VEDĀNTAKALPALATIKĀ

EDITED
With an Introduction, English Translation and Appendices

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PREFACE

The Vedāntakalpalatikā by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī is a well-known Sanskrit manual embracing all important topics relating to Vedānta philosophy. It is most probably the first work written by the author who all the same thinks highly of it, as is clear from the ambitious title bestowed upon it.

The aim of the writer is to show how the non-Advaita philosophic doctrines fail to give a true evaluation of the ultimate Reality which must be admitted to be Nirviśeṣa and Nirdharmaka, if one is to do proper justice to both Śruti and Tarka.

A detailed summary in English of the work is given in the Introduction, for the benefit of the reader.

I have to thank Prof. R. N. Dandekar (Poona University) for many useful suggestions. Thanks are also due to Prof. Dr. Sulochana Nachane, M. A., Ph. D. (Baroda University), Dr. Shilavati Oke, M. A., Ph. D., Miss Vimal Thakar, M. A. and other Research workers of the Post-Graduate Department, Shri G. N. Shrigondekar, Librarian, and Shri S. N. Savadi of the Manuscript Department for help in various ways.

Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute,
Ṛṣipāñcamī,
4th September, 1962

R. D. KARMARKAR
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ABBREVIATIONS

( Bṛ. Saṁh. )
( Katbo. )
( Kā. Rudro. )
( Keno. )
( Gītā )
( Cittyu. )
( Chā. )
( Taṭṭī. )
( Nā. Pa. )
( Nirā )
( Nyā. Bhā. )
( Nyā. Sū. )
( Paṇca. )
( Praśno. )
( Brḥ. )
( Brḥa. )
( Brḥa. Saṁh. Vā. )
( Brḥa. Vā. kā. )
( Bra. Si. )
( B. S. )
( Brahma. )
( Gītā )
( Ma. )
( Mi. Bhā. )
( Mi-Ślo-Vā-Co Sū-kā )

व्रं ला.
कठो.
काः रुद्रो.
केनो.
गीता
चित्यु.
छाः.
तैत्ति.
नाः प.
निरा.
न्याः भाः.
न्याः सु.
पञ्च.
प्रशो.
ब्र�.
ब्रहः.
ब्रह्म.
मग.
मी.
मी.
मी.
मी. श्रोता चो. सू. का.
भगवदंशिता
कठोपनिषद्
कालानुक्रमोपनिषद्
केनोपनिषद्
भगवदीता
चित्युपनिषद्
छान्दोग्योपनिषद्
तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद्
नारदपरिवाजकोपनिषद्
निराकृमोपनिषद्
न्यायाभाष्य
न्यायचून्त्र
पञ्चपादिका
प्रशोपनिषद्
ब्रह्मारणयोपनिषद्
ब्रह्मारणयक सं. वार्तिक
ब्रह्मारणयक वार्तिक-कारिका
भगवदगीति
भद्रसूत्र
भगोपनिषद्
भगवद्गीता
महाभाष्य
महामाताभाष्य
महामाता-श्रोत-वार्तिक-चोदनासूत्र-कारिका
| सन् सु.          | (Mi. Sū.) | मीमांसासूत्र          |
| सुण्ड.          | (Munḍa.) | सुण्डकोपनिषद्          |
| मैत्रा.          | (Maitrā.) | मैत्रायण्युपनिषद्          |
| वा. सं.          | (Vā. Sa.) | वाजसनेयसंहिता          |
| शाख्या.          | (Śātyā.) | शाख्यायन (तैतिरिय ब्राह्मण)          |
| शि. सू.          | (Śi. Sū.) | शिवसूत्र          |
| श्रेता.          | (Śvetā.) | श्रेताश्वतरोपनिषद्          |
| सा. का.          | (Sā. kā.) | साङ्क्यपकरिका          |
| सुवालो.          | (Subalo.) | सुवालोपनिषद्          |
| सं. शा.          | (Sam. Śā.) | संक्षेपशारीरिक          |
INTRODUCTION

I Vedāntakalpalatikā: Text

The present text of the Vedāntakalpalatikā is based upon a collation of two manuscripts (one from the India Office Library — I.O., and the other from the Ānandāśrama, Poona — Ā) and the printed edition of the work edited by Ganganath Jha and Gopinath Kaviraja (Banaras 1920). This printed work is itself based upon a collation of two manuscripts as is pointed out by the editors. We have designated this printed edition as Ā.

Details about the manuscripts I. O. and Ā consulted by us are as follows:

वेदान्तकल्पलतिका

India Office Library [I. O.]

No. 539
I. O. Lib.
E 2399

Size — 9½" × 3½"

Extent — 43 leaves; 9–10 lines to a page; 42 letters to a line.

(foll. 8, 9, 10 missing)

Description — Country paper; Devanāgarī characters; handwriting clear, legible and uniform; red pigment occasionally used; the MS. is in a bound book along with two other works viz.: (1) Kṛṣṇāṃṛtamahāṛṇava and (2) Tattvasāra. Foll. 8, 9, 10 missing. The MS. has been described in the India Office catalogue Vol. I, pt. IV, pp. 768–769.

Age — Appears to be old.
Author — Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.

Subject — “A treatise on Mokṣa by Madhusūdana Saraspāda wherein the author refutes the views of Jaimini, Kapila, Kaṇāḍa, Aksapāda and others and follows those of Vyāsa, Śaṅkara and Sureśvara” — Colebrooke.

Begins — सीमांसया कपटो शुजांवाचयेव खाधीनतासुपरिष्ठिनितः कर्तवता।

केनोद्वातुमूलपर्वेन गार्हस्त्येव

तस्ये नमो भगवते॥

Ends — इति वेदान्तकल्पकतिकायां परमहंसपरिवाचकं महापूर्वसरस्वतीकर्माद्वगुप्तिः नाम प्रत्यक्तत्त्वकः॥

भोविन्दो व्यक्तिव्यायं भार्याँ न्यायिते तिथी।

चढ़त्वाँ त्वरया तेन प्रसीद्धि रमापति॥

नमः श्रीये।

In Bengali characters —

श्रीकुञ्जनमद्यायायुजगोपालमद्यायायेयेद पुस्तकं .... या .... मुद्रया चहोतम्॥

Ānandāśrama (Ā)  

No. 7175

Size — 11¼" × 3¾"

Extent — 50 leaves; 8 lines to a page; 42 letters to a line.

Description — Thick country paper; Devanāgarī characters; handwriting beautiful, clear, legible and uniform; red pigment used for marking certain portion of the text and yellow used for corrections; modern paper with watermarks used for the last two folios; complete.

1st Stabaka only.

Age — Not very old.
Subject — Vedānta.

Begins — fol. 1

श्रीमसुद्रुक्करणार्विन्दाम्यं नमः ॥

श्रीसुद्रोश्चरणपंक्तजमादरेण ॥

नतवा मनोश्रमस्यभूतियमेकतिधिः ॥

वेदान्तकक्तुतिक्का परिलिख्यते ॥

विद्वंसततितत्वकाव्यसुखश्रद्धा ॥

Ends — fol. 50

न्यायैन्द्रिय दुधानिः कपिलकणादकपादाविवादाः

नादवादाकेन्द्रश्चुतिमितमुतारमहैतवां ॥

वेदान्तकक्त्वेन परस्मुखमथं श्रावमशानस्यं

मोक्षं व्याचरकतेवं क्रमिः युक्तिन्: सोहमवार्षिम पूर्ण: ॥ ४ ॥

इति स्वपरमहृदश्रीविवेशचरसरसतीविष्णुश्रीमसुदःस्थलसरसत्युजचेदान्तकक्तुतिक्काः

संसाधनापन्नंतिरूण: प्रथमस्वभ: संपूर्ण: ॥ ४ ॥ सिर्व ॥

The important variants have been given in the footnotes; these do not materially involve any change in the many passages concerned. We have taken the I. O. text as authoritative; in two or three places, however, it was found desirable to admit readings from A or Â to make the meaning clearer.

II. THE AUTHOR: DATE AND WORKS

Madhusūdana Sarasvati is generally accepted to have been born and bred in Bengal. The following facts about his genealogy can be cited as follows:—
Pramada (Pramodana) purandaracarya

Śrīnātha | Yādavānanda | Kamalaja- | Vāgiśa-
Cūḍāmaṇi | Nyāyācārya | nayanaya | Gosvāmin
(Madhusūdana | Sarasvati)

Kamalajanayana spent his days at Banaras and became a Saṃnyāsin, changing his name to Madhusūdana Sarasvati. The famous Hindi poet Tulasidāsa was his contemporary. He had been invited to his court by Emperor Akbar, and the Pundits at the court praised him for his scholarship,¹ ‘Madhusūdana Sarasvati knows the bounds of the Goddess of Learning; the Goddess of Learning knows the bounds of Madhusūdana Sarasvati’. Madhusūdana was a contemporary of Gaddharabhatṭa also.

Madhusūdana Sarasvati appears to have studied under more than one preceptor. He mentions Śrīrāma, Viśvevaramarasvati and Madhavasarasvati as his Gurus in his Gūḍhārthadīpikā² (one Śripāda is also mentioned as his Guru). Balabhadra, Puruṣottamasarasvati and Śeṣa Govinda (author of Sarvasiddhāntarāhasyaśivaraṇa) are described as his pupils.

Date

Madhusūdana is generally taken to have lived about 1540–1647 A. D.¹ Shri S. L. Katre² has, however, shown

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¹ वेचि पारं सरस्वता मधुधरनसरस्वती।
मधुधरनसरस्वता: पारं वेचि सरस्वती॥

² श्रीरामबिजेष्ठमायवामान्य प्रणयं पादार्जुपण्यपारस्तृ॥
वेषाय प्रभावाञ्चलस्वितं योश्वं शिक्षापि चौतन्त्रमहम्मध्य देशम्य॥

³ P. C. Divanji — Introduction to Siddhāntabindu GOS.

⁴ Ganganath Jha Research Institute Journal p. 181, Vol. VII, parts 2 and 4
that the \textit{Ved\=antakalpalatik\=a} and \textit{Siddh\=antabindu} must have been written before 1500 A. D., on the strength of a contemporary Ms. of the \textit{Mahimnastotra-\=tik\=a} copied in 1593 A. D. Dr. Miss Nachane takes the verse

\begin{quote}
अद्रीन्द्रियनंसतःयेषुवद्वै राष्टे चैति( त्र)मेचके \\
द्वितीयवादी पवववः कृत्वारितमिदे गुरोः \\
\end{quote}

which occurs after the colophon in the \textit{\=Anand\=asrama} Ms. of the \textit{Ved\=antakalpalatik\=a}, as having been written by Madhus\=udana himself.

Shri S. L. Katre shows more or less convincingly that the year 1717 in the above verse can only be of the \=Saka era and that the verse in question could have been written only by the copyist and not by Madhus\=udana, the author.\footnote{Poona Orientalist, Vol. XIII, Nos. 3 and 4.}

\textbf{Works}

The following works (alphabetically arranged) can be definitely attributed to Madhus\=udana.

(1) \textit{Advaitaratnaran\=ak\=a} — It is a criticism of \textit{Bhedaratna} (of \=S\=ankarami\=s\=ra), and contains references to \textit{Advaitasiddhi} and \textit{V. L.} (\textit{Ved\=antakalpalatik\=a}).

(2) \textit{Advaitasiddhi} — A voluminous work, refuting the \textit{Ny\=ayam\=r\=ta} (of Vy\=asar\=ajasvamin, a Dvaita).

(3) \textit{Bhagavadbhaktiras\=ayana} (\textit{Bhaktis\=am\=an\=yanir\=up\=a\=na}) — Referred to in \textit{V. L.} and in \textit{\=G\=ud\=h\=ar\=thadipika} and \textit{Paramahamsapriy\=a}.

(4) \textit{\=G\=ud\=h\=ar\=thadipika} — A commentary on the \textit{Bhagavad-g\=ita} from the point of view of \=S\=ankara.

(5) \textit{Harililam\=r\=ta\=t\=ik\=a} — A commentary on \textit{Harililam\=r\=ta} of
Vopadeva (12th century). It refers to his work *Paramaharinsapriyā*.

(6) *Mahimnastotraṭikā*

(7) *Paramaharinsapriyā* — A commentary on the first verse of the *Bhāgavatapurvona*.

(8) *Prasthānalheda*.

(9) *Saṅkṣepaśārivarakotikā* — A commentary on the *Saṅkṣe pasaśārivaraka* of Sarvajñatman.

(10) *Siddhānta tatvo jbindu* — A commentary on Saṅkara’s *Dasāsloki*. Refers to *V. L.* twice and is itself referred to in *V. L.*

(11) *Vedāntakalpalatikā* — The Mss. mention this work as *pradhāna*: सत्ततः सत्ततानापथवभिःध्य नाम. It is referred to frequently in the other works.

Madhusūdana is also credited with having been the author of the following works—commentaries on (1) *Ātmabodha*, (2) *Vedastuti* and (3) *Śaṅḍīyasūtras*.

Ānandamandākini, Krishnacūdavanātaka and Rājñām Pratibodhak are also ascribed to him.

The *V. L.*, *S. B.* and *M. S. T.* are most probably his earliest works. Some Mss. describe the *V. L.* as a Stabaka (of the Kalpalatā), but the work is obviously complete in itself and no Mss. describes any other work as a Stabaka. It appears that both the *V. L.* and *S. B.* are intended to give the reader Madhusūdana’s ideas about the Advaita–Vedānta in a nutshell, and the other works are just expositions of these in greater detail. Similarly the *Mahimnastotraṭikā* explains Madhusūdana’s views on Bhakti in general.

Taking all this into consideration, we have come to the conclusion that the name *Vedāntakalpalatikā* for the present work is a misnomer; all the works of Madhusūdana can be
jointly considered as Vedāntakalpatikā with many Stabakas. In that case the present work may better be styled Sasādhana-pāvurnganirūpaṇa.

III. A SUMMARY OF THE VEDĀNTAKALPALATAKĀ

(1) Madhusūdana gives his aim in writing his work—

(1) Explaining the Śāstra correctly (this could be done due to the grace of his teacher Viśveśvara).

(2) Refutation of the views of Jaimini, Patañjali, Gautama, Kuṇāda, Kapila, Śaiva etc., in accordance with the interpretation given by Vyāsa, Śaṅkara and Sureśvara.

(Madhusūdana fervently salutes Śaṅkara who, in his opinion, has correctly interpreted the Upa-niṣads, and shows how the views of the Mīmāṃsā-vādins are fallacious.)

(3) Explaining the true nature of Mokṣa and the means thereof, and pointing out the fallacies in the views of the opponents.

(2) Philosophers (both Nāstika and Āstika) hold different views about the nature of Mokṣa, and the means of securing Mokṣa. Thus—

(1) The Cārvākas do not admit any Caitanya apart from the body, and admit only Direct perception as a means of proof. So, there is no question of any eternal thing like Mokṣa being admitted in their system.

(2) A section of the Cārvākas admits the sense-organs (individually or collectively), mind or Prāṇa as the Cetana element. (They are no better than Cārvākas referred to in (1) above.)
(3) The Vijñānavādins (Bauddhas) regard Vijñānasantāna as momentary, and its total extinction as Mokṣa.

(4) The Mādhyamikas (Bauddhas) describe 'void' (Śūnyabhāva) as Mokṣa.

(5) The Jainas (Arhatas) regard Mokṣa as the ascent of the Jīva upwards, when freed from the clutches of the eight-fold Karman-bondage.

(6) The Vaiśeṣikas regard Mokṣa as the realisation of the Ātman as freed from his special qualities.

(7) The Naiyāyikas regard Mokṣa as the extinction of the twenty-one divisions of Duḥkha, due to the coming to an end of the Karman, as a result of the disappearance of Rāga, Dveśa and Moha, caused by the realisation of the two-fold Ātman.

(8) Others regard Mokṣa as the extinction of all Karman in the present birth, due to the proper observance of the Nitya and Naimittika Karmans, and the avoiding of the prohibited and Kāmya Karmans.

(9) The Prabhakara Mīmāṃsakas regard Mokṣa as the total extinction of Dharma and Adharma which are connected with the body and sense-organs, through the absence of the Vedic Karmans enjoined, preceded by the ordained knowledge of the Ātman.

(10) The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas regard Mokṣa as arising from the combination of Jñāna and Karman. Mokṣa is the manifestation of eternal bliss.

(11) Some Mīmāṃsakas regard Mokṣa as the mani-
festation of bliss or absence of misery through mental realisation.

(12) The Sāṅkhyaśas regard Mokṣa as the realisation of the Puruṣa as quite apart from the Prakṛti.

(13) The Pātañjalas regard Mokṣa as the attainment to the highest Samādhi, through the complete restraint of the five-fold mental tendencies by following the Yogic practices.

(14) The Tridāṇḍins regard Mokṣa as the merging of the Jīva into Brahman, through Jñāna and Karman.

(15) Some Tridāṇḍins regard Mokṣa as the attainment to the Highest Lord.

(16) Some regard Mokṣa as the attainment to the changeless state of Brahman, by giving up the state subject to change, through the combination of Jñāna and Karman.

(17) According to the Pāśupatas, Mokṣa is to be always near Paśupati.

(18) According to the devotees of Viṣṇu, Mokṣa is to stay in the world of Viṣṇu, through devotion to Viṣṇu.

(19) According to the devotees of Hiraṇyagarbha, Mokṣa is attainment to Hiraṇyagarbha, through the devoted observance of the Five-fire-Vidyā etc.

(20) Others hold similar views about Mokṣa that are opposed to Śruti and reasoning.

(21) The followers of the Upaniṣads, who are graced by Nārāyaṇa, hold Ātman alone with the Avidyā
gone away, constituted of limitless bliss and enlightenment, to be Mokṣa.

The last view is the most reasonable one, because Avidyā is the cause of all misery; with its disappearance all misery vanishes.

Mokṣa, being just the true nature of Ātman, stands in no need for any means to secure it. We talk of means only metaphorically, when we say that Mokṣa is due to the realisation of the nature of Ātman, freed from the four obstacles — (1) the Vāsanās for enjoyment of the objects of senses, (2, 3) wrong notions about the means of proof and the object of knowledge and (4) perverted conceptions.

The practice of Śama, Dama etc., (which lead to the proper Śravaṇa), Śravaṇa, Manana, and Nididhyāsana remove respectively the above four obstacles, and the Brahma-sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa help in the removing of these obstacles.

(3) In short, the Upaniṣad view is that one desirous of salvation, practising Śama etc., should approach a duly qualified teacher and under his direction should revolve upon the Vēdaṇta-passages in the Brahma-sūtras till his purpose is achieved, viz. the removal of obstacles for the realisation of the one-ness of Brahman and Ātman, which ensures salvation.

(4) It is necessary first to have a clear idea of the nature of Mokṣa, before a desire arises to secure Mokṣa; then the question of the proper means could be properly considered.

(5) Excepting the followers of the Upaniṣads, other philosophers propound views not supported by the means of proof. Thus, amongst the Nāstika philosophers —
(1) The Čārvākas admit no permanent entity which can survive the body etc., and so there can be no question of Mokṣa, according to them.

(2) The Bauddhas regard everything to be momentary; their Mokṣa can thus be only the destruction of Ātman (People committing suicide at Prayāga for securing Mokṣa, no doubt destroy themselves in popular parlance, but they actually believe in a permanent imperishable enjoyer).

(3) The Vijñānavādī-Bauddhas who admit a stream (Santāna) of Vijñāna fare no better; the Santāna can not be separated from its members, and it must come to an end when the members are no more.

(4) The Śūnyavādins can not even dream of Mokṣa.

(5) According to the Jainas, rising upwards (ञञञञञञञञञ) is Mokṣa, but that being a Kriyā must be impermanent. Secondly, the Jīva being screened by the eight Karmans, can not be proved. Thirdly, the Jīva has a fluctuating dimension which means that the Jīva is liable to destruction, and lastly the Jain idea of Mokṣa, attaining to heaven etc., can not be the highest human purpose in life.

So, the above Nāstika systems (not believing in any permanent entity) can be ruled out of consideration without much ado.

(6) But the different Āstika systems can not be so summarily dismissed; for, a desire for securing Mokṣa can arise there:—

All these systems admit the existence of the Ātman, eternal, all-pervading and apart from the body, sense-organs; thus —
(i) Recognition in the form ‘I who perceived my parents in my childhood, am now perceiving my grand-sons’—this shows that the Ātman must not be a momentary entity.

(ii) A child newly-born is able to suck the breasts of the mother—this shows that the Ātman remembers the impressions in the previous birth.

Anumāna—Buddhi, Sukha etc., are Guṇas; they must have a Guṇin; that is the Ātman.

An object of enjoyment must have an enjoyer; the body is Bhoga; it must have a Bhokṭr, viz. the Ātman.

Ātman can have no prior existing cause and so is not liable to destruction.

Śruti—The Śruti passages, all of them describe Ātman as imperishable.

Such an Ātman can only be atomic or Vibhu. As the effect of Ātman is seen everywhere, Ātman should be considered to be Vibhu as his nature is not different from that of Brahman.

Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas, and Prābhākaras (Mīmāṃsakas)—They admit the nine Viśeṣaaguṇas, Buddhi etc., due to the contact of the mind, as existing in the Ātman in the Sāṁsāra state. Mokṣa is the simultaneous disappearance of these. Thus, for the sake of the absolute cessation of pain, desire for Mokṣa does arise in the case of the thinking people.

The refutation of the above views would be as follows:—

(1) As long as the Dharmin (Ātman) exists, the destruction of the natural Dharmas is impossible. Both Dharmas and Dharmin must disappear together. This means that there would be no Ātman!
(2) There is no proof to show that Ātman can exist even when the Viśeṣa-Guṇas are no more.

(3) The absence of pain which cannot be known can not be the human purpose in life.

(4) The Śruti can be no help here, as it deals with the Ātman who is bereft of the Dehābhimāna.

(5) Again if one Duḥkha is destroyed, there is no guarantee that a fresh Duḥkha would not arise.

(6) The suggestion that as Duḥkha-prāgabhāva is responsible for Duḥkha (in the sense that the destruction of Duḥkha-prāgabhāva is due to Duḥkha) why should not Duḥkha cease to exist if there is no Duḥkha-prāgabhāva at all? The answer is:— How many Duḥkha-prāgabhāvas are you going to eliminate and when and how? They can not be eliminated all at once and the elimination can not be effected by any human effort. What use then can one have for Śravaṇa, Manana etc., which involve Pravṛtti which surely does produce Duḥkha? Actually this view shows no prospect of Sukha being achieved, involves the elimination of Sukha of every kind and deserves to be kept at arm's length; who would indeed like to stay on like a dried piece of wood?

(7) The view of the author of the Nyāyabhāṣya that the absence of all Duḥkha should be the Puruṣārtha is also objectionable. Dhūkhābhāva can only be acceptable if it leads to Sukha. One enjoying a little Sukha craves for more; Sukha is not Duḥkhābhāva; at the Dissolution and in Deep sleep, there is no Sukha when Duḥkhābhāva is there. So, it is better to say that one yearns for positive Sukha, not merely for Duḥkhābhāva.

(8) The view of Kumārila, viz. Mokṣa is the manifestation of permanent Sukha is also not acceptable. If we
analyse the view, we would find that if the Sukha is different from Atman and is to be produced, no one would desire for such an impermanent Sukha. If it is not different from Atman, how can it be known or experienced? There being no connection with the mind and sense-organs in Mokṣa, such a Sukha cannot be experienced. If the mind and sense-organs persist in Mokṣa also, what difference is there between Saṁsāra and Mokṣa? If Atman is described to be enveloped by some covering element, which is neither Sat, nor Asat, and indescribable, then this is exactly the view of the Brahmavādins. That is why the Neo-Mimāmsakas having given up the view about Sukha being not different from Atman who is always uncovered and the same at all times, have preached Mokṣa to be only negation of Duhkha; but as has already been pointed out, this view cannot stand, as Atman cannot have any Vikriyā in himself to get rid of the Duhkha resorting to him.

(9) The view of Sāṅkhya and Yoga, which admits Atman to be Asaṅga and Duhkha to be a dharma of the Buddhi — it is true — rules out of order Atman being exterminated, and further Atman being self-illuminating, is able to work consciously — this view also fares no better. Because if Duhkha is Sat, it cannot be destroyed, and what exists not cannot be produced either. So, the Saṁsāra and Mokṣa according to the Sāṅkhyas who are Satkāryavādins are hardly different from each other. (The Vaiśeṣikas are more honest when they say that an Asat thing can be produced and destroyed!) To say that production and destruction are just manifestation and non-manifestation would also not help; for they are just Sattva and not different from Sattva. If they are admitted to be Anirvacaniya, that would be admitting the Brahmavādin’s view.

(10) It would thus be seen that all the above views
cannot get rid of the basic objection viz., Mokṣa, whether described as an entity or negation, is an adventitious thing and is non-eternal, being regarded as a product. Even admitting some Dharma residing in the counter-entity, makes no difference, because that Dharma also is perishable.

Mokṣa can never be regarded as Utpādyā, Āpya, Vikārya or Saṃskārya; for, that would make it perishable (This has been very well explained by Śaṅkarācārya in his Bhāṣya on Bra. Sū. I. 1. 4.)

