[Advaita-l] akhanDaakara-vRtti

kuntimaddi sadananda kuntimaddisada at yahoo.com
Tue Jul 7 22:34:41 CDT 2015

On Tue, 7/7/15, Keshava PRASAD Halemane <k_prasad_h at yahoo.co.in> wrote:

 I am really puzzled by the response about the sOyam-dEvadattaH example for akhanDAkAra-vRtti. 
Let me seek clarification on one question, clearing which i will be better able to understand that viewpoint. 
Q: in the vyAvahArika (laukika?) world,  is an 'object'/'vastu' (capable of being cognized/revealed through antahkaraNa vRtti) distinctly separate/different from and independent of the 'set-of-all-its-attributes' (viSEShaNas) ? 
I understand that you answer is yes, the object has independent existence of its own apart from its attributes.

Keshava Prasad - PraNAms

No. my answer was NO. I do not subscribe perception without attributes since substantive is Brahman - sat - which is imperceptible (aprameyam) and the world of objects are naama ruupatmakam.. I gave an example of dark room where mind can travel but sense of sight cannot operate. Sense of hearing does by shabda pramaaNa one can know an object exists. But that is regular pramaaNa operating. That there is a Devadatta in the room is heard by the teacher or even by Devadatta himself but form/color attribute is not. If teacher says there is Devadatta, that is hearsay knowledge, a durbala pramaaNa, subject to verification by direct perception. If mind can perceive without senses (we are not taking about internal perceptions where recollection from memory of objects with their associated attributes involved or anger, happyness, emotions, etc which are moods of the mind,)  then it can perceive homogenous presence or absence of anything and everything, which no
 one experiences.

I do not personally subscribe mind going out and it need not since sense-info is brought in to the mind in the form of vRitti. 

Hari Om!

If so, let us consider two thought experiments: 
E1: Consider two different ghaTas 'G1' & 'G2', with all the attributes for each of them. 
Now, if all the attributes of both these ghaTa objects are removed, how are the two ghaTas 'G1' & 'G2' cognized as two and not one single ghaTa say 'g'  devoid of all attributes ? 
Rather, how is a counting process possible in such a scenario? 
E2: Consider a ghaTa 'G' and a paTa 'P'. 
Now, if all the attributes of both the ghaTa 'G' and the paTa 'P' are removed, how are the two objects 'G' & 'P' cognized as two and not one single object say 'o' devoid of all attributes ? 

If indeed so (as you say/imply) then every object can be cognized (revealed by vRtti as having independent existence, i.e. pramA not bhramA) independent of its set-of-attributes, and similarly every attribute can be cognized (revealed by vRtti as having independent existence, i.e. pramA not bhramA) independent-of every other attribute as well as whatever objects that attribute can be associated with. 
If so, then, what prevents one to consider hare's horn or vandhyA-putra as having independent existence ? 

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