[Advaita-l] [advaitin] Illusoriness of causation (cause-effect-relationship)

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji.

Didn't Madhusudhana structure Videhamukti as 'superior' to jivanmukti and
> he was a DSV, no? Videha mukti admits avidyA-lesha.
>

The concept of videha-mukti vis-a-vis jIvanmukti appears only in
sirshTi-drishTi-vAda. In drishTi-srishTi-vAda, jIvanmukti is treated as
merely arthavAda.

Madhusudan Saraswati presented both SDV as well as DSV.

jIvanmukti cannot be explained without avidyA-lesha.

The idea of "superiority" of videha-mukti is only on account of
non-obstructed manifestation of Ananda. In case of jIvanmukti, vikeshpa
created by prArabdha sustains, and hence there is subdued manifestation of
Ananda. However, these are all valid in SDV alone.

Excerpt from advaita siddhi:





*न च जीवन्मुक्तिप्रयोजकवृत्त्यपेक्षया परममुक्तिप्रयोजकवृत्तौ
आनन्दाभिव्यक्तिगतविशेषाभावे चरमक्षणेन चरमश्वासेन वा उपलक्षित आत्मा
मुक्तिरिति किं न स्यादिति वाच्यम् ;
प्रारब्धकर्मप्रयुक्तविक्षेपाविक्षेपाभ्यामभिव्यक्तिविशेषस्याङ्गीकारात्
।Objection: There is absence of difference in the expression of bliss in
AV1 (akhanDAkarA-vritti leading to jIvanmukti) and AV2 (akhanDAkArA-vritti
leading to videha-mukti). Therefore, why liberation should not be
last-moment-upalkshitA-AtmA or last-breath-upalskhita-AtmA. {Liberation
i.e. avidyA-nivritti is AV2-upalskhita-AtmA.}.Answer: No. The difference in
the expression of bliss in AV1 and AV2 is admitted on account of
vikshepa-caused-by-prArabdha (in case of AV1) and
absence-of-vikshepa-caused-by-prArabdha (in case of AV2).*

Also, we find this perspective on Videhamukti in BUbh4.4.6,
> "How does such a man attain liberation? This is being stated: He who sees
> the Self, as in the state of profound sleep, as undifferentiated, one
> without a second, and as the constant light of Pure Intelligence" ...
> "Rather this man of realisation is Brahman in this very life, although he
> seems to have a body. Being but Brahman, he is merged in Brahman. Because
> he has no desires that cause the limitation of non-Brahmanhood, therefore
> 'being but Brahman he is merged in Brahman'* in this very life, not after
> the body falls*. A man of realisation, *after his death, has no change of
> condition*-something different from what he was in life, but he is only
> not connected with another body. This is what is meant by his becoming
> 'merged in Brahman'; for if liberation was a change of condition, it would
> contradict the unity of the Self that all the Upani~ds seek to teach."
>

This is a description of jIvanmukti. This is admissible in SDV.

and these objections to avidya-lesha need to be considered:
> BSB 1.1.4: Śaṅkara affirms that embodiment is purely misconceived; the
> self has never been embodied.
> (misconceived, not apparent Bhavarupa Avidya creation )
>

What is misconception? Isn't it an activity? How can activity be permitted
in nishkriya Brahman?

BSB 3.3.32: Liberation is immediate with right knowledge and does not
> require death.
>

What is liberation? Is it an event in time which happens post
"right-knowledge"? No. Liberation is ever-present. Even now when one thinks
that he is in bondage, he is actually free. So, where is the question of
death for liberation!!

(In SDV model), difference between jIvanmukti and videha-mukti is different
grades of manifestation of bliss. in DSV, even that is not there as
jIvanmukti itself is not admitted. So, questions of death etc do not arise.
When there is no birth in the first place, where is the question of death!!


> "For the sentence, "That thou art", cannot be construed to mean that you
> will become That (Brahman) after death, because the text
> "The sage Vamadeva, while realizing this (Self) as That (Brahman), knew,
> 'I was Manu, and the sun'" (Br. I. iv. 10), shows that the result of
> knowledge, consisting in becoming identified with all, occurs
> simultaneously with the rise of complete illumination. Hence liberation
> comes inevitably to a man of knowledge."
>

Yes. The dawn of knowledge removes the covering of ignorance.

