Fri Jun 6 09:54:18 CDT 2003

```--- Nomadeva Sharma <nomadeva at yahoo.com> wrote:
> wrote:
>
> > > > Question 1. First senses can only grasp the
> > > > qualities of the object and not the object
> > > > (substantive)per sec. Qualities are
> > > > different from the object, right.
> > >
> > > Your question presumes that (i) there exists
> > > something called object and that (ii) object
> > > is different from qualities.

Krishna - these are presumptions. VisheshaNa and visheshya are different
and they are not identical - VisheshaNa may not exist independent of the
visheshya. That does not mean they are identical. There can be many
visheshaNa-s for a single object. Form is one attribute and color is
another, so is taste, smell - The very fact that each visheshaNa is
different from the other, establies that are related but not identical
with the substantive.

Substance is what is referred to as dravya. Hence that they  are
identical is only a postulation and not factual. One is dharma and other
is dharmi. It is true that VisheshaNa or attribute should have a locus
or ashraya. The substantive is the dravya. These are some essential
visheshaNa-s and there are non-essential visheshaNa-s for an object. In
mathematicas we call them as incidental qualifications (tatasta
lakshaNa-s), necessory and the necessory and sufficient qualifications,
etc.

> How did you
> > > percieve all this, while maintaining that
> > > senses cannot grasp the substantive?
>
> > Krishna that exactly is my question when one says I
> > perceived an object? How does one perceive the
> > substantive?
>
> Your question ("How does one perceive the
> substantive?") is different from mine. You made 2
> statements (i) that senses grasp qualities only and
> (ii) qualities are different from substantive. My
> question is regarding these 2 statements. If (i) were
> to be true, the term 'substantive' in (ii) does not
> arise at all.

Not really - evey object has visheshanas and the substantive is
visheshya or draya or dharmi.  Fact of the matter is no way you can
grasp the substantive with senses. The rest are assumtions and
inferences.  This should be understood clearly. We take things for
granted and there lies the problem.

So, either (ii) is false or (i) is
> false.

There is nothing false in the statements. Senses can only grasp the
form, color,sound,smell etc. Hence they are called maatra-s as they only
measure the degrees - eyes can measure the degree of shades in red or
green etc as diverget colors.

Krishna - There is nothing new for me to delineate - this facts based on
the working of the senses and the mind.

I am trying to draw your attention what actually happens in perception
and what is concluded, since conclusions involves further assumptions -
drawing the line between facts and postulations/inferences/conclusions
etc.

I will present my postulations later!.  But first the problem is to be
understood.  That visheshana and visheshya are interrelated is known.
Tarkika-s have brought in 'samavaayu', a glueing factor, to account the
inseparatability of these two. Bhagavan Ramanuja and Shree Vedanata
Deshika have also postulated that one need not bringin unnecessorily
glueing factor  to account interdependency of the two. They called it
'inherency'.  Shree Madhva also rejected the glueiing factor and used a
differt term for the same thing.  Essential implications is the same in
both.  But these are just explanations or postulations of their
interdependency or to account for relationship between visheshaNa and
visheshya.

But the fact remains that in perception senses can only grasp the
qualities not the substantive. The rest are all postulations.

If this is not clear, the rest has no relavence.

Hari OM!

> Before we go further, pls delineate what you mean by
> questions below. (while at the same time, I wonder how
> you will describe the same, that is not available to
> your senses.) Or will you say that there is nothing
> like substantive at all?
>
> Also, you should efine what you mean by 'quality'
> without using the idea of substantive.
>
> > Object has the qualities that do not mean object is
> > the same as qualities? One is an attribute and the
> > other is substantive. The relation between the two
> > as Jay has recognized is assumed. There is a
> > fundamental problem involved in perception of the
> > substantive?
>
> That depends on how you define 'substantive'.
>
> > > > If five senses are not operating there is no way
> > > > one can have any perception of the object,
> right?
> > > > The jarness is percived through what sense and
> how?
>
> > > Through the same sense that you perceive this
> > > mail, without doubting if it is actually a mail or
> a
> > > rope or a snake.
