[Advaita-l] akdhandaakara vRitti - My mistake
Keshava PRASAD Halemane
k_prasad_h at yahoo.co.in
Mon Jul 6 05:56:19 CDT 2015
Good thought-experiment [ . . . unitary conscious particle (knowing) in (infinite)unbound-empty-space (no limits, no objects what-so-ever) . . . ] indeed. But, then, I don't know the answer. Maybe you can share whatever you think as a possibility!
If cognition of an attributeless-object as-it-is (whatever that means) is possible, then the question arises as to how you will distinguish between two or more such attributeless objects ?
IMHO: Indeed the vyavahArika world is all relativistic, nothing absolute about anything. To continue on the example of blueness - if indeed the only color that we were to have happened to be simply blue and blue alone and nothing but blue, then there would not have arisen the need to talk of color and blueness at all. Same with every other attribute.
What attributes does an attribute have? Well, let us first understand as to what is an attribute. In my opinion-piece(IMHO) that i presented in some earlier email/post in this thread, i talk of not just the set of attributes, but the "set_of_attribute-value_pairs" that help us in identifying and distinguishing one object from another. In the above example, 'color' is the attribute and 'blue' is just one possible value among a myriad of possible values for that attribute. In order for an object to be objectified, uniquely-identified and unambiguously-distinguished from among all possible objects, we need an anchor to tie that specific object with its "key_set_of_attribute-value_pairs". So here we establish a 'relationship' between the object of interest and its key_set_of_attribute-value_pairs; say for example, 'oRk' [a relation like 'aRb' as Sri Anand Hudli mentioned in one of his earlier posts/emails]. That is the idea of the relativistic nature, and not necessarily the Einsteinian one! Keshava PRASAD HalemanemOkShakaamaarthadharmahjanmanaa jaayatE jantuḥ | samskaaraat hi bhavEt dvijaḥ || vEda-paaThaat bhavEt vipra | brahma jnaanaat hi braahmaNah ||
On Monday, 6 July 2015 3:35 PM, Venkatraghavan S <agnimile at gmail.com> wrote:
Namaste,I don't think so. You recognise the attribute of an object for what it is - as an attribute inhering in the object, not as the opposite of other attributes located in other objects. If it is as you say, then everything will depend on everything else and we'll end up with pure relativism - the outcome of such a setup would be the negation of fundamental existence, or Brahman, which is not acceptable.Btw the context of my initial comment to SadAji was to establish that it is possible to perceive a non-attributeless entity.Regards,
On 6 Jul 2015 10:48, "Keshava PRASAD Halemane" <k_prasad_h at yahoo.co.in> wrote:
IMHO: Don't we (re)cognize blueness in blue color, only in relation to the non-blueness in all non-blue-objects . . . So, then it is all relative . . . meaning duality of contrasts or rather multiplicity of contrasts that helps us perceive . . . How do we (re)cognise empty-space ? What are the key identifying-&-distinguishing attributes / characteristics / features / properties of empty-space ? Perhaps (IMHO) by "object-abhAvatva" - earlier i cognised an-object-in-space and now that object is gone and what remains is empty-space; but no cognisable attributes, right? Maybe or may not be! The limits of a finitely-bound-empty-space may be (re)cognised by such limits, and the limits separated in space through a 'distance-measure'. So, then the concept of a distance measure can be considered as a key attribute for empty-space! Now, that is maths, geometry in particular!
Keshava PRASAD HalemanemOkShakaamaarthadharmahjanmanaa jaayatE jantuḥ | samskaaraat hi bhavEt dvijaḥ || vEda-paaThaat bhavEt vipra | brahma jnaanaat hi braahmaNah ||
On Monday, 6 July 2015 2:00 PM, Venkatraghavan S via Advaita-l <advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
What attributes do attributes have? What is the attribute of blueness
itself? The answer has to be nothing - but still it is possible to perceive
blueness. So it is possible to perceive an attributeless thing.
If not, how can one cognise Brahman, an attributeless thing?
On 6 Jul 2015 09:06, "kuntimaddi sadananda via Advaita-l" <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
> Rameshji - PraNAms
> That was my first post -Here we are referring to jnaana phalam although
> there is no phalavyaapti for the Vedanta jnaanam. I was told that I was
> wrong. I waited to get clarification from Swami Paramarthanadaji. In
> response to my question of what is akhandaakaara vRtti he mentioned (or to
> be more precise I heard) the Vedanta jnaana vRitti that eliminates the
> jiiva-brahma abhinnatvam and makes us understand the ekatvam. It is not
> phalam but the jnaana vRitti that eliminates the bhinnatvam of
> jiiva-brahma. I was told that I am wrong again. I am not sure if I am wrong
> or the definition is incomplete as it is claimed that it applies to
> perception of objects too.
