[Advaita-l] Dvaita Vaada - Vadiraja Teertha's Nyayaratnavali Slokas 310 - 314 Pativrataa Stree

kuntimaddi sadananda kuntimaddisada at yahoo.com
Fri May 8 07:58:25 CDT 2015

Shree Anand – PraNAms and thanks for the excellent summing up the inherent problems in the analysis of the identity/difference of dRik-dRishya duality. Atma being aprameyam or not an object of knowledge, can neither be witness or nor witnessed. The inherent problem in all these theories is trying to jump across the vyaavahaarika to paaramaarthika; and therefore every analysis is bound to be problematic. Transactionally, mind itself acts as substantive of both the subject-object duality – both as knower-thought and known-thought or aham vRitti and idam vRitti – both in the external or internal perceptions – that involves sense or sense-less input. 

Self-realization also has to occur at the upahita chaitanya level only with akhandaakaara vRitti – as I am – I am - without the qualifications or attributive objectifications of –this- this, staring with the mind itself. Yet, that akhandaakaara Vritti has to arise in the mind only where the inherent identity of I am both as a subject and I am as substantive of the object arise based on understanding of scriptural statements via shrotavyaH, manthavyah, nidhidhyaasitavya, which are again vidhi vaakyas until that understanding takes place. 
Just my 2c
Hari Om!

On Fri, 5/8/15, Anand Hudli via Advaita-l <advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

 Subject: [Advaita-l] Dvaita Vaada - Vadiraja Teertha's Nyayaratnavali Slokas 310 - 314 Pativrataa Stree
 To: "advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org" <advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org>
 Date: Friday, May 8, 2015, 12:37 AM
 Perhaps, VAdirAja's contention that
 the advaitin admits the subject and
 object of a cognition must necessarily be different is not
 without a basis
 in an advaitic text, albeit this principle is taken out of
 context and
 applied cleverly in the nyAyaratnAvali in an attempt to
 discredit the
 abheda shruti. The influential work, nyAyamakaranda of
 Anandabodha, for
 example, is concerned with, among other things, arguments
 with naiyAyikas,
 PrAbhAkaras, Buddhists, and others on the Self-luminosity
 Self-manifestedness (svyaMprakAshatva) of Atman and JnAna as
 well. To
 understand what Anandabodha is saying when he rules out the
 identity of the
 subject and object in a cognition, we need to be aware of
 the nature of his
 arguments in the nyAyamakaranda. First, according to
 naiyAyikas, knowledge
 of jnAna is one of the attributes of the soul Atman, in
 which it inheres,
 jnAnAdhikaramAtmA, as the tarkasaMgraha says. Atman is the
 substratum or
 adhikaraNa in which jnAna inheres by means of the samavAya
 relation. Further, many naiyAyikas maintain that the Atman
 is revealed in
 an inner perception of the mind, which they call
 "mAnasapratyakSha". This
 mental perception, mAnasapratyakSha takes place
 independently of external
 senses and is of the form "I know", "I will", "I feel", "I
 wish", etc.
 However, even in such "inner perceptions", the Atman is not
 presented as
 itself, but only as the substratum of jnAna, sukha, duHkha,
 icchA, and
 yatna. To give a rough analogy, when we see a pot placed on
 the ground, the
 substratum of the pot is the ground, and the perception of
 the pot is the
 "foreground" perception, while that of the ground is the
 perception. The ground is undoubtedly perceived, but only as
 the substratum
 of the pot, not in isolation. Even so in the case of the
 inner perception,
 "I know", knowledge is perceived as inhering in its
 substratum, the Atman.
 For this reason, a naiyAyika would describe the
 (substratum-ness) of Atman (in a somewhat complicated way)
 Thus, in short, the Atman is an object of inner perception,
 In total contrast with the above, the advaitins hold that
 jnAna is not an
 attribute of Atman, but jnAna *is* Atman/Brahman, vide
 satyaM jnAnam
 anantaM brahma, prajnAnaM brahma, etc. And Atman is a
 self-luminous entity,
 which does not require another entity to reveal it. Rather,
 self-luminous Atman reveals/manifests other objects in the
 (vyavahArika)  world, which themselves are not
 self-luminous. Cognition or
 jnAna, is also self-luminous and manifests itself. This
 being the case,
 Anandabodha argues that the Atman cannot be an object of
 cognition, in the
 sense objects of the empirical world are. He neatly sums up
 his argument:
 saMveditA na saMvidadhInaprakAshaH
 saMvitkarmatAmantareNAparokShatvAtsaMvedanavaditi | The
 Cognizer cannot
 depend on Cognition for His manifestation, because He is not
 an object of
 Cognition, (but) directly reveals Himself, just as
 In other words, the Atman is the subject or witness of all
 cognitions, and it is self-luminous. Being the subject, it
 cannot be an
 object of cognition. Anandabodha refutes the theory of
 mAnasa-pratyakSha of
 the naiyAyikas thus: kartRkarmaNoraikAtmyAnupalambhAd, no
 khlavangulyaivAngulI spRshyate chidyate vA
 dharayaivAsidhArA|  The Atman
 cannot be the object of a vRtti (modification of the mind)
 because the
 subject and object of a cognition cannot be the same, just
 as a finger
 cannot touch itself, nor can a sword cut itself. It is also
 natural to
 expect that Anandabodha was well aware of Shankara's bhAShya
 dealing with
 the topic of adhyAsa and upanishad statements such as "na
 pashyeH" (you cannot see the witness of vision), taM
 dRShTerdraShTAram na pashyeH, ataH naiva darshayituM
 shakyate gavAdivat
 (hence It cannot be pointed out objectively like a cow),
 etc. To sum up,
 the Atman cannot be an object of a cognition in the sense an
 object can be. It cannot be known in the sense an empirical
 object can be.
 However, Shankara's adhyAsa bhAShya's point about the Self
 being the
 "asmatpratyayaviShaya", as was pointed out, must be
 remembered in
 interpreting vAkyas such as "AtmA vA are draShTavyaH", etc.
 In fact,
 Sureshvara, in his Br. Up. vArtika, says that the AtmA vA
 are draShTavyaH
 vAkya cannot be an injunction, in the sense of an injunction
 to perform an
 act, precisely because the realizer (draShTR) and the
 realized (draShTavya)
 have to be different in order for such an injunction to
 exist. When there
 is no difference between one who is enjoined to perform an
 act and the
 object of the act, no such injunction is possible.
 सत्येवं धीर्विधीयते।
 घटते न विधिर्यतः॥९७॥
 (vArtika on Br. Up. 4.5.6)
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