[Advaita-l] Advaita Siddhi series 027 - jaDatva hetu upapattih (part 3)
agnimile at gmail.com
Fri Feb 16 12:27:09 EST 2018
In the previous *post*
we had looked at the siddhikAra's justification for jnAna to exist in the
absence of a knower and the known. Therefore, the quality of being
different from objectless consciousness was postulated as the definition of
the term jaDatva, or inertness.
The pUrvapakshi now asks:
ननु - प्रमाभ्रमभिन्नं न ज्ञानं, Cognition cannot be that which is different
from pramA, right knowledge or bhrama, wrong knowledge. It has to belong to
one of the two categories.
न चात्मस्वरूपं ज्ञानं प्रमा; तद्विषयस्याविद्यादेस्तात्त्विकत्वापातात्; The
knowledge of the nature of the self cannot be valid knowledge, because the
object of such a knowledge cannot be sublated. The object of the knowledge
of self is nescience, avidyA. If self knowledge was valid knowledge, then
its object, nescience, cannot be sublated. The destruction of nescience
would be rendered impossible.
नच अप्रमा दोषजन्यत्वापातात् | It cannot be wrong knowledge either, because
it would imply that such a knowledge is born from a defective source.
However, it is the knowledge of the vedic mahAvAkyas that generates this
self-knowledge, and the vedas can never be defective. Thus it cannot be
wrong knowledge either.
The siddhikAra replies
- इति चेन्न; if this is your argument, no. The position that all knowledge
must either be right or wrong is not true always.
तार्किकसिद्धेश्वरज्ञानवत् घटादिनिर्विकल्पकवच्च स्वभावत
उभयवैलक्षण्येनानुपपत्ते:; It is possible for knowledge to be intrinsically
different from either category, like God's knowledge in nyAya, or the
indeterminate knowledge of objects such as pots.
According to the logician, God's knowledge is permanent. The logician
defines valid knowledge as guNa janyam, ie that which is born from a
non-defective source, and wrong knowledge as doSha janyam, ie that which is
born from a defective source. Since God's knowledge is permanent, it is not
born - thus according to him, God's knowledge is neither pramA nor bhrama.
Similarly, the indeterminate cognition of objects like a pot (ie I know
some object is present, but I am not sure what it is exactly), cannot fit
into either category - right or wrong knowledge.
तत्रापि ईश्वरज्ञानस्य प्रमात्वे गुणजन्यत्वस्य भ्रमत्वे दोषजन्यत्वस्य
चापत्ते:, Because even in that case if God's knowledge is right, then it
would be born from a non-defective source, and if it was wrong, it would be
born from a defective source. Either possibility would be unacceptable to
the naiyyAyika, as according to him, God's knowledge is not born, it always
निष्प्रकारके च निर्विकल्पके तद्वति तत्प्रकारत्वस्य तदभाववति तत्प्रकारत्वस्य
चानुपपत्ते: Neither niShprakAraka (non-relational cognition) nor
nirvikalpaka jnAna (indeterminate cognition) can be classified as either as
right knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of the object contains the feature that
is present in the object (tadvati tatprakArakatva) or as wrong knowledge,
i.e. the knowledge of the object contains a feature that is not present in
the object (tadabhAvavati tatprakArakatva).
जन्यसविकल्पकत्वेन भ्रमप्रमान्यतरत्वनियमे चास्माकं क्षत्यभावात्, If the rule
of classification as either right or wrong is applicable for generated
determinate cogintion, that does our view no harm.
विलक्षणवृत्तिद्वयोपरागेण च स्वभावतो भ्रमप्रमाविलक्षणस्याप्यात्मज्ञानस्य
तदुभयरूपेण व्यवहारोपपत्ते: | Because the knowledge of the self is
intrinsically neither right or wrong, being unclassifiable into either
category (tadvati tatprakAraka or tadabhAvavati tatprakAraka). However for
the sake of vyavahAra, one may take it as either right or wrong.