> It can apply in the case of soyam devadattaH since we have two operations-
> 1. Direct perception of the current devadatta where the current attributes
> of Devadatta are involved, and 2. recollection of past perception from
> memory where that devadatta with different attributes are involved. Hence
> in the knowledge of soyam devadattaH, this is that Devadatta, the
> attributes of this and that Devadatta are to be discarded since they are
> contradictory, and only take the essence of Devadatta -The process is
> bhaagatyaga lakshana where part of it rejected and part is retained; the
> contradictory vishshaNaas are rejected and unifying one is filtered since
> there is only one Devadatta.
> Note that in the first perceived Devadatta, we do not perceive him devoid
> of attributes but with current attributes. When we recall, we recall the
> past Devadatta with past attributes. Now we use Viveka that sees
> cognitively the changeless Devadatta in the changing devadattas. Hence it
> is not direct perceptual knowledge, but can only be known by those who have
> the Viveka (who can pick up the changeless ones in the changing ones).
> Hence the example is used to understand tat tvam asi -using baadhyaayam
> samanaadhikaranam or discard the contradictory qualifications while
> retaining the essence. Only a trained mind can do that.
> We also note that in the direct perception, the knowledge is always
> attributive knowledge since senses can only gather attributes. In the
> recollection (internal perceptions) we do not have sense input, but still
> in recollecting a cow or horse we do recollect the viseshnana sahita
> viseshya , the object with attributes the recollection of cow differs from
> that of horse.
> When we see for the first time since we have no memory of the past, then
> the cognized object is stored with a name . Second time perception
> involves direct perception that cause cognition and recollection from
> memory past similar attributive object and matching (sometime if the
> recollection is vague or fuzzy) the attributive content, we say, this is a
> cow or He is Devadatta, etc. Vishishtaadvaita says the first time cognition
> is indeterminate and the second time on the cognition is determinate.
> The point remains however that only without the attributive content the
> object cannot be cognized – In seeing we see form of an object. But in
> hearing we have to go by the attributive sound to compare whether it is a
> cat or dog that is not seen but heard. In the case of lightning we see
> first then we hear later since we have learned that velocity of the light
> is greater than sound – even though both happened at the same time. All
> these aspects are involved in perception shabda, sparsa, ruupa, rasa and
> gandha- where sometime direct contact with the object with sparsa and rasa
> is involved for cognition and recognition.
> Hence I maintain based on our experiences, that there cannot be
> perception of an object without visheshanas since by definition one object
> differs from the others because of visheshanas only. I cannot say I have
> indeterminate perception of cat, cow and horse here – it is like blank
> perception without the attributive content. If theoretically it is
> formulated then it has no relevance to human experience.
> Therefore I am not sure what akhadaakaara vRitti in perception of unitary
> objects is.
> Hari Om!
> Sunday, 5 July 2015 9:49 PM, Ravi Kiran <ravikiranm108 at gmail.com>
> On Sun, Jul
> 5, 2015 at 7:51 PM, Keshava PRASAD Halemane via Advaita-l
> <advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org>
> namastE. praNaams
> My Dear
> I am continuing further on the same line of
> thinking . . .
> Irrespective of the object
> being objectified, the akhanDAkAra-vrtti always
> corresponds to the brahmAkAra-akhanDa-vRtti
> This would
> akhanDAkAra-vrtti is
> of the svayam-prakAsaka Brahma vastu alone, hence get Its
> akhanDAkAra-vrtti on any object does not dispel the ajnAna
> of Brahman
> which illumines the real
> brahma-vastu in any/every/all object(s); that is the vision
> of a brahma-jnAni - even when looking at any object the
> brahma-jnAni sees the brahma-vastu in any/every/all objects
> being objectified.
> Here it is
> understood that, because of the brahma-jnAna alone, one sees
> the real Brahma vastu everywhere ( sarvAtma bhAva) and not
> because of akhanDAkAra-vrtti on that object, uncovered the
> real brahma-vastu, dispelling the ajnAna of Brahman
> So, my understanding about the
> akhanDAkAra-vRtti is that it goes far beyond any/every/all
> viShEShaNas and reaches the real brahma-vastu any illumines
> it, rather than stopping short at the level of the
> viShEShaNas as in the case of other
> Keshava PRASAD
> HalemanemOkShakaamaarthadharmahjanmanaa jaayatE jantuḥ |
> samskaaraat hi bhavEt dvijaḥ || vEda-paaThaat bhavEt
> vipra | brahma jnaanaat hi braahmaNah ||
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