The view that there is both Bheda and Abheda in the case of Mokṣa is most absurd, being opposed to all means of proof. A real Bheda cannot be removed by Jñāna (which can remove only non-knowledge or ignorance). If both Bheda and Abheda are regarded to be known from the Veda, they would persist in the Mokṣa-state as well!

Limiting the respective spheres of action such as,—from Jñāna comes the cessation of false knowledge, and from Karman, of Bheda — also does not stand. For, if once you admit Bheda and also Abheda, everything would be Pramā and false Jñāna cannot be singled out; nowhere again is ever seen the disappearance of Bheda by Karman. The combination of Jñāna and Karman is opposed to the Śruti which preaches Advaita, and the attainment to the Nirviśeṣa Brahman would be an impossibility, if such a combination of Jñāna and Karman is admitted.

The Baudhās talk about the four-fold Bhāvanā (pertaining to individuality, momentariness, grief and ‘void’) as the means of salvation. But there is no proof for this, beyond the word of Buddha, and this is opposed to the Śrutī, and the Bhāvanās are just illusion.

Likewise, the Jaina doctrine is not proved by any proof, and the means of salvation spoken of by them cannot be acceptable,
Thus, there is no proof whatsoever to show that the Jñāna of the six Padārthas (of the Vaiśeṣikas) or of the sixteen Padārthas (of the Naiyāyikas) leads to Mokṣa, the knowledge of which could be had only through the Scriptures. A mere statement about Mokṣa by some sage like Kanāda can not be held to be authoritative; in that case, there would be no necessity for the definition, examination etc., of any statement. The Śruti of course never countenances this. Further a knowledge of the Padārthas, whether in a general way or in their characteristics, cannot produce Mokṣa. A general knowledge everybody has; it is impossible to know the special features of all Padārthas; to understand the Padārthas as merely being Dravya is both obvious and useless.

(Some who hold that Karman gives its fruit in the present one birth only, hardly deserve any consideration.)

Similarly, the knowledge of the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is of no use, whether general or particular. The knowledge of Ātman only, in a general way, is patent to everyone, as one is conscious of the same when one says 'I know'. That such a knowledge gets rid of the false Vāsanā, after practising 'hearing' etc., by producing another knowledge is also untenable; for, in that case the direct knowledge of Ātman, which is not illusion, would appear superfluous.

The followers of Prabhakara who do not admit illusion are in a worse position. For, the knowledge of Reality does not help at all. It cannot destroy the Karman, as such a knowledge is always there; so, the question of the destruction of Karman does not arise. The very idea that Jñāna could be enjoined to achieve something is ridiculous. Again, the nature of Ātman, untramelled in any way can alone be Mokṣa. The Śruti referring to the destruction of
Karman, does not refer to any direct destruction, but through the destruction of false knowledge removable by the realisation of the Ātman.

Self-realisation is impossible for the Sāṅkhyaśas who regard Ātman to be always inferable, and so, indirect knowledge being always there, it cannot be means for realisation. Yogic practices help only in intensifying the indirect knowledge; they cannot bring about realisation.

The objector says that Kāmanā cannot arise in the Upaniṣadic scheme of things either. Thus —

(1) Kāmanā can arise in respect of an entity to be established or known. But Ātman is neither Heya nor Upādeya, and is always Siddha.

(2) There cannot be any desire for something already established.

(3) It cannot be said that Ātman in the Sāṁsāra state is enveloped by Avidyā, and so a desire for the removal of Avidyā can arise, because the removal of Avidyā is difficult to envisage, whether it is different from or not different from Ātman.

The Siddhāntin replies —

(1) Simply because an entity is Asiddha, it is no cause for the absence of Kāmanā.

(2) After all, what is meant by being Siddha?

(i) It cannot be ‘really existing’; for, in that case, the removal of the illusory serpent on the rope would not be concerned with a Siddha entity. A Siddha thing forgotten for the time being is Asiddha.
(ii) It cannot be 'being known'; for that cannot be produced by desire. A desire can arise about something known in a way.

(iii) It cannot be the object of unobstructed realisation; for, in the present case, the obstructions are there which prevent the realisation. A person suffering from biliousness cannot realise the sweetness of sugar. Further, one desires for a thing, which is

(A) actually not secured,

(B) though secured, is associated with illusion. Likewise a thing to be avoided is

(C) something which really exists and which has to be avoided (like a big trench on the way)

(D) which, already avoided and not existing (the serpent on the rope) but as good as not avoided owing to illusion.

Now, as regards A and C, some Kriyā or action is necessary, before A is secured and C is avoided. B and D can only be accomplished through direct realisation; that is why the highest purpose in life, Mokṣa, is said to have nothing to do with Kriyā.

A desire for Ātman who is always Siddha arises as the attainment to the highest bliss and cessation of Avidyā are Asiddha owing to illusion.

The removal of Avidyā cannot be described as impossible to demonstrate. It is true that Avidyā (and it Kārya) cannot be described as (1) Sat, (2) Asat, or (3) Sadasat; and so usually it is described as (4) Anirvacaniya; but owing to this position, while Avidyā becomes identical with anirvacaniya, its Nivṛtti and Pratiyogin (counter-
entity) cannot be regarded as identical with it; so a fifth method viz. Anirvacaniya-vilaksana, should be accepted to describe Avidya. (Actually, the Advaita-Sruti concerns itself with the Sad-Advaita only.) In this way the Atman could be described as free from the Bheda idea, whether homogenous or heterogenous. Thus the Advitiya Sruti (as also the Asthuladi Sruti) could be properly explained.

This is the view of the author of Istitasiddhi, and others. Really speaking, the Anirvacaniya-vailakshanya method is unhelpful in cognising Abhava. Abhava, after all, must be connected with some Caitanya; if it is just imaginary, it is rooted in Avidya.

The Sruti-passages, Asthula etc., (describing the Atman) point out to Atman’s nature being different from Sthula etc., and not their Abhava; because both Bhava and Abhava natures of imaginary things are nothing but the nature of their Adhisthana. For instance —

A conch-shell, not cognised properly, can be said to be possessed of the Bhava of the silver; but when cognised it is known to be constituted of the Abhava of the silver.

In the same way the Atman, not realised properly, is constituted of all Dvaita; but when realised he is known to be constituted of the Abhava of Dvaita.

This is not a novel view at all. The followers of Prabhakara admit the nature of the Shruti as giving us the idea of any Abhava (as Shravana-bhavarajyam). The logicians also explain Shravana as Sthoro naiva, and do not admit any Shravan-abhava as any counter-entity for the Abhava. All this shows that shravakam itself is competent to give the idea of Abhava.

Thus Atman who is Sat, Caitanya, Advitiya and entire perfect Bliss, is spoken of as ‘the cessation of Avidya’ when realised.
The objector says —

When the expression ज्ञात आत्मा is used, ज्ञान particularises आtman and that means Mokṣa is particularised by ज्ञान; if ज्ञान is not there, Mokṣa also would disappear. ज्ञान, therefore, must be taken to be just an accidental characteristic (उपज्ञान) in which case, Mokṣa would be there even before the realisation.

The answer is: — An उपज्ञान can not affect the object in question. When we say 'Devadatta's house is the one on which a crow is sitting' that does not mean that Devadatta's house was not there before the crow came in the scene. An उपज्ञान, therefore, performs its function after it is there. The case is similar here. Avidyā being beginningless does not function again, like the antecedent negation, when the right knowledge is secured.

Now, what is the nature of Jñāna involved in the expression ज्ञात-आत्मा, which removes Avidyā or the Ajñāna? It cannot be —

(1) Merely Sentience, because that being always there, Avidyā would always be not existing, with the result that Samsāra based upon Avidyā would not be there and all Śāstra would be without any job! Further, there would arise contradiction with actual experience!

(2) It cannot be any functioning on the part of आtman —

(A) If the functioning is real, its cause, the Avidyā in the mind, must also be real, with the result that the functioning could not possibly remove the cause and there would be the uselessness of all Vedānta.

(B) If the functioning is unreal, how could any-
thing unreal remove the Ajñāna? In that case, even the knowledge in a dream can be effective! Our experience is that only the real knowledge of the rope can remove the illusory knowledge of the serpent.

(3) This Jñāna, whether it is सप्रकारक or निप्रकारक, is impotent to achieve its object —

(A) A सप्रकारकः Jñāna is useless to tackle the निप्रकारक Brahman in any way, as it is अयथायथ. If it is यथायथ, there would be no Advaita left.

(B) A निप्रकारकः Jñāna is nowhere seen to remove Ajñāna. Jñāna can remove that Ajñāna only which has समान आध्यात्म, प्रकार and विषय with the Jñāna. Otherwise, even a general knowledge, like ‘A substance is knowledge’ would enable us to remove the Ajñāna about a jar!

(4) Further, if this ज्ञान is indirect, it cannot remove the Ajñāna which is the cause of direct superimposition; otherwise, an inferential knowledge about whiteness of the conch-shell would remove the illusion about the yellowness on the shell.

The Jñāna cannot be direct, as शब्द can only give us indirect knowledge which is the ज्ञानकरणः. Even in the case of expressions like ‘You are the tenth’ (where the speaker who had forgotten to count himself is reminded of that fact), there is first the indirect knowledge and later the direct knowledge is produced in the mind.

In the present case about Brahman, there is no other करण than the Vedānta to cognise Brahman (Ordinary शब्दज्ञान cannot have any power to produce knowledge about any supersensuous entity).
It is true that Vedānta passages like सत्यं ज्ञानममि भवं although producing indirect knowledge are not productive of illusion, because they do not refer to any other entity than Brahman. But our Siddhānta is that direct knowledge is identical with the Pramāṇa himself; if it were not so, the knowledge of Brahman (as being apart from the Pramāṇa) would be unauthoritative! No other Kāraṇa can function in the case of Brahman without a second; from Śabda no direct knowledge can proceed and so no Mokṣa from Śabda-jñāna.

It cannot be argued that the beginningless Ajñāna of a positive form can be removed by the Śabda-jñāna, because a beginningless entity, like the Ātman is invariably associated with indestructibility; otherwise Ātman also being an entity would be destructible like a jar. It cannot be argued that the comparison with Ātman is misleading, because in the case of the Ātman, it is not the beginninglessness of the Ātman that is the cause of his being eternal but his real or self-illumining nature, — the answer is — No similar instance can be produced owing to no highest Reality other than Ātman being admitted. Further, if Ajñāna is the object of the means of proof, it cannot be removable by the means of proof which cannot remove its own object; if it is not the object of the means of proof, it would be just like the horn of a hare (as it is not admitted to be self-illumining) unable to produce anything. Again, Ajñāna cannot be removed by itself (no one can remove oneself); otherwise it would be just momentary; nor by another Jñāna which would require another Jñāna to remove itself and so on, there would be the fault of endlessness. It is further impossible to find any resort for this Jñāna; it cannot be Ātman who is without any Dharmas; it cannot be the mind, for the Jñāna in the mind cannot remove the Ajñāna.
in the Ātman. Ajñāna cannot be resorting to the mind, as Ajñāna exists prior to it and all agree in holding that Caitanya alone can be the resort. Further, what is the sphere of activity of this Ajñāna? It cannot be the Highest Brahman, for, no proof to that effect can exist. The mind cannot do anything in the matter, for, it itself is not self-proven, being merely a co-worker (and in addition, this concept would be contrary to the Śruti). Manas (mind) can only tackle particularised entities, never any Advaita. The mind polished and strengthened by Śravaṇa, Manana etc., can do this, but the real means in that case is the Vedānta-passages themselves.

In this connection it is necessary to clarify our ideas about what the Vedānta-passages actually do in the matter —

(1) Are they (the Vedānta-vākyas) the actual means of proof for Brahman?

(2) Is the Jñāna produced by them Direct, or

(3) Is the Jñāna produced in the mind dependent on the knowledge of the Vedānta-passages?

As regards No. 1, no Vākyā can have any authoritative nature as regards any निर्विभेदकृत. In the case of निर्विभेदकृत Brahman, Direct perception is impossible, as Brahman is not possessed of any Rūpa etc., Anumāna is impossible, there being no Liṅga and Vyāpti, possible; Upamāna also is impossible, there being no resemblance with anything; similarly Arthāpatti is impossible as also Abhāva (as Brahman has a positive form). Śāstra cannot help, as it deals with possible Dharmas denoted by the words —

To explain the same in detail —

Different views are held as regards the function of a word for giving its meaning —
(1) The Logicians hold that it is God's will that enables a word to give its conventional meaning pointing to a particularised individual entity.

This view is untenable as God's will must be supposed to be one only, and so all words would have only one meaning, or there would be as many meanings as there are limiting adjuncts. Synonymous words are necessarily taken to have different Šaktis to denote their meanings. If the Will is regarded as related to the different objects, it would mean that its denotation is merely formal and there would be no scope left for a metaphorical meaning. There is no point in associating Šakti along with God's will for which there is no proof. The natural Šakti of words cannot be questioned on the ground that it is not included in the six categories admitted. Šakti can be described as playing the same role as the Samavāya admitted by the Vaiśeṣikas.

Lakṣaṇā or metaphor can still function as it is regarded merely as the cause of the remembrance of the object; it cannot denote anything. (The Anvīabhidhānaavādins hold that words in a sentence denote their object, being already grammatically connected with one another.)

The Abhihitānvayaavādins hold that the words are grammatically connected after they have denoted their meaning.

It is, therefore, better to hold that Šakti is concerned with merely the Sāmānā as the Mīmāṃsakas declare. There is no necessity of holding that Samavāya as a separate relation should be admitted; for, that purpose is secured by admitting the Tādātmya relation.

As the Vedāntins regard Ātman as the only Sat, it matters very little, if the Šakti refers to Vyakti or Vyakti particularised by some Upādhi. The Šakti (or, denotative
power of words) is two-fold. Conventional or Etymological; of these Conventional meaning is the more important.

The Nyāyānikas and Bhāttas combine the above two and regard Etymology-convention as the primary power of the word.

The Prabhākaraṇas and Vedāntins contest the above view, declaring that in that case, one cannot possibly have the sense 'the bank of the Ganges' from the expression gṛhasthaṁ, if etymology and convention are to prevail everywhere. Though a word may have more than one meaning, the frequency with which a word is found used in a particular sense, enables one easily to find out the proper meaning.

However, it does not matter much if Etymology-convention is regarded as an independent function.

The Subordinate functioning is two-fold:

(i) Indication (where there is actually possible the connection with the primary sense, e.g. gṛhasthaṁ, where the indicated sense of gṛha, viz. tiśa is actually connected with the primary sense gṛhasthāṁ.)

(ii) Qualitative (where the primary sense is connected with the गुण of the indicated entity, e.g. मार्गवत्: सिंहः).

Some regard Metaphor (उपचार) as a separate श्लूति, distinguishing it from लक्षण as follows — In उपचार, the connection between the primary sense and the indicated sense is occasional, e.g. in मन्त्र: (मन्त्रावलं : कृत्यशति; while in लक्षण it is permanent (e.g. gṛhasthaṁ and gṛhāntar).

But it is unnecessary to multiply such divisions. A possible connection between the primary sense and the indicated sense is surely to be met with in both लक्षण and उपचार.
The grammarians give a six-fold division, but it can be easily shown that रुद्र, शैलम and ब्रम्हरुद्र can be included in सुख्या ब्रति; and लक्षणिक, आपवारिक and गाँग in जहर्नया.

The Rhetoricians believe in व्यजनाग्रंथिनि, based upon शक्ति, लक्षणा and व्यजना; but this is also unnecessary. It can be included in अर्थांशिनि; Even if it is regarded as a separate ब्रति, we do not mind at all.

लक्षणा is three-fold —

(1) जहरलक्षणा — where the primary sense in retained, e.g. काकेम्प्यो द्रवो रक्ष्यता, where काक means 'a crow and others capable of injuring Dadhi'.

(शोषा धाविनि, where शोष means a red horse, is not an example of this type of लक्षणा; there is the ताकाच्य relation involved here. The remark of the नहरमास्त्यकार, चटुर्यस्य शब्दानां प्रवृत्ति: (जाति, गुण, क्रिया and क्रित्र) also shows that no लक्षण is possible here. If however, साधारण relation is admitted, then, this might be taken as an instance of जहरलक्षण where the primary sense is totally given up.)

(2) जहरजहरांध्या — e.g. सोडयं बबदन्तं, where a part of the primary sense is given up (तत्कलवविश्वय is given up); also called भावलक्षणा.

(3) जहरसांध्या — e.g. गहसांघोषः.

This three-fold लक्षणा is more powerful than the गाँगी (based on the गुप्त). In this way we have listed the various ways in which a word can give its meaning in the particular context.

It is now pointed out that not one of these is in a position to make us know the ब्रह्मन without a second, which is without any धर्मास.

(1) रुढि, which is the outcome of ब्रम्हवद्वार and can only
be associated with a tangible object, is powerless to inform us about Brahman;

(2) so also, Anumāṇa based upon the connection with a tangible object.

(3) Upamāṇa, based upon सादृश्य with a tangible object, or knowledge based upon a dissimilar object.

(4) Âptavākya is actually the matter under dispute and so cannot help.

(5) Being in the same case with a well-known word is also impossible in the case of the Nirvikālpa Brahman.

Similarly वाक्यशोधस, both विविधता and निरशिष्टता are of no avail as they cannot point out to the निरविशेषत्व Brahman. ‘Yoga’ also based upon the अवयवशक्ति of the word is practically based upon हठि. The etymology of Ātman also cannot take us to the Nirvikālpa Brahman.

Lakṣaṇa, with its three divisions, based upon connection with the primary sense, is equally impotent. Vyājjanā is not supported by any means of proof.

Thus, none of the available means being helpful in finding the import of Ātman, the objector says that the description of salvation as अविद्यानिनित्यस्थापतन्त्र आत्मा cannot be sustained.

The Siddhāntin’s reply is —

First of all, the objector’s obsession that only सत्यशब्द ज्ञान is capable of being effective must be removed. The Logicians admit the imaginary Ākāśa (bounded by the hollow of the ear) as capable of perceiving the Sound; the Mīmāṁsāsakas admit the imaginary shortness or length of the syllables for their thesis. The knowledge in a dream is not contradicted as long as the dream lasts, though it is certainly Mithyā. In short, it is possible to have the reali-
sation of Brahman even from the Mithyā-jñāna. Again, it must not be forgotten that we admit the Anirvacaniya-khyāti and Vyāvahārika-sattā.

Similarly Niśprakāra can also remove Ajñāna, as it is the right knowledge (Pramā) of the Adhiṣṭhāna, that really removes the Ajñāna. According to the different circumstances this Pramā may be Niśprakāra and Sapratkāra. This does not mean that we accept a two-fold Kāryakāraṇabhāva. For, what really matters is the Adhiṣṭhāna. This is not to suggest that even a general Pramā like ‘A substance is that which is capable of being known’ would give the knowledge of everything. A possible solution that we should accept a particularised causal relation is no good in the case of Brahman, as the right knowledge about Brahman can remove the ignorance about Brahman, without imagining any additional Brahman-prakāra.

This view must not be confused with the Nirvikalpa idea of the Logicians. For, the Logicians do admit the Jñāna of the Viṣeṣaṇa as the cause of the particularised knowledge. Actually the Nirvikalpaka is inferable according to the Logicians,—according to our view it is directly realised by the Witness.

So, all this means that directly realisable right knowledge is the proper Pramā and it cannot be one overlapping the Nirvikalpaka that is inferable.

The argument, that Brahman being void of Dharmas, cannot likewise be the object of any knowledge involving Karman, otherwise it would be non-sentient like a jar, cannot be upheld, as it would mean that all the Vedāntas would be regarded as unauthoritative. Brahman cannot be said to be metaphorically an object of knowledge, because nothing is known to remove Ajñāna merely by having that
as its object. — This can be answered as follows—Brahman is not the object of knowledge, but Jñāna can have Brahman as its object. Jñāna is a dharma of the Antahkarana and so a Dravya, having a form conforming to the different objects. The difference of forms is actually perceived and that cannot be questioned. Even if being the object is imagined in respect of Brahman, that would not make Brahman non-sentient. Or, we might say being the object of sentiency is the cause of non-sentiency, but that does not make it the object of functioning. The word Phala used in this connection in the Śrutī refers only to the Caitanya, and not to the functioning.

The objector asks—Just as you admit the imaginary object, why not admit also an imaginary mode? That would put an end to any awkward positions. The reply is that in that case, the object of knowledge would be a particularised one, and the mode could not be removed by the Jñāna which is incapable of removing its object. So, only the Nisprakāra Jñāna can have Brahman for its object. When Adhyāsa of various kinds is removed, nothing stands in the way of Mokṣa.

The objector says—There can be no removal of Ajñāna by the knowledge of the identity of Brahman and Ātman; nowhere is it seen that Jñāna causes the removal of Ajñāna. In believing this, you secure neither Jñāna, nor the removal of Ajñāna.

The answer is—When we talk of the removal of dream-knowledge by the knowledge of the waking state, we presume that the original Ajñāna is possessed of wonderful powers and so if one power is removed, other powers producing other dream-knowledges exist. But when the root-Ajñāna is removed, there cannot be any further manifestations of Ajñāna.
Jñāna is, it is true, a function of the Antahkaraṇa, but as the Antahkaraṇa is super-imposed upon the Caitanya, no objection need be taken. Even the Logicians have no objection to admit the perception of sound resorting to the Mahākāśa by being intimately connected with the ear-hollow.

We hold that Brahmajñāna is able to remove the Ajñāna not on the strength of any inference, but on the strength of the Śruti, and the presumption based on Śruti. Both Śruti and Smṛti declare Ajñāna as the obstacle for Mokṣa.

It is ridiculous for the objector to doubt the removal of Ajñāna, which is so patent to everybody, by the Jñāna purified by the worship of the Lord of the Nila-mountain. If the removal of the Ajñāna is not effected sometime, it must be due to some unknown obstacle.

It cannot be argued that Ajñāna having the nature of an entity which is beginningless cannot be removed, because in the first place that inference is not warranted by the Śruti and Smṛti, and secondly whatever you understand by the nature of Bhāva, it cannot produce indestructibility. Bhāvatva cannot mean Sattva as it is not proven in the case of Ajñāna which is neither Sat nor Asat; it cannot be Abhāvatva which must be discarded, as no favourable inference is available and unfavourable inference can be produced. Further only Sattva can prove the non-destructibility of Ātman. There being no Sattva other than Ātman, no Vyūpti is possible in the case of Ajñāna. The Śruti again and again points out to the destructibility of Ajñāna which is established in the form ‘I am ignorant’. Further the Śruti is interested in describing Brahmaṇ, not in establishing Ajñāna which can very well be proved by inference.
Thus, Ajñāna is but something superimposed upon the Ātman and can be removed by the knowledge of the nature of Ātman.

This Jñāna is direct. Śabda-jñāna by nature gives indirect knowledge, and in respect of Ātman no means of knowledge is possible.

(1) Some hold that Śabda gives indirect knowledge and direct knowledge arises from the mind assisted by Bhāvanā.

(2) Others hold that Śabda to start with gives indirect knowledge alone, but later on assisted by hearing, thinking etc., direct knowledge arises, like recognition from the sense-organs assisted by the impressions.

The first view is wrong because Jñāna arising from Bhāvanā can never be authoritative, like the realisation of the absent lady, revolved in the mind by some lover.

The objector argues — Being produced by Bhāvanā is not the cause of the unauthoritative nature, but having its object contradicted. In this case of Brahma which is always uncontradicted, the knowledge produced by Bhāvanā must be regarded as authoritative.

The answer would be — Any Bhāvanā based upon indirect knowledge cannot produce direct realisation. Inferential knowledge about fire, even though repeated a thousand times cannot make one directly realise the fire.

Likewise the mind cannot be authoritative, whether it is assisted by Bhāvanā (in which case the blemishes pointed out above would be there) or alone by itself (in which case, there would always be realisation of Brahma as Brahma is always there.) This would also mean that Śabda cannot be regarded as authoritative, if it is dependent upon some-
thing else. Again Śruti describes Brahman as capable of being thought by the mind. The Śruti व मानसीन आत्मा means that the Ātman is fit to be associated with the Upādhi, Manas, not that it can be realised by the mind. मनसेवातः-प्रश्नयम् really means that Ātman is not the doer, not that the mind is the instrument. The Śruti क्राम, संकल्प etc., shows that Manas is the उपादानकारण of these qualities, Ātman is Nirgūṇa, is the Draṣṭr and the Drṣyadharmas cannot belong to him; they are just super-imposed on him.

विज्ञान यद्य तदुः does not speak of विज्ञान as an instrument, but as being over and above the sense-organs.

The case of Śabda can not be similar to that of recognition ( Pratyabhijñāna ) because the eye cannot produce the तत्तांश ( in सोभ्य ) and प्रश्चिन्ह gives direct knowledge; and remembrance is admitted to produce the तत्तांश which is produced by the impressions, while the eye is not known to be dependent upon the impressions.

It is better, therefore, to say that Śabda itself is responsible for the realisation directly. Anyway the mind does not come into the picture. The Śabda alone is the cause of Sākṣātkāra. This does not mean that the sense-organs have no function to perform. The eye and the impressions though intended to produce Jñāna having a different genus are found to produce the same type of Jñāna in the case of recognition.

