[Advaita-l] [advaitin] T&D – Avidyā

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Sudhanshu ji,
//Ontologically, the bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNa avidyA is non-existent.
Period. Non-existence does not and cannot prohibit appearance.//
I believe you mean to say, non-existence like snake appears but
non-existence like hare's horn does not appear. And, I get the third category
- sat/asat and phenomenological.
But, both snake and horn are asat - they are both errors and sublatable -
one seen, the other not seen.  The point of bhasya is that neither are
real, both are illusion. period. .

*Prātibhāsika* is not taught as some separate quasi-epistemological, class
of provisional entity. It is simply *misperception* (*adhyāsa*). What
appears is only the substratum, wrongly cognized. -a *cognitive error*.

Indeed, the entire triad—seer, seen, and seeing—belongs to avidyā alone
without distinction. By positing a distinct *prātibhāsika level*, the
theory covertly treats illusion as something positively produced,
as though error required a subtle material manifestation. This mistakes
misapprehension for creation. Illusion is not produced; it is only falsely
attributed.

The result is a violation of the law of excluded middle: what is neither
sat nor asat is granted a quasi-status. But for strict Advaita there is no
third category. The real alone is unsublatable; everything else is simply
unreal.

What has happened in this departure from PTB is this elaborate construction
explaining and inadvertently reifying creation. The distinction between DSV
adn SDV are only further constructions - mula and tula ajnana - vivarana
and vishepa shakti - bhava-abhava vilakshana - on and on - all
constructions not found in PTB.  Sankara wasn't interested in building
explanation only dismissing the superimposition

//Epistemic and error require a mind upfront. So, is the opponent saying
that ignorance pre-requires mind?
If so, then entire VedAnta stands refuted because mind being nAma-rUpa, is
a product of ignorance.//
“Epistemic” in this context does not imply a pre-existing mind as a
substance; it simply denies that ignorance is an ontological principle.
 Mind, ignorance, and error all belong to the same empirical explanatory
framework and are jointly sublated.
 The idea of one who is in ignorance and one who becomes free from
ignorance, is a serious distortion of Sankara's PTB. 🙏🙏🙏



On Tue, Jan 27, 2026 at 8:47 AM Sudhanshu Shekhar <sudhanshu.iitk at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Namaste Michael ji.
>
>>
> However, this move is purely stipulative and depends entirely on a prior
>> reification of avidyā.
>
>
> It just shows that there is no logical inaccuracy in postulating
> bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNa entity.
>
> The need for a “third ontological category” arises
>> only if avidyā is first treated as a positive explanatory entity requiring
>> metaphysical classification.
>
>
> It is not a third ontological category. This is the point which has been
> mentioned umpteen times. Ontologically, the bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNa avidyA
> is non-existent. Period.
>
> Non-existence does not and cannot prohibit appearance. There are umpteen
> examples in daily life viz. Illusory snake.
>
>
> Once that assumption is questioned—as in
>> Śaṅkara’s strictly epistemic treatment of ignorance as mere
>> non-apprehension or error—the dilemma itself dissolves.
>
>
> "Epistemic", "error" need to be rigorously defined for any meaningful
> discussion.
>
> Epistemic and error require a mind upfront. So, is the opponent saying
> that ignorance pre-requires mind?
>
> If so, then entire VedAnta stands refuted because mind being nAma-rUpa, is
> a product of ignorance.
>
> Ignorance is not a
>> candidate for ontological taxonomy at all, and thus need not be located
>> within or outside the bhāva/abhāva schema.
>>
>
> Why not? Illusory snake and horns of hare are both non-existent. Yet, one
> appears and the other doesn't. So, a distinction is required to be made for
> clear communication.
>
> Accordingly, the appeal to “paraspara-viraha-vyāpya” does not solve an
>> independent problem; it merely accommodates a problem generated by the
>> prior hypostatization of avidyā.
>>
>
> It merely refutes the objection of the opponent who claims that it is not
> possible to have bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNA avidyA.
>
> Regards,
> Sudhanshu Shekhar.
>
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