[Advaita-l] Vaadiraaja Teertha's Yuktimallika - Advaita Criticism - Slokas 1-511 to 1-524
agnimile at gmail.com
Mon Jun 26 11:46:54 EDT 2017
Knowledge's validity is not because it is generated by pramANa, its
validity derives from it not being subsequently sublated. On the contrary,
one of the conditions for means to be pramANa is that it produces pramA.
If the original knowledge was pramA when it was stored in memory, and
provided that it is recollected correctly, the memory is a valid
recollection of events that occurred in the past. One need not postulate
memory being a valid pramANa for it to produce an accurate recollection of
On Mon, Jun 26, 2017 at 4:18 PM, Srinath Vedagarbha <svedagarbha at gmail.com>
> On Mon, Jun 26, 2017 at 10:28 AM, Venkatraghavan S <agnimile at gmail.com>
>> Namaste Sri Srinath,
>> Here the focus is if smriti can be called a pramANa or not. Validity is
>> only one of several conditions for a means of knowledge to be called a
>> pramANa (dispeller of prior ignorance is another). Memory may be valid (or
>> not), but because by definition, it is the recollection of something
>> previously known, it cannot be said to dispel the ignorance of an object
>> and thus cannot be termed pramANa.
> That is fine as far as memory being not valid pramANa. But my question is
> specifically about whether it is valid knowledge (pramA) or not.
> Form your articulation it seems -- since memory is not a valid pramANa
> (means of knowledge), it implies knowledge gained from such means is also
> not a valid knowledge (pramA). Is that correct?
> My understanding is that validity of knowledge is tightly coupled with
> means of knowledge. If the means is invalid, the knowledge must be invalid
> as well.
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