The pUrvapakshi says:
नच - ज्ञानपदवाच्यभिन्नत्वविवक्षायां उपाधेरपि
ज्ञानपदवाच्यत्वात्तत्रासिद्धि:, ज्ञानपदलक्ष्यभिन्नत्वविवक्षायां तु घटादेरपि
ज्ञानपदलक्ष्यत्वात्तत्राप्यसिद्धिरिति - वाच्यम्;
"If you desire to define (jaDatvam) as that which is different from the
direct meaning of the word 'cognition', then as the adjunct (thought) is
the direct meaning of the word 'cognition', this will lead to bhAgAsiddhi."
Thought is mithyA, but if jaDatva is defined as that which is different
from the primary meaning of the word 'cognition', it would result in the
meaning of jaDatva as not thought. This will result in thought being
excluded from the set of all mithyA objects, which would result in
"If instead you say that (jaDatvam) is that which is different from the
implied meaning of the word 'cognition', then everyday objects such as pots
(as cognitions objectify objects such as pots, the word 'cognition' would
imply those objects) will be excluded from the set of of mithyA objects.
The siddhikAra says - Do not argue thus.
ज्ञानपदजन्यप्रतीतिविशेष्यभिन्नत्वविवक्षायामुक्तदोषाभावात् | Because if
(jaDatva) is defined as that which is different from the visheShya, the
qualificand, in the meaning generated by the word 'cognition', such defects
would be absent. To explain, the meaning of the word jnAna or cognition is
'vritti vishiShTa chaitanyam', or consciousness qualified by thought. Thus
if jaDatva is defined as everything other than consciousness in the meaning
of cognition, then the said defects will be absent.
एवमानन्दभिन्नत्वरूपमनात्मत्वमुपपाद्यम् | Similarly, if the meaning of
non-self (the third alternative for jaDatva proposed by the nyAyAmritakAra)
is taken as that which is different from bliss, that would be appropriate.
The happiness derived from objects is also the bliss of the self in reality
- we falsely assume that objects cause the happiness - but the real source
of happiness is the self.
तदुपाधिमात्रस्यैवोत्पत्तिविनाशप्रतियोगित्वात् | The nature of objective
happiness is as Brahman only, because it is only the upAdhi of that
happiness (ie the thought) that is generated and destroyed. The thought
that generates the experience of happiness may come and go, but the real
source of happiness eternally shines.
The pUrvapakshi objects to this:
नच - ज्ञानभिन्नत्वस्यानन्दभिन्नत्वस्य च काल्पनिकस्य ब्रह्मणि सत्त्वात् तत्र
व्यभिचार इति - वाच्यम्; If that is the case, then because a difference from
consciousness and a difference from bliss are both imagined in Brahman,
such qualities exist in Brahman too - Thus there is vyabhichAra.
The siddhikAra says - do not argue thus.
धर्मिसमानसत्ताकतद्भेदस्य हेतुत्वात् | Because we can remedy the defect by
adding "a difference that is not of the same order of reality as its locus"
to the definition of the hetu. An imaginary difference will be of a lower
order of reality than Brahman.
अनौपाधिकत्वेन वा भेदो विशेषणीय:, तुच्छे पञ्चमप्रकाराविद्यानिवृत्तौ च
व्यभिचारपरिहार: पूर्ववत् | Alternatively, one can add the
qualifier "non-relationally" to the difference in the definition. i.e.
jaDatva means that which is non-relationally different from the qualifand
in the meaning of the word 'cognition'. The vyabhichAra in absolutely
non-existent objects, and the destruction of nescience, which is considered
as belonging to a fifth order of reality can be remedied by adding the same
qualifier as *previously
in the drishyatva chapter. There, the vyabhichAra with asat and
avidyAnivritti was remedied by adding the qualifier - अज्ञानकालवृत्तित्वं,
ie "existing contemporaneously with ignorance" - to the definition.
एवं अस्वप्रकाशत्वम् वा जडत्वम्, तच्च पूर्वमेवोपपादितमिति शिवम् ||
Similarly, the definition of jaDatva as the absence of self-luminosity is
also acceptable, as has been said previously. In the drishyatva *chapter
the absence of self-luminosity was defined as अवेद्यत्वे
सत्यपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वाभावं - the absence of a characteristic of being
unobjectifiable, while being directly known.
That completes the chapter on the suitability of jaDatvam as a hetu for the
Originally posted on 16th February 2018.
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