advaita-siddhi -3 (Brief review of nyAya concepts and terms)

Anand Hudli anandhudli at HOTMAIL.COM
Fri Aug 13 18:28:06 CDT 1999

A review of some concepts and terms from nyAya is in order before we
 proceed further. Please see "Materials for the study of Navya Nyaya Logic"
 by Ingalls or "The Navya-Nyaya doctrine of negation" by Bimal Krishna
 Matilal for more details.

 Process of inference:

  Every noneternal entity, according to nyAya, must be a result of
  an instrumental cause (karaNa) and an operation (vyApAra).
  An inference (anumAna), that is a means to knowledge of man and hence
  noneternal, must have an instrumental cause and an operation by which
  the cause brings about the inference.

  In the process of inference, the operation is called parAmarsha or
  consideration, and the instrumental cause is the knowledge of
  invariable concomitance (vyApti), also called pervasion. This vyApti
  corresponds very roughly to logical implication in Western logic.

  In the inference, "the mountain possesses fire because it has smoke",
  the instrumental cause, karaNa is the knowledge of the invariable
  concomitance, "smoke is the invariable concomitant of fire",
  vahni-vyApyo dhUmaH, ie. where there is smoke there is fire.
  The operation, vyApAra is the consideration (parAmarsha) that is
  a knowledge of the occurrence of the concomitant in the subject (pakshha)
  where the inference is being made. In the inference, "the mountain
  possesses fire because it has smoke", the parAmarsha will be of the
  form, "the mountain possesses smoke which is an invariable concomitant
  of fire" - parvato vahni-vyApya-dhUmavAn.h

  In polemical treatises and debates, an inference is stated tersely
  by listing the inference (conclusion) followed by a single word
  representing the application of the consideration and the invariable
  concomitance. For example, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain
  possesses fire because of smoke."

  In every inference, there are evident three terms, called 1) sAdhya
  or that which is to be proved, 2) the hetu or linga, the concomitant,
  and 3) the subject or pakshha, that in which the hetu is known to occur.

  In the inference, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain has fire
  because of smoke", the sAdhya is vahni (fire), the hetu is smoke, and
  the pakshha is parvata (mountain).

  In the standard form of inference, the three terms are placed as

  pakshha sAdhya-with-possessive-suffix hetu-in-ablative-case

  For example, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain has fire
  because of smoke."

  The definition of vyApti is very important. It is defined by the
  bhAshhA-parichchheda (of VishvanAtha) as:

  vyAptiH sAdhyavadanyasminn-asaMbandha udAhR^itaH |

  Invariable concomitance is said to be the absence of relation of
  the (hetu) to anything other than what possesses the sAdhya.

  Here the relation should be the same as the relation under consideration
  for the vyApti. As per this definition of vyApti, smoke is an invariable
  concomitant of fire (or smoke is "pervaded" by fire) because it is not
  the case that there is something that has smoke but not fire. However,
  fire is not an invariable concomitant of smoke. There are things such
  as a red-hot iron rod that has fire but no smoke. So fire is not an
  invariable concomitant of smoke.

  A relation between two entities is often explained as the superimposition
  of one entity on the other. Here, the entity that is superimposed is
  called the superstratum or Adheya. The entity on which the Adheya is
  superimposed is called substratum or locus. Sanskrit names for
  "substratum" is  AdhAra or Ashraya or adhikaraNa. In the example,
  bhUtale ghaTo vartate, "there is a pot on the ground", the superstratum
  is the pot (ghaTa), the ground (bhUtalam.h) is the substratum or locus,
  and the relation is "contact", saMyoga.

  Another way of looking at relations (saMbandha) is to differentiate
  between what Ingalls calls "occurrence-exacting" and "non occurrence
  exacting" relations. Relations such as inherence (samavAya) are
  always occurrence exacting. samavAya or inherence is the relation
  between a whole and its parts, a genus or class (jAti) and a particular
  instance of the class, etc. Contact (saMyoga) can sometimes be
  occurrence exacting but sometimes not.

  In relation between two entities, one of the entities is an adjunct or
  pratiyogin, and the other is a subjunct or anuyogin. If a relation is
  such that one entity is a locus or substratum (AdhAra) of the other which
  must be the superstratum (Adheya), then the AdhAra is the subjunct or
  anuyogin. The Adheya is the adjunct or pratiyogin. In the example,
  bhUtale ghaTaH, "there is a pot on the ground", ghaTa is the pratiyogin
  while bhUtalam.h is the anuyogin.