We find the mind producing direct or indirect knowledge somewhere or other, so the same can be postulated in the case of Śabda also. It is unnecessary to imagine in the case of Śabda, two kinds of characteristics producing direct and indirect knowledge.

Śabda ( or Vākya ) can be shown by the law of Presence and Absence, to ward off the illusion and another mental cognition for that purpose is redundant.
The objector says that just as in the case of the six sense-organs, eye and others, it is usual to admit another sense-organ which may be said to be the general cause, so in the case of Śabda we may allow a general cause. Even if this is done, Śabda cannot function like a sense-organ for the purpose of the popular dealings. The Śrutī makes a distinction between the ten Prāṇas and the eleventh Ātman. The detailed description in this context given in the Śāṅkhya philosophy makes it clear that a sense-organ is the material cause of the Sāttvika Āhamkāra.

It could not be argued that a sense-organ not concerned with the eleven (ten Prāṇas and Ātman) is quite useless. An Indriya is that which is the Upādāna of the five elements not mixed up five-fold. The Śrutī-passages like तेजोमन्त्र वाच्य do not mean that Vāk is made of Tejas. This is dealt with in detail in the Pāñcabāriś.

Anyway Śabda cannot be called a sense-organ, even though it produces direct knowledge.

This does not mean that there would be a commixture of direct and indirect knowledges, for such a commixture like that of Upādhis, does not cause any flaw in the argument.

It must not be forgotten that direct perception associated with Caitanya is not anything apart from its nature. Direct knowledge is produced by the Śabda pointing out to the identity of the Para with the Tvam-entity properly understood.

Even with all this, the question still remains. Where does the Vicāra (consideration) come in, as the Śabda is capable of producing the direct knowledge even before the Vicāra? The answer is — Vicāra gets rid of the obstacles in the way of the Direct knowledge to be produced. The procedure is as follows —
(1) Instruction about Brahmavidyā, accompanied by the proper performance of the prescribed duties, gets rid of the Cittadoṣa which obstructs the discrimination between Nitya and Anitya entities.

(2) The Nityānitya-viveka gets rid of the Cittadoṣa coming in the way of aversion to enjoyments here and there hereafter.

(3) Then by the Viṣaya-vairāgya is got rid of the Cittadoṣa obstructing Śama, Dama etc.

(4) Then is got rid of the Cittadoṣa causing improper activity, by the practice of Śama, Dama etc.

(5-7) Then is got rid of, the Cittadoṣa which believes in the unauthoritative nature of the Vedānta preaching the oneness of Brahma and Ātman, by means of Śravaṇa, Manana, Nididhyāṣana in succession.

(8) Thus, ultimately the idea about the real purport of the Vedānta passages gets firm root in the Citta cleansed of all blemishes, and drives away Ajñāna and its effects automatically.

It would be seen that the Vicāra of the Vedānta- Vākyas plays a very important part in removing the blemishes in the Citta; Vicāra does not produce any positive result; thus the Svatah-prāmāṇya (self-authoritative nature) of the Vedāntas remains unaffected.

Mokṣa, therefore, is Ātman himself from whom Avidyā has disappeared, and that can be secured by the realisation of the oneness of Brahma and Ātman from the proper scrutiny of the Vedānta passages.

So, a person, removing the world and turning a recluse intent upon securing salvation, should approach a properly qualified teacher and indulge in consideration of the Mīmāṃśā Sūtras and passages, till the fruit is achieved.
INTRODUCTION

III. A CRITICAL APPRECIATION

The *Vedāntakalpa-atikā*, as has been pointed out, is probably the author’s first work and contains jottings or important points for detailed exposition later on, bearing on the Advaita doctrine in the Upaniṣads.

Madhusūdana first of all briefly refers to the ideas about Mokṣa in the different systems of philosophy (both Astika and Nāstika) and weeds out the Nāstika systems (of the Materialists, Baudhāyas and Jainas, with their subsects) as not deserving any consideration, because they do not admit any changeless, permanent entity which could experience the state of Mokṣa which likewise must not be undergoing any change.

There could not exist even a desire for securing Mokṣa among the Cārvākas (who believe that with the extinction of the body, nothing is left behind) or the Baudhāyas (who regard everything as momentary) or the Jainas (according to whom Mokṣa is the going up higher and higher, thus involving some Kriyā).

In the case of the Astika systems, a desire for Mokṣa can arise, but according to these systems, Mokṣa is either something to be newly attained or reached or produced or improved, and certain Sādhanas are mentioned for securing this end. But such a Mokṣa would necessarily be transient or non-eternal as it is bound to be after all adventitious. Whether Mokṣa is described as absence of misery, or aquisition of new qualities or removal of blemishes, the result is the same.

According to the followers of the Upaniṣads, Mokṣa is Ātman himself realised in his proper nature as being without any Dharmas.

The Baudhāyas, Jainas, Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas mention certain Sādhanas as leading to salvation; so also the Sāṅkhyaśas speak of as Sādhana for Mokṣa, the discrimination
between Prakṛti and Puruṣa; the Mīmāṃsakas denounce Jñāna as a means for Mokṣa. But all these agree in regarding Mokṣa as something to be produced, and hence their views are unacceptable.

It might be argued that as Mokṣa (Ātman) is always Siddha, there cannot arise a desire for the same; possibly the removal of Avidyā may be said to be the desired end, but Avidyā itself can hardly be described in an intelligible manner, whether it is regarded as different or non-different from Ātman. This objection can easily be answered as follows — It cannot be a rule that only an Asiddha entity can produce Kāmanā for it. A Siddha entity, if it be forgotten or misunderstood on account of illusion or if there is some obstructing agency, can certainly produce the necessary Kāmanā. The removal of Avidyā can be demonstrated as being something peculiarly Anirvacaniya. When Ātman is spoken of as Advitiya, we do understand that there is the negation of any second entity and this in no way affects the Advaita idea. Actually there is no necessity for going about in this round about way. The notion of Abhāva is also based upon Avidyā and so Anirvacaniya can very well express the correct position and no Anirvacaniya-vailakṣaṇya need be admitted.

The Highest (Ātman, Brahman) is void of any Dharmas and so there can not be any particularised knowledge of the same. The well-known Pramāṇas,—Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Arthāpatī etc.,—cannot help in realising Brahman as they are unable to tackle an entity that is not tangible. The Vedānta-passages (Śabda-Pramāṇa) are helpful, but not in the ordinary way. The well-known powers of Śabda,—Denotation, Indication and Suggestion with their accepted divisions according to the Naiyāyikas and Rhetoricians are useless for the purpose of knowing a Nirdharmaka entity, so also Convention and Etymology.
In short, Brahman cannot be the object of Jñāna, but Jñāna can certainly lead to Brahman. Jñāna and Ajñāna have different resorts, so Jñāna cannot possibly demolish Ajñāna — this objection can be met with by admitting the superimposition of the Antahkarana on the Caitanya. The Śruti in so many words assures us that Ajñāna can be removed by Jñāna, and that is also a matter of actual experience. Avidyā is got rid of by the Jñāna of the nature of the Ātman. The Śabda produces direct Jñāna. When Ātman is described in the Śruti as Mānasā, there it is not meant that the Manas is the Karana; but Kartrtva is attributed to the Manas. Śabdajñāna cannot be equated with Pratyabhijñā which is indirect, and the sense-organ (eye) there cannot directly perceive the Tatāmsa (the portion not directly present). Śabda is not to be confused with any Indriya. Though Śabda produces direct knowledge, consideration of the Vedānta-passages is necessary, and this gradually removes the blemishes in the Citta which, when it is cleansed of all blemishes is, with the grace of God, able to realise the Ātman, with the removal of Avidyā.

Madhusūdana, like all Advaitins, is interested in pointing out that Mokṣa can never be described as a product, as that would make Mokṣa impermanent. At the same time he wishes to keep in tact the invulnerable nature of the Śruti-passages. He himself is greatly influenced by devotional fervour and so tries to show that while Mokṣa requires no Karana for its realisation, the Vicāra of Śruti-passages, devotion, instruction from a qualified teacher—all help in preparing the back-ground for the realisation of Ātman, and in removing the Ajñāna, by ensuring all round purity of the Citta, automatically bring about the Realisation or Mokṣa.
\[ 1 \]
A bow to that divine wonderful Śaṅkara, by whom, with the fruit, immortality, the Upaniṣad brought under control through fraud by the (Pūrva-) Mīmāṁsā (Karmakāṇḍa) was rescued, as by Gaurḍa with the securing of nectar Vinātā, made a slave by (Kadrū) the mother of serpents.

(2) Although by me with confused (soiled) intellect is not possible to comprehend the meaning of the Śastra difficult to arrive at even by wise persons striving for it continuously, still (I hope that) I, sprinkled over by the auspicious showers of nectar from the lotus-like feet of the
Revered Viśvesvara (Brahmadeva—the Lord of the universe; the name of the author’s teacher), would not be somehow or other deficient (empty).

(3) This ‘Vedāntakalpalati’ should be respectfully taken to by the persons of great talents,—growing on the heavenly tree in the form of the true nature of the individual Soul, exhibiting the highest glory by the heaps of flowers in the form of excellent logical reasonings, (and) by the fruit in the form of devotion to the illuminating knowledge of the highest Ātman.

(4) Having shaken off the statements of Jaimini (Pūrva-mīmāṁsā), Patañjali (Yoga), Gautama (Nyāya) and the views of Kaṇāda (Vaiśeṣika), Kapila (Sāṅkhya), Śiva (Paśupata) etc., I am going to propound clearly in measured words the true sense indicated by Śri Vyāsa, Śaṅkara and Sureśvara.

(5) I am going to speak of salvation, with the means thereof, by refuting the views of the other parties, for the purpose of removing the obstacles in the prescribed activities of those desirous of salvation.
[ २ ] अथः मोक्षे तत्साधने च विप्रतिपघन्ते विपश्चितः—तत्र

( १ ) लोकायतिकाः, तात्त्व प्राकृतलोकार्थसारिणः भूमयत्वादि-
विशिष्टभूतत्तत्त्वसंपिद्यते तथ चेतन्यं मन्यमानाः, नानागमपुराणार्थ-
मानादे, वायुसिद्धार्थसमपि धौहादिविभ्यतिर्क्तं चेतनं बन्धमोक्षमागिनिन्म-
शुद्धजुद्धयोपपलपति, 'नाप्रत्येकं प्रमाणसं' इति वदन्तः। तत्र कष्ट
मोक्षप्रत्याशा?

( २ ) तदेदेवदेविः, अपि प्रत्येकस्मुक्तयाःभामिनिमपिभाँणि मनः
प्राणं वा चेतनस्मुपंजनं, तथैव बश्चकः।

( ३ ) विज्ञानवादिः, तु क्षणिकविज्ञानस्कृयं देयेन्द्रियादि-

[ २ ] Now, in the matter of salvation and the means thereof,
wise men hold different contradictory views:—

( १ ) There to begin with, the Laukāyatikas (Materialists) following (the views of) the man in the street (prāk-
ṛtā), holding the aggregate itself of the four elements
particularised by the nature of man etc., as the Sentient
principle, of perverse mind, deny the Sentient sharing in
bondage and salvation, distinct from the body etc., although
well-established by various Āgamas (Śāstras), Purāṇas,
and other means of proof such as inference etc., foolishly
proclaiming 'what is not directly perceived, cannot be the
means of proof'. In that case, how can there be any hope
of salvation for any one?

( २ ) Followers of a sect of them (Materialists) also,
taking the sense-organs, the mind or the vital air severally
and jointly as the Sentient, are but cheats in the same way.

( ३ ) The followers of the Viṣṇu-vāda as well, holding
the momentary Viṣṇu-aggregate distinct from the body,
sense-organs etc., as being the Atman, consider salvation to be the complete cessation of the Vijñāna continuity along with the impediments of that (Vijñāna-skandha) or its inclusion within the all-knowing continuity without any impediments, on account of the concept of the four-fold state of being void of Atman.

(4) The Mādhyamikas as well, holding the Atman to be mere Void, and as there is no reality of any kind, speak of salvation as just the void-nature, from the metaphysical knowledge extending over the full development of the concept of Void.

(5) The followers of the Arhat (i.e. the Jainas) as well, admitting the Atman to be of the measure of the body, distinct from the body, sense-organs etc., speak of salvation as the constantly going-high-up, or, not-going-to-the-Lokākāśa (the region meant for the unliberated beings) on the part of the Atman, having uniform bliss, freed from the covering knowledge, when there comes about the total
The followers of Kaṇāda (the Vaiṣeṣikas), again, imagining the all-pervading Ātman, distinct from the body, sense-organs etc., as the resort of the nine Vaiṣeṣa-qualities (Icchā, Dveṣa etc.), prattle on:—What the real knowledge of the six Padārthas (categories) — Dravya (substance), Guṇa (quality), Karman (action), Sāmānyā (generality), Vaiṣeṣa (particularity), Samavāya (intimate relation), owing to the similarity and dis-similarity—from the realisation of the nature of Ātman, preceded by the above (knowledge), together with the worship of Īśvara, (the resulting) destruction itself of the Ātman not staying with the antecedent negation of the nine Guṇas admitted by the Vaiṣeṣikas, is salvation.
( 7 ) The followers of Nyāya as well imagine that when there is the realisation of the two Ātmans by the proper appraisal of the twelve-fold Prameyas called Soul, body, sense-organ, object (or categories), cognition, mind, activity, defect, trans-migration, fruit (or result of deeds), pain and salvation—by the enumeration, definition and examination of proof, object of knowledge, doubt, motive, instance, tenet (or, demonstrated truth), member of syllogism, hypothetical reasoning, conclusion, discussion, wrangling, cavilling, fallacy, perversion, futility and ground for confutation; and when there is the turning away of the false knowledge with the Vāsanās, there is the turning away of passion, hatred and infatuation, the products of that; and then of Dharma and Adharma, preceded by activity regarding the products of them,—then there comes about the non-production of another body on account of the destruction of Karmans done in previous birth, by the enjoyment preceded by the body-array; and thereupon the total freedom from misery with twenty-one-fold variety, causing obstruction, which is the salvation.

1 A निष्यपेन. 2 A वासलुक्षण...
(8) Others again say:—There is no production of future Karman on account of the non-performance of the prohibited and voluntary Karmans and by the performance of the compulsory and occasional Karmans, even without the knowledge of Ātman, confining to what happens in one birth; and the present Karman being destroyed by the enjoyment, they speak of Salvation as characterised by the destruction of the entire Karman.

(9) The followers of Prabhākara (Pūrvamīmāṃsā) also, consider Salvation, characterised by the most complete annihilation (of Karman), due to the destruction of Dharma and Adharma associated with the body, sense-organs etc., through the right performance of Karmans prescribed by the Veda, preceded by the knowledge of the Ātman as ordained.

(10) The followers of Bhaṭṭa (Kumārila), again, say:—Only through the combination of knowledge and Karman, there arises eternal knowledge and eternal bliss for the Ātman steeped in the knowledge of non-sentient objects; thereby afterwards, there is the Salvation,—the manifestation of eternal bliss, by the eternal realisation, owing to its being not dependent upon particular objects.
(11) Some belonging to the same (Bhāṭṭa school) (think) Salvation (which) is, through mental realisation, to be either the manifestation of eternal bliss or merely the absence of misery.

(12) The followers of Sāṁkhya (Kapila), again, say:— When the beginningless non-discrimination is turned away by the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti, there is not again activity for the sake of the enjoyment (by Puruṣa) of the Prakṛti that had been lording it over in respect of the Puruṣa—so, the unreserved total obstruction to the three-fold misery alone, is the Salvation of the Puruṣa, although quite unattached (kevala) by his very nature.

(13) The followers of Patañjali (the Yoga school) think thus:— Owing to the maturity of passionlessness by practice, due to the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti, preceded by the (proper observance of) Yama (restraint), Niyama (regulations), Āsana (Yogic-posture), Prāṇāyāma (breath-control), Pratyāhāra (continuity),
The three-staff Ascetics, again, admitting difference-cum-non-difference between the Jiva and Brahman, say that Salvation is through the constant combination alone of Knowledge and Karman, the cessation (merging) of the part differentiated along with Karman and Vāsanā, of the Jiva as the Effect, in Brahman constituted as the (one) Cause.

Others (belonging to the same Tridāṇḍin-order speak of Salvation) as the attainment of the Highest Lord.

Others (of the same Order), having imagined two states of Brahman, in the forms—changing and changeless, like the two-fold state of the sea, due to the distinction of being with waves, and being without waves, speak of Salvation, as the attainment of the changeless state by the
(17) The followers of Paśupati (Śiva, the Śaivas) speak of Salvation as going near Paśupati, without any return therefrom, through the observance of the Dharmas of the Paśupatas as ordained.

(18) The followers (or devotees) of Viṣṇu, likewise (say) that Salvation (is) going to the world of Viṣṇu, by the observance of the Bhakti-ritual as ordained.

(19) The followers of Hiranyagarbha (the Golden Egg, say):—Salvation (is) just the attainment of Hiranyagarbha by the path, ‘Arciḥ etc.,’ through the devoted observance of the Five-fire Vidyā etc.

(20) Thus, others also prattle in various ways, what is conceived by themselves, contrary to the Śruti (meaning) and reasoning.

(21) The followers of the Upaniṣads, on the other

1 A omits यथोक्त; 2 A कल्पयन्ति.
hand, graced by Nārāyaṇa, the divine Lord of the Nila mountain, speak of Salvation as the Ātman alone, constituted of limitless bliss and enlightenment, characterised by the cessation of beginningless Avidyā (Nescience).

And as Avidyā is the material (cause) of all misery, when that is removed, the total cessation of misery duly follows. And although the nature of that (Salvation) stands in no need of any means, the realisation itself of its nature, freed from the four-fold impediment (and) caused by the ‘Great sentence’ manifesting it is metaphorically spoken of as the means of Salvation. The four-fold impediment is:—the Vāsanā for the enjoyment of the objects of senses; the wrong conception in respect of the means of proof; the wrong conception in respect of the objects of knowledge, and contradictory conception.

There Śama (control), Dama (restraint) etc., which form part of the ‘hearing’ (Śravaṇa) are the removers of the attachment to the objects of sense; Śravaṇa is the
remover of the wrong conception in respect of the means of proof; meditation (is the remover) of the wrong conception in respect of the object of knowledge; and contemplation is the remover of the contradictory conception. Therefore, (the Śāstra of) Mīmāṃsā dealing with the embodied soul, consisting of four Adhyāyas (Lakṣaṇa), has been composed by the Revered Bādarāyana for the destruction of the impediments—wrong conception etc., by taking to Śravana etc. And one desirous of salvation is the proper (authorised) person for (the study of) this (Uttara-mīmāṃsā); because (the Sūtra) being based upon the injunctions with their consideration augmented by control, etc., mentioned in the Śruti (passages), such as

‘Having become controlled, restrained, inactive, enduring (and) full of faith, one should behold the Ātman within the Ātman himself’.

(Br. IV. 4. 28)
in the Sūtra

‘Now then the desire to know Brahman’ (B. S. I. 1. 1)
by the word Ātha, one alone desirous of salvation, characterised by (the possession of the qualities) control etc., has been referred to.

[3] Thus this is the sense ultimately conveyed — By one desirous of salvation, endowed with (the qualities of) control etc., approaching (studying under) a teacher, the consideration of the Vedānta-passages by the Mīmāṁsā of four Adhyāyas is to be repeatedly gone through till the removal of the impediments, for the purpose of the removal of the wrong conception etc., standing in the way of the realisation of the oneness of Brahman and Ātman, which is the means of salvation.

[4] There, so long as the nature of salvation is not definitely ascertained specifically, in whom could any desire for that rise up? Even when desire is produced by the ascertainment of only its nature, it is only when there is the ascertainment of specific means (that) the activity of one desirous of salvation is possible in that behalf,—so, by the refutation of (the wrong idea of) apparent salvation and its means admitted by the various disputants, salvation in its

1 अ तत्त्वसन्वांसम्बन्धन 2 अ -लाखुशानी
3 अ सलंक्र अयम्बोर्त्त अत्तः
true nature and the means thereof are definitely ascertained after (due) consideration.

[5] There, a desire for its means does not deserve to rise in respect of the views, other than the view of the followers of the Upaniṣads, on account of the modes of salvation admitted by the various disputants being not supported by the right means of proof and being opposed to the means of proof. Thus—

(1) Apropos the Cārvāka-system, for the matter of that, on account of the nature of salvation itself not being admitted, on account of admitting the perishable nature of the body and of the sense-organs, vital airs and the mind, because they are constituted of the material elements, and on account of their being themselves by nature constituted of misery and being the cause of misery, there is no scope either at the time of their removal or during the period of
(2) Hence too, the Buddha-doctrine is also cast away. Even there, on account of the momentary Vijñāna being constituted of every (kind of) misery, owing to being full of impediments, and when that is removed, for whom would there be the scope for salvation on account of the absence of himself? Surely, nobody favours one's own destruction, on account of (oneself) being the target of unequivocal love. A miserable life is preferable to one's own destruction. As to the statement about death at (the holy Tirtha) Prayāga etc., through the desire to secure the highest bliss, and elsewhere also in respect of those completely affected by leprosy etc. — this cannot be an illustrative instance, because it points out to the existence itself of an imperishable enjoyer.

(3) By this (above argument) is cast away the view advocating the inclusion of an omniscient stream, on account of the all-knowing having the form of the entire knowledge...
with impediments, being made of extreme misery, as compared to the continuity of one associated with the worldly existence, on account of the greater degree of the impediments and on account of the impropriety of another thing being included in another. Otherwise, there would be the undesirable result of admitting the doctrine of World-Advaita, on account of the (qualities), blue, white, being looked upon as similar and even the all-knower stream would have a perishable nature on account of the continuity not being different from one associated with continuity, or there would be the undesirable contingency of stability (being admitted), if the continuity is not possessed of a perishable nature — thus these perverse views deserve to be ignored.

(4) Apropos the doctrine of the Void, however, what (and) by whom can be desired, on account of one possessed of desire, not being in existence in all the three times (past, present and future)?

(5) Even according to the view of the Ārhatas (Jainas) on account of (the Ātman) always going up, residing in the Alokākāśa and as involved in action, being of a perishable nature, there is no object for the desire of salva-
tion, characterised by a non-return; or, if happiness is admitted to have the form of salvation there would be the same aforesaid defect, as that would be a product. Even if (it is held that) it is not originated, the same defect remains on account of there being no distinction between the released Soul and one continuing in the Samsāra. If it is argued that the happiness is veiled by the eight-fold Karman in the state of Samsāra, but when the eight-fold Karman ceases that is without any veil,—(our answer is)—No, on account of the nature of having a veil in respect of the Karman not being seen anywhere. We shall be speaking of that being impossible later on, on the strength of the nature of the Ātman and his being distinct from that etc., as well. And further, by admitting the size of the body for the Ātman, and that the bodies are possessed of dimensions not fixed up, and by the acceptance of (the theory of) the increase and decrease of parts in respect of the bodies, of an elephant, a mosquito etc., it will have to be said that the Ātman is possessed of dimensions not fixed. And accordingly when there is the change of dimension, the destruction of

1 A सुखस्थ ॠ A सुखमिति विशेष हस्ति चेत
2 A कर्मणामानवरङ्गस्य
3
Atman would perforce be there, like that of the lamp etc., on account of the change of the dimension not being reasonable without a change in substance. Even though the stability of a thing is admitted so long as the recognition takes place, there cannot be the sharing of the fruit—the imperishable salvation—on account of the perishable nature being certain owing to its being possessed of parts; and there cannot be that nature of salvation—the very highest human purpose—owing to the perishable fruit being included in heaven etc.,—so enough of this great proximity!

[6] I say (says the objector)—Let there be no desire for salvation in heretical theories, on account of the fruit and the enjoyer of the fruit (being both) perishable. That blemish does not exist in the orthodox view. And so, that (desire for salvation) properly fits in there. To explain the same—

It has been established, for the matter of that, by all means of proof, that the Atman is eternal, all-pervading, distinct from the body, sense-organs etc. Regarding this (tatra), Direct perception, for the matter of that, is of the
nature of recognition in the form, 'That I, who noted (my) parents in childhood, in old age am noting great-grandsons', (that perception) not proven otherwise and uncontradicted having for its province the one same continuous perceiver, even though in childhood and old age the body has become different, refers to a permanent Ātman definitely over and above that (body etc.). And it is void of any previous contact (i.e. beginning), on account of the rule of the relation of cause and effect, because there being no other way to explain reasonably the activity towards the purpose, drinking the milk from the breast etc., in his case, when born, having no experience whatsoever in this birth and being invariably the resort of the experience of the remembrance of the desirable means of that type, of the impressions producing that, and of those producing the same, and that same (state of things) being admitted (to exist) even prior to that, and because of the previous experience, impressions, remembrance, desire etc., having the same resort and referring to the same object. To the same effect is the Sūtra of the great sage—
Desire, hatred, mental effort, pleasure, pain, knowledge—these are the logical mark (to prove the existence) of the Atman.

