya
position which is held by the mAdhvas but rejected by the
vishishhTa-advaitins. The latter cannot accept (nor can the advaitins)
that there is gradation in Bliss (Ananda) in the state of mokshha.
This position is also criticized by ParakAla Yati on exegetical
grounds as well. There is another vishishhTa-advaitin work named
Ananda-tAratamya-khaNDana that is also mentioned by Dasgupta.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the advaitin's use of the
mAdhva example on "guNa" and "guNI" is for illustration purposes only.
Any other example would also be fine.
bhava shankara deshikame sharaNam
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