[Advaita-l] Jnana and ajnana (Bhakti vs. Jnana)

Rajaram Venkataramani rajaramvenk at gmail.com
Mon Jul 4 08:24:43 CDT 2011


The examples you have given are not examples of knowledge and ignorance
co-existing but partial knowledge - direct knowledge of some attributes of
an object coexisting with inferred ignorance of some attributes of the same
object. In the panchadasi example, the father has direct knowledge due to
past memory of his son's presence in the group and infers his ignorance
about his son due to not being able to see or hear him. His partial
knowledge is of the type,"My son must be in that group of boys because I
left him there. I dont know which one of this is my son because I cannot see
the face or hear the voice clearly". There is no direct ignorance of the
type, "I do not know this face or voice, which is my son's". It is the same
as you inferring ignorance that "Every trip has a cost and so will the trip
to Tiruvannamalai but no one has told me what that is. Hence I dont know the
cost of the trip to Tiruvannamalai" You do not have direct ignorance of the
type,  "I do not know the cost of travel to Tiruvannamalai is 100Rs".

Now the question should make more sense. As ajnana is always with respect to
an object, jnana of the object of ajnana is a pre-requisite for ajnana. In
the face of this jnana of the object, there cannot be ajnana of the same
object. If there cannot be ajnana, then there can be no rising of jnana of
the object. If I know the cost of the travel to Tiruvannamalai is 100Rs.,
then how can there arise knowledge of the cost, which is pre-existent?

  On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 12:00 PM, V Subrahmanian
<v.subrahmanian at gmail.com>wrote:

>  On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 2:28 AM, Rajaram Venkataramani <
> rajaramvenk at gmail.com
> > wrote:
>
> > None of the answers hit the mark. The answer is not partial knowledge,
> > co-existence of knowledge and ignorance, objective knowledge of brahman,
> > error in percpeption, total ignorance or about avidya being eyong time
> and
> > space. The question is very straightforward and simple and has been
> > answered
> > by advaitins but not in the ways listed above. Let me rephrase the
> question
> > and give an example to make the question clearer if it was not already
> > clear.
> >
> > As ajnana is always with respect to an object, jnana of the object of
> > ajnana
> > is a pre-requisite for ajnana. I say, "I do not know the cost of travel
> to
> > Tiruvannamalai". When I say this I have knowledge that there is a cost to
> > travel to Tiruvannamalai. So there is knowledge prior to ignorance. Now,
> I
> > may be ignorant of the actual cost but this is not known to me through
> > direct perception. I will never have perceptive knowledge of ignorance of
> > the type, "I do not know the cost of travel to Tiruvannamalai is 100Rs."
> >  We
> > see that knowledge of the object is a pre-requisite for direct knowledge
> > of ignorance of the object. If "I do not know the cost of travel to
> > Tiruvannamalai is 100Rs.", then I know the cost of travel to
> Tiruvannamalai
> > is 100Rs. Then, how can there arise knowledge that the cost of travel to
> > Tiruvannamal is 100Rs? It is pre-existent. This is what is meant by how
> can
> > ajnana arise at all in the face of jnana with respect to the same object?
> > If
> > ajnana does not exist, then there is no question of jnana arising with
> > respect to that object. But we cannot say that ajnana with respect to
> > particular object does not exist at all because we have the experience of
> > ignorance. Otherwise, we wont say, "I am ignorant" or such a statement
> > would
> > be meaningless.
>
>
> Even though almost all of what you have said by way of
> clarifying/elucidating does not give  me any understanding, I am trying to
> know whoever stated the following position that you have characterized as
> 'illogical':
>
> And a position that "I have general ignorance but knowledge
> > of all particular objects" is illogical because it is like saying "I know
> > every one but I dont know any one".
> >
> > The position, from the Shankara bhashya, that I had stated was:
>
> // even though there is a generalized, hazy, aspaShTa knowledge about any
> object initially, there coexists ajnAna too about that very object with
> respect to the particularities. //
>
> I think the contrast between the position stated by me and the one
> annotated/paraphrased by you is quite obvious.
>
> There is a Panchadashi verse where Vidyaranya gives an example for the
> phenomenon of 'knowledge and ignorance co-existing':
>
> अध्येतृवर्गमध्यस्थपुत्राध्ययनशब्दवत् ।
> *भानेऽप्यभानं* भानस्य प्रतिबन्धेन युज्यते ॥१२॥ (प्रयक्तत्त्वविवेकः)
> A father has left his boy in a gurukula.  He comes on a visit to the place.
> From a distance he is able to hear the boys there chanting the veda.  He is
> aware that his boy too is in the group; yet he is not able to discern his
> boy's voice from the group's chanting sound.  The authoritative commentary
> of Sri Ramakrishna concludes: भानेऽप्यभानम् -  *सामान्यतः* प्रतीतावपि *
> विशेषाकारेणा*प्रतीतिर्युज्यते उपपद्यते इत्यर्थ: ।  One can see the close
> similarity between the Shankara bhashya passage and the above
> verse/commentary.
>
> Regards,
> subrahmanian.v
>  _______________________________________________
> Archives: http://lists.advaita-vedanta.org/archives/advaita-l/
> http://blog.gmane.org/gmane.culture.religion.advaita
>
> To unsubscribe or change your options:
> http://lists.advaita-vedanta.org/cgi-bin/listinfo/advaita-l
>
> For assistance, contact:
> listmaster at advaita-vedanta.org
>



More information about the Advaita-l mailing list