(Nyā. Sū. I. 1. 10)

As the aggregate of objects is for the sake of another, it is seen that the non-sentient object of enjoyment—the bed, seat etc., is for the sake of the enjoyer. Thus in the case of the body also, it is (intended) for the sake of the enjoyer as it is of no different nature than (other) objects of enjoyment. And he who is the enjoyer, himself keeping apart, is proved to have his own purpose, otherwise he would not be staying there. Similarly his establishment (is proved) also on account of his being the perceiver of the non-sentient class of objects. And such being the case, there is in his case even the absence of the other end (i.e. destruction), owing to his having no prior existing cause and owing to the impossibility of any cause of destruction, and on account of the Śruti-passage

'O dear, this Atman is, verily, imperishable' (Brha. IV. 5. 14)
and others. Thus, on account of that (Ātman) being proved to have a permanent nature by (the means of proof). Direct perception, Inference and Word, and on account of the impossibility of his being possessed of the nature of having parts and middle dimension, being pervaded by the non-eternal nature opposed to that — when it is concluded that Ātman is without parts, there being the doubt whether (the Ātman) is atomic or of the highest dimension, it is concluded that he is of the highest dimension, on account of his activity being seen everywhere and on account of the Śruti-passage such as

'Like Ākāśa, all-pervading and eternal'.

Even according to the view of his being atomic, prima facie, though the desire for salvation can be regarded as reasonable owing to the possibility of his possession of the eternal nature, still, as a result of serious pondering, we shall state its unreasonableness (impossibility) on account of the non-establishment of salvation as having the nature of not being different from Brahman of the highest dimension.
Thus then, in common with all orthodox systems, the Enjoyer, apart from the body and the sense-organs sharing in Bondage and Salvation, being established as eternal, the Vaiśeṣikas, the followers of Nyāya and the followers of Prabhākara (Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) attribute to him nine particular qualities,—cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, activity, merit, demerit, Bhāvanā (mental impression) — as being produced by the contact with the mind. The rise of the nine particular qualities in him is Samsāra, and salvation is the simultaneous destruction (of them). To the same effect is the Śūtra of the great sage —

'On the passing away in succession of pain, birth, activity, blemish, false knowledge, there is the salvation due to their absolute absence.'

(Nyā. Śū. I. 1. 2)

Therefore, owing to the absolute cessation of pain, owing to its imperishable nature, owing to its denoting the highest human purpose, reasonably enough is produced the desire for this here in the case of the discriminating persons —
(The Siddhāntin replies) — (Do) not (say) so, owing to the impossibility of destruction of the natural qualities, when the entity possessing the qualities is in existence, as when the jar is there, it is not perceived that there is the absence (or, turning away) of the entire particular (or, special) qualities in it. To the same effect has been stated in the Vārtika —

"If the Ātman has the nature of the doer etc., then expect not (his) release from that; for, not indeed does the nature of entities turn away, like heat from the Sun."

(Brha. Vā. Kā. 55-56)

Consequently, the turning away of them (the special qualities), verily, along with the entity itself possessing the qualities has to be admitted — which would bring forth the (undesirable) contingency of (accepting) the theory of Ātman-less-ness spoken of before. That is spoken of by the reverend author of Brahmasiddhi —

"Salvation having the characteristic of the turning away of the special quality, Vijñāna etc., is not different from the theory of extinction. Not indeed is the total
absence of perception in the case of an entity although existing, different from negation; and who indeed would be hankering after the absence of the Ātman dear (to him) in all respects? — thus salvation would be serving no human purpose."

(Bra. Si. Bra. Kā.)

Because there is the absence of any means of proof in regard to the Ātman characterised by the turning away of all special qualities, and because the absence of pain not known, serves no human purpose, there is the invariable concomitance with the non-existing nature, like dancing in darkness. (Even if it is argued that) there would be the human purpose served in the case of something not known by its very nature, (the answer is) — No; the non-establishment of its own nature on account of the absence of means of proof has been (already) stated, on account of the inferences taken as favouring the existence of means of proof in their case being mere fallacies. If it be said that the Śruti itself,

‘The agreeable and the dis-agreeable, verily, touch not him without a body’

(Chā. VIII. 12. 1)
is the proof; (the reply is) — No. Because that (Śruti passage) is concerned with postulating the absence of connection with pleasure and pain in the case of one bereft of egoism about the body although he is living, and there is the absence of anything to measure the special state bereft of the nine particular qualities, and also the absence of any word postulating that. And further, the destruction of pain cannot be the human purpose, owing to the possibility of the rise of another pain again, like the destruction of pain obtaining at the present moment.

[ 8 ] Now, if the idea is favoured viz. as the antecedent negation of pain is the cause of pain; when that is removed there would be the non-production of another pain — (our reply is) — No. Even if some antecedent negations be removed, there would be the possibility of the existence of others owing to the absence of any proof regarding the removal of all (antecedent negations) once for all; owing to the removal of antecedent negation not being capable of being accomplished by human effort, there the continuous study of the Śastras such as Pañcādhyāyī and others, and...
efforts for that (as involved in) hearing, thinking, meditation etc., are bound to result in being fruitless, and further there would be the undesirable contingency of activity being meant for the purpose of production of pain itself. Actually the feeling of hatred itself being proper here on account of the removal of every kind of pleasure, which is the highest human purpose, who possibly would desire to remain like a dry piece of wood, by the removal of every kind of pleasure?

[ 9 ] As to what has been said by the author of the Nyāya-bhāṣya

'Tranquil, verily, is this Salvation—the detachment from all, the cessation of all. A lot of difficult, terrible sin is wiped off in it—what talented person would not like this Salvation, —the uprooting of all pain and the non-cognition of all pain? It is like this—as food mixed up with honey and poison should not be taken, so pleasure mixed up with pain is unacceptable.'

(Nyā. Bhā. I. 1. 2)
— That is not (so). On account of the absence of any proof for postulating two independent human purposes of life, as even the negation of pain, being subordinated to pleasure, is a human purpose of life, on account of the negation of pain being there as a rule at the time of (experiencing) pleasure, and on account of the absence even of pleasure in the states of deep sleep, Dissolution etc., at the time of the absence of pain, there cannot be the conception of pleasure as the human purpose of life, as conveying the negation of pain, owing to the violation (of the concomitance between ‘Sukha’ and ‘Duḥkhā-bhāva’). However, indifference towards pleasure in a small measure is proper with a desire for more pleasure, but not merely for the sake of negation of pain — this is the way of (argument of) those who act after proper scrutiny.

[10] Well then, let (Salvation) be the manifestation of permanent pleasure,—the view of Bhaṭṭācārya (Kumārila), on account of the impossibility there of the blemishes spoken of before. (Our reply is)—No; because that would not allow any alternatives — is that permanent pleasure different from Ṛta or not different? And in respect of

\[ A \] नित्यसुखाविन्यासिकिं इति भञ्जाचार्यमतम्, तत्र पूर्वोक्तदृष्टान्तापरमात् । न, विक्ल्यासहत्वात्—तत्सिद्धिः सुखं, आत्मनो भिंसं, अभिन्नः वा । आश्चर्यम पण्यं, अजन्यं वा । तत्रार्थे, जन्यं स्थलितः
even the first, is it produced or not produced? Apropos the first, as what is produced is as a rule perishable, how could it be the object of desire for the imperishable human purpose of life? For, one desirous of salvation is spoken of as one having no longing for the pleasure ending in the Brahmaloka; and that absence of longing (arises), verily, because of its being perishable, on account of its being produced. Apropos even the last view, some agency for making it known should be stated, on account of the impossibility of its being self-illumining and on account of this not being admitted. Further, there being the absence of the connection between the mind and the organs of knowledge in salvation, that same viz. not being the human purpose in life, would be the (undesirable) result on account of its not being comprehended. For, pleasure not capable of being comprehended cannot be the human purpose in life; otherwise, the pleasure of another also would have perforce to be (treated) like that. If the sense-organs etc., are admitted (to function in salvation), there would be no distinction from the state of worldly existence and further in that case you will have to state (some) cause for its comprehension in the Samsāra-state. If some enveloping factor be admitted, there would be the undesirable contingency (from your point of view) of the admission of the
indescribable Māyā, on account of the impossibility of pondering, with its nature being different from existence and non-existence; but in that case you would be admitting the entire view-point of the Brahmavādins. For this very reason, (the view) that pleasure is not different from Ātman is dismissed, because the form of Ātman being always uncovered, the pleasure not different from it would perform be comprehended, (an undesirable contingency), even in the state of Samsāra. On account of this very impropriety, the Neo-Mimāṃsakas have admitted merely the negation of pain. But that stands, verily, dismissed; because without activity in the Ātman, there would not be any chance of the removal of pain, resorting to him, on account of the followers of Bhatta having admitted the identity of cause and effect, and on account of the removal of the effect being seen in the world by the removal of the material cause itself.

[II] Well then, (let us) accept the view of the followers of Sāmkhya and Yoga. For, there on account of Ātman, who is without any attachment, being bereft of
any particularity, and the admission of pain being the quality of Buddhi, there is no possibility of the extinction of the Atman even though it is admitted that the removal of pain has for its cause the destruction of the constituent cause of pain. And on account of (the Atman himself) being self-illumining there cannot be any comparison with the dancing in darkness—(Our reply is)—No. Apropos even this view there is the impossibility of destruction of pain having the sat-nature, and the impossibility of the origination of the destruction having the asat-nature, on account of the Smṛti-passage

"There cannot be the existence of what is asat, nor is there the non-existence of what is sat."

(Gita II. 16)

On account of the impossibility of any distinction of the slightest degree in the case of salvation from Samsāra—its not being the human purpose in life remains there equally. It is better (to admit) that according to the Vaiṣeṣika view, the destruction of pain even though not existing is possible, and the origination of the non-existing

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1 मूर्त्तिः 2 अस्तित्वं 3 द्वैतात्मकार्य निरूपः ...
असत्व निरोधस्योत्पत्ति: संभवति। तदपेक्षायि तुच् एवायं सत्कार्य-वाद्यपश:। सत्कृष्णाविश्रावितरोषावै संभवतः। इति चेतौ, न, तयोरि सत्वाविषेषोति। तत्त्राप्यन्यकथुप्ये, अनवस्था मूर्त्तिकारी। तथोः सदस-दिल्लुष्णत्वाणीदारे ॥ अनिर्वचनन्यरत्याम्युपगमात् ब्रह्मवादिमतापचि:। तथादस्मिन्यपशे नितावो नोपपतेतो मोक्षः।

[ १२ ] सर्वसिद्ध मैते मोक्षस्यगांत्युतवाम्युपगमे भावते, अभावते वा, जन्यत्वेन अवस्य क्षरितल्लप, जन्यत्वामात्रस्येव लाघवेन क्षरितल्ल-

destruction is possible.—As compared to that view, this doctrine of the effect being always sat (satkārya-vāda) is absolutely without any substance. If it be argued that appearance and disappearance can exist even in an existing nature, (our reply is)—No; even those two are not distinct from the existing nature. If some other thing is imagined even there, there would be (the fault of) Endlessness, which strikes at the very root (of the doctrine). On the other hand, if the two are admitted to be possessed of the characteristic of being different from sat and asat, that would be (tantamount to) the acceptance of indescribable nature for them; so, there would be the undesirable contingency (from your point of view) of accepting the view of the Brahmavādins. Therefore, salvation is quite impossible according to this view.

[ १२ ] According to all these views, salvation being admitted to be an adventitious thing—whether it is possessed of a positive nature or a negative nature, there is bound to be the perishable nature on account of its being something produced, because merely being something produced becomes straight away the cause of perishable nature.

१ अ drops वाद २ अ मूर्त्तितिक् रिणी ३ अ पक्षे
Whether is admitted the destruction of some peculiar special feature residing in the counter-entity which is perishable and possessed of a positive nature itself, or whether a non-entity over and above the basic resort is not admitted,—nothing can come in the way of destruction. Because the apprehension—The jar is destroyed—whether as resorting to the destruction or as resorting to the nature of its counter-entity, it involves the jar as the object of knowledge, because at that time, the jar being not in existence there cannot be any apprehension of a quality without any resort. As regards (the statement) ‘the destruction of the jar’ relating to the meaning of the genitive,—that is welcome to us like the statement, the head of Rāhu (who was headless), and thus there cannot be the establishment of the destruction without any reference to the counter-entity as admitted by the Logicians. If it be argued that even at the time of the destruction, there would be the perception of the jar as before, on account of its existent nature,—(our reply is)—No. Because even without direct perception, the existence of something screened by

\[ 1 \text{ तार्किकायुपमत्वनिधित्वार्थियोगिक ...} \]
the fencing etc., is taken for granted; because that cannot be obtained through the existent nature not in invariable concomitance with direct perception, and the screening objects can be inferred only by the result thereof, the impossibility otherwise of the destruction alone causes the screening things of a different nature like fencing etc. to be comprehended—so, there is no blemish (on our side). (You cannot argue that) if that is the case, then there would be the undesirable result of the blemishes being there spoken of in connection with the satkāryavāda, on account of the removal of the blemishes stated by both the parties by the admission of the unique state of being neither sat nor asat. We shall propound this further in detail.

And further likewise, apropos some particular distinction called the absence of pain in the case of the Ātman—you have to state whether it is characterised by the addition of good qualities, or characterised by the wiping away of the blemishes. According to even both of these views there (would result) its impermanent nature surely, because even the four-fold results of action characterised by origination, attainment, transformation and polish are as a rule possessed of a perishable nature and the imperishable nature

\[ A \] drops सति  \\
\[ A \] विस्तरेष चैतदुपरिधानपादयिन्यमः।
of salvation is admitted by all the disputants. To the same effect has been stated by the venerable author of the Vārtika—

'Origination, attainment, transformation and polish—that is the result of action. Salvation is different from these. Therefore, injunction serves no purpose here.'

(Bṛha. Vā. Kā. 236)

And by the venerable commentator (Śaṅkara) has this been propounded in great detail in the topic Samanvaya (harmonising).

[13] For this very reason, there is no scope for the view of those who partially agree (with the above), on account of difference-cum-non-difference being opposed to all means of proof, and on account of real difference not admitting removal. What, again, can be its remover? If you say (it is) the knowledge of Reality, (we further ask)—Does that refer to the different and the non-different, or does it refer only to the non-different? In respect of the first (alter-
विषयं वा? आधे, न तथा मेदविनिर्वकं सम्बन्धति, ज्ञानस्य खलिषयनिवर्तकत्वायोगात्। द्वितीये, ज्ञाननिर्वव्य खलिषयनिवर्तकम्, कल्पितस्येव ज्ञाननिर्वस्य खलिषयनिवर्तकम्। पुरुषोत्तमदेश्नादिना पापादिनिर्वव्यं व्यभिचारः।

इति चैत्, न। तत्र विनिष्ठक्तिया विशेषतेनेव पापादिनिर्वव्यत्वात्। इह च ज्ञानत्वस्य निर्ववस्य खलिषयनिवर्तकम्। खलिषयनिवर्तकम् विनिष्ठक्तित्वात्, खलिषयनिवर्तकम् रजितादी तथा दर्शनात्। तदुर्दः पश्चापिद्वृक्कः।

' यतो ज्ञानमक्षानस्येव निर्ववस्य।' ( पश्चापिद्वृक्कः)

इति। अज्ञानस्य च विषयं खलिषयनिवर्तकम्, भूत्तियेचैतन्येके कल्पितवः

native), that cannot possibly be the remover of difference because knowledge cannot be associated with the nature of the remover in respect of its own object. In the case of the second (alternative), the difference being removable by the knowledge, it will have to be admitted as being imaginary, because as a rule only an imaginary thing is removable by knowledge. If it is argued that there is violation (of the above rule) in the removal of sin etc. by the sight of Puruṣottama, (our reply is)—No. For, there exists the nature of the remover of sin etc. by the very distinctive prescribed rite. Here, on the other hand, the nature of knowledge is definitely intended as being restricted to the remover-nature, because that is seen in respect of dream, the Gandharva-city, conch-shell and silver, etc. As has been said by the venerable author of Pañcāpādikā—

'Because the knowledge is the remover of non-knowledge'.

(Pañca.)

We shall describe further on, the Ajñāna as being superimposed on the Sentient without a second, on account of its being the constituent cause of the world-illusion. When

\[1 \text{ अ तन हि सिद्धिः ...} \quad 2 \text{ निर्ववस्य खलिषयनिवर्तकम्} \quad 3 \text{ अ drops } \text{ च} \]
only the non-different (knowledge of Reality) is the thing to be known from the Vedas, how can the difference-portion be in accordance with the Sūtras? If different as well as non-different (knowledge of Reality) is the thing to be known from the Vedas, it would be exactly the same even in the state of salvation, on account of there being no means of proof regarding that as different — enough of this killing a dead person.

The removal of the false knowledge is due to Jñāna, the removal of difference is due to Karman,—this (argument) also is extremely flimsy, on account of the nature of the false knowledge being difficult to point out according to the view of those who advocate the ‘difference-cum-non-difference’ view, (and) on account of the possibility of every kind of apprehension everywhere indeed, by (resorting to the view of) Bhedābheda. And regarding the Karmans, nowhere indeed is seen or heard their nature as the remover of difference. And we have already spoken of the impermanent nature of what is produced by Karman. If it is argued that inference about returning again is contradicted by the Śruti-passage

‘He does not return again’ (Nīra. XXXIII; Nā. Pa. IX. 22, Kū. Ru.)
'Just as the world secured by Karman perishes, in the same way, verily, hereafter the world secured by merit perishes.'

(Chā. VIII. 1. 6)

And on account of being produced by mere Karman only, there is no difference if (it is regarded as) produced by Jñāna and Karman. There is no scope for (such a) combination on account of the Jñāna of the Ātman being beyond hunger etc. and on account of its being opposed to all Karman. And the attainment of Brahman free from all changes and states — all this would become unreasonable, on account of there being no means of proof, on account of
In the case of the apparent means spoken of in the Buddhist and other systems, there is not even the possibility of their being the means of salvation, on account of their very nature, not supported by means of proof. To explain the same — There is not the slightest proof (about the contention) here viz. the four Bhāvanās — the Bhāvanā in respect of the individual, the Bhāvanā about the momentariness, the Bhāvanā about pain, the Bhāvanā about the void — are the cause of salvation; and there is also the contradiction of the Scriptural passage such as

‘Having, verily, known that (Atman), one goes beyond death’

and further on account of the Buddhistic Scriptures being composed by human agency, being unauthoritative as they
are wanting in the basic means of proof; and on account of the Bhāvanās about the individual etc. being just illusion as regarding the permanent means of happiness, constituting the sat-nature, associated with the paraphernalia of name, genus etc. How it is so, we shall describe (later on).

For this very reason, the Ārhatā-Śāstra (Jaina-Śāstra) being unauthoritative, the means mentioned there are indeed not fit for acceptance.

[15] Thus, there is not the slightest proof to regard the knowledge of the six categories or the knowledge of the sixteen types, as the cause (of salvation), on account of the nature of the means for (securing) the non-mundane fruit being fit to be known only from the Scriptures. Nor should it be said that the statements themselves of the great sages Kaṇāda and others are the authority here like the statements of Manu and others, on account of there being no authoritative nature in them in accordance with the statement in the Scriptures, on the strength of logical reasoning. Otherwise, if an entity is established merely by an authoritative statement, nobody would be taking

1 A...तदुक्ताम्मान्याममचिह्नस्वस्या...
वस्तुसिद्धेः, उदेश्युक्तगरीक्षादिप्रयासो न खातः।
'य एतदिदृश्युक्ताते भवन्यथेते दुःखमेवापियति।'
(कटो. ६.९; १३.२.१७; शेता. २.१०)
'मृत्योऽस मृत्युमामोति य इष्ट नामेन पापति।'
(कटो. ४.१०; ब्रह्म. ४.२.१९; आ. प्र. १)
इत्यादिशुभविषयितः। चौद्धशृणूं च पदार्थर्थवच्चां मोक्षहेतुः। सामान्या-कारण वा, विशेषाकारण वा? आधे, प्रमेयत्वादिरूपेण सर्वांस्मस्त्वेव तत्तत्त्वम्। द्वितीये तु, सर्वना पदार्थाणां तेन रूपेण ज्ञानं व्रजात्सृणा-शृणांनन्तरत्वात्। दृष्ट्वत्वादिना ज्ञानं कारणमिति चेतृ, तद्रः तैत्तिरिष्ण-वचनादेव तत्त्त्वात्। प्रत्येकित्वादिरूपेण तत्त्त्वाणां व्यर्थम्। यथा

the trouble about enumeration, definition, examination etc. And further, this is opposed to the Śruti-passages such as

'Those who know this, they become immortal — and others get sunk into pain alone.' (Kaṭho. VI. 9, XIII. 4.17; Svetā. III. 10)

'From death to death he goes, who perceives here as though manifold.' (Kaṭho. IV. 10; Brha. IV. 4.19; A. Pra. 1)

Of what nature, again, is the real knowledge of entity as the cause of salvation — is it in its general form, or in a particular form? Apropos the first (alternative), there does exist that knowledge in the form of being the object of knowledge etc., in the case of all. Apropos the second (alternative), the knowledge of all entities in their different forms is impossible even in the case of Brahma-deva, because they are infinite. If it be argued that the knowledge as characterised by the nature of the substance etc., is the cause, then that is secured by the statement of that division alone. Its exposition in the form of the nature of earth etc., is useless. How there is the unauthoritative

१ आण्वेयार्थ तत्त्त्वान्म् ... २ आण्वेयार्थ तत्त्त्वान्म् ३ आण्वेयार्थ तत्त्त्वावलोकनं
The refutation of the doctrine of those who believe only in one life, only brings on a sense of shame for one who refutes! It is ignored, being just completely void of reasoning!

Thus also would be the process of thought (or the alternatives) in respect of the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Therein also, knowledge in a general form is extremely easy to have, but on account of the impossibility of (having it) in a particularised form, there is the same kind of impropriety (as in the other systems criticised above). If it be argued that the comprehension of only the Ātman would be the cause (the reply is)—There, according to the view of the Logicians, does exist the knowledge of the Ātman, viz. ‘I know’, which is a public experience. It is not possible to speak of (or dub) it as being non-perception or illusion. (If it is argued) even though it be regarded as Direct right comprehension, there can not be the power to remove the false knowledge, owing to its being under the control of the Vāsanā and
false knowledge; but it is another knowledge, produced as a mature result of hearing etc., at a period subsequent to the discrimination about the real nature of the entity, which alone is the remover of the false knowledge along with the Vāsanā — (our reply is) — No. There too is common the absence of being the remover of Vāsanā on the part of the direct knowledge of Ātman; we cannot see even any slight proof (to postulate) about any different state of things associated with it.

[18] As for the followers of Prabhākara, where can be the use of the knowledge of Reality (to them) on account of their not admitting any illusory nature? If it be said that the destruction of Karmān itself is effected by knowledge on the strength of the Šruti-passage —

'His Karmans perish' — (Mūḍa, II. 2. 8) — (our reply is) — No; then why is there no destruction of the Karmans as the real knowledge of the Ātman exists there always? There is an additional (point against you.)
in that it is not possible even to suspect any different position as you do not admit any generality associated with the qualities. If it be said that the ordained knowledge strengthened by the accessories control, restraint etc., leading a celibate life etc., having for its ultimate fruit, no return again, is the removing factor, (our reply is) — No; as it is impossible for knowledge to do, not to do, or to do otherwise, its being the subject of injunction would be impossible. (We ask you) — What kind of knowledge is to be enjoined — it is concerned with Atman particularised by knowledge etc., or is it concerned with mere Atman? Apropos the first (alternative) there is here not the slightest distinction from the knowledge associated with the Samsāra. Apropos the second (alternative), again, that nature itself of Atman which is the province of the knowledge of Reality — the means of salvation — is real, as it is based upon the Śāstras and is constituted of knowledge, — so comes in here the view of the Brahmavādins; because the knowledge of Atman, beyond hunger etc., is not linked with being the cause of salvation as it is not of an illusory nature. We shall

1 A omits n (only — दानश्र्य करुणमकर्पएति)
2 A ...विषयं स्वप्नपत्तिः ... A विषयं स्वप्नत्वान् वास्तवम्
3 A शानस्तिविद्धायान्तरः A शानस्तिविद्धाय तदान्तरः संख्यावाचारान्तरः
4 A नीत्वेतुलब्धोऽभावः A नीत्वेतुलब्धोऽभावः
describe later on the propriety of Direct perception etc., in a different way. As for the Śruti-passage quoted here, its purport is the propounding of the destruction of Kārman—because the wrong knowledge which is the cause of Kārman is fit be removed by Right knowledge,—by means of that (tattvajñāna) and not directly, there being no contradiction in this way—that has to be borne in mind.

[19] Even according to the view of the Saṅkhya and others, as the Ātman is always to be inferred, his realisation is absolutely impossible. Indirect knowledge (of the Ātman) cannot be its means as it continues to exist even today. (The argument that) there is the realisation of the Ātman, with his nature although beyond the sense-organs, on account of the efficacy of the power due to Yogic practices, cannot stand either; because even the power produced by Yoga is (just) the cause of (producing) an excess in conformity with the original capacity of the object concerned. The venerable Bhaṭṭācārya says in that connection—

'Where again is seen an excess of power, that (is there) without transgressing the limits of its own province;
the activity of the ear may extend to the comprehension in respect of (hearing) what is at a distance and subtle, but not in respect of its visual form.

