[Advaita-l] [advaitin] A Post-Shankara Advaitin says 'anādi ajnāna, etc. are mithyā'

Jaishankar Narayanan jai1971 at gmail.com
Thu Jul 2 23:38:10 EDT 2026


Namaste,

See below.

On Wed, 1 Jul 2026 at 17:15, Michael Chandra Cohen <
michaelchandra108 at gmail.com> wrote:

> Namaste Jaishankar,
> I find it disappointing that you only present scant response to my
> critical assessments.
>

Jai: I have already written an entire paper refuting your arguments which
was shared a few years back for which there is no refutation from your
side. So this is facetious for you to say.

I understand, Bhasyakara is difficult to refute when he is understood as
> SSS sees him. Nevertheless
>

Jai: It is so absurd that there is nothing to refute really.


> you say, //Śaṅkara's avidyā is neither a bare abhāva nor a
> bhāva-padārtha; it is atasmiṃs tad-buddhiḥ
> That is the definition of bhAvarupa which you have given, which is the
> same for moolAvidya as for viparyaya jnAna.//
>
> Yes, quite interesting and too easily conflates the two understandings. So
> what is the difference, do you suggest?
>

Jai: Only difference is we assign the same reality to kArya and kAraNa. You
absurdly and stubbornly hold kAraNa is abhAva which is against all means of
knowledge and BhashyakAra. Further you say this abhAva kAraNa somehow
manifests a kArya which is neither a bare abhāva nor a bhāva-padārtha!


> // bijAnkura nyAya which is appropriate only if the bIja is moolAvidya.  //
> You are asserting, not arguing. The analogy simply presents a
> beginningless causation. To say the analogy *requires* a positive
> substance is to smuggle in the conclusion as a premise!!
>

Jai: I am not smuggling anything. Everything I state is from the BhAshya
unlike your concoctions which are kapola-kalpita. See the following

eka eva parameśvaraḥ kūṭasthanityo vijñānadhāturavidyayā, māyayā māyāvivat
, anekadhā vibhāvyate, nānyo vijñānadhāturastīti । B.S.Bh. 1.3.19

vidyayā tasyā bījaśakterdāhāt । avidyātmikā hi
bījaśaktiravyaktaśabdanirdeśyā parameśvarāśrayā māyāmayī mahāsuṣuptiḥ,
yasyāṃ svarūpapratibodharahitāḥ śerate saṃsāriṇo jīvāḥ
... avyaktā hi sā māyā, tattvānyatvanirūpaṇasyāśakyatvāt ।
... avidyā hyavyaktam; । B.S.Bh  B.S. 1.4.3


> Accusing SSS of postulating an abhavarupa ontic as seed, is a superficial
> reading:
> "But 'Ignorance' in the form of failure to apprehend the Self is only a
> precondition
> for misconceiving it: it may be referred to metaphorically as a seed, but
> it is
> not a substance (dravya) having a po\ver (saleti) in any concrete sense.
> As S~kara puts
> it, 'The "seed" is only failure to apprehend the real'
> (tattva-apratibodha-matram eva hi
> bijam, G.K.Bh. 1.11). If it \vere anything else it would be real, and
> then it \vould be
> impossible to cancel it through metaphysical knowledge. SSS, Heart of Sri
> Samkara p212
>
>
Jai: All these fancy words like Ontic or epistemic are irrelevant. The
kArikA you quote is given below

kāryakāraṇabaddhau tāviṣyete viśvataijasau ।
prājñaḥ kāraṇabaddhastu dvau tau turye na sidhyataḥ ॥ 1.11 ॥

The BhAshya is
kāryaṃ kriyata iti phalabhāvaḥ, kāraṇaṃ karotīti bījabhāvaḥ ।
tattvāgrahaṇānyathāgrahaṇābhyāṃ bījaphalabhāvābhyāṃ tau yathoktau
viśvataijasau baddhau saṅgṛhītau iṣyete । prājñastu bījabhāvenaiva baddhaḥ
। tattvāpratibodhamātrameva hi bījaṃ prājñatve nimittam । tataḥ dvau tau
bījaphalabhāvau tattvāgrahaṇānyathāgrahaṇe turīye na sidhyataḥ na vidyete,
na sambhavata ityarthaḥ ॥

It is very clear from the above the tattvāpratibodha is kAraNa which can
never be abhAva as then the kArya anyathāgrahaṇa will be from abhAva-kAraNa
which will make Shankara and GaudapAda as saying abhAvAt bhAva-utpattih
which is against all means of knowledge. This tattvāpratibodha is bījaśakti
as quoted above in B.S.Bh  B.S. 1.4.3. It is AvaraNa as mentioned in B.G
5.15. BhAshyakAra also uses the timira-DrishtAnta (cataract analogy) to
point out the AvaraNa shakti of avidyA. You cannot get out of jail by
simply saying all of this is figurative or metaphorical. If it is so then
bhAshyakAra would have definitely mentioned it ,but he does not.
Further figurative
or metaphorical meaning can only be considered if the direct meaning does
not make any sense. In this case the direct meaning makes immense sense and
your metaphorical reading will make bhAshyakAra into a Buddhist.

