Discussion of verses posted so far ...
Here the argument runs as follows:
We may make a charge or partial siddha-sAdhana against you, the advaitin, because the establishing of absence of sattva and absence of asattva has a part, the establishing of absence of asattva with regard to the world, that is already established by others.
Well, in that case, we can make the same charge against you because your establishing of the difference and nondifference of a quality from its possessor has a part, the establishing of difference of a quality from its possessor, is already established by others such as the bhATTas, naiyAyikas, sAMkhyas, etc., who admit the difference of a quality from its possessor.
Not so. You cannot establish such difference and nondifference independently of each other. You have got to establish the conjunction of the two conditions, namely difference and nondifference of a quality from its possessor. The hetu here is "samAnAdhikR^itatva", which is explained as being capable of being the content of a cognition of a relation of nondifference in the same substratum where there is difference. Or, we can explain the hetu, samAnAdhikR^itatva, as being capable of being cognized as a qualifier (visheshhaNa) of the possessor of the quality. In the cognition, "the pot is blue", (ghaTo nIlaH), the blue color of the pot is cognized as the qualifier, visheshhaNa of the pot which is the qualificand, visheshhya. The particular instance of blue color of the pot is different and nondifferent from the pot (although the generic character of blue color is accepted to be only different from the pot.) If we split the sAdhya into bheda (difference) and abheda (nondifference), then we run into the following problem. The sAdhya abheda in itself CANNOT be a necessary factor (prayojaka) of the (sole) hetu. For example, there is no cognition of the form "the pot is the jar", where the terms "pot" and "jar" are synonyms and the hetu samAnAdhikR^itatva is present. Therefore, even though there is abheda between "pot" and "jar" here, there is no hetu. And in the case of the (erroneous) cognition "the pot is the cloth", there is bheda between the pot and the cloth but again there is no hetu, samAnAdhi- kR^itatva. Therefore, we need the conjunction of bheda and abheda as the sAdhya so that the sAdhya becomes a prayojaka of the hetu.
But, in your (advaitin's) case, things are different. You claim that the world is unreal (mithyA) or has the absence of sattva and the absence of asattva (or the difference from sattva and the difference from asattva), because of the hetu, dR^ishyatva, perceptibility. (What is perceptible or cognizable is mithyA.) Now, perceptibility is a characteristic of everything other than Brahman, as per your view. And Brahman is "sat". All you need to prove is absence of sattva or difference from sattva with regard to the world. Proving the absence of asattva (or difference from asattva) is redundant. Hence the charge of partial siddha-sAdhana.
What you say is not justifiable. Just as in your case, the conjunction of bheda and abheda is a necessary factor (prayojaka) of the hetu, so in our case too the conjunction of absence of sattva and the absence of asattva (or equivalently the conjunction of difference from sattva and the difference from asattva) is the prayojaka of the hetu, dR^ishyatva (perceptibility). Here is why. If we make just the absence of sattva the sAdhya, then we run into a problem in the case of a fictitious entity (a chimera). A fictitious entity, such as the horn of a hare, has absence of sattva only. But here the hetu, dR^ishyatva is NOT present. A fictitious entity is never perceived. Again, if we make just the absence of asattva the sAdhya, then we run into a problem in the case of Brahman. Here, we have absence of asattva, but again the hetu, dR^ishyatva is NOT present in Brahman. Therefore, we need to have the conjunction of absence of sattva and absence of asattva as the sAdhya in order to make the sAdhya a necessary factor (prayojaka) of the hetu. The charge of siddha-sAdhana against us cannot be made.
The thrust of the argument is that the hetu for the sAdhya in the mAdhva's case as well as for the advaitin has to be a prayojaka, a necessary factor of the hetu. In other words, the hetu must occur exactly wherever the sAdhya occurs, no more no less. This is more restrictive than the general form of vyApti, as may be recalled from the introduction to nyAya in the third part of this series. When the mountain has the hetu, smoke and we infer the sAdhya, fire, the vyApti is less restrictive in the sense that we may allow the sAdhya fire to occur without smoke, although the smoke must always be accompanied by fire in order for the inference to be valid. But in the present discussion, we cannot allow the sAdhya to occur where the hetu is not found. The occurrences of sAdhya and hetu must exactly coincide. Here, the sAdhya for the advaitin is sadbheda and asadbheda and the hetu is dR^ishyatva. By defining a "tight" form of vyApti, what the advaitin is saying is:
Whatever is perceptible (cognizable) is different from sat AND different from asat.
The converse also holds.
Whatever is different from sat AND different from asat is perceptible (cognizable).
Symbolically speaking, if H is the hetu, and the sAdhya is the logical conjunction (AND) of S1 (sad-bheda) and S2 (asad-bheda), we may write:
H -> S1 AND S2
S1 AND S2 -> H
where "->" means "implies"
2) The mAdhvas' view here regarding the bheda-abheda of a quality from the possessor of the quality is used here by MadhusUdana as an example only. It does not necessarily mean that MadhusUdana endorses this view of the mAdhvas in a broader context, as for example, with respect to an exegetical context. Indeed, the mAdhvas seem to come under some heavy attack from the VishishhTa-advaitins for not recognizing the bheda (difference) between dravya and adravya as RAmAnuja holds. In his fourth volume titled "History of Indian Philosophy", Dasgupta outlines the criticism of the mAdhvas by the vishishhTa-advaitin, ParakAla Yati in his VijayIndra-parAjaya. Parakala Yati points out how several texts in the upanishads become absurd if the mAdhva position on dravya and adravya is held. Another major disagree- ment between the two schools of Vaishnavism is the Ananda-tAratamya position which is held by the mAdhvas but rejected by the vishishhTa-advaitins. The latter cannot accept (nor can the advaitins) that there is gradation in Bliss (Ananda) in the state of mokshha. This position is also criticized by ParakAla Yati on exegetical grounds as well. There is another vishishhTa-advaitin work named Ananda-tAratamya-khaNDana that is also mentioned by Dasgupta.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the advaitin's use of the mAdhva example on "guNa" and "guNI" is for illustration purposes only. Any other example would also be fine.