[Advaita-l] [advaitin] Re: 'Satyasya Satyam..' of the Upanishad explained in the Bhagavatam

[V Subrahmanian]

On Fri, Sep 26, 2025 at 7:46 PM Michael Chandra Cohen <
michaelchandra108 at gmail.com> wrote:

> Namaste Subbuji,
> I appreciate your patience. I have read through your link and the Tait
> bhasya 2.6.1 but find it extremely weak evidence to accept three states of
> existence.
>

Dear Michael ji,

This is rather an audacious commentary of Shankara's intellect. When he has
explicitly enumerated the three types/levels of reality drawing that from
the text of the Taittiriya Up. 'Satyam (Brahman) (A) became satyam
(vyavaharika) (B) and anRtam (the errors/delusions that happen in
day-to-day life, the solution of which does not require Brahman
realization) (C).  Thus, the Upanishad has covered the entire creation -
which has two components: 1. the objects that we use for fulfilment of our
needs and 2. those situations where we are deluded, err, with reference to
taking object A for B. Shankara has commented upon this statement of the
Upanishad by so clearly giving a one-to-one correspondence with the three
things, levels of reality the Upanishad is also practically enumerating,
three in number.  SSS has also translated the Bhashya of Shankara exactly
the way it is stated and also adds a footnote to explain the 'relative
reality' and gives the analogy of real water (vyavaharika) and mirage water
(error).

But in that article SSS either forgets what he has said in the translation
of the Tai.Up. Bhashya, or consciously rejects that statement of the
Upanishad and Shankara since it is not fitting his own thesis.

warm regards
subbu


> The text is saying nothing about three states but simply distinguishing an
> object from a non-object. Repeatedly the text calls all creation namarupa
> including true and not-true. Thus, water that quenches is true whereas
> mirage water is not-true. These are relative values within vyavaraharika
> but not distinct states along with Paramarthika.
>
> Alternatively, here is a quick but pointed selection of teachings
> declaring the sameness of waking and dream, object and thought of object,
> jiva and the world. I don't see how you can justify your peripheral example
> against such categoric declarations as below. 🙏🙏🙏
>
>
> The (supposed) distinction between the two kinds of experience
> is itself imagined' (G.K. 2.14).
>
> Mental objects are verily extern~ and external objects are verily mental'
> (Chand. Sh.
> 8.5.4).
>
> 'Because of the well-known reason
> that the characteristic distinctions (into subjective and objective
> factors) are common to both
> states, the wise have called the waking and dream states one' (G.K. 2.5)
>
> The idea and its object are in mutual dependence. The idea is dependent on
> the soul or its other
> objects for its existence. And the soul and other objects of the idea are
> dependent on the latter
> for their existence. (In the case of the soul at least,) soul and idea are
> each objects for the other.
> Therefore, when the question is raised, '\vhat is the idea and \vhat is
> the object of the idea?"
> people of insight say, "They are neither of them anything". In a dream,
> there is neither a real
> elephant nor the real idea of an elephant, and people of insight see that
> the same is the case here
> in the waking state. Why is this so? Because neither idea nor object is
> capable of being either
> defined or proved. Each is apprehended in dependence on the other. The pot
> cannot be
> apprehended without the idea of the pot, and the idea of the pot cannot be
> apprehended \vithout
> the pot The meaning is, "There is no distinction benveen idea and pot
> \vhereby one could be
> established as the proof of the other"' GK4.67
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