I have written this reply knowing very well that it will not make any
difference to you. I hope other sincere mumukshus do not get confused by
such faulty prakriyas and for their sake the above has been stated.

with love and prayers,
Jaishankar


> Regards, Michael
>
> On Wed, Jul 1, 2026 at 12:56 AM Jaishankar Narayanan <jai1971 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Namaste,
>>
>> You claim
>>
>> Śaṅkara's avidyā is neither a bare abhāva nor a bhāva-padārtha; it is
>> atasmiṃs tad-buddhiḥ
>>
>> That is the definition of bhAvarupa which you have given, which is the
>> same for moolAvidya as for viparyaya jnAna.
>>
>> Further you are talking about bijAnkura nyAya which is appropriate only
>> if the bIja is moolAvidya. The bIja cannot be abhAva in which case you are
>> closer to Buddhists than Shankara who clearly talks about a bIja which is
>> bhAvarupa and which needs to be burned by the fire of knowledge.
>>
>> I think enough has been said about these topics.
>>
>> With love and prayers,
>> Jaishankar
>>
>>
>> On Tue, 30 Jun, 2026, 4:45 pm Michael Chandra Cohen via Advaita-l, <
>> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Namaste Jaishankarji,
>>>
>>> You are quite right and I easily forget satkaryavada. Your 3 definitions
>>> are helpful.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The issue is how does SSS warrant the accusation of reifying a second
>>> entity onto PSA? It is more subtle than just upAdAnakAraNa. There is
>>> always
>>> an implication of ‘something’ that is not Brahman with the notion of
>>> mulavidya. Calling it anirvacaniya, maya or ‘not a tangible substance as
>>> it
>>> avyakta (unmanifest) and sookshma (subtle),’ only disguises by implying
>>> there is something which is avyakta, sookshma, or indefinable.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> “mulAvidya is drishya as it is sAkshi-bhAsya and so it is mithyA.” –
>>> reifying by way of both standpoint and explanation.
>>>
>>> “So it is created every time a samsAri wakes up.” – the mere idea of
>>> creation, of a samsAri ‘waking up’,  is the subtle second thing SSS
>>> refers
>>> to in all the above.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> However, none of this applies to simple error – adhyasa. Why add a cause
>>> to
>>> adhyasa and all sorts of weighty explanation to that which is to be
>>> sublated in the end anyway? Instead, simply recognize Sankara’s words
>>> that
>>> adhyasa is prasiddha, anadi, naisargika – no cause necessary to prove
>>>
>>>
>>> Claude responds to the remainder of your attack:
>>>
>>>
>>> First, the Taittirīya maxim you turn against us — abhāvād bhāvotpattiḥ
>>> sarvapramāṇavyākopaḥ — charging that we breed the waking saṃsārin from
>>> the
>>> jñāna-abhāva of suṣupti. But we assert no utpatti. The whole force of
>>> "naisargiko 'yaṃ loka-vyavahāraḥ" is anāditva: the saṃsāra is
>>> unoriginated.
>>> Where nothing is produced, a maxim against production-from-absence has no
>>> purchase. It binds precisely whoever needs a positive upādāna for an
>>> arisen
>>> effect — i.e., the bhāvarūpa account. The pramāṇa tells against the side
>>> that requires a bhāva, not against ours.
>>>
>>> Second, the abhāva/bhāva pincer — "viśeṣaṇavattve bhāva eva syāt." A
>>> false
>>> dilemma. Śaṅkara's avidyā is neither a bare abhāva nor a bhāva-padārtha;
>>> it
>>> is atasmiṃs tad-buddhiḥ — viparyaya-jñāna, erroneous cognition. A
>>> cognition
>>> may be false and still be a cognition, bearing its phenomenal features
>>> without being reified into insentient stuff. The abhāva-horn is not ours
>>> to
>>> hold. It is mūlāvidyā that must be at once positive (bhāvarūpa),
>>> insentient
>>> (jaḍa), and the negation of knowledge — Padmapāda's own gloss — and it is
>>> that composite which strains the very logic you cite.
>>>
>>> On naisargikatva: occurrent superimpositions do recur on each waking;
>>> granted. But beginninglessness belongs to the series (bīja-aṅkura-nyāya),
>>> not to a continuant dozing through suṣupti. To read a persisting positive
>>> substrate out of the recurrence is to assume the reification under
>>> dispute
>>> — no differently than inferring a stored homunculus from the daily return
>>> of waking.
>>>
>>> @advaita-vedanta.org <listmaster at advaita-vedanta.org>
>>>
>>


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