( Mi. Ślo. Vā. Co. Sū. Kā. 114 )

We have already spoken of the useless nature of this view, on account of this being void of what is fit to be abandoned and what is fit to be taken.

Let this discussion stand over: What is the use of the refutations of the (so-called) threatening (arguments) of the various disputants and their howlings jarring upon the ear, in the case of those who have fixed their thoughts and are wedded to non-duality? — After this, now would be convincingly proved by right reasoning, what again is this matter in hand — the Entity constituted of the one knowledge, without a second, the highest bliss, not different from the inmost (Ātman).

[ 20 ] (I say, says the objector) — The impropriety is the same even in the view of the followers of the Upaniṣads. To explain the same — As desire cannot rise in respect of something unknown, the desire must be spoken of there in
अज्जाते कामनानुद्वादति, ज्ञाने तत्र कामना वाच्या। तथा च, कथमहेियामुणादेशे नित्यसिद्ध आत्मनि सा भवतु? सिद्धे, इच्छाविरहात संसारावस्थायामंिि मोक्षाप्तेषाः। तदुपर्यः—
'कि च मानानविज्ञाति विसिद्धि: काम्ये त्व च। ज्ञातायं लाभनित्यवाच्यितां नासित कामना॥'
( ब्रह्म गाः काः २८९ )
इति। न च संसारावस्थायाम्, अविद्यात्त्वातिाधिक्यात्मकोप्याणन्दो न मासते, विद्यायं लविद्यायं निःस्रुतायं स्वरक्राश्वादानन्दरुपेण स्वयं वेण प्रेषते, इति, अविद्यानिःस्रुतिविद्याप्रकाश्याति काम्ये, इति वाच्यम्, अविद्या-
respect of what is known. And so, how can it arise in respect of the Atman always existent, which has nothing to be abandoned and nothing to be taken? If the Atman is (already) established, there cannot be any desire (for the same) and there would be the undesirable result of salvation even in the Samsāra-state. As has been said—

'And further, salvation not known by any means of proof—is it longed for or not? If it is known, as the Atman is eternal, there cannot be any desire for the same whatsoever.'
( Brah. Vā. Ka. 259)

Nor again should it be argued by you—In the Samsāra-state, because it is screened by Avidyā, the bliss due to the realisation of non-duality although existing, does not appear on the scene; but when the Avidyā is removed by Vidyā, it by itself spreads on in the form of bliss owing to its self-illuminating nature,—thus arises the desire characterised by the removal of Avidyā—because the removal of Avidyā is difficult to point out. (We ask you)—Is that Avidyā?
निव्रद्धेदृप्रिनरूपमतात् । सा, अविद्या, आत्मार्का तत्क्रुपा वा? आघे, इत्यादि ।

[ २१ ] अथोच्यते—न सिद्धेत्तमाने, आत्मनि, इच्छावर्तहः ।
सिद्धतं किं सचं वा, नायमानलं वा, अप्रतिरूपसङ्काशाकारविशिष्टव वा ।
नायतः, विवृत्तत्रैवयक्रमार्गी रज्जुस्वज्ञमनिवृत्ताचौ च व्यभिचारात् ।
अत एव न द्वितीयोपपि, तस्माद्वत्रायहोतकेलवात् ।
तत्त्वयस्तु भवति, इच्छापरिस्वरूपीयीः ।
स तु प्रकटेन नाति, असंज्ञायादिप्रतिविषयतात् ।
अत एव पितुदृशितसस्य
सिद्धाम्बश्वतो मधुरत्वेन तां जानतोपि न माधुर्यनिमित्ततसिद्धिस्पेश्योपरिवर्तनि।

different from Ātman, or his own nature? Apropos the first (alternative), there would arise the undesirable admission of duality, and also the wrath of the Śruti advocating his being one without a second; apropos the second (alternative) there would be the fault pointed out before.

[ २१ ] In this connection, we reply (as follows) — There is not the absence of longing in respect of the Ātman, merely on the ground of his being established. Is being established, existence or being known or being the object of unobstructed realisation? Not the first (alternative can stand). Because it is vitiated in respect of the finding of the necklace that is forgotten and in respect of the disappearance of the snake on the rope. For the same reason, the second (alternative) also (cannot stand), because it points out to the desire. The third (alternative), however, can stand in the way of desire. But that exists not in the present case, on account of the obstacles, wrong conception etc. For this very reason, in the case of a person whose tongue is spoiled by the bile, in eating sugar although knowing it to be possesed of sweetness, there is no rise of

१ अन्त्वीयाभास्यति...
२ अनासिक्षत
३ प्रयोजनकवाद
४ अर्थाश्चात्वश्चति...
the special contentment due to the sweetness, on account of the absence of the realisation of sweetness, due to the blemish of the bile. Thus there are two things desirable—
(1) the village etc., which is not really reached, (2) the golden necklace etc., although already secured, screened by illusion. Similarly things fit to be discarded are also two-fold—(1) ditch etc., which cannot actually be discarded, (2) the serpent on the rope etc., always given up, are as good as not discarded on account of there being only illusion. There, in the case of the first two, the impediments for the action are (respectively) the attainment (already) and the discarding. In the case of the second two, they are to be attained by realisation (realistic attitude) alone. Here, verily, one understands the highest human purpose owing to action not being the intervening (or screening) factor. Similarly, even in the case of the attainment of the Highest bliss and the removal of Avidyā, there does exist rightly the nature of being the object of longing, owing to the conclusion that they stand as unestablished, as they are screened by illusion. As has been said in the Vārtika—

'It is not right to say that longing does not exist in

² A बस्तुतोत्सरीत...
The sense is — Even though the state of being the Ātman is established, the state of having unlimited happiness, not being established, the desire (or, longing) rightly persists in that form. And further,

‘One desires to reach the desired (goal) here, what little — the village etc., — has not been secured; one also longs for something, gold etc., forgotten, although (actually) held in the hand; similarly, one wishes to abandon the undesirable thorn etc., that are fit to be abandoned; one wishes to abandon, though already abandoned, something, the snake etc., on the rope. In the case of objects fit to be secured or fit to be abandoned, because they can be had by definite means, there would be the expectancy for the means, through a positive injunction and the prohibitory statement; but in
the case of things, secured or abandoned, characterised by the intervention of Ajñāna, nothing else than the knowledge of things as they are, can be conducive to the human purpose."

( Brahma Samhita V. 885-888 )

[ 22 ] As to what has been stated (by you)—the removal of Avidyā is difficult to point out, (our reply is)—That (is) not (so), on account of our admitting a fifth mode. Just as the fourth mode, the ‘indescribable nature’ itself, was admitted, as (1) existence, (2) non-existence, or (3) existence and non-existence, are not possible in the case of Avidyā and its effects; so, as the Anirvacaniya is invariably identical with Avidyā, and because its removal and counter-entity cannot have identity with it, even something different from Anirvacaniya is established, in the case of the removal of Avidyā; everywhere (the argument) ‘the impossibility otherwise’ being the strongest. Again, as the Sruti advocating non-duality, is concerned merely with ‘Sat-Advaita’, there is no conflict with it. Such being the position, the passages (describing the Ātman) as ‘not gross’ etc., would
also be rightly given their due, as the negations of being gross etc., can be cognised in the Ātmā, and the cognition of the absence of a second, by the expression 'without a second' also. Otherwise, if there is the knowledge only of the Ātmā, in the absence of comprehension of the absence of homogenous and heterogenous distinctions, what is being opposed by the Śruti advocating non-duality? Therefore, the admission of 'negation' (as a means of proof), verily, establishes the nature of being without a second — thus there is no impropriety whatsoever (in concluding thus) — so hold the author of Ṣtatasiddhī and others.

In reality, however, as negation is constituted of sentiency, its apprehension ought to be taken as being connected with the self-illumining sentiency itself; if its imaginary nature has to be necessarily spoken of owing to the impossibility of connection with reality of something absolutely unchanging and of contactless nature, then as the whole fancy is based upon Avidyā, the fancy about negation is also based upon Avidyā — and so, there exists not the

1 Ā kēvalaṁmājānvāde
2 Ā adhitīṣṭhānasāyak...
3 Ā kūṭaśāsākṣamaṇya cha
unique indescribable nature about it. So has been spoken of by the author of the Vārtika—

‘There is no other existence apart from Ajñāna like that of a second other than Ātman. Its removal is, verily, that (comprehension) itself; and no other (removal) by the comprehension of Ātman is there.’ (Brha. Vā. III. 8. 122)

As for the passages (describing the qualities) 'not gross etc., — they only convey the nature of the Ātman as being quite different from the 'gross' etc.; they do not convey the negation of them; because the presence and the absence of fancied entities have only the nature of their basis (adhiṣṭhāna). As the conch-shell substance itself, when unknown is constituted of the nature of silver; that same when comprehended is constituted of the negation of silver, on account of its unique nature itself being constituted of the negation of silver. — Thus here also the Ātman, unknown, is constituted of the nature of all duality; but when known he is constituted of its negation, on account of the nature of
the negation of duality of that unusual form itself. So has been said—

‘Here there is the concealment of the gross, inasmuch as the entity concerns reality. There can be no denial based upon negation even elsewhere; what then in the case of the Immutable?’

(Bṛha. Vā. III. 8. 74)

‘By which form the Immutable denies the gross entity, by that itself, here too there is a complete (denial), on account of its being opposed to everything.

As the fire destroys the opposites with various different opposite forms, like that there is not here the driving out of the gross etc.

As there might be the denial of being associated with the means of proof (mānitva) etc., with the form of the actionless, so (here also), on account of the inmost absolutely unchanging form it is the denier of everything.

There the direct realisation, the fullest comprehension
The followers of Prabhákara admit the real nature itself or the ground-region etc., as the cause of dealing with negation. As the Logicians also not admitting another negation, the counter-number of negation in the case of the (cognition of) absence of a jar — 'The jar exists not' etc., admit the nature itself of that as the cause of the idea of negation, — then why should it not be for (applicable to) us also? Concerning this itself, it has been said—

'There can be no denial based upon negation even elsewhere.'

Therefore, the Ātman being known as continuous Bliss, without a second, sentiency and merely Sat, is spoken of as the removal of Avidyā. Here itself is the culmination of all human purposes, as from the Smṛti passage—
What is fit to be done, has been done; what is fit to be reached, has been reached; there exists nothing beyond the attainment of Atman.'

I say (says the objector) — Here in (the expression) ‘Comprehended is the Atman’, Jñāna being the qualifier, something qualified by Jñāna itself would be salvation, — so, with the destruction of the qualifying attribute there would follow the undesirable result viz., the negation of that (Atman), therefore that should be regarded as just its characteristic. Further still, even prior to that time, there would be the absurdist position of practical association with salvation. — (Our reply is) — (Do not say) so. Even (in expressions) like ‘Devadatta’s houses are associated with crows (sitting upon them)’ etc., even prior to the association of the crows, the undesirable contingency about the practical use of the houses etc., is the same. If it is argued that the characteristic feature also has the power of turning away something only in the time after its own (establishment), then (our answer is) — here also the state of things is similar. Surely there cannot be indeed (any discussion about) the impropriety (impossibility) in respect of what is (actually) perceived. Now Avidyā being beginningless, even though (there is) the removal of the jar in the form of
the removal of the antecedent negation, there is the non-production of the antecedent negation,—like that even when the exclusion (of Avidyā) by the knowledge of Reality is effected, there is not the undesirable contingency of its advent again.

[ 23 ] What kind of knowledge, again, is admitted as the remover of Ajñāna? (It) cannot be merely sentiency, because it being always in existence, Avidyā would be always removed—an undesirable contingency. And as a consequence, there is the impossibility of the existence of Samsāra as based upon that, the unwelcome position of there being no scope for activity on the part of all Śāstras and further, the contradiction with the experience. Neither can it be of the nature of functioning,—if that is real, the Avidyā in the antahkarana would also necessarily be real on account of that cause; it cannot be removed by that, and further there would be the unwelcome position of the violation of the implications of all the Vedānta. If that is false, how is there the capacity to remove Ajñāna? Not indeed is (any) false knowledge seen to be the remover of Ajñāna; otherwise, even in the case of knowledge in dreams, that
would take place—an undesirable result! Only the real knowledge of rope etc., is found as being the remover of Ajñāna, which is the producing cause of the illusion about the serpent etc. And again, is that (Jñāna) possessed of some mode, or without any mode whatsoever? Apropos the first (alternative), the Jñāna having a mode being unreal in respect of Brahman without any mode, there can be no capacity to remove the Ajñāna; even if it is possessed of a real nature, there can be no establishment of Advaita. Neither is the second (alternative possible)—Nowhere indeed is seen the modeless Jñāna to be the remover of Ajñāna, because that kind of nature (of removing) is seen in the case of (that) Jñāna alone, having the same resort, the same mode and the same object. Otherwise, even from the knowledge viz., ‘a substance is the object of knowledge’, there would be the unwelcome position about the removal of Ajñāna about the form of the jar etc.; because it is on a par with the Ajñāna etc., having the mode of the nature of the jar on account of having the same object.
And further, is that (Jñāna) indirect or direct? Apropos the first (alternative), it cannot have the capacity of being the remover of Ajñāna which is the producing cause of super-imposition on the direct (perception); otherwise, even by the inference etc., about whiteness, there would be the undesirable contingency viz. the removal of illusion about the yellow colour of the conch, because the direct superimposition is fit to be removed by the direct knowledge. Not the second (alternative either), because the Word is not seen to be producing direct knowledge, because it is a rule that the Word is the producing cause of the indirect knowledge, as characterised by being the means of knowledge. Even in cases like 'You are the tenth', when (at first) the indirect knowledge is produced by the word, then afterwards is (produced) the direct knowledge in the mind. — Otherwise, there would be the undesirable contingency, viz. the loss of its nature as the cause (of knowledge). Neither can it be said that the same might take place even in the present case, because it would go counter to the explanations in the Upaniṣads; because there is a denial of any instrument of knowledge over and above the Vedānta in the Śruti-passages like —

1 A परोक्षप्रचार 2 A परोक्षप्रचार जन्मते
None, not knowing the Vedas, comprehends that Big (Brahman).

and because the Word would lose its authoritative nature in producing an indirect knowledge in the case of an object directly visible. Even though the knowledge produced by passages—

'Truth, Knowledge, Infinite'

and others, although by nature indirect, should not be regarded as illusory, because it cannot grasp the indirect state, owing to the absence of the mode of having a different resort; still what appears as not different from the Knower, has the nature of directness according to our own conclusive view; if however that (directness) exists not in the knowledge produced by the passages, That thou art, and others, then as Brahman would not appear as not different from the Knower, the scriptural passages would have an unauthoritative status, marked by the non-enlightening nature. Now (if you say), the cognizance of Brahman is accepted as not
different from the Knower, then (we say) that same is the
direct nature; so, on that ground it is not established that
the passages, That thou art, and others are the producing
causes of indirect knowledge. Therefore, no other cause
being possible in the case of Brahman without a second, and
as the Word as a rule produces indirect knowledge, there is
not the establishment of the direct knowledge. And in its
absence, there would not be the removal of Ajñāna—the
cause of direct illusion, and so there would be the absence
of salvation.

[24] And further, if it be argued that the beginning-
less Ajñāna of a positive form is capable of being removed
by that knowledge, (our reply is) as the beginningless state
is co-extensive with the imperishable nature, so is it seen in
the case of Ātman. Otherwise, Ātman also being an entity,
there would be the undesirable contingency of his having the
perishable nature of a jar and others. Therefore, there can-
not be the contingency of the removal of Ajñāna as it is
possessed of a beginningless nature. Further, it should not
be said (by you) that in the case of the Ātman either his nature as the highest Reality or (his) self-illumining nature is the cause of eternal existence and not his being possessed of a beginningless nature, (our reply is) — Owing to the absence of a similar illustration, the relation of product and the producing cause is not established, as we do not accept the existence of the highest Reality etc., in something other than the Ātman. And further, in the case of the object of some means of proof, the position of being fit to be removed by some means of proof is not possible, because the means of proof cannot be the remover of its own object. If (Ajñāna) is not the object of some means of proof, as its self-illumining nature is not accepted, there is no possibility of its being the cause, as it would be incapable of doing anything for some purpose, being on a par with the horn of a hare etc. What, again, is its remover? Not for the matter of that it itself; for, nowhere indeed is found the self-removing nature; otherwise, if it is so, there is bound to be the undesirable contingency of momentariness. Nor again, some other knowledge, — that also cannot be removing itself and so there too, (for the other knowledge) another (would be the remover), there too, another — by such endless proce-
there would never be the establishment of salvation. Which again is its resort? Not, for the matter of that, the Ātman himself; he is admitted to be not possessed of any Dharmas. If he is the resort of Dharmas that are to be produced, there would be the undesirable contingency of his being of an impermanent nature, owing to his immutability being jeopardised thereby. Nor again, the mind, on account of the impossibility of knowledge resorting to it, being the remover of Ajñāna belonging to Ātman, because there is contradiction between Jñāna and Ajñāna belonging only to the same resort, not between any two; otherwise, there would be an unwarranted extended application (of the rule). Further, Ajñāna cannot have the mind as its resort, because that (Ajñāna), its product, exists even prior to its being produced from it and because it is admitted that it has for its resort pure sentiency. What again is its object (sphere of activity)? If (you say that) it is the Brahman, not different from the inmost, (and) its nature being — without a second, highest Bliss, knowledge, — (we ask you) — What is the proof here? It cannot, for the matter of that, be the mind; because it lacks the nature of being self-proven

₁ \text{मनोक्षणस्याश्वास्त्रदिकाः} ... ₂ \text{अद्वितीयपरमाणुः शास्त्रमें श्रीम्य} ...
on account of its being just a co-worker with other means of proof, like light etc., and because it would be against the Scriptural passage

'What one thinks not by the mind' (Keno. I. 5)

and others. If it is admitted to be perceptible by the mind, there would be the giving up of the Advaita-doctrine by accepting the creed of the Tārkikas, because the mind can grasp only what is particularised by pleasure and others. If you say that the mind perfected by hearing, thinking (and) contemplating the Vedānta-passages is the proof there—thereby would not ensue the blemish spoken of—then the Vedānta-passages themselves would be (the proof), being something on which the others are dependent; the mind, however, is only concerned with the direct state—this should be noted.

[25] But, all that is but another point at issue. First, let the nature of proof of Vedānta-passages themselves be propounded; then (should be considered) whether the knowledge produced by them (is) direct, or the mental compe-
hension depends upon that. For, surely, the authoritative nature of a sentence is not possible in the case of an entity without Dharmas. For, a sentence enlightens through the knowledge of the meaning of words. The knowledge of the meaning of words ensues through the power of the words with their inter-relation grasped. And the comprehension of the inter-relation takes place even before the knowledge of the import of the sentence by the practical behaviour etc., of the elders in respect of what is put forth by other means of proof. Here, however, in the case of Brahman without any Dharmas, no other means of proof can function, because, Direct perception is untenable owing to the absence of form etc. It cannot come within the province of Inference on account of the absence of a logical mark pervaded by that. It cannot be the province of Analogy, on account of its being bereft of similarity. It cannot be understood by Presumption, on account of the absence of any object, which cannot be accounted for without that. It cannot come within the ken of Negation, because it is possessed of a positive form. If (you say that) it can come in through the Śāstra itself like the sacrificial post, Āhavanīya fire etc., (our reply is)—No, there is here
complete dissimilarity — because the sacrificial post, Aha-vaniya-fire etc., are possessed of Dharmas, characterised by the words and the possibility; while here (Brahman) being beyond all Dharmas, cannot be the object of any function of the word.

[26] To explain the same — the word-function, for the matter of that, is two-fold — (1) Principal and (2) Subordinate.

There the Principal (function) is concerned with an individual particularised by generality, — of the nature of God's will in the form 'from this word this meaning is to be understood' — the convention, so (say) the Tārkikas.

(The Principal function) is a relation concerning itself only with generality, by its own nature having the unique power of producing the comprehension of the meaning, — so (say) the Mīmāṁsakas.

There, the first (view of the Tārkikas) cannot bear investigation (pounding), on account of the unwelcome
result viz., all words having only one power, as the will of God is only one. If (it be argued that) there is division on account of the division of limiting adjuncts, (the reply is) — there would necessarily be that division in respect of each word. If (it be argued that) there is the proper understanding through the unity characterised by possibility, then even though the unity is there, the difference of power of the synonymous words is accepted through the division due to the characteristics of the power and because the will cannot have its dependence upon the word; or, even if its (of the will) connection with the object is accepted, it would perforse be of merely conventional nature, and also because no separate nature of the object is accepted, and further there would be the undesirable position, viz. there would be the destruction (end) of all figurative use; for, even in the case of a figurative word there would be the possibility of the denotative power (persisting) owing to its being the object of God’s will; because God’s will exists as a rule there, because it is a general cause. Otherwise, there would be the contingency of the effect not coming into existence. If (it be argued that) the denotative power is a special connection with its

1 A अब तदनन्तरपि... 2 A ... अभ्युपमे च, औष...
nature along with God’s will, and that exists not in the case of the figurative (words); so, there would not be the blemish referred to above,—then (our reply is) it is not so; because in that case there would perforce be its indescribable nature, and also there is no proof to postulate the existence of that kind of God. If (it be argued that) even the natural denotive power of the word is non-existent on account of its non-inclusion in the six categories (of the Vaiśeṣikas), (the reply is)—then O! What a big frightening argument this (is)! As by one who advocates the existence of the denotive power over and above the six categories, is imagined the power to produce fire in the case of grass, the seat of kindling wood and the jewel,—this way being simpler,—but not this three-fold speciality dependent upon fire, as that would be more cumbrous; in the same way, in the case of synonymous words like Ghaṭa, Kalaśa, Kumbha etc., only one power producing the apprehension referring to the mode of jariness is imagined, on account of simplicity. Otherwise, there would be the impossibility of grasping the relation of cause and effect owing to the violation of the rule. To the same effect is the Sūtra of the great sage (Jaimini) —

1 A इष्टोऽः
2 A विज्ञानसांसार्यमेव; A ... सांसार्यमेव
3 A पारस्पर युज्यः
Therefore, that same is the principal function called Denotation (abhidhā). Nor again should it be argued (by you) that there would be the apprehension of the meaning even on hearing the word Kumbha from the denotative power understood in respect of the word Ghaṭa on account of their identity, because it is not understood as residing in there; like your ‘intimate relation’, understand the Sakti-category also of mine!

[27] Nor again should it be argued by you, that on account of the possibility of the denotative power in the form of the capacity of producing the apprehension of various modes even in the case of the figurative (word) there would be the undesirable position, viz. the destruction of the figurative use (itself); otherwise, there would follow the disaster, viz. the non-production of the effect,—(the reply is)—

(1) According to the view of the Anvita-bhidhanavādins (those who advocate that words already grammatically connected, have the denotative power), in the case of a figurative word, the capacity to produce a connected appre-
hension not being admitted, there could not be the butting in of the denotative power, forming the capacity to produce the connected apprehension, because Lakṣaṇā is merely the cause of remembrance only of the meaning of words. Because only in the case of a denotive word connected with the figurative word is admitted the power to make one comprehend connectedly. Even though all the words in the glorificatory passages are figurative, there is no contradiction in having the power to make one apprehend connectedly in the case of the injunctive word connected with it. For this very reason, it is an established fact in the Śāstras that a figurative word cannot make one apprehend (the denotation).

[ 28 ] (2) According to the view of the Abhihitānva-yavādins (those who advocate that there is the subsequent connection of the words denoting their meaning), however, there being no possibility of the relation involved, as the denotative power of the word merely points out the meaning of the word, by the meaning of the word itself is brought forth the meaning of the word connected with it, which is fit for the connection with the meaning of the sentence. — There, the figurative use is, verily, based upon
the meaning of the word, and not based upon the word. The meaning of the sentence also is indicated by the meanings themselves of the words and not by the words, — thus the indicative words would not have the contingency of possessing the denotative power. In the case of the indicated (sense), which is to be brought forth by the meaning of the word established by the word, the practical method about its being the object of the functioning of the word takes place in (successive) order, being possessed of the meaning of the sentence and the meaning of the words — thus there is no blemish. And that sense of the denotative word refers only in a general manner, on account of (this procedure involving) simplicity, and also on account of the absence of the blemishes — endlessness and violation, — and does not refer to an individual particularised by that generality, because that would be cumbrous. As has been said —

'Denotation does not reach the particular object, with its power coming to an end in respect of a qualifying attribute.'

On account of the admission of the identity of the limiting adjunct and the object possessing that, even from the denotative word of the limiting adjunct could be accounted for,

1 वाक्यार्थ शब्दस्त...
the presence of the individual; there is the intimate relation of the generality in respect of the individual in the form of the genus and also in the form of the limitation of the nature of the action 'cooking' etc.; in the same way (there is the intimate relation) of (the word) denoting the generality with the individual, (that is to say), the implication or indication—so (argue) others. (Our reply is)—That is not (right), because we do not admit any intimate relation, on account of the apprehension of identity in cases like a 'dark jar', and Indication not being admitted there too.

