[Advaita-l] Shabda-ajanya-vritti-vishayatva of tuchch

Venkatraghavan S agnimile at gmail.com
Tue Dec 28 08:41:08 EST 2021

Namaste Sudhanshu ji,

Response in-line below.

Kind regards,

On Tue, 28 Dec 2021, 18:11 Sudhanshu Shekhar, <sudhanshu.iitk at gmail.com>

> //How would you prove that अकारणत्व and अक्षणिकत्व are mithyA to the
> opponent? Without this, the hetu in your reasoning would be unproven and
> hence the opponent would allege asiddhi.//
> The opponent has defined kAraNatva as arthakriyAkAritva. He states that
> arthakriyAkAritva implies kshAnikatva and hence (due to equating kAraNatva
> and arthakriyAkAritva) kAraNatva implies kshAnikatva. He further stated
> that akAraNatva is the hetu and akshaNikatva is the sAdhya owing to two-way
> vyApti.
> Now, world has artha-kriyA-kAritva and hence as defined by the opponent
> himself, the world will have kAraNatva. And hence kshAnikatva also. Now,
> world is mithyA (for not being either tuchcha or Brahman - world’s
> mithyAtva is not disputed by the opponent. The definition of drishyatva is
> in dispute). So, kAraNatva and kshaNikatva will be mithyA also.
I agree.

So their abhAva, akAraNatva and akshaNikatva will be bhAvarUpa mithyA only
> [through the logic adduced by Acharya in BU 1.2.1 - तथैव
> भावात्मकताभावानाम्].

kAraNatva abhAva need not be mithyA. shuddha brahma has kAraNatva abhAva,
but it is sat, not mithyA.

tucCha also has kAraNatva abhAva, but it is asat, not mithyA.

Similarly akshaNikatva. shuddha brahma has akshaNikatva, but it is not
mithyA. Similarly tucCha - it is akshaNikam, but asat, not mithyA.

Taking a step back: the rule that if there is an object with a particular
order of reality, its attribute must be of the same order of reality is not
a valid one in my opinion.

A vyAvahArika shukti can have prAtibhAsika rajatatva. The pAramArthika
brahma has vyAvahArika sarvajnatva / vyAvahArika kincijjnatva.

To this, if it is said that in the cases presented, the substance is of a
higher order of reality and the attribute is of a lower order of reality
whereas in our prakaraNa, we are discussing asat (substance) can have or
cannot have akAraNatva (attribute), which for the sake of argument, let us
assume is mithyA (let us also assume that mithyA is notionally higher than
asat), the reply would be:

What about the bhrama, daNDI devadattah, when it is daNDI yajnadattah in
reality? The substance (Devadatta) is incorrect (mithyA), but the attribute
(daNDa) is correct (satya).

So, even if akAraNatva was mithyA why cannot it be said to be present in

> Please indicate fault in this logic.

Not sure if I have understood your intention correctly, but presented my
prima facie review of the argument presented. If I have misunderstood,
please clarify.


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