[Advaita-l] [advaitin] References to drishTi-srishTi-vAda in Shruti, BhAshya and works of sampradAya-vit-AchAryAs

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji.

//The Māṇḍūkya Kārikās employ dream analogies, dṛśyatva-based inference,
and citta-vikalpa language solely to negate the reality and origination of
the waking world (MK 2.4–2.38), explicitly denying both physical and mental
causation (MK 4.39, 4.71), and therefore do not support a dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi
doctrine but culminate instead in uncompromising ajātivāda (MK 2.32;
4.71).//

Sir, ajAti-vAda is apavAda. For adhyArOpa, shAstra provides either pariNAma
or vivarta. Within vivarta, either DSV or SDV. Wherever dream is equated to
waking, the adhyArOpa falls under DSV. MANDUkya unarguably equated waking
and dream. So, for adhyArOpa, MANDUkya uses DSV.

For apavAda, obviously there is ajAti.

//Waking objects are illusory because they are perceived, not because they
are mentally produced.//

True. Mind itself is a perceived object

//Gauḍapāda establishes *dṛśyatva* (being perceived) only as a *mark of
falsity (vaitathya)*, using dream as the illustrative case—not as a causal
principle of origination. *Citations:* MK *2.4*, *2.7*, *2.15*, *2.31*,
*2.38//*

And vaitathya implies prAtibhAsikatva. That is DSV.

//Dream–waking parity functions exclusively as a negation of waking’s
privileged reality.//

What is "exclusively"? There is no difference between waking and dream.
BhAshya tells in Aitareya "three dreams", "there is perception of
non-existent objects in waking just as in dream". (Aitareya).

Dream-waking identity establishes complete identity.

//The analogy shows that waking objects are no more real than dream
objects; it does *not* assert that perception brings objects into
existence.//

None has claimed that perception brings objects into existence.

There are two views - drishTi is srishti. OR. drishTi and srishTi are at
the same time. Neither claims that objects are brought in existence. The
seen objects are non-existent appearances.

//Calling waking the ‘cause’ of dream does not grant waking ontological
reality.//

DSV does not state that waking is cause of dream. So, unwarranted
assertion. When there is no claim, where is the need for rebuttal. DSV
rejects kArya-kAraNa-bhAva.

//Here Gauḍapāda concedes causal language only to immediately *neutralize
it*, stating that waking is called the cause of dream *without thereby
being real*. This preserves explanatory usefulness while blocking
ontological commitment.//

Waking is stated as cause of dream in SDV. Not in DSV.

//Siddhānta-bindu, however, *operationalizes this causal talk*, folding it
into a DSV framework that treats cognition as a functional origin-point
rather than a merely didactic posit.//

Useless stuff. kArya-kAraNa-bhAva is denied by DSV.

//*Jīvas are compared to dream-beings, magical beings, and conjured beings
to deny real birth, not to affirm perceptual creation.//*

Nothing is being affirmed. It is adhyArOpa.

//These analogies are cumulative and decisive: dream-beings, magical
beings, and conjured beings all appear without ever being born. The
emphasis is not on *how* they appear, but on the fact that *appearance does
not imply origination*.//

Fine. "How" of appearance is adhyArOpa. SDV says sequential, DSV says
simultaneous. Both are adhyArOpa. They don't imply origination.

//Siddhānta-bindu shifts the force of these examples toward *mind-dependent
projection*, thereby reintroducing a subtle form of production that the
Kārikās are at pains to deny.//

Incorrect. Emphasis is not on that. It is within adhyArOpa, which is
subsequently rescinded, on which emphasis is placed.

//Jīvas and objects are reduced to citta-vikalpa only to negate independent
existence.//

They have no existence. Not even "dependent" existence. There is appearance
of existence.

//Reduction of objects and jīvas to citta-vikalpa serves to dissolve their
independent ontological status, not to elevate mind into a creative
principle.//

Mind itself is imagination..none is elevating mind to creative principle.

//The citta itself is immediately shown to be non-separate from the seer,
preventing its reification. Siddhānta-bindu nonetheless treats citta as the
site where appearance is generated, thereby granting it an explanatory role
foreign to Gauḍapāda’s strictly eliminative use.//

All VedAnta texts refer mind to be a drishya and hence non-existent
appearance.

//Ajātivāda decisively precludes any dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi causal thesis.//

ajAti is apavAda. DSV is adhyArOpa.

apavAda and adhyArOpa go together hand in hand.

//The declaration that “no jīva whatsoever is ever born” functions as a
global constraint on interpretation, ruling out physical, mental, and
perceptual origination alike. Ajātivāda leaves no conceptual space for even
a momentary arising dependent on cognition.//

This is true. It is apavAda.

//Siddhānta-bindu affirms ajāti verbally, yet retains DSV explanatory
language, creating an unresolved tension between denial of birth and
accounts of perceptual emergence. *Citation:* MK *4.71//*

This statement is made because it does not understand adhyArOpa. DSV is a
tool to reach ajAti. SiddhAnta Bindu too states the ultimate truth as ajAti.

//The final purport is universal non-origination, not perceptual idealism.//

Of course. This is the final purport. To reach there, one goes through DSV.

//All prior analogies and inferences culminate in the denial of origination
altogether, not in the assertion that perception creates the world.
*Citations:* MK *2.32*, *4.71//*

This assertion is part of adhyArOpa.

Regards.
Sudhanshu Shekhar.