[29] (3) According to the view of the Vedāntins, in the case of the Ātman having the Sat-nature, involving identity with everything, denotation in respect of merely that, is not contradicted, owing to something particularised having the form of the varied generality concerned, or by admitting the generality bull-ness etc., that is indescribable. Even if the denotative power is regarded as belonging to the individual particularised by the limiting adjuncts, we do not stand to lose anything. That (denotative power) also is two-fold—(1) Convention, (2) Etymological usage.

1 शास्त्र्यस्त्र ... च्यक्ष्—dropped in IO.
There Convention is indeed declared as the combined power functioning either on account of the unchallenged use in all the regions, or as denoting the forms of bull and others, as in the case of the words Akṣa (sense-organ) etc., and of the words Bull and others. Etymological usage, verily, is the functioning of the word, giving another sense by its component parts intended for some other meaning, as the word Soma having convention in respect of the moon, has its power to denote Śiva on the strength of the etymology — one who stays with Umā, or as in the case of the words Pācaka (a cook), Paṅkaja (a lotus) etc. It is for this reason, that the convention is the most powerful factor, that is (as infallible as) the Scripture, while etymological meaning is just a (purport-) sentence. Therefore, in respect of the words Maṇḍapa, Āśvakarṇa etc., there is no connection with being the agent of the drinking of Maṇḍa etc., on account of this being in contradiction with the maxim (specifying the respective importance) in the topic dealing with Śruti, logical mark, (etc).

Here again, apropos the relation of the stultified and the stultifier, the states of being dependent upon another

1 A drops va 2 A gavākṛt... 3 A vyākṣaśārdhvadāna... 4 A kṛṣṇācaryavādākṣiṣṭhāraṇ... 5 A pāṇḍkapāṭṭhakādi... 6 A ruti: सर्वेक्षवति 7 A maṇḍpaśārdhavanīśu 8 A am ca
and not being dependent upon anything,—this alone is the determining factor. Some say (that the determining factor is) the state of presenting itself with delay and the state of presenting itself quickly from the words.

Here in the case of words Paṅkajā and others, as the nature of lotus etc., presents itself as a rule, and as that is capable of being established by convention, there is the chief function called Etymology-cum-convention. —So think the followers of Bhaṭṭa and the Naiyāyikas.

The followers of Prabhākara and the Vedāntins, however, do not tolerate that. Though the word Go conveys many senses, the particular form possessing the dewlap etc., alone, as a rule presents itself (to the mind), on account of the very frequent use (of that word in that sense), and that of Śara and others, by its being mentioned along with other words, in like manner. Though the power of the parts of the word Paṅkajā equally concerns Kumuda and Padma lotuses, it is rightly confined to the Padma on account of the very frequent use (in that sense).

1 A पश्चादेविमतः 2 A adds तत्त्वम् after योगशब्दार्थः 3 A जस्मादिः 4 A पहले
Nor again should it be said that there is invariably the apprehension regarding the meaning of words from the words associated with its functioning; there being no functioning in respect of the nature of Padma, there is no apprehension in regard to the meaning from the word, because apprehension is admitted in the meaning from the word, even of the causal factors the agent etc., although not expressed in (so many) words; in respect of the meaning from words only that which presents itself invariably determines the connection with it. Otherwise, by not admitting the state of functioning in respect of what characterises the thing to be indicated, there would not be the apprehension of the state of the bank etc., in the expression ‘The cow-pen on the Ganges’ etc.

[30] Or, let there be even the third function ‘Etymology-cum-conversion;’ nothing is lost by us. The subordinate (function) also (is) two-fold—Lakṣaṇā and Qualitative (Lakṣaṇa). There ‘Indication’ is the possible connection (with the denotative sense) as in the expression ‘A cow-pen on the Ganges’, the word Ganges denoting the

１A reads उपस्थितस्वेत ２A लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकर्ष्य
current has the function regarding the bank — the connection with it. Though here this (Lakṣaṇā) has a direct function with the denotative sense, it is the function of the word indirectly, so there is no contradiction. And here the basic factor is the impossibility of the connection with what is to be pointed out. The Qualitative (Lakṣaṇā) is the connection with the qualities that are to be indicated by the denotative function. As in the expression ‘Māṇavaka is a lion’, there is of the word Lion the function in regard to Māṇavaka who is possessed of those qualities, by the indication of qualities, heroism and others residing in the lion. For this very reason, Indication is more powerful than the Qualitative, because the Qualitative is made up of two functions. As has been said—

‘The apprehension not existing otherwise from the object denoted is called Lakṣaṇā. The function thereof is accepted as qualitative on account of its connection with the qualities to be indicated (or of what is to be indicated).’

(Kumārila).

[ 31 ] Some say that in such cases there is a different subordinate function called Metaphor. Metaphor is the func-
tion (of the word) elsewhere on account of its unregulated connection; (while) Laksana is the function elsewhere by an invariable connection. As in the case of expressions like 'The cots are shouting', the connection of the cots with the men is not invariable. But there is an invariable connection between the current of the Ganges and the bank. — This (reasoning) is not (right). Though there might be such minor differences in this way, they can be included in Laksana itself, because the connection with the denotative sense is the same in both. But in the case of the Qualitative which has two functions it cannot be included in Indication. Nor again is it right (to say) that the word Lion having some function in respect of Manavaka on account of the connection of similarity is Laksana itself; because similarity cannot be apprehended when the word is understood; a possible connection (with the denotative sense) would have nothing to establish itself, because its function is admitted to be solely for the purpose of the apprehension of something connected with it. Therefore the Qualitative function is quite different on account of its dissimilarity with Laksana — this appears to be proper from every point.

1 A निवर्तक्षेन ...
As to the six-fold division spoken of by the grammarians, viz.—

'A word may be (1) etymological, (2) etymological-cum-conventional, (3) metaphorical, (4) primary, (5) indicative and (6) qualitative—(thus) the word is described as six-fold.'

that has to be explained by taking into account other subsidiary divisions of the primary and subordinate varieties themselves. To explain the same—(1) Primary conventional, (2) Etymological, (3) Etymological-cum-conventional,—this is one triad in the case of the Principal, (4) Indicative, (5) Metaphorical, (6) Qualitative—this is the second triad in respect of the Subordinate.

[32] There is another function called Suggestion—so (say) the rhetoricians. They indeed having included the Qualitative in Indication speak of the three-fold nature as (1) Denotation, (2) Indication, (3) Suggestion. There is Suggestion conveying various meanings in respect of many...
things, after the use of the sentence 'The sun has set', "Do not go far away", 'Let the articles of merchandise be removed', 'Perform the Sandhyā-ceremony' etc. In these cases there is neither the Denotative power nor Indication; but another function called Suggestion has to be accepted in accordance with the (law of) presence and absence of the word alone. By that division, there is not the splitting of the sentence, because that is admitted only when there is the difference in the denotative and indicative meanings. For this very reason, it (Suggestion) is not Presumption, on account of the absence of a definite characteristic. For, the word alone is ascertained to be the cause there by the (law of) presence and absence. If Presumption is somehow possible, then there would be the total annihilation of the Word- (means of) proof—because that (Presumption) is available everywhere. They also speak of subsidiary divisions, viz. based upon Denotation, based upon Indication, and based upon Suggestion.

(Our reply is) — That is not so. Because it has been
shown in the *Vyakti-viveka* of (Rājānaka) Mahimān that it (Word) is included in Presumption. For, Word can suggest only on the strength of invariable connection; otherwise there would be sheer anarchy. And further, on the strength of that very connection, who can keep outside, the inferences from the various intentions of the speaker? In respect of Inference, there is no scope for violation etc. If again it cannot be included in Presumption, then let that again be a function of the Word; we do not lose anything thereby.

Indication (is) also three-fold—(1) Ajahatsvārthā (where the primary sense is not abandoned), (2) Jaha-tajahatsvārthā (where the primary sense is partly abandoned and partly not abandoned), (3) Jahatsvārthā (where the primary sense is abandoned). There the first (Ajahatsvārthā), by the very fact of the non-abandonment of the denotative sense, leading to another (sense), equal to the denotative power, is the strongest of the subordinate ones—as in the expression—‘Let the curds be protected from the crows’, used in the world, the word Crow has power to refer to the crow and others on account of their being the
The function of words is four-fold."

And the four-fold division refers to the nature of Genus, Quality, Action and Substance. In such cases, there is the genus (Bull-ness) in the expression—Bull etc. In expressions like—White, Dark, there is quality. In expressions like—Moving, there is action. In expressions like—Dittha (a proper name), there lies the very nature of the substance. If Indication were to be admitted (there), that would go counter to what has been stated above. This has been explained with proper scrutiny in the Vākyapadīya (of...
Bhartṛhari). Those who admit the Samavāya relation, may remain contented by (calling it) Indication where the primary sense is abandoned.

Indication where the primary sense is partly abandoned and partly not abandoned, is the function possible in one part by the abandonment possible in another part. This also is stronger than the Jahat-lakṣaṇā and also than the Qualitative, because it is connected with a part of the denotative sense, as in the case of (the expressions) like—‘That is this Devadatta’. For here, there being contradiction regarding the simultaneous association with something particularised by that (past) time, and the same particularised by the present time, the very nature of Devadatta indicated thereby is brought forth by the two words through the possible Indication in one part. This same is spoken of as ‘Part-Indication’. It should not be argued that owing to the qualifying being stultified, there is no connection there, but there is no Indication in the case of the qualified — because that would merely be indulging in a technical terminology, because it is admitted that only the counter-entity involving the connection is ushered by the functioning

1 अ तत्रात्रहएश्वरेणि 2 अ ... अन्वयविरेषावद 3 अ भागलकृत्योऽनुपपाद्ये
known and mere different terminology not being capable of producing anything — there is also a third, Jahat-svārthā, functioning elsewhere by the total abandonment of the primary sense as in 'A cow-pen on the Ganges' etc. This (type of Lakṣaṇā) stronger than the Qualitative, but the weakest of all Lakṣaṇās is not favoured, when there is the possibility of any other functioning power, on account of the contradiction of the primary sense in every way.

[ 33 ] Thus have been pointed out the functioning powers of words, in accordance with the conclusive view itself (accepted by us). Not even one of these deserves to exist in respect of Brahman without a second. Apropos that, first is propounded the impossibility of convention. Other (powers) being based upon that (convention), there would arise the denial of them by the denial itself of that. That (convention) is analysed by one going deep into the matter. Somewhere (this is achieved) from inference based upon the logical mark — the activity concerned. As for instance, regarding (the expression) 'Bring the jar', immediately after hearing the sentence, some one brings the object possessing a tortoise-like neck etc. Having actually noticed his process of
bringing (the jar), having inferred the action as its cause, one infers that action, as being produced by the promoting knowledge on the strength of a similar type of action of his own. And that knowledge, following the presence and absence of words, there being no other cause forth-coming, postulates the power of the word itself in establishing what is to be done, viz. the bringing with a jar as its object, and then one gradually concludes the power of each (of the words) through the inclusion and the exclusion (of the words concerned) — such is the order of the understanding of the (word-) power.

In a similar manner, immediately on hearing the sentence ‘Congratulations!’ ‘O good one, a son is born to you!’ etc., having inferred the (rise of) joy through the characteristics, the blooming of the face etc., of the hearer and there being no other cause forth-coming, the birth of the son not being known by some other proof, having concluded it (the joy) as being produced, having postulated this sentence as the cause referring to that knowledge by apply-

1 A  तच्च स्वार्थं द्राशबं अन्वयः ...  2 A... सुपविकाशारि  3 A मानान्तरेण शातत्वाद  4 A तत्त्वानन्तरताः
ing the rule of presence and absence—there is in order as before the understanding of the power of each word. Following the same line (tādvaḥ), here the knowledge of Brahman cannot be the producing cause of activity etc., and that does not come within the province of any other proof; so, there is no scope for the understanding of the Denotative power in that case.

[ 34 ] Somewhere the understanding of Śakti is through analogy. As for instance, in the case of a city-dweller who has heard the sentence ‘A Gavaya is like a bull.’, there is the ascertainment (of the primary sense) of the word Gavaya, through resemblance to the bull, on the strength of the remembrance of the sentence heard before, when he perceives another individual like a bull, perchance after he had been to the forest.

[ 35 ] Somewhere (the understanding of Śakti is) through dissimilarity—as for instance, in the case of one who has heard the condemnatory sentence,—‘Fie upon this camel, with its very long neck, eating the rough thorns’

1 A ... प्रतिवर्त शक्तिग्रहः 2 A adds वचन्यश्च after गच्छयिद 3 A नामार्थशक्तिः नेचे
पूर्वेन तु कर्मसंदर्भावत्वाति न सम्भवति साधन्यः
वैधिकवैभवायत्व, सानन्दतयायोगाच ।

[३६] कर्मिन, आत्माभवायत्-यथा ’कल्याणीवदिलेण घटस्वरूपः’ इति। तद्वत, अधि, अर्थ न सम्भवति, उदेत्यांशोस्मार्थमपदः
मात्रात्, तस्येव, अभुष विचारविभावः।

[३७] कर्मिन, प्रतिद्वार्थद्व्यायनाधिकरण्यात्-यथा हि ’सह-
कारतरी चित्रो रूप्ति’ इति स्वरूपातः प्रत्येकसिद्धे विश्वद्वायत्वाति निषयः।
यथा ’वाजहत् सहस्राष्ट्र: पुरुर्विर’ इत्यादि बजहस्ताद्वायतिविशिष्टे पुरुर

etc., there is the ascertainment of the primary sense of the word Karabha at the sight of the individual of that nature as before. Both of these are not possible in the case of Brahman, on account of its being void of similarity and dissimilarity, and on account of no other means of proof being available.

[३६] Somewhere (the understanding of Śakti is) from the sentence of a reliable person — as for instance ‘(The object) possessing a tortoise-like neck etc., is to be denoted by the word Ghaṭa’. It is not possible like that also here (in the case of Brahman), on account of the absence of a word establishing the matter to be mentioned, because that itself is the matter under consideration now.

[३७] Somewhere (the Śaktigraha is) from the case—coordination of words with the meaning established, as for instance, in (the expression) ‘Here a cuckoo (Pika) coos on the mango-tree’, — there is the ascertainment of the denotative sense of the word Pika, when the agent of the cooing is established by Direct perception. As in (the expression) ‘Thunderbolt in hand, thousand-eyed, smasher of for-
दरादिपद्वाच्यतवाच्यवसायं-तदद्विन नेह संमवति, निर्विकल्पके तस्मान स्वज्ञाय यद्वाच्यासिद्धार्थकवातः।

[ ३८ ] कन्चिद्वाच्यशेषात्-यथा यत्करिहादिशोद्वानाम्
‘ यदान्त्या ओषध्यो म्यायति, अथैत्तौ मोदमाना पाभवित्तित्।
वराहमणुयावति।’

इत्यादिवाच्यशेषात्, कक्षकाकादिव्यावश्यका वाच्यार्थविशेषनिष्ठः। यथा
वा स्नेख्यूपापहनीयादिशङ्ख्यानाः। ‘यज्ञ हुःकृत सम्भिर्म्’ इत्यादि-
वाच्यशेषात्, अलौकिकार्थविशेषनिष्ठः। तदद्विन श्रवणी न संमवति,
tresses’ etc., particularised by the form of having the thunderbolt in hand etc., there is the ascertainment of the denotative sense of the words, Purandara etc. — Here anything like that is not possible, because in the case of that (Brahman), which is void of any distinction, all the words have their meanings not established.

[ ३८ ] Somewhere (the Śaktigraha) is from the remaining part of the sentence, as in the case of the words Yava, Varāha etc. From the remaining part of the sentence such as,

‘ When other herbs fade out, then these, verily, remain,
full of joy. (The cows) run after the Varāha (Boar)’

there is the ascertainment of the particular denotative sense, by the exclusion of the Kaṅgu-seed, and crow etc. Or, as for instance, in the case of the words Svarga, Yūpa, Āhavaniya (fire of that name), there is the ascertainment of a super-mundane particular sense on account of the remaining part of the sentence — ‘What is not mixed up with

१ अर्थे। २ एवावति नद्य। ३ एव वराह गानोनुसंधायित।
४ इवाद्रि द्रोप्ते in।
misery' etc., — anything like that too either, is not possible in the case of Brahman, because the remaining part also of the sentence cannot possibly have Brahman for its object. On the strength of the remaining part of the sentence referring to some other matter, it is not right to ascertain any denotative power referring to Brahman.

I say (says the objector) — There would be the comprehension of the denotative power from the remaining part of the sentence in the case of Brahman, even though any other method is impossible there. To explain the same — When it is stated that the knowledge of Brahman is the means for attaining the highest human purpose in (the passage)

'The Brahman-knower secures the Highest'

(Taitti. II. 1)

with the expectancy to know what that Brahman is, (the Śruti) points out to the characteristic of Brahman as

'Existence, Knowledge, Infinite (is) Brahman'.

(Taitti. II. 1)
And subsequently if there is the establishment of power regarding the word Brahman, verily, in the entity without a second, established by the words Satya etc.,—(then our reply is)—No (that is not so), on account of the impossibility of the distinctionless (Brahman) being brought home even from the words Satya etc. There also would arise the fault of endlessness in running after another remaining part of the sentence.

If it be argued — Let there not be Śaktigraha from the remaining part of the injunctive sentence, but there would be Śaktigraha from the remaining part of the prohibitory sentence, on account of the possibility of the distinctionless (Brahman) being brought home through the denial of being prior etc., as in the passage

‘This is that Brahman, not prior, not posterior; not inside, not outside;—this Ātman is Brahman.’

(Bṛha. II. 5. 19)

—(our reply is)—No. There being the denial of some particularities by that (passage), there is no establishment of a distinctionless Brahman. If, however, there is the denial

1 Ᾱ ma, astu 2 Ᾱ drops शक्तिग्रह 3 निषेध…ஆ HEAP dropped in IO.
12
of all particularities, there would be no possibility of the Śaktigraha, on account of the denial even of the denotation of the word, and on account of the direct denial of (Brahman) being the object denoted by the word, in the Śāstra-
(or Sruti-) passage

'From which the words turn away' (Taittī. II. 4)

'Which is grasped neither by the eye, nor by word' (Mūnd. III. 1. 8)

e tc. Thus is explained away also (the passage)

'Neither gross, nor atomic' (Byha. III. 8. 8)

e tc. If it be argued — From the remaining part of the passage in

'From which these beings are originated, by which these when originated live, to which they go, into which they enter — know that fully, that is Brahman'

(Taittī. III. 1)

the Śaktigraha is possible in the case of Brahman parti-
cularised by being the material cause of the world, — (our reply is) — Let that be possible there (we have nothing to do with it). Where does the distinctionless thing come in here?

[39] For the same reason the etymological (method) is also not possible. For, it is based on convention constituted of the denotative power of the parts. If it be argued — The word Brahman, being etymologically derived from the root Bhra meaning increase, addition, by the termination Man, as belonging to the Uṇādi-Sūtras, has the denotative sense of increase on the strength of the etymology, and there would be in it the absence of any limitation of space, time and the entity, on account of the absence of contraction of that big (thing, Brahman). Therefore, on the strength of the etymology itself, by the word Brahman is spoken of, an entity void of all limitations. So also is stated by the venerable author of the Bhaṣya (Śaṅkarācārya) —

‘On account of the existence of the connection with the root Bhra’

(Sa. Bhā on I. 1. 1)
Likewise, the etymological position of the word Ātman is pointed out in the Purāṇa —

‘Inasmuch as, he secures, he takes to, he eats the objects here, and in that there is his continuous existence, therefore, he is described as Ātman.’

This means that Ātman is the form from Āpnoti ( √ Āp), Ādadāti ( √ Dā with ā), Atti ( √ Ad), Atati ( √ At). Like that here also, the meaning of securing should be understood as it is useful for the matter in hand. There, on account of the absence of any contracting factor, by the word Ātman is pointed out on the strength of etymology the all-pervading entity, bereft of all limitations. — (Our reply is) — No. If this be the case, there would arise just the synonymous state of the words Brahman and Ātman, there would be the repetition with the word Ananta ( Infinite), and also there would arise the meaningless state of the word Satya etc, as a distinctionless thing cannot be grasped by the understanding, there being no other means of proof available, and also on account of the absence of the grasp of
the etymological factor has to be discarded in the case of the words Jñāna and others.

[40] For this very reason, there (can not be) Indication also, owing to the impossibility of grasping the connection with a possible thing. Nor indeed is the forth-coming of the nature of the thing indicated by Indication alone; for, that is the cause of remembrance, and remembrance is invariably produced by the prior knowledge. Although, somehow or other, there might come forth (the idea, understanding of) the distinctionless, from the passage—Not gross, —and others, the possible connection (with the Lakṣya) being put out of question by itself, there is no possibility of Brabman being the thing indicated from the passage—Truth etc. What again is the Indication to be admitted here? (It can) not (be) Ajahat-svārthā, because of the unwelcome result viz. the understanding of something particularised, and on account of there being the unwelcome non-connection, owing to the contradiction by the sentence—That thou art, etc. Neither again is Jahat-Ajahatsvārthā
also; although it is possible in the case of Devadatta etc.,
that are understood from the other means of knowledge and
which can have a possible connection with that (Indication),
it has no scope in the case of something void of all con-
nection, and which cannot be understood from other means of
knowledge. For this very reason, nor the Jahat-svārthā
also; for, if that is accepted, the indicated sense of the word
Truth etc. would be Non-truth etc., like the bank indicated
by the word Gaṅgā conveying the non-Gaṅgā nature,
because the primary nature is totally abandoned. Nor is
the acceptance of the Qualitative (Indication) possible on
account of its being void of all similarity. The acceptance
of the Qualitative owing to the quality, being all-powerful
etc., even according to our demonstrated doctrine, is but a
show of his over-ingenuity by the venerable author (Sarva-
jaññatman) of the Śāṅkṣepa-Śāriraka — this is the traditional
view.

[41] Nor, again, is possible there the Vyañjanā-power,
because it is not supported by any means of proof. Even if
it is supported by any means of proof, it would not be
functioning owing to the absence of connection. Therefore,
because Brahman without a second is not the meaning of the word, it has no connection with the import of the sentence, because there the undifferentiated nature is not proved on account of the difference between the meaning of the words and the meaning of the sentence; and if non-difference is admitted, the meaning of the sentence would be purposeless — by no device whatsoever there is possible the realisation of the identity of Brahman without a second, with the Ātman. Therefore in this manner, from its very nature, the mode, the object, the resort, the effect, the cause, the knowledge removing the Avidyā not being pointed out, we do not see that the view that Ātman himself characterised by the removal of Avidyā is salvation, capable of being challenged. Thus dull-witted people, who have not properly learnt under their preceptors, themselves not quite clear in their minds put forth this prima-facie view, — they have just to be pitied by the kind-hearted by pointing out to them the proper method (of understanding).

[ 42 ] To this, we reply — As to what has been said — Is the nature of knowledge true or false? — we do not see any fault in both the views in this case. Because sentiency,
which is quite real and which is manifested by the direct realisation in the mind, produced by the means of proof, is the remover of Ajñāna because the function of the mind being characterised by the nature of the cause, like the nature of the staff (as in the case of Dandi Devadattaḥ) is not accepted as the cause, because it is established otherwise. Even though the characterising factor is imagined, the real nature of the thing characterised is not vitiated. In such a case, as here—what appears as having the nature of silver, is the substance, conch-shell. Thus Logicians have admitted imaginary characterising connection with the cavity of the ear, in apprehending the sound from the sky. The Mīmāṃsakas admit the letters themselves as producing the right knowledge,—(letters) characterised by the contact with the imaginary shortness, length etc.,—why should not such a case be applicable to us as above? Nor again is that to be accounted for by admitting a real connection; as there exists the mere contact with the cavity of the ear, in its entirety, in the otherwise there would be here anarchy. And that also
would be just imaginary on account of the absence of any other real contact in the sky. Likewise, when the ramifications of the sound are apprehended as belonging to the sound, there would be just anarchy on account of the non-comprehension of distinction as regards the order of priority, in the all-pervading letters, and therefore as there would be the impossibility of understanding the meaning, we have got to admit the comprehension of shortness etc., as residing in the letters themselves,—and that would be all imaginary. Further again, because they admit Anyathā-khyāti, according to their view, even a non-existing contact can be a characteristic. But in our view, because we admit the Anirvacaniya-khyāti, there would rightly be existing the power to bring into effect the effective action, on account of its being different from non-existence. For this very reason, there is no fault even if the direct realization in the mind produced by the means of proof is admitted to destroy the Ajñāna in the case of the non-dual Sentienty, because
although there is no real nature, existence for practical purposes is admitted. Nor, further, is there the fault viz. its being similar to the knowledge in dreams etc., for, owing to the non-comprehension (of the object) its real nature is not the producer of its authoritative nature, as according to your view even though that exists in the case of a jar etc., there exists not its authoritative nature, but its referring to an unstultified object. And that surely exists not in the case of the knowledge in dreams etc. For this very reason, is discarded the view that Brahman also being the object of false knowledge is false like a dream etc., because from its very nature it is not the cause of false nature. And the false nature from the point of view of the object is not established owing to the absence of stultification. And because the unauthoritative nature is not admitted even of the inference about fire, produced by the illusion of smoke, because it concerns an object not stultified. And because the inference about a real object from the reflection although imagined is authoritative, and because the objects in the dream do indicate good fortune etc. And
because the continuity of some chants etc., sometimes understood in dream, in the waking state stands unstultified. —Thus even from the knowledge that is dubbed as false, the attainment in reality of Brahman is not open to question, because the absence of stultification alone is the *sine qua non* of a thing being real.

