[Advaita-l] avidya is virodha...review #1 though part of 4

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste All,

This review simplifies and condenses earlier responses. It follows
Jaishankara/JSN's summary topics as cited 1-part of 4. The remainder of
topic 4 will follow.


JSN summarizes the points showing why avidyA is jnAna-vJirOdhi and not
jnAna-abhAva.

1. नञ्pratyaya meaning in the word avidyA is vidyA-virodhi and not
vidyA-abhAva. I give supporting  statements from the bhAshya.
“Not abhava padartha/ontic but agrahana/epistemic non-apprehension.” “So,
Śaṅkara using the term virōdha (opposition) does not contradict abhāva in
the epistemic sense. They are complementary, not exclusive.” BGbh2.69,
Bhasyakara is quoted noting that absence of duality includes the perceiver
and that it is discriminating knowledge which alone is opposed to
ignorance Brbh3.3,
anabhivyaktasthaḥ = non-manifestion should be taken as agrahana and not as
a rarified covering and then ridicules the notion of a shakti removing
ignorance. SSSS explains that later schools (like Vivaraṇa) that take
virōdha to imply mutual exclusion between two entities—i.e., that avidyā is
a bhāva opposing another bhāva (vidyā).Thus, the term vidyā-virōdhi is a
figurative description of the function of knowledge, not a statement about
avidyā’s ontological status.

2. avidyA is AvaraNa. “AvidyA is mentioned as a covering in multiple places
in both Gita and bhAshyas. bhAshyakAra  himself argues that covering
implies a covered by and covered entities and a covering cannot be abhAva.
so avidyA cannot be an abhAva?
BGbh 5.15, clearly non-discrimination is the cover - epistemological.

BGbh 13.2, tamo guna can be functional, not just material.Tamoguṇa-samudbhavā"
literally means "arising due to tamas", not being composed of tamas as a
substance. This is a causal expression, not ontological. Tamas may be said
to be the upādhi or the instrumental condition in empirical existence
(vyavahāra), not the ontological essence of avidyā.

BrU1.2.1 - Ghata Bhasya.
"Naiva kiñcana" = absence of names and forms. Empirical not ontological
absence

“Mṛtyunā idaṁ āvṛtam āsīt” = the self evident nature of the Self is not
recognized

,

3. All types of abhAva are also bhAvarUpa only. “BhAshyakAra does not
accept any abhAva at all. He says abhAva is just bhAva-pratiyogi (opposed
to existence) and cannot have any vishesha (qualities and activities etc.).
As soon as you associate it with any quality or activity it is to be taken
as bhAva only. So jnAna-abhAva also is only bhAvarupa as  per bhAshyakAra.

Also jnAna-abhAva proponents actually use avidyA-kalpita,
avidyA-adhyaropita  etc. associating their abhAva with activities making it
a bhAvarupa only. “
+-Just because “absence of pot” is spoken of with reference to something
else (like “there is no pot on the cloth”), it does not follow that absence
is a thing or that the cloth is the positive substitute for the pot's
absence. From the abhāvarūpa view, abhāva is purely conceptual or epistemic.

Bhava pratiyogi is saying,  if something is referable or describable, it
must be a positive entity. But from Śaṅkara’s standpoint, many things are
referable in language or thought but are not real, i.e., adhyāsa,
mithyā-jñāna, dreams, and avidyā itself are cognitive constructs, not real
entities.

JSN: “Abhāva is a pratyakṣa or anupalabdhi-based cognition. “

It is not a bhāva (a real existent), but a conceptual marker of something
that is not present

Addendum:

JSN: “the absence of knowledge (jñāna-abhāva) is a positive thing,”

“So let us suppose that contradiction means absence of mutual identity of
nature. But this

will not do, as it would imply that a pot and a cloth were
contradictories.” SSSS, HOSSp19

The mīmamsaka-s say, every entity is bhāva (positive) from its own svarūpa,
and it’s in abhāva when viewed from another object. Following this school,
the vyavahāra bheda of jars and clothes, of bhāva and abhāva is expounded
here. Imagining bheda in abhāva is wrong, say Tai.U.Bh (9, introduction),
BSBh 2.1.18 (449), BGBh 18.48 (546) - all these from pāramartha drsti. So,
no contradiction here (with abhavarupa avidya).
…In ‘abhāva of jar,’ if bheda is imagined, then abhāva will be imagined;
then to say, jar is non-

existent would be incongruous.
…Because abhāva is bhāvātmaka, one cannot say svarūpa is non-existent. If
it is said that the

svarūpa of jar is non-existent before birth, then it is said so (to set up)
the defect discussed next.”(SSSS Ghata Bhasya fn)

4. avidyA as a Cause / Seed of nAma-rUpa / SamsAra.  “AvidyA is spoken of
as bIja (seed), kAraNa / hetu (cause) in multiple places. A kAraNa can
never be  an abhAva according to bhAshyakara and even common sense, as
something cannot be even  perceived if the locus is not bhAvarupa, let
alone something being created / projected from nothing.
III. Comparison of Abhāvarūpa and Bhāvarūpa Interpretations

Point of Comparison

Abhāvarūpa View (Bhāṣya)

Bhāvarūpa View (Counter)

Ontological Status

Abhāva is not real, it is only a negation parasitic on bhāva.

Abhāva is a real negative, a mode of being (nihil-object).

Cognitive Validity

Cognized only via its pratiyogin; no direct cognition.

Perceived via anupalabdhi as a legitimate pramāṇa.

Qualifiability (viśeṣaṇa)

Cannot have attributes; distinctions are conceptual.

Distinctions in absence are cognitively and linguistically real.

Production (utpatti)

Abhāva cannot be produced; saying so is illogical.

Pradhvaṁsābhāva arises determinately post-destruction.

Relation to pramāṇa

Allowing bhāva from abhāva contradicts pramāṇas.

Without acknowledging abhāva, pramāṇa like anupalabdhi becomes
unintelligible.

Use in discourse

Linguistic usage of abhāva is figurative.

Usage is based on real ontological and logical distinctions.