And therefore following powers of ignorance cease:
(i) causing illusion of reality to seen-world
(ii) causing illusion of usefulness to the seen-world.

However, that power of ignorance which creates illusory perceptible-seen
remains. That is how jIvanmukta mahAtmA sees the world. prArabdha is not
contradictory to jnAna. However, it ensures that jnAna is unable to remove
avidyA-lesha.

Excerpt form advaita siddhi:
अनेकशक्तिमदविद्यायाः प्रपञ्चे पारमार्थिकत्वादिभ्रमहेतुशक्तेः प्रपञ्चे
अर्थक्रियासमर्थत्वसम्पादकशक्तेश्च प्रारब्धकर्मसमकालीनतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारेण
निवृत्तावपि अपरोक्षप्रतिभासयोग्यार्थाभासजनिकायाः शक्तेरनुवृत्तेः तद्वती
विद्यापि तिष्ठत्येवेति नोक्तदोषावकाशः ।

--please say more about these 'aspects of avidyA'
>

As discussed above.

--'anirvacaniya mithya' is never a term used by S. in PTB. Instead, it is
> referenced to avyakta namarupe. S. uses the term, tattvanyatvabhyam
> anirvacaniya while all PSA, sadasatbhyyam anirvacaniya.
>

So what?

Hacker points out the difference between Śaṅkara using anirvacanīya to
> describe the status of the world as it appears, not to explain how it came
> into being while  Later Advaitins reify anirvacanīya as the source of
> creation, turning it into a theory of how the universe arises (cosmogony),
> not just how it is experienced (cosmology).
> Here's further notes on Hacker and Alston on the term:
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1DBfZh_swP4eTvIMIEgDIMK8KGI8GQDdp/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=115262902008900337610&rtpof=true&sd=true
>

Shankara also meant the same. Nishkriya Brahman cannot create. You can
never answer as how nishkriya Brahman appears as world!! Giving clay-pot
example for appearance of Brahman and world is incorrect because clay is
not singular inactive entity. A singular inactive entity cannot appear as
anything else.

--how can non-existence appear?
>

That is what illusion is. Non-existent phoenix can appear in thin air as
illusion.



> What appears is Brahman only! That it looks like something other than
> Brahman is the mistake of avidya.
>

This is true. However, Brahman is not non-existent. The non-existent is
what I saw. The phoenix in thin air -- that has always been non-existent.


> There's no evidence of anything other than Brahman.
>

Your eyes are the evidence of non-Brahman. You saw a phoenix in thin air
and you yourself are saying that phoenix was non-existent. Brahman is never
non-existent. This proves that seen-phoenix was non-existent illusory
non-Brahman.

To say phoenix is Brahman is same as saying "phoenix is not (being
non-Brahman), only Brahman is".


> Perception is not proved by anything other than perception so seeing a
> snake does  not indicate a third category apart from sat and asat.
>

Seeing a snake is evidence enough that it is not asat. Sublation of snake
is evidence enough that it is non-Brahman.

-- an anirvacaniya mithya bhavarupa avidya explaining perception is a
> logical entity.
>

Your experience "I am ignorant" is a proof of perceptible-ignorance. We can
discuss it separately.

What is perceived is Rope not snake. Snake is a wrong idea. It becomes a
> logical entity when you suggest snake is the *bhavarupa* *thing *
> perceived.
>

What do you mean by "wrong idea"? Is it horns of hare? What vastu is it? Is
it a mental transformation? If yes, then is mind itself not wrong idea? If
yes, then it is infinite regress.

Define what vastu "wrong idea" is!!

Please, adhyasa is error. It is not a substantive error but only wrong
> cognition, a lack of discrimination says Bhasyakara. How deep must it be to
> conclude an error is an actual thing?
>

Let us come to what BhAshyakAra says separately.

First. What vastu is "wrong cognition"?

a condescending remark especially when you recognize that it is standing up
> to 1200 years of entrenched tradition.
>

I am sorry but repeating BhAshykAra's quotes serves no purpose when basic
logical analysis has not been done. Just see: how can singular inactive
entity appear as anything else!! Try explaining this to an eight-year old
boy. I bet you won't be able to explain to him.

The explanation of SSSS ji does not stand a chance even before an
eight-year old boy. What to talk of standing against traditional AchAryAs.

Regards.
Sudhanshu Shekhar.