>
> > - Krishna, you are not answering the question -
>
> I did; You 'saw' this mail (or heard using a
> (half of it, actually). Regarding 'how' of it, we will
> see that later.
>
> > > Certainly, but if model cannot explain, that does
> > > not mean observation is not real.
> >
> > Right. Observation is an experience involving
> > experienced, experiencing and experiencer.
> > We are trying to understand the whole process
> > is it not?
>
> Hope so. But tell me this: Have you never known an
> 'object'? Are "I", manas, chakShu and other senses
> themselves -- are they qualities or are they entities?
>
> > > > Question 2. you have not answered how saakshee
> > > > perceives the time and space either other than
> > > > making an axiomatic statement that it is
> > > > perceived by saakshee since they cannot be
> > > > perceived.  Remember experience is not a
> > > > pramaaNa even according to you - pratyaksha,
> > > > anumaana and shabda are only three pramaaNa-s
> > > > for you. Now on
>
> > > I am not sure what all has been told, but this is
> > > just not sakshee-D (and AFAIK, not even
> sakshee-A).
> > > How can anybody say that experience is not a
> pramANa
> > > for a school that holds 'na cha anubhava virodhe
> > > Agamasya prAmANyaM'?
>
> > No Krishna - experience is not listed of the six or
> > one of the three pramaaNas.
> > And rightly so.  Proper analysis of the experience
> > can lead to prama and that analysis is pramaaNa.
>
> You are saying that the proper analysis of experience
> is pramANa? And experience by itself is not a pramANa?
>
>
> Now, what is the basis of your theory? Experiences by
> themselves or your analysis of them? Not first, for,
> that leads to apasiddhAnta, for, here's a case where
> experience by itself is giving knowledge. If latter,
> are you saying that 'your proper analysis of
> expereinces' is not an experience by itself? Think of
> it, it can lead to anAvasthA.
>
> > PramaaNa is that gives you knowledge. Experience
> > can lead to knowledge if it is supported by valid
> > pramaaNa.
>
> Note that dvaita defines pramANa differently:
> yathArthaM pramANaM. Nothing like 'yena pramA labhyate
> tatpramANam.h'. And it rightly says that there are two
> types of pramANa: knowledge itself and means of
> knowledge.
>
> > > > what basis or pramaaNa or means of knowledge
> > > > saakshee perceives time and space independent
> > > > of senses, that needs to be established.
>
> Dvaita accepts sAkshi-pratyaksha. The experience of
> 'I', 'I am happy' -- gives us knowledge, no analysis
> is needed to 'extract' the knowledge the experience
> itself conveys; therefore, it is a pramANa. 'sAkshi'
> is also referred as 'sAkshi-indriya'; i.e., it is its
> own instrument, nothing extra needed.
>
> I don't know if you are saying that dvaita does not
> hold sAxi-pratyaxa or that dvaita position is wrong.
>
> > > Wrong. With that idea (if it has been conveyed
> > > thus so far), there wouldn't be any difference
> > > between sAkshI and manas.
>
> > That is exactly my original question - where and
> > when does that senses input, manas and saakshee
> > enter into the equation according to
> > Knowledge-D and Saakshee-D?
>
> I am afraid this is not a matter of this list (given
> the size of the explanation). Actually, it will be of
> great help if you tell me how and why Advaita builds
> the concept of sAkshi. Given my time-constraints, I'll
> be happy to just provide differences in
> conceptualization and justification.
>
> Btw, you wrote elsewhere:
>
> > how do you establish the reality of the universe
> > is jagat satyam, jiiva satyam and parmaartha satyam
>
> Sadananda ji, using whatever pramANas _you_ accept,
> one notes that jagat-satyatva is neither contradicted
> by any pramANa nor is its contrary supported by any
> pramANa. The burden of proof is on you for postulating
> jaganmithyatva, a concept which, you must accept, is
> contrary to common experience, atleast on the face of
> it. When a physics student is asked to prove E=mc2, he
> wrote, 'Disprove it to me first'. Your requesting for
> proof of reality of world is akin to that.
>
> Regards,
> Krishna
>
>
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=====
What you have is His gift to you and what you do with what you have is your gift to Him - Swami Chinmayananda.

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