[ 43 ] In this way, the alternatives, being possessed of a mode, or not being possessed of a mode also cannot stand. Being with the mode is out of question, because it is not admitted (by us). Neither is it improper for something not possessed of a mode to be the remover of Ajñāna, because the removing of the Ajñāna is due to the right knowledge itself about the basis thereof. Where there is a base with a mode, there is required the right knowledge with the mode. But where the base is without a mode, there is required (only) the modeless right knowledge itself, because that alone is competent (for the task) there. Nor in this manner would there be clumsiness in postulating two ideas about the relation of cause and effect. Because there is the persistence of the right knowledge of the base.
The nature of the base has for its object the Ajñāna, producing the illusion or it is merely of the nature of the object of Ajñāna. Nor again should it be argued — if that be the case there would be the unwelcome result, the removal of Ajñāna of the form jar and others even from (the knowledge) what is to be known is a substance etc., like the right knowledge of the object of the Adhīṣṭhāna — because the nature of being the object of knowledge is not ad) mitted in only the object having a positive (affirmative-connection, that knowledge cannot cover all objects. The knowledge, ' (this is) a substance', concerning itself with the generality jarness etc., does not concern a particular object although it concerns only the individual. Likewise even in the case of knowledge, 'this', — it concerns only the individual situated in front, and does not concern jarness etc., because a doubt is entertained later on. Therefore on account of this there is no unwelcome contingency of the removal of Ajñāna about particularised objects; (and) there would be the unwelcome contingency of the removal of Ajñāna concerning all objects, from the cognition (I)
know the object, even though the qualifying factor, viz. a similar mode is thrown in. Even in the case of jarness etc., which can be the object of knowledge, the knowledge is possessed of the mode jar-ness etc. This very reason, even though the qualifying factor as not having the mode of the genus-quality is thrown in, there is no clearing away of the field. Because from the knowledge ‘the object of knowledge is the jar’ etc., there would follow the absence of the removal of Ajñāna having the form of a jar etc., and there would be the absence of continuity of being the mode and the object, and mode and the non-object etc. If it is argued — in order to get rid of this fault a particularised relation of cause and effect should be entertained, (so that) there would be the perishable nature on account of the Ajñāna about a jar and the destructive nature by the nature itself of the right knowledge with the mode jar-ness, (and) this (would be the state of things) everywhere; — (our reply is) — then in that case, the relation of cause and effect being different everywhere, (the reasonable view should be) where (the ‘cause and effect’ relation) does not become completely effective without which qualifying factor, there only that much

\[1\] A drops अविष्कारस्वप्नकार \ldots \ A ... अविष्कारस्वप्नकार \ldots

\[2\] A भिन्नताधिक्य यथ
should be accepted. And here in this case, the relation of cause and effect being properly accounted for by the right knowledge of Brahman itself owing to the removal of Ajñāna about Brahman, the qualifying factor, having the mode of being Brahman, should not be accepted on account of its being clumsy (to do so), on account of its serving no purpose and on account of the contradiction. For this very reason, on account of the absence of the continuity of the nature of being fit for practical dealings in the relation of cause and effect, due to the knowledge of (things) fit for practical dealings on account of its having practical dealings, when it culminates into something particular owing to its possessing the knowledge of ‘a jar’ etc., owing to the practical dealing with the jar, the relation of cause and effect is entertained by the possession of the knowledge of the jar itself, owing to the practical dealing associated with the knowledge of a jar; not on account of the possession of the knowledge of a jar, on account of its being clumsy (to do so), on account of its serving no purpose, and on account of the contradiction. That the knowledge of a jar itself establishes its self-illuminating nature owing to its being the cause of practical dealings regarding itself — this is quite another matter. Or, the right knowledge about the
same object possessing only the generality-nature without any particular mode, is the cause of the removal of Ajñāna. Here, the expression ‘generality’ is put in to ward off the fault of being over-extensive, in the case of the knowledge ‘(This is) the object of knowledge’. (The expression) ‘only’ is put in as the qualifying factor, in order to ward off the fault of being less extensive in (cognitions) like ‘a jar is the object of knowledge’; so that ‘this’ would be continuing in something modeless and in that having a particular mode. Nor does this involve being less extensive in the case of cognition which has the mode of generality only, because there is no doubt perceived such as ‘this’ or ‘not this’, ‘object-of-knowledge’ or ‘no-object-of-knowledge’, because when you do not admit the cognition having the mode only of generality, it is improper to ward it off. And here, however, the qualifying factor ‘right knowledge’, not challenged by any doubt about its unauthoritative nature should be understood everywhere. And that is, not being affected by the paraphernalia of doubt about its unauthoritativeness or its not being associated with a particular fault, so, there would not be any violation in
respect of cognition soiled by improbability etc. For surely a cause not producing the effect under the force of obstruction does not cease to be a cause.

As to (what is stated about) the cognition having a definite form about the existence because it is admitted as the remover of Ajña; and because the cognition which has not attained to the state of repetition not being possessed of that form, there would be no violation of the rule even without the qualifying factor spoken of— that is wrong. What kind of non-ascertainment of the existence can there be in the case of cognition pointing out to only one end, produced by means of proof, having an object neither more nor less, from the cognition having a definite form of existence, so that there would be no violation of the rule? If (you say that there is) the absence of certainty, (our reply is)— no. For, here also has been admitted the certainty as being different from doubt or as having a particular genus. Certainty is being opposed to doubt etc.,— that however exists not here, owing to the doubt etc., being noticed later on,— if (you argue like that), then you have come to the right path. And we do not see

\[ \text{A drops } \]
that it is different from being unchallenged by any doubt about the unauthoritative nature spoken of by us — enough of these stupid vapourings of an uncultured one!

[ 45 ] Now, I say (says the objector) — this (your view) is over-extensive in respect of the indeterminate established by the view of the Logicians, because that possesses the form spoken of and has the capacity to remove Ajñāna. In that connection, owing to the absence of (other) means of proof, the cognition of the qualifying attribute being the cause with reference only to the particularised cognition, even in the case of the particular knowledge in the form ‘This is a jar’, there is not the nature of the cause by its being the qualifying knowledge itself; that it is produced by the knowledge of the qualifying attribute is inferred by the illustrative instance of the cognition in the form ‘A man possessed of a staff’ etc. And if it is argued that that cognition becomes established as unparticularised itself, otherwise there would be the danger of endlessness — (our reply is) — no. No means of proof other than Direct Perception and Inference exists for the nature of the particularised cognition being characterised by the nature of the product. And
even though it is there, the relation of cause and effect in the form of Direct Perception etc. being essential, and that being postulated, verily, in the form of the qualifying and the qualified, the close contact with the sense-organs etc., another unusual relation of cause and effect need not be thought of. And that being admitted as always inferable, there can not be the possibility of another means of proof also. If you, however, desire its having the same form, in company with the Tārkikas, then you will have to qualify 'the right knowledge' as 'having a nature directly perceivable'. Because the 'indeterminate' established by the Logicians being always inferable has not a directly perceivable nature. According to our view, however, there is no blemish whatsoever, because that is directly cognisable by the Witness.

[ 46 ] Therefore, this is what the whole sense boils down to. The nature of directly perceivable right knowledge which is possessed of only the attribute of generality, without any particular mode, and is not associated with particular blemishes referring to the common object, is
being the remover of Ajñāna, characterising being the remover of Ajñāna. Being directly perceivable is meant to be understood from its nature and its object, and so it cannot be over-extensive respecting Inference etc. and the indeterminate.

(If the objector argues)—if Brahman is not possessed of Dharmas and the nature of object also is impossible there, the knowledge of its object also is difficult to have; for, being the object is the state of Karman; if that is admitted, then that being habituated to giving the fruit of action, it would perforce be non-sentient like jar etc. If it is argued that its knowledge, verily, possibly referring to its object would be the remover of that Ajñāna—(our reply is)—no. Because only something having a common object is characterised by the nature of being the remover; otherwise, there would be all anarchy. And there would be the absurdity of the Vedānta passages not being the authority, by the non-production of cognition about that
object. Further, you cannot say that it has the nature of being the remover of Ajñāna and by that very nature, being the remover of that Ajñāna, its being the object is stated metaphorically. Because there is the fault of mutual interdependence — there is the nature of being the remover of Ajñāna owing to its being the object of that; and by that (being the remover of Ajñāna) it is the object of that. Further, nowhere is it established that one is the remover of Ajñāna, merely by being the object. Because that itself is now being considered. If it be argued that the nature of being an object which is imagined, cannot lead to its being the object — (our reply is) no; because nowhere have we admitted the real nature of the object, its being there for mere practical dealings is common (to both).

[ 47 ] In this connection we say — Though it is impossible for Brahman to have the nature of the object of knowledge, the knowledge has Brahman for its object, and that (having Brahman for its object) is either the nature of perceiving the original object or quite something else in-

1. अज्ञानिनिवर्तकत्वम्  2. अन्योऽनुपमेश्रयति  3. अत्तिप्रयत्तेन  4. अज्ञानिनिवर्तकत्वः  5. अज्ञानिनिवर्तकत्वाः  6. अत्तिप्रयत्तेन असंभवम्
Nor should it be argued — How can the nature of an object be residing in knowledge on account of something apart from a substance, not being the resort of the Dharmas produced? And if they are not produced there would be just anarchy, and that cannot bear scrutiny — for, the knowledge also is a substance because it is a transformation of the inner sense-organ, and even though it has no nature of a substance, there can be no contradiction regarding the resort of the Dharmas produced, and the terminology ‘substance’ etc. serves no purpose. The nature of an object is some form, and that too is different for each object. Therefore, because of the removal of Ajñāna not over-extensive being quite possible by the direct right knowledge itself in the form of Brahman, the qualifying attribute — not having the mode of generality — is not wanted as the direct right knowledge having the form of the nature of being the remover of Ajñāna persists everywhere. And further, it is not possible even to think of the cognition in the form ‘this’ as ‘having the form of jar’, because the difference in form is directly perceivable by the Witness quite distinctly. Otherwise it would be possible to state shame-
lessly that both these cognitions have just only one mode. In such cases, realisation alone is the (last) resort. And that is equally available in the present case.

[ 48 ] Or, let there be an imagined nature of object even in the case of Brahman; but it should not be argued that the nature of Karman involves (Brahman's) being non-sentient, because only the nature of object which has a common existence with itself, produces the nature of Karman, and that is possible (only) in jar and others, because even both of them stand on the same footing, existing for practical dealing. But in the case of Brahman which has 'real existence', the nature of being an object even concerned with practical dealing, is not common as there is the absence of 'real existing nature'—thus what is not accounted for here? Thus (by taking such a view), the Śruti (passage)

‘Him, (the Puruṣa) propounded in the Upaniṣads’
(Bṛha. III. 9. 26)

would also be properly respected.
Or, being the object of sentiency itself is the producing cause of non-sentiency, but not also being the object of the functioning. Because that would be the idea in conformity with the Śruti-passages propounding both these, such as—

‘From whom words turn away’  
(Taitti. II. 4)

‘It is neither perceived by the eye, nor by words’  
(Mu. III. 1. 8)

‘But I am asking you about that Puruṣa propounded in the Upanisads’  
(Bṛha. III. 9. 26)

‘One who does not know the Vedas, cannot think of that vast one’  
(Śātyā. 4)

‘What is fit to be known only by the Vedas’  
(Bṛha. V. I)

As to what they say that the Śāstra-authors have disproved merely its being pervaded the fruit; some argue that being pervaded by the fruit itself, is the producing cause of non-sentient nature, because it has been stated that for the destruction of Ajñāna about Brahman is needed invariable association with its functioning—(to this we
reply) that is not so. Because the sentient nature itself manifested by the functioning of the mind, and produced by the means of proof, is designated in the Sāstra as the nature of the fruit; and if not being pervaded by that itself is the producing cause of non-sentient nature, there would not be the non-sentient nature of entities appearing to the Witness also, like that of Brahman. The activity of sentience does exist, however, everywhere, characterised by the difference from ‘Cit’, and that same is the producing cause of non-sentient nature. Even in the Kārikā, given as an instance, the word fruit must be understood as pointing out only to the sentiency, but not to being the object of the functioning. There does exist invariably the nature of the object of sentiency affected by it, because the functioning rightly takes its place as involving the form of the ‘Cit’ within. It has been said —

‘In the case of the origination of the complete sky, verily, it exists in conformity with the nature of the Viyat-entity itself, not from any producing cause; the same obtains in the case of the jar, on account of the perception of the ideas.’

¹ A drops ṭu  ² A nnu ṭad...  ³ A pūrṇottacena:
The nature of jar, pain etc., is caused by the Dharma etc., of the Understanding. The invariable association with the comprehension of the self-established entity is in conformity with the entity.'

In the same manner, the non-sentient nature being the object of the sentiency cannot, verily, be avoided; as the sentiency affected by the functioning, having itself the form of sentiency, cannot be pervaded by it, (the existence of) another fruit in a fruit being out of question. In the case, however, of those that are different from it and are by themselves lacking comprehension, the invariable concomitance with it has got necessarily to be resorted to, — thus there is no fault whatsoever. As has been said —

'What Saṅvit has been agreed to as the fruit in the case of outside objects of knowledge, that same here is the thing to be known on the strength of the Vedānta-passages.'

(Pañca. 8. 11)
[ 49 ] I say (says the objector)—why then is not admitted the imaginary mode also like the imaginary nature of the object in this way? In that case, there would not be any trouble about imagining the nature of cause-and-effect etc., spoken of—(our reply is) —Not so. As the mode has for its counter-entity, the particular nature of what is being presented, the object of knowledge has got to be spoken of as particularised. And further, the knowledge not being the remover of its object, there would not be the removal of its mode—an undesirable contingency. And in the case of what is not perceivable by the pure sentiency, there could not be the possibility of its being the remover of the Ajñāna perceivable by the pure sentiency; and because only the presentation by the sentiency not tinged by anything else, has the capacity of removing the Ajñāna in the aforesaid manner. In the case of being the object, however, the state of being perceivable by sentiency not tinged by anything else is proper, because though it is fit to be known by the Witness who presents that knowledge, it is not the object of that knowledge—that is the difference (between the viṣaya and prakāra). Therefore, it is proper that the

1 Ạ adds ज्ञानस्य after केवलचैतन्यगोचरस्य
modeless knowledge can have Brahman for its object. For this very reason, although at the first moment, the functioning and the object functioning are fit to be presented by the Witness, there is no contradiction of the functioning with the indeterminate nature. Because that (functioning) being produced from the words fortified by logical reasoning investigating the meaning of the word, has the form of mere Sentientcy without a second, this same is spoken of as the state of the result of the means of proof. At the second moment, however, by the functioning gathering strength by the grasping of the form of mere ‘Cit’ is removed the Ajñāna, associated with the pure ‘Cit’, as by the functioning of grasping the form of the rope, the Ajñāna concerning it. Thereupon follows the removal of the super-imposition of the divisions, Ahamkāra, Jīva, Brahman etc., because the destruction itself of the constituent cause is the cause of the destruction of the unscreened constituents, and Ajñāna itself is the constituent cause of that (super-imposition). Thereupon (follows) along with that, or subsequent to that, the removal of the manifesting functioning of the sentiency, which is the constituent of that. Thus comes about also the removal of the super-impositions of the body, sense-organs
etc. Thus, over and above that, there being no limiting factor, only the unscreened Caitanya remains, void of the divisions Jiva, Brahma and the world, with the Ajñāna and its products all swallowed up, and flashing up always in the form of self-illumination and the highest bliss, — this same is spoken of as the Salvation-state. As Ajñāna, again, being beginningless is not something produced, and another beginningless Ajñāna is not admitted; when the only one Ajñāna-individual, which is the constituent cause of everything is totally removed, the paraphernalia, its effect, knower etc. also being totally removed, there is no return again of the Samsāra.

[ 50 ] By this argument is removed also the doubt whether that knowledge is removable by itself or by something else, because that is fit to be removed by the destruction of its cause. It is a matter beyond dispute for all, that the destruction of the constituent cause causes the destruction of the effect. There is no blemish either even though (it is held that) it is fit to be removed by itself along with the Avidyā in its form as the perceivable. If there is the
identity of the limitations of the nature of thing to be removed and that of the remover, there would be the violation of the rule about moments. In this case, there is the removing nature on account of the particularised right knowledge mentioned before and the nature of being fit to be removed on account of its being perceivable,—so there is no fault referred to.

(The objector says)—Well then, when the Ajñāna which is the cause of the super-imposition in dream etc., is removed by the knowledge of the means of proof, the waking state etc., there would not be again the super-imposition in dream etc., because the reasoning adumbrated (by you) is the same. If it is admitted that there are many Ajñānas there, the same is possible in the case of Ātman as well, and so there would be the unwelcome result—the absence of relief in Salvation. (Another objector says)—It is for this very absence of propriety, that the removal of Ajñāna is not accepted there. Like the screening of illusion about a stream of water by the illusion about the serpent on one and the same unknown rope, here is effected merely the screening of the illusion about dream etc., even by the illusion about the waking state etc. The removal of Ajñāna,
however, is from the realisation itself of the identity of Brahman and Ātman, and so there is not the unwelcome result,—the absence of relief in Salvation. (The first objector says) — Not thus. Even from the realisation of the identity of Brahman and Ātman, there is not the possibility of the removal of Ajñāna. Because nowhere indeed is seen the removal of Ajñāna from the knowledge. Thus (you are in the state of a person described as one by whom) 'the capital itself is defrauded, of one who was hankering after the interest'.

Here we say — Even under both conditions there is no impossibility. To explain the same — Even according to the view which admits the removal of the super-imposition in dream etc., from the knowledge in the waking state etc., because the original Ajñāna itself is held to be possessed of many various powers, even when one power is destroyed, by another power is possible the repetition again of other dreams etc. But when the original Ajñāna possessed of all powers is removed, there being no other cause possible, because a second (Ajñāna) like that not being admitted, there cannot be again the origination of the super-imposi-

1 A adds अपि after ज्ञात्व
सम्बन्धितः इति, अपुनराद्वाविशिष्टः। रञ्जतुजनास्यना, अज्ञाननिष्ठद्वाविशिष्टः। कारे सैं, न कोष्ठिं दोषः। चिन्मात्रेश्वराजनाश्रयत्वविषयवर्गमनवत्। जहे प्रमाणप्रयोजनाभावेन तदन्नूः क्षराद्।

न च, अज्ञानस्य चिन्मात्राश्रयत्वे कथमेवः करणावृत्तिः प्रयोगान्त: ज्ञानेन तत्त्वस्वातं। भिक्षुअर्थवत्? ज्ञानस्य च जन्यत्वेन चिन्मात्राश्रयानुपपत्तिः। तस्य कौटस्यस्वभाववत्। अज्ञानस्य च, अनादित्वेन कौटस्यस्वभाववत-कल्पवत्। इत्युस्मिति वाच्यूः। चैतन्यान्तः करणायस्तदात्मायाध्यक्षेण। अन्तः करणायस्मि चैतन्यमेवत्यतन्त्वायाः। तत्वकं पश्चाप्तिदीक्षितः——

tions of Ahamkāra etc. Thus is established the non-return again. There is again no blemish either, even if the removal of Ajñāna by the knowledge of the rope etc., is admitted. Because only the pure ‘Cit’ can possibly be the resort of the object of Ajñāna. That is not accepted to exist in the non-sentient owing to the absence of the means of proof and the purpose.

Further, it should not be argued that if Ajñāna has the pure ‘Cit’ as its resort, how can take place its removal by the Jñāna in the form of the functioning of the mind, having a different resort? And Jñāna being a product could not possibly have the pure ‘Cit’ as its resort, because that ‘Cit’ has an immutable nature, and Ajñāna being beginningless cannot destroy its immutable nature, as we have stated accordingly. (Our reply is) — In the case of the Caitanya and the mind, owing to the super-imposition of identity, even the attributes of the mind cannot be going away from the attribute of sentiency. It has been said by the venerable author (Padmapādaśārya) of the Pāñcapādāka——

\[1\] अ drops इत्युस्मिति
'Bliss, realisation of the object, eternal nature — these are the attributes (of Caitanya); though identical they appear to be as though apart from Caitanya.'

Even the Logicians admit the comprehension of the sound resorting to the great Ākāsa through its intimate connection with the Ākāsa limited by the hollow of the ear. Although screened, the identity of the natures does not disappear, — thus is accounted for, the state of having a common abode in the case of Jñāna and Ajñāna.

Further, it should not be argued by you — Jñāna is nowhere seen as the remover of Avidyā, so it cannot be thought of in that capacity even in the case of the knowledge of Brahman. (Our reply is) — Not indeed do we establish the knowledge of Brahman being the remover of Ajñāna from Inference, in which case there would arise the necessity of an illustrative instance for the sake of grasping the invariable concomitance; but we say (that it is established) by the Śruti and by Verbal Presumption. In that connection, there is the Śruti-passage for the matter of that,
'Having known that alone, one goes beyond death.'

(Wa. Sa. XXXI. 18; Sveta. III. 8, VI. 15)

—Death (is) Avidyā; this is well-established in the Sāstra. Likewise, through the nature of reality,

‘There is the removal of the world-illusion at the end further again’

(Sveta. I. 10; Na. Pa. IX. 9)

And (there is the following) Smṛti (passage)

‘For this my divine illusion constituted of ‘guṇas’ (is) difficult to surmount; who take refuge in (or, worship) me alone, they cross over this illusion.’

(Gita VII. 14)

‘But (in) whose (case) that ignorance of the soul is destroyed by knowledge, their knowledge like the Sun reveals (or causes to shine forth) that Supreme.’

(Gita V. 16)

e tc. To the same effect (are the passages),

‘One who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself.’

(Mundaka. III. 2. 9)
'The knower of Ātman crosses over grief.'

(Chā. VII. 1. 3)

'A bow to that Jñānātman known through his wonderful power, with whom established in the heart, the Yogin crosses over the wide-spread Avidyā.'

etc. And also the Verbal Presumption in

'You make one cross the farthest end of Avidyā.'

(Praśno. VI. 8)

and other passages. Because identity with Brahman from the realisation of Brahman, spoken of in the Śruti-passages, cannot be accounted for without the removal of the intervening Ajñāna,—it points out to the removal of Ajñāna by the Realisation. From (the passages in) the Śrutis and Smṛtis such as —

'Enveloped, verily, by Untruth'  (Chā. VIII. 3. 2)

'Covered up with mist'  (Ṛ. Sa. I. 82. 7)

? Ā drops हि
"Your heart became something else"

"Knowledge is covered up with ignorance; by that are bewildered the creatures."  
(Gita V. 15)

etc., it is known that Ajñāna alone comes in the way of salvation.

[51] And further, one whose Jñāna-eye is rendered pure through the collyrium in the form of devotion to the divine Lord of the Nila mountain experiences the removal of Ajñāna by Direct Perception itself. What (room for) any different opinion there? If, however, in the case of some one Ajñāna could not be turning away when the knowledge of Reality is produced, then there (Jñāna) would not be the cause on account of the violation of the rule on that account; but that is nowhere seen, because it is admitted that there is the removal of Ajñāna by the right knowledge of oneness alone. Because the presentation of Jīva as different is just mere illusion like the appearance of another Jīva in dream etc. We shall speak later on of its validity in the case of the Living-Liberation. By this (argument)
Ajñāna is not to be removed by Jñāna because it is possessed of a beginningless nature, like the (existence) positive nature because it is contradicted by the Śruti and Smṛti passages mentioned above. Further (we ask you)—What kind of positive nature is there which makes the Ajñāna indestructible—(is it) existence, or a characteristic of the nature of negation? Apropos the first (alternative), it is not established in the case of Ajñāna, which is different from (both) Sat and Asat, because it cannot be associated with existence being of the nature which cannot be stultified by all means of proof. Apropos the second (alternative), it cannot be the producing cause of an indestructible nature, because there is no suitable logical reasoning, and is driven away by an unfavourable logical reasoning, and because only the ‘Sattva’ (existent nature) can be the (effective) cause of the indestructible nature of Ātman.

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Ā
... बिनाशिते प्रयोजका ...
Further, it is not that there is no scope for the comprehension of the invariable concomitance on account of the absence of the Sat-nature in anything apart from Atman, because the absence of the Sat-nature is established as being apart because it produces the destructible nature. Thus, it is concluded that the Ajñāna is destructible, even on the ground of its being perceivable, limited and non-sentient. And it is proclaimed to have a destructible nature (distinctly and) singly in so many words by passages like —

'At the end — the removal of Viśva-illusion further again'

(Svēta. I. 10; Na. Pa. IX. 9)

Neither can there be the undesirable contingency, that it would not be stultified like Brahman, if it were the province of Śruti, because only being the province of the purport of the Śruti is the cause of non-stultification. And in the case of the Śruti with a definite purpose, its purport in respect of what is not known by other means of proof is ascertained by the six-fold characteristics — Introduction etc. As Ajñāna, however, is established directly by the Witness in the form 'I am ignorant', there is no purpose

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1 A व्यातिनित्राहवतः  न वाक्यः ... साधारणभाष्यम् * dropped in A
2 कृपया: in A
served in propounding that. And so it cannot be the province of the purport of the Šruti, because the purport (of the Šruti) is ascertained in respect of Brahma alone in the manner to be stated later on. It being so in the case of Ajñāna possessed of a positive nature and, verily, established by the Witness, is established by Inference etc., its being different from negation etc., and so there is no flaw whatsoever. Even a false connection like ‘This one is possessed of the knowledge of silver in the conch-shell’ becomes the province of the real knowledge, (then) why should not that obtain in our case?