  Two types of absences (abhAva) are distinguished in navya-nyAya. One
  is called anyonya-abhAva that is essentially a denial of identity
  between to entities. The other is saMsarga-abhAva or relational absence.
  Here, there are three kinds: 1) prAgabhAva, the absence of a thing before
  it is brought into being, 2) dhvamsAbhAva, the absence of a thing after
  it is destroyed, and 3) atyanta-abhAva, eternal absence.

  The terms pratiyogin and anuyogin are also used in the context of
  absences. When we say "bhUtale ghaTo nAsti", "there is no pot on the
  ground", the pratiyogin of the absence is "ghaTa", pot, and the
  anuyogin is "bhUtalam.h", ground. The pratiyogin of this type should
  be called "abhAvIya-pratiyogin" to distinguish it from the relational
  adjunct, but naiyAyikas often write "pratiyogin" for both relational
  and absential adjuncts.

>From ADVAITA-L at LISTS.ADVAITA-VEDANTA.ORG Sun Aug 15 18:11:13 1999
Message-Id: <SUN.15.AUG.1999.181113.0000.ADVAITAL at LISTS.ADVAITAVEDANTA.ORG>
Date: Sun, 15 Aug 1999 18:11:13 +0000
Reply-To: List for advaita vedanta as taught by Shri Shankara
To: List for advaita vedanta as taught by Shri Shankara
From: "Anand V. Hudli" <anandhudli at HOTMAIL.COM>
Subject: advaita-siddhi - 4 (avachchhedaka & avachchhinna)

Some of the properties that are commonly used in
 naiyAyika literature are those that correspond to
 the terms sAdhya, hetu, pakshha, adhikaraNa (locus), vishhayin
 (knowledge), vishhaya (content of knowledge), visheshhya
 (qualificand), visheshhaNa (qualifier), prakAra (chief qualifier),

 The abstract properties or relational abstracts of these
 are formed by simply adding the suffix, "tva" or "tA" to
 each term. For example, one may write sAdhyatva to mean
 "the property of being a sAdhya" or "sAdhya-ness", hetutva
 or "the property of being a hetu" or "hetu-ness", etc.

 A sentence of the form, parvato vahnimAn.h, "the mountain
 (parvata) has fire (vahni)", can be first rewritten as parvato
 vahnyadhikaraNam.h, "the mountain is a locus or substratum of
 fire". This is then analyzed by the naiyAyika as follows:

 parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nirUpitA |

 The adhikaraNatA resident in parvata is described by vahni.


 parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nishhThAdheyatA nirUpitA |

 The adhikaraNatA resident in parvata is described by the
 AdheyatA (superstratum-ness) resident in fire.

 The most characteristic terms of navya-nyAya are
 "avachchhedaka" (limitor) and "avachchhinna" (limited).
 These terms are used in the context of relational abstracts or
 abstract properties. An entity, such as a pot (ghaTa), is said to
 be qualified by a qualifier, but a relational abstract is said
 to be limited by a limitor.

 Let us take the same sentence, parvato vahnimAn, "the mountain
 has fire." Here, the mountain is a substratum (adhikaraNa) of
 fire which is the superstratum (Adheya). The adhikaraNatA in
 parvata is described by vahni (fire), but this adhikaraNatA is
 said to be limited (avachchhinna) by parvatatva. Similarly, the
 AdheyatA in vahni (fire) is said to be described by parvata but
 this AdheyatA is said to be limited (avachchhinna) by vahnitva
 or fire-ness.

 So a navya-naiyAyika would write:

 parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nirUpita-parvatatva-
 avachchhinna-adhikaraNatA, vahni-nishhThAdheyatA sA
 parvata-nirUpita-vahnitva-avachchhinnAdheyatA |

 The adhikaraNatA in mountain is described by fire and limited
 by parvatatva (mountain-ness), and the AdheyatA in fire is
 described by mountain and limited by vahnitva (fire-ness).

 A generic relational abstract may also be limited. In the
 sentence, "a stick is the instrumental cause of a pot",
 daNDo nimitta-kAraNaM ghatasya, the assertion is not with
 respect to a specific pot and stick. The assertion is generally
 about all sticks and pots.

 So the naiyAyika writes:

 daNDatvaM ghaTa-nirUpita-nimitta-kAraNatva-avachchhedakam.h |

 Stick-ness is the limitor of instrumental-cause-ness described
 by pot.


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