[Advaita-l] akhanDaakara-vRtti

Keshava PRASAD Halemane k_prasad_h at yahoo.co.in
Tue Jul 7 21:28:07 CDT 2015


namastE. praNaams to the learned seniors (jnaanavRddhaas). My Dear Sri Sada ji and Sri Anand ji 
I am really puzzled by the response about the sOyam-dEvadattaH example for akhanDAkAra-vRtti. Let me seek clarification on one question, clearing which i will be better able to understand that viewpoint. Q: in the vyAvahArika (laukika?) world,  is an 'object'/'vastu' (capable of being cognized/revealed through antahkaraNa vRtti) distinctly separate/different from and independent of the 'set-of-all-its-attributes' (viSEShaNas) ? I understand that you answer is yes, the object has independent existence of its own apart from its attributes. If so, let us consider two thought experiments: E1: Consider two different ghaTas 'G1' & 'G2', with all the attributes for each of them. Now, if all the attributes of both these ghaTa objects are removed, how are the two ghaTas 'G1' & 'G2' cognized as two and not one single ghaTa say 'g'  devoid of all attributes ? Rather, how is a counting process possible in such a scenario? E2: Consider a ghaTa 'G' and a paTa 'P'. Now, if all the attributes of both the ghaTa 'G' and the paTa 'P' are removed, how are the two objects 'G' & 'P' cognized as two and not one single object say 'o' devoid of all attributes ? 
If indeed so (as you say/imply) then every object can be cognized (revealed by vRtti as having independent existence, i.e. pramA not bhramA) independent of its set-of-attributes, and similarly every attribute can be cognized (revealed by vRtti as having independent existence, i.e. pramA not bhramA) independent-of every other attribute as well as whatever objects that attribute can be associated with. If so, then, what prevents one to consider hare's horn or vandhyA-putra as having independent existence ? 
KINDLY NOTE: i am going by simple reasoning, since i am not a SAstrajna/SAstravit - so i cannot be expected to give any references or citations to SAstras.  However, i eagerly appeal to you to be kind enough to provide references/citations to original texts if possible, so as to enable me to understand better. i am not 'questioning' the ideas/concepts for the sake of simply questioning, but i am questioning with a sincere purpose to develop a firm understanding of what is intended to be conveyed by the original texts of the SAstras. i request your kindness to bear with me in this regard.  Keshava PRASAD HalemanemOkShakaamaarthadharmahjanmanaa jaayatE jantuḥ |  samskaaraat hi bhavEt dvijaḥ ||  vEda-paaThaat bhavEt vipra |  brahma jnaanaat hi braahmaNah || 


     On Wednesday, 8 July 2015 7:08 AM, kuntimaddi sadananda via Advaita-l <advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
   

 Anandaji - PraNAms and thanks for your input. 

Yes in the soyam devadatta - the statement by the teacher to the student who is perceiving this Devadatta now, obviously via sense input, to that Devadataa recalling his memory where the attributive content of that Devadatta was stored. By the equation This Devadatta = That Devadatta - one currently perceived Devadatta and the other memory based Devadatta each with different attributes. Since the faith in the teacher's words the equation is validated by bhaagatyaaga lakshana to arrive at unitary understanding of Devadatta sans the contradictory attributes. This example was provided by Shree Sadananda yogindra to illustrate the bhaagatyaaga lakshaNa that need to be employed in tvam = tat..akhandaakaara vRitti is evident and that is precisely what Swami Paramarthanandaji indicated to me. Viveka is therefore required to arrive at changeless entity in the changing Devadattas. If the Devadattas are really two different people, then the teacher and the
 disciple - both commit errors in understanding. 

The discussion actually pertains to the case of just direct perception of this Devadatta  or any object - I do not think there can be attribute-less perception - by just some one introducing - this is Devadatta since attribute-less object does not exist. The person who is being introduced may not really be Devadatta. 

Internal perceptions also involve the recollection of object along with its attributes only, but they were perceived by a pramaaNa. 

Mind grasping the object without sense input does not make sense to me. If so even in dark room I should be knowing all the objects since senses only need light not the mind. Blind man also should perceive all objects sans attributes since sense of sight is not needed. Finally one object cannot differ from the other since attributes are not perceived.

Operation of shabda pramaNa is different when the teacher says this is Devadatta  in a dark room or to even a blind person. That was the discussion. 

Personally I do not subscribe to the mind running to the object - the natural perception is light reflected by the object is perceived via eyes. The similarly sound and light travel at different speeds and hence we see before we hear. All these are human experiences which epistemology should accounts correctly. 

Any way, thanks for taking time to provide the input.

Hari Om!
Sadananda




Ananda: 
 I am not sure what exactly is being discussed, so I'll just
 say this. I
 remember seeing comments to the effect that anything with
 attributes cannot
 be the object of  "nirvikalpaka" or indeterminate
 perception. However, we
 have the example of "this is that Devadatta". Both the
 Devadatta seen now
 as "this" and the Devadatta seen earlier as "that" have
 attributes. They
 are both men, with parts such as hands, feet, etc. What is
 going on here?
 Although Devadatta is very much a perceivable person with
 attributes, the
 crucial point here is that the perception "this is that
 Devadatta" does not
 involve any of those attributes. It is exactly expressing an
 identity
 between two objects, this Devadatta and that Devadatta,
 nothing less,
 nothing more. So there is no "appeal" made to any attribute
 in the
 knowledge "this is that Devadatta", although Devadatta does
 have
 attributes. Obviously, the same Devadatta could be an object
 of determinate
 perception, "Devadatta is stout", "Devadatta is short",
 etc.
 
 Anand
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