By this (reasoning) Ajñāna not being capable of being removed by some proof if it is the object of the means of proof, and if it is not the object of the means of proof, it is possessed of a false nature, like the horn of a hare etc., because its self-illuminating nature is not admitted — all this is brushed aside. Even though it is not the object of the means of proof by its very nature, its being established by the Witness is admitted, and it shares in the features of illusion and right knowledge. As has been stated —
This, verily, is the characteristic pointing out to the Avidyā-nature in the case of Avidyā, not tolerating the scrutiny by the means of proof, and desired as a peculiar feature.

The Avidyā in the case of a person is imagined the Avidyā itself by non-establishment. This Avidyā, however, functions nowhere from the point of view of Brahman.

Therefore, Avidyā also being super-imposed upon the Ātman like the serpent on a rope, its removal by the knowledge of the nature of the Ātman stands to reason.

[52] It has been said (by you) — Is that Jñāna direct or indirect? — We say (respecting this), it is direct alone. (The objector says) — The impossibility of there being a means of knowledge has already been stated by us, because the word has the nature of producing indirect knowledge; and here there is no possibility of any other cause.
In this connection, some, afraid of the Logicians, admitting only the indirect knowledge (as produced) from the word, speak of direct knowledge from the mind, associated with the Bhāvanās.

Others, however, think — From the word is produced prima facie only the indirect knowledge, that being the nature of the instruments (of knowledge). Later on, however, from the word itself associated with hearing, thinking, meditating etc., arises the direct knowledge, as from the sense-organs associated with the impressions, recognition.

Now the first alternative (that the knowledge is indirect) is, for the matter of that, improper. Otherwise, if that Jñāna is produced by the Bhāvanās it would be un-authoritative — an undesirable result, like the clear perception of the beloved who is away in the case of a love-sick person pondering over the beloved.

I say (says the objector) there,—being produced by the Bhāvanā is not the cause of the un-authoritative nature

1 Ā ... सिद्धांतसंस्कारार्थादिकार्य 2 Ā इन्द्रियादिविव 3 Ā adds सचंदा after कामाहुरस्य
but having its object stultified. In the case of the illusion of silver etc., in the conch-shell, without even requiring any Bhāvanā, its unauthoritative nature is admitted as due to the stultification itself. In the case of Brahman, however, which is beyond the ken of all means of proof, as there is no possibility of any stultification, the authoritative nature of the (result) produced by the knowledge of the Bhāvanā does not become vitiated. And further, on account of the Bhāvanā being found out as a flaw in the case of the illusion about the distant beloved etc., there would not be in the case of the realisation of Brahman any illusory nature due to its being produced by a flaw, even when produced by that. For, like the nature of the object stultified, being produced by some flaw also, is the cause of the illusory nature. To the same effect is stated by the venerable author of the commentary on Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā

‘In whose case, there is the instrument of knowledge which is full of flaw, and where there is the conviction that it is false—that alone is untrustworthy, not any other.’

(Mī. Bhā. I. 1. 6.)
and also by the venerable author of the Vārtika—

‘Therefore, the authoritative nature of the knowledge arises from its being constituted of enlightenment. Anything else, however, is brushed aside because it is a faulty knowledge arising from some cause.’

(Mi. Vā. Co. Sū. Kārikā. 53)

—here two causes of the unauthoritative nature have been given as being equally potent. Therefore, even though there is the absence of stultification, one must speak of the unauthoritative nature when it is produced by some flaw. Though Bhāvanā is possessed of a flaw at times, it cannot be conclusively spoken of as being faulty everywhere. Otherwise, in the case of a yellow substance which is the cause of the illusion about the yellowness in the conch, it would be the cause of producing unauthoritative nature even in respect of the knowledge about its own object. And there would be the supposition of the stultification of the object itself producing the flaw simply because some flaw is admitted to exist somewhere. And further also, there would be the admission of the authoritative nature of inference and
others, even though produced by the faulty instruments of knowledge, because there exists the non-stultification of the object. Otherwise, the whole thing would merely boil down to technical terminology. The venerable authors of the Mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya and Vārtikas also have spoken of what is deduced by the faulty instruments of knowledge as the cause of unauthoritative nature, because that is, verily, in invariable concomitance with the object that is stultified, and not in an independent manner. Therefore, the knowledge of Brahman even though arising from Bhāvanā may have the authoritative nature because it is not stultified.

(Our reply is) — Not so, the Bhāvanā produced by the indirect knowledge cannot possibly produce direct knowledge. Not indeed does the inferential knowledge about fire, although repeated a thousand times, lead to the direct presentation of the fire. Because it is a rule that only that knowledge which is being produced without the paraphernalia necessary for the right knowledge is unauthori-
otherwise, even in the case of the sentences uttered by human beings, such as ‘One should bow down to the shrine, desirous of securing heaven’ there would not be the unauthoritative nature owing to the absence of the stultification of the object. For, not indeed is there any means of proof (to ensure) that the salutation to the shrine is a means of securing heaven, because the means for supramundane welfare and the absence thereof, are to be known only from the Vedas, there being no room for any other means of proof; while in the case of words uttered by human beings, they are authoritative only when they are based upon some other means of proof. If it be argued that the unauthoritative nature exists there on account of the absence of any base, because of the possibility of illusory knowledge, in the case of human beings, (our reply is)—the same obtains even in the present case.

It should not be argued (by you), that in the present case, there is no baselessness as the Word-proof is the base, because if the authoritative nature is admitted as being

| ¹ | आलोकितिह | ² | अमानान्तरप्रसंस्करण अनुमति अमूल्याबादित | ³ | अग्रामाण्यमु यथार्थमसंभवत | ⁴ | अनुनयमाण्यांसिरभवान्य | ⁵ | आदि अवर्गाविद अदोषाविद |
due to mutual discussion (etc.,) there would be the undesirable contingency of violating the self-authoritative nature profounded in the previous (Pūrvamīmāṃsā) Doctrine, and because here, it is right that there should be the authoritative nature of the word itself, as it is necessary. If it be said that, here we suppose that there is the authoritative nature, although not seen elsewhere, on account of the result not capable of being accounted for otherwise,—(our reply is) No; there is no proof for the supposition of some other unusual means of proof, as the result can be accounted for by the means of proof (already) admitted. You also will have to suppose that the indirect Bhāvanā is concerned with a direct object, and any other means of proof in that case is not seen elsewhere. Instead of supposing the two (things mentioned above), it is better to suppose that the word itself is concerned only with the direct object, where the authoritative nature is taken for granted; because the supposition about Dharmas is less clumsy than that about the Dharmin (the entity possessed of Dharmas).

[ 53 ] Well then, let the mind itself be (regarded as) authoritative here (says the objector)—(our reply is)—Is it associated with Bhāvanā or merely on its own?
Apropos the first (alternative), there accrues the flaw already spoken of before. For, the rule is—the special cause, resorting to which the mind produces right knowledge, has another means of proof (to prove it). Otherwise, if the mind alone associated with the knowledge of the invariable concomitance with the eye and others, is possibly authoritative everywhere, there would ensue the destruction of all other means of proof,—an undesirable result. If it is admitted that even the eye and others are possessed of the authoritative nature owing to some peculiar nature everywhere, the same thing obtains in the case of Bhāvanā as well. Neither is the second (alternative possible). Because the mere mind exists even prior to the hearing of the Vedānta-passages and as Brahman is always near at hand, there would always be the realisation. And because the means, hearing, thinking, meditating etc., would be useless, there would not be the beginning of the Mīmāṁsā in four chapters propounding them. (And further, the Word would have perforce to be admitted as unauthoritative if it were to depend upon Bhāvanā. For, dependence upon but not resorting to the nature of the cause pointed

$1 \text{ A सदा} \ 2 \text{ A... चतुर्भुज्यमांमोत्सा...} \ 3 \text{ dropped in IO and A}$
out by the nature of the effect, limited by the right knowledge produced of word is the cause of the unauthoritative nature; (and) in the case of the eye and others, there is the same type of unauthoritative nature.

Further, as that (Manas) has the capacity to favour (or strengthen) a means of proof, there is no possibility of another means of proof, as in the case of Inference, light etc., because, on account of the absence of any uncommon object, as the attributes of the mind, pleasure, pain, desire etc., are admitted, in the Siddhānta view, as to be known by the Witness, verily, in the absence of the intervening instruments (of perception). Nor again (is) Brahman itself the peculiar object of the mind, because that would be in contradiction with the Śruti (passage)

‘What one thinks of not by the mind’ (Keno. I. 5)

and others.

I say (says the objector)—Even, in the Siddhānta view, there is equally the contradiction with the Śruti (passages)
‘What is not spoken of by words’ (Keno. I. 4)

‘It is neither grasped by the eye, nor by words also’ (Mundaka. III. 1. 8)

‘Whence words retreat’ (Taitti. II. 4. 5)

and others — (our reply is) — On the strength of the Šruti (passages)

‘One who is a non-knower of the Veda, knows not that big one’ (Sātyā. IV)

‘This what is fit to be known by the Veda’ (Bṛha. V. 1)

‘I ask about that Man propounded in the Upaniṣads’ (Bṛha. III. 9. 26)

and others, the condemnatory Šruti passages can be rightly accounted for, as not being within the province of their primary (denotative) power, there being the absence of the division, principal and subordinate in the case of the mind.
If (you ask) — What happens then to the Śruti (passages) such as

‘Where all Vedas become one’ (Cittyu. XI. 1)

‘That Ātman belongs to the mind’ (Cittyu. XI. 1.2)

‘It has to be perceived by the mind alone’ (Brha. IV. 4.19)

—(our reply is) — Listen. Mānasānatva (means) what is fit to be found in the limiting adjunct, the mind, and not being the object of the direct perception produced by the mind. Manasaiva—(here) the instrumental case denoting agent, intended to propound the nature of the non-doer in the case of Ātman, speaks of the mind being the agent of perception, and not its being the instrument, on account of the contradiction with the well-known view of the Upaniṣads. References (names) are in conformity with (some) uncommon (characteristic) like the expression Mānasīna in practical use.

[ 54 ] For this very reason, there is no scope for the
mind to be the instrument, even on the ground of its being the resort of right knowledge. In the Śruti (passage)

‘Desire, thought, doubt, faith, non-faith, firmness, slackness, shame, understanding, fear — all this is the mind only’

(Bṛha. I. 5. 3; Maitrā. VI. 30)

the mind is described in case-co-ordination, as being the constituent cause, as in (the expression) ‘the clay-jar’. As no case-co-ordination is seen in ‘the staff, the jar’ (in such cases, the position) is to be accounted for, by admitting the nature of the Instrumental cause; the presence and absence (of factors) which have necessarily to be understood for the purpose of understanding the nature of the Instrumental cause, are themselves properly the province of the constituent cause, there being no other constituent cause in evidence. And the Ātman is described as attributeless in the Śruti (passage)

‘The Witness, Sentient, Pure and Attributeless’

(Śvetā. VI. 11; Brahmō XVI)
as the Perceivables cannot rightly be the Dharmas of the Perceiver, as, in the case of the perceivables, jar and others either from their nature, or from their being the Dharmas, the absence of their being identical (with Ātman) is all-established; and when ‘Desire, thought etc.’, are definitely ascertained as not being the attributes of the Perceiver, as they are perceivable, owing to their not possessing the self-illumining capacity, it is concluded that ‘Desire etc.’ are just the Dharmas of the mind, by the Śruti (passages)

‘It is fit to be perceived only by the mind’ (Bṛha. IV. 4. 19)

‘When all the longings which had resorted to the heart of this one are cast away’  
(Kaṭho. II. 3. 14; Bṛha. IV. 4. 7)

‘Verily, then he has crossed over all the longings in the heart’  
(Bṛha. IV. 3. 22)

and others. And on account of the superimposition of the identity of the mind (on the Ātman), there is the statement of its attributes also involving superimposition on the Ātman (as is clear) from the Śruti (passages)
By the attribute of the Buddhi, and also by the attribute of the Ātman he is perceived even as the lowest—having the measure just of the point of the awl'

(Svetā. V. 8)

'He, remaining uniform, moves about in both the worlds, as though meditating'

(Bṛha. IV. 3. 7)

'With the understanding, having become the dream, he goes beyond this world'

(Bṛha. IV. 3. 7)

and others. In the Śruti (passage)

'The Vijñāna spreads the sacrifice, and also spreads about the Karman'

(Taitti. II. 5)

the mind itself, denoted by the word Vijñāna, although referred to by a word in the nominative case, is described as the agent. If it be argued, that it is stated in the Śruti as being the Instrument as well, as in the (passage)

'He, verily, perceives by the mind itself, hears by the mind'

(Bṛha. I. 5. 3; Maitra. VI. 30)

and others, (our reply is)—No, because that Śruti passage purports to point out only to the existence (of the

1 A भाषाषाप्रच्छस्य 2 A ... पदरीवेद्येन
mind) as apart from (the sense-organs), for (the benefit of those) who hold conflicting opinions about the mind which is apart from the sense-organs; (the Śrutī passage is not intended) to point out to its being the instrument; otherwise its connection with the Eva (alone) would not be properly explained; even in the case of the eye and others, their being the instrument is established by the (law of) presence and absence, and so, no rule can be rightly laid down, when they are separated from it, and the Instrumental case is known to be used (lit. remembered), to point out only to the cause. The well-known fact of the mind being the instrument, however, is, verily, due to the fact that the Ātman, without any Dharmas, and self-illumining, unattached, himself incompetent to experience the objects, (of senses), experiences the objects, by functioning in the form (of the mind) due to the super-imposition of his oneness on it; and not by remaining indifferent like the eye and others—Let this suffice for the present; we shall propound this at length in (our work) ‘Prakāśaprakriyā’ (or, in connection with the technique of ‘self-illumination’).

[55] (The objector says)—All right then! Let it be that the word itself, although producing indirect know-
knowledge at first, would produce direct knowledge afterwards, through the assistance of the particular associates. (Our reply is) — No, that (it) not so, because in that case, there would come in the ‘maxim of the half-old woman’. If the word has the nature of producing the indirect knowledge, that cannot be pushed away from it by even a thousand associating agencies, because an accidental characteristic cannot be the nature (of a thing).

[56] As to ‘recognition’ cited forth as the illustrative instance (we ask you) — What is it that is intended to show up there? (1) Is it that the eye, which has the nature of producing direct knowledge, can produce the indirect knowledge, with the co-operation of the impression (sāṁskāra), or (2) is it that the eye, having the nature of producing direct knowledge in respect of the object near at hand, is the producing cause of the direct knowledge in respect of an object of the portion, viz. the nature of that, not near at hand with the co-operation of the impression, or (3) is it that the eye although producing the knowledge independent of the impression is not unauthoritative even when it depends upon the impression?

1 A तदपकरणयोगात् 2 A ... शानजननस्वभावस्य 3 A reads अ 4 A ... शानजनन ... 5 A संस्कारसपेश्वेति ामाण्यम्
In this connection, the first (alternative) cannot stand because recognition is direct and the eye cannot produce the portion involved in that.

For this reason, not even the second (alternative can stand) because in respect of the portion involving the nature of that, directness is not admitted, and only the nature of remembrance is admitted in respect of that portion while it is produced only from the impressions. Thus recognition produced by the mental impressions would be having the nature of remembrance, and so the view viz. the remembrance produced from the impressions is its cause, on account of the knowledge of the qualifying factor alone, is brushed aside. Because the nature of remembrance is admitted in respect of the portion produced by the mental impressions; and because there is no scope for the supposition of remembrance intervening between, when there is the possibility of the production of the recognition from the mental impressions rising up and that have necessarily to be postulated as being the cause of remembrance, and in accordance with the maxim 'Let it be in accordance
with the cause. What is the matter about it? — as in the case of remembrance, so even in the case of recognition the presence and the absence of the previous experience are equal in the picture. As in the case of the nature of right knowledge and the nature of wrong knowledge there is no contradiction in the case of experience and remembrance having the power to produce the same knowledge, on account of the difference in the portions affected by the objects of knowledge. Because remembrance and experience are not admitted as being possessed of a generality.

For this very reason (cannot stand) the third (alternative) — Not indeed exists for the eye the dependence upon the mental impressions in respect of its own object, so that there could have been the unauthoritative nature, characterised by dependence, but there comes in ultimately in the case of the eye and the mental impression producing a simultaneous cognition in their respective objects by taking into account their respective associates, the nature of the producer of only one knowledge involving experience and remembrance by the combined objects. Otherwise, if the eye produces the cognition even in respect of an object not at hand with the co-operation of the mental impression,
there would be the undesirable contingency of the ocular cognition in respect of the silver even though it is not nearby through the co-operation of the impression of silver; or there would perforce be the acceptance of ‘Akhyāti’. When the relation of cause and effect is regulated by the ocular perception of silver through the connection itself with the silver, that is the same in respect of the cognition of thiness having a connection with the particular space and time, because Direct Perception is as a rule the cognition of what actually exists. But in the case of the eye and the mental impression, although accepted as the cause of the cognition of the different generality, has been postulated, in respect of the recognition, the nature of being the cause of one cognition, in conformity with the law of presence and absence. This itself has been given as an illustrative example by the venerable author (Padmapāda) of the Pañcapādikā establishing the production of the false knowledge known as ‘Anirvacaniya’, by the refutation of the view of ‘Anyathākhyāti’. But, by this there cannot be the authoritative nature of something which is even dependent upon something else. Here, however, in the
case of the word, formerly quite incompetent to produce direct knowledge, (now) producing the direct knowledge through the special co-operation of the impression produced by thoughts, the undesired contingency of there being the authoritative nature depending upon something else, and the loss of the nature become all the more inevitable and unshakable. Therefore, it is better to accept the position that the Word itself self-authoritative, prior and posterior to pondering, produces direct realisation by virtue of the special importance of the object. Further, there is no flaw of the loss of the nature, because as in the case of mind, the nature of producing indirect and direct cognition is admitted. As is admitted by the opponents that the mind sometimes produces indirect knowledge and sometimes direct knowledge, why may not that obtain in the case of the Word in our case?

Now I say (says the objector), there exists a two-fold nature of a limiting charateristic. (1) In the capacity of the mind, there is produced the indirect knowledge. (2) There is produced the direct knowledge in the capacity of

A सापेक्षत्वक्षणा ...

1
the sense-organs having a peculiar nature, like the eye etc. And the nature of sense-organs depends upon the connection with the mind which is the cause of cognition, having the same substratum with the absence of special qualities arising from (the means of proof) other than Word, or it depends upon the connection with the mind which is the cause of cognition, with its functioning not caused by remembrance. And that exists in the case of the mind also as in the case of the eye and others. Thus even in the case of the Word, a two-fold form should be stated, thus — (1) being characterised by the nature of producing the indirect cognition, and (2) being characterised by the nature of producing the direct cognition.

[57] (To the above objection) it is stated in reply (by us as under) — In the case of the Word, either through being the producer of cognition not produced from the object or through being the instrument of cognition, there is the nature of producing indirect cognition; there is the nature of producing direct knowledge, through the word pointing out to the identity with the object ‘you’ after a
proper scrutiny of the objects. The first qualifying attribute is for the sake of warding off the violation in respect of expressions like ‘you are religious’; being turned away by the other qualifying attributes is obvious (enough). And that is so, because from passages like ‘you are the tenth’, ‘you are the king’, there is seen the direct realisation, such as ‘I am the tenth’, ‘I am the king’ etc., otherwise there would not be from them, the direct discarding of the illusion, such as ‘I am not the tenth; I am the ninth’, ‘I am not the king, I am the hunter’, because it is postulated that in the case of a direct illusion there should be contradiction by the direct contradictory knowledge itself.

[ 58 ] It should not be argued that there is no comprehension thereof of the contact with the mind, when the unqualified object is brought to view from the sentence (uttered), because in the case of all sentences that possibility exists, and so would follow the undesirable contingency of the means of proof ‘Word’ being just scotched off; and because in the case of cognition of an object through the peculiar co-operation of the mind being another means of...
proof has to be necessarily there, in conformity with the maxim ‘What is peculiar, is the cause’ etc.

For this very reason (the view) that after the indirect cognition from the sentence, another mental cognition is the cause of turning away illusion is brushed aside, because there the sentence itself is ascertained to be the cause in conformity with (the law of) presence and absence. Otherwise, with the whole paraphernalia existing even prior to the hearing of the sentence, there would be the undesirable contingency of the mind or the eye and others, producing the direct realisation. If you say that the sentence also is the co-operating agency there, then it follows that the sentence itself has the authoritative nature, the mind being (just) a peculiar co-operator. Therefore the Word itself is the cause of direct realisation there. As the nature of the mind pervaded by the indirect is one, that one pervaded by the direct is another, so the nature of the word also is two-fold; hence there would be no confused mixing up (either).

1 A वदसाधारणकारणमिति 2 A मानस स्त्रान्तर ... 3 A तत्र तत्र 4 A adds इन्द्रियालन्न after अपरम्
59 I say (says the objector) — Even though being the cause is possible in a special form as in the case of the six (sense-organs) the eye and others, limited by the characteristic of being a special cause — the nature of the eye etc., — there is the characteristic of being the general cause and there is desired another (characteristic) — the nature of the sense-organ. Likewise, even in the case of the Word, you have to state a characteristic involving a nature of a general cause in conformity with the six sense-organs. Otherwise, in respect of the cognition produced by the Word, the direct generality would be an accidental feature, there being no producing cause of that in the word. And similarly, in the absence of the more extensive, there would not be the direct cognition from the Word, pervaded by it, like the perceptibility of the sight etc.

(To the above objection) it is stated (by us in reply) — Being the instrument of knowledge not having the base of indirect knowledge only, is found in seven (entities) like the nature of the sense-organs characterised by being the producing cause of direct knowledge existing in the six

1 A व्यापकाभवेत
admitted by you. The nature of the cause of the special
cognition being the characteristic of the nature of the
general cause, obtains equally in your view as well as in my
view. Otherwise, if the sense-organs are not established
as the cause in a general manner, there would not be the
nature of the cause by resorting to particular contact with
the mind producing the cognition. Therefore, the state-
ment that the eye and others that are accepted as the
causes in the special form — the nature of the eye etc., —
by some limiting adjunct or other — this is not vitiated in
the case of the Word also.

[ 60 ] It should not be argued that in that case, the
Word would have the functioning of the sense-organs, foist-
ed upon it, because something characterising the nature of
the cause of the direct perception is the cause of the func-
tioning of the sense-organs. (Our reply to this is) —
Because the sense-organs are super-sensuous, there is the
absence of only popular direct functioning in their case and
the scrutineers carry on their dealings in their own tech-
nical terminology. Even though in the case of that (Vyava-
hāra) of the nature described, there is the particular feature
of its not being heard, there is no flaw because it is admit-
ted that it is the cause of the practical dealing. And
further, the nature described is not the cause of the
functioning of the sense-organs, because it does not cover the five organs of action. There is no absence of proof in respect of them, because that has been propounded by the Śruti and Smṛti passages,

‘There are these ten Prānas in a man, the Ātman is the eleventh’ (Bṛha. III. 9. 4)

and because the five-fold action known as speaking, grasping, going, evacuating, sexual-joy cannot be accounted for otherwise. Further in that same way has been described in the fourth part, named ‘Avirodha’, by the Revered author of the Sūtras —

‘Those sense-organs, on account of that appellation other than the best.’ (Bra. Sū. II. 4. 17)

The Sāṅkhyaś also say —

‘Egoism is the Ahamkāra; from it the two-fold creation proceeds, (the creation) concerning the sense-organs is the eleven-fold host; there are also the five-fold subtle elements.
The eleven-fold host constituted of the Sattva-quality proceeds from the Vaikṛta Ahamkāra. The subtle proceed from the elements (Tamasa Ahamkāra) etc. That is constituted of the Tamas. From the Tejas proceed these both varieties.

The organs of knowledge are known as the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin. They speak of the organs of action as speech, hands, feet, the organ of excretion, and the organ of generation.

(Sā. Kā. 24–26)

The meaning of this is — From the Mahat which existed as the first effect of the Prakṛti constituted of the generality ‘the great existence’ was produced the entity called Ahamkāra. — This has been stated in the passage

‘From the Prakṛti, the Mahat; from that the Ahamkāra.’ (Sā. Kā. 21)

Now is stated the characteristic of Ahamkāra — Abhimāna (egoism) in respect of the entity here put forth by the sense-organs, — I am the authorised master, I am indeed powerful, these objects are for my sake alone, there is
no authorised master elsewhere than I, thus am I—the Abhimāna (self-importance) of this nature, engaged in activities associated with Ahamkāra, is the characteristic of Ahamkāra. Therefore, