[Advaita-l] akhanDaakara-vRtti‏

kuntimaddi sadananda kuntimaddisada at yahoo.com
Wed Jul 8 09:37:05 CDT 2015

Shree Venkataraghavan - PraNAms - in the bhaagatyaaga lakshana only the contradictory attributes are dropped and not those that are common for this and that Devadatta. Some saadRisyam has to be there for validation of oneness of  Devadatta. At least the name is common here. If every attribute is dropped then this Devadatta could also be that yagnadatta too!

In the case of tat tvam asi - the existence part is not negated existence as this and that -only contradictory attributes that appear to invalidate the equation are dropped and not to the common ones. 

Bhagavan Ramana puts this as 
Isha jeevayoH veshadhee bhidaa, satva bhaavato vastu kevalam. The costumes that Iswara and Jeeva wearing are only different but from the existence part is not dropped. 

Hari Om!

On Wed, 7/8/15, Venkatraghavan S via Advaita-l <advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

 Subject: Re: [Advaita-l] akhanDaakara-vRtti‏
 To: "Bhaskar YR" <bhaskar.yr at in.abb.com>
 Cc: "A discussion group for Advaita Vedanta" <advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org>
 Date: Wednesday, July 8, 2015, 6:38 AM
 Sri Bhaskar-ji,
 Namaste and thanks for the email.
 I am not disputing that the
 common devadatta has attributes - he/she/it
 clearly does. I am simply saying that the
 sentence "this is that" is not
 conveying any attributes, and the knowledge
 generated by the sentence* does
 not contain
 any attributive content about that common devadatta*.
 Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 11:15 AM, Bhaskar YR <bhaskar.yr at in.abb.com>
 >  PraNAms Sri
 Venkatraghavan prabhuji
 > Hare Krishna
 > Ø  At the risk of stretching this
 analogy, let me share my thoughts with
 > The question
 was if it is possible to cognize an object without its
 > attributes.
 > The answer in certain cases, like
 "soyam devadatta", you can. Please
 > consider the sentence soyam devadatta,
 leaving all notions of whatever or
 whoever devadatta is.
 > What does that sentence, taken in
 isolation, convey? Do we know, just by
 that sentence, if devadatta is a man, a woman, a dog, an
 alien? We don't.
 > The sentence simply conveys that there is
 an object called devadatta,
 > which is
 commonly referred to by the sa: and ayam padAs.
 > Ø   Yes,
 that sentence would simply convey that there exists  some
 > by some ‘particular’ name
 (‘devadatta’ in this example) on which I donot
 > know anything.
 > Because we don't know the attributes
 of devadatta, can we say that no
 knowledge whatsoever is produced by the sentence?
 > We cannot, because
 that sentence produces knowledge that there is such a
 > common object referred to by sa: and ayam,
 we just dont know what exactly
 he/she/it is.
 Ø   As Sri Keshava Prasad prabhuji observed,
 normally an inquisitive mind
 > does not
 stop by mere getting the knowledge that there is something
 > there!!  Though knowing something
 more on that something exists is a
 subsequent process, as soon as some object has been pointed
 and addressed
 >  ‘this’ object is
 ‘that’, our mind would grasp this sentence with some
 > attributes only, it may be either way,
 wrong or right immaterial here, but
 invariably our mind associates some attribute to ‘this’
 to know that ‘this’
 > is nothing but
 ‘that’.  We may recall here shankara’s observation
 > bruhadAraNyaka here with regard to
 ‘drum sound’ ( in second adhyAya!!?? Not
 > sure).  Here shankara clarifies by
 grasping the genus sound as produced by
 the beat of the drum, that species underlying it are also
 grasped, but
 > ‘they cannot be grasped
 as distinct from that genus’.  For as species they
 > have no independent existence.  If we
 apply this rule to this particular
 example, this and that devadatta must have some underlying
 common genus
 > through which this
 devadatta has been  equated with that devadatta.  And
 > without this common underlying devadatta
 there cannot be independent
 > existence
 for both ‘this’ and that devadatta.  Hence, this
 > common genus (called
 devadutta who is common in both this & that) must be
 > recognized first to declare that this is
 that devadatta.  This recognition
 > need
 not be directly related to currently perceiving attributes
 of object
 > (this devadatta)  nor it is
 necessary that it should have the similarity
 >  with the previously cognized ‘that’
 devadutta, but what needs to be there
 is some commonality which can be termed as attributes to
 correctly identify
 > the devadatta.  I
 think this commonality what Sri Ananda Hudli observed
 > while narrating his observation, he said
 > //quote//
 > Both the Devadatta
 seen now as "this" and the Devadatta seen earlier
 > "that" have attributes.
 They are both men, with parts such as hands, feet,
 > etc. What is going on here?
 > Although Devadatta is
 very much a perceivable person with attributes, the
 > crucial point here is that the perception
 "this is that Devadatta" does not
 > involve any of those attributes. It is
 exactly expressing an identity
 > between
 two objects, this Devadatta and that Devadatta, nothing
 > nothing more. So there is no
 "appeal" made to any attribute in the
 > knowledge "this is that
 Devadatta", although Devadatta does have attributes.
 > //unquote//
 > So, bottom line is
 ‘devadatta’ (any object) does have the attributes
 > is common in both this & that
 but directly not related in raising the
 knowledge i.e. this is that devadatta.
 > Hari Hari Hari
 > bhaskar
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