[Advaita-l] Causal Body

Jay Nelamangala jay at r-c-i.com
Fri Jun 6 00:30:19 CDT 2003

Sri sadAnanda,

>Krishna - My request to you is to keep following the discussion between
>Jay and myself and enter when you find there is misrepresentation of
>dwaita position.  Jay wants to get to the bottom of this by his series
>of adhyaasa theories finding fault with the advaitic concept. I have no
>problem if something is wrong in Advaita, but before one ventures into
>the criticism of a well established theory, one should understand it
>correctly too.

I assume Krishna is  Nomadeva Sharma.
My request to you is to let NomadEva ask these relevant questions.
That is what this email list is all about.  Let us not kill that spirit.

Sri Sharma  has asked you some very valid questions which you need to

>Object has the qualities that do not mean object is the same as
>qualities? One is an attribute and the other is substantive. The
>relation between the two as Jay has recognized is assumed. There is a
>fundamental problem involved in perception of the substantive? That is
>the reason why epistemology is intimately connected to ontology in our

That brings us to the doctrine of vishEsha.

You are very correct when you say pramANa-pramEya are intimately

The character of the object of pratyaksha is the same as that of the objects
other pramANas.  Every instance of pratyaksha reveals its object as "This is
so and so".
Here "so-and-so" refers to the property of the object which is revealed as
"This" as
a substantive.  So, the object of pratyaksha is a substantive qualified by a
No pratyakhsa reveals a property independently of the substantive,  or a
substantive independently of property.  The object of pratyaksha under all
is a qualified entity or "vishishta vastu".

What is the relation between a substantive and its property?
Let us take a piece of white cloth, for instance.  Cloth is substance and
whiteness its
property.  But they are not different.  Only NyAya-vaishEshikas think they
different.  But whiteness itself is not cloth either.  So they are given as
This suggests there is a peculiarity in them. This peculiarity is called
It is this peculiarity enables us to talk and think as if the two they are
This peculiarity is not the same as difference.

"abhEdE bhEdakAree vishEshaha" - vishEsha is that which shows difference
where there is none.  The attributes are identical with the substance.  It
is vishEsha
that causes the idea of difference in an identical thing.  So, vishEsha is
the core
of reality.   Everything is what it is by means of vishEsha.  Owing to its
in the thing, the thing is said to have many aspects, properties, and so on.
To explain as many properties, there must be as many vishEshas in the same
That does not mean adding fresh properties to it.  The vishEshas are those
explain the presence of the properties of the thing without making them
from it.  The fact that they are, is the necessary implication of the fact
that a thing is
qualified.  So they maintain themselves.  To try to explain by means of
vishEshas is to ignore the very starting point.

The acceptance of peculiarity (vishEsha) is inevitable even for advaita,
advaita ignores it.  Advaita regards Brahman as partless.  This implies that
partlessness is a property of It.   It is akhanda.   So partlessness is not
from it.  Then the question is, "how can there be the thought that
is a property of Brahman? "

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