[Advaita-l] Body is the disease
v.subrahmanian at gmail.com
Wed Jan 22 00:57:26 CST 2014
On Wed, Jan 22, 2014 at 9:11 AM, Srinath Vedagarbha
<svedagarbha at gmail.com>wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 4:48 PM, V Subrahmanian <v.subrahmanian at gmail.com
> > It is common knowledge that Shankara in the Brahmasutras, the ones like
> > 'bhedavyapadeshAt cha anyaH' (1.1.21), has explicitly established the
> > difference between the jiva and the Supreme. The 'hetu' given is, as the
> > Sutra itself gives: because the difference, bheda, between the jiva and
> > antaryAmi Ishwara, is clearly stated in the Br.up. 3.7.9 where the jiva,
> > the knower, is spoken of as not knowing the antaryAmi Ishwara.
> > (jiva-Ishwara bheda)
> > This kind of explicit bheda is upheld by Shankara in such sutras as the
> > above, the other instances being BSB 1.1.16 and 17: 'IdRsham cha
> > vijnAnAtma-paramAtmabhedamAshritya 'netaro'nupapatteH' (1.1.16) and
> > 'bhedavyapadeshAccha (1.1.17) ityuktam.
> > There is another sutra where Shankara very clearly establishes, along
> > hetu-s, the difference between jiva-s (jiva-jiva bheda).
> > Thus the pancha bheda-s: jiva-jiva, jiva-Ishwara, jiva-jaDa, jaDa-Ishwara
> > and jaDa-jaDa bhedas which non-advaitins hold as pAramArthika, and
> > advaitins hold as vyAvahArika only, are yet upheld wherever necessary
> > across the bhAshyas of the prasthAnatraya by advancing the appropriate
> > hetu-s. None can fault such a method which, is the one followed by the
> > Shruti/smRti.
> Don't forget such all bhEda-s are only for upAsana purpose and not really
> tAtvIka in nature. Under Shankara's reading, shAstra's such assertions are
> aimed at performing anthakaraNa shuddhi of a sadahaka.
It is quite well known that the bheda-s are not taattvika. Why would an
Advaitin say that they are tAttvika? Did I or the bhAShya say/imply that
the bheda-s are tAttvika? There is no substance in the statement you make
above. Also, not all acceptance of bheda is for upAsanA purpose; we need
bheda even for loukika vyavahAra.
> dEhAtma-pratyayO yadvat pramANatvEna kalpitaha loukikam tadvadEvEdam
> tvAtma nischayAt |
> (As long as the idea of the Self is identified with the body consciousness
> so long i.e, till the realization of the true nature of Atman, the world
> perception, the reality of the world is
> also equally valid.)
> This last one is important for the context of our current debate. I am
> pretty sure Madhusudhana's opponents are not denying the fact that in
> Advaita siddhAnta provisional reality (and resulting provisional bhEda) is
> accorded to this jagat. They are not saying such attribution is wrong in
> itself either. What, if my reading of their text is correct, is being
> contested is that summoning of such "provisionally valid" elements to
> support Advaita's stand in the vAda. In reality, those "provisionally
> valid" elements are meant only for upAsana purpose and definitely not for
I do not see anything wrong in 'summoning' such 'elements'. In a certain
workshop the Advaitin scholar made a statement: 'In matters such as why
creation, when onwards, why jiva-s are put in samsAra, etc. all schools
have to throw their hands up in the air for no school can give any
'logical' replies to these.' And there was no protest to this statement
from the other school. It is evident that they too have to admit anAditva,
etc. If they are aware that Advaita too holds anAditva for samsAra,
creation, etc. they should have no right to make any objection. And as I
said before, the admittance of bheda in the vyAvaharika by Advaita is not
ONlY for upAsana purposes; it is also for accounting vyavahAra, like
pratyakSha. The pramAtR-pramANa-prameya bheda has to be admitted to
account for the basic experience of perception. The big part of vedanta
paribhaSha is on the loukika vyavahara accounting rather than on the
upAsanA. In the case of upAsanA, Shankara has clearly stated that it is a
buddhipUrvaka adhyAsa, as in the case of vishnu buddhi in sAligrAma.
Everyone knows that the sAligrama stone is not the all-pervading vishnu.
Yet, for the sake of upAsanA/pUjA meant for chittashuddhi, a
superimposition of vishnu in the stone is made knowingly.
You say // (Dvaitins)They are not saying such attribution is wrong in
itself either// Let me point out to you just one instance of how their
thinking is not in accordance with your 'opinion' about them:
In retaliation to the famous 'bhaja govindam' the Dvaitins have composed a
song (bhaja madhwesham) in the same meter, in abject caricature of the
bhaja govindam and criticism of advaita. One verse in the song goes like
//" Ko va Bhajakah: Kim va Bhajanam
Yasmat Dwaitam Na Angikriyate,
Tasmat Bhajanam Durghataghatanam"
Bhaja Madhvesham Bhaja Madhvesham//
[ Who indeed is the worshiper/devotee? What indeed is devotion/worship?
Since dvaita is not admitted (by Advaitins). Therefore devotion/worship is
an impossibility (in Advaita). Therefore (reject Advaita) and worship
This is just one example of their misunderstanding advaita. If the
scholar-monk who composed the above work had truly understood advaita's
stand on worship, etc. he would not have said the above. Let me state that
the top ranking Advaita scholars who have studied the classical objections
of Dvaita/VA on Advaita have concluded that the objections have their basis
in their ignorance of the methods of Advaita. They have not studied
Advaita correctly. Even today, as I was a witness, they organize meets so
as to understand Advaita better.
> This aspect is especially significant when it comes to supporting pramEya-s
> such as locus of avidya etc, where the very existence of avidya is in
> question and it's locus (as either jIvAshrita or BrahmAshrita) cannot
> possibly be substantiated using elements (such jIva anAditva etc.), which
> are allegedly effect of avidya in itself and also which are "provisionally"
> and/or "admittedly" accepted for some other reason other than
> tatva-niSchaya in the siddhAnta.
I do not see any problem here. AvidyA and anAditva etc. are definitely
required for tattvanishchaya. Why do you say that they are not?
> Opponents are arguing -- if pramANa-s are provisionally valid, so also
> pramA jnAna (such as jIva is ashraya of avidya, or Brahman is ashraya for
> avidya etc) which are generated by such pramANa-s are also "provisionally"
> true and not necessarily "idamittam" type of truth.
Where have we said this? Where have we said that such provisionally true
statements are idamittham?
> When pUrvapaxi-s are arguing on the basis of (alleged) reality of their
> pramANa-s, siddhAntin cannot argue on the basis of tatkAlika-pramANa-s.
There is no rule as the above. In my opinion you are raising a non-issue.
> In my opinion this is the crux of the issue.
> > In several places Shankara advances 'nahi dRShTe anupapannam
> > nAma' with regard to things which are common knowledge. Yet such things
> > are vyAvahArika in Advaita.
> > regards
> > subrahmanian.v
> > On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 10:31 PM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com
> > >wrote:
> > > *Srinath Vedagarbha wrote:*
> > >
> > > >That anAditva argument is only from vyavahAra perspective, for per
> > > >siddhAnta time itself is mithya. Your argument, supporting vAcaspati's
> > > >stand, is sva-vachana virOdha if not apasiddhanta, per your position
> > here
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > > MadhusUdana's opponent, the dvaitin, considers the world, including
> > > pramANas, to be real, whereas we know that advaitins grant a
> > > provisional (vyavahAra) status to the world. The same holds for avidyA
> > > too, which is considered provisionally real. The same holds for jIva
> > > too. Without such provisional reality assigned, it would not be
> > > possible for the advaitin to even enter into a debate with the
> > > dvaitin. For example, the advaitin could trivially dismiss the
> > > dvaitin's objection that there is anyonyAshraya between avidyA and
> > > jIva in this way. avidyA does not exist at all and jIva is
> > > Brahman/Atman (vAcaspati says: na khalu jIvashcidAtmano bhidyate), and
> > > therefore, the charge of anyonyAshraya between jIva and avidyA is
> > > meaningless. But the advaitin also has to be make sure he answers the
> > > dvaitin's objection in the vyavahAra realm. Hence, he invokes the
> > > anAditva argument, which is also supported by the texts.
> > >
> > >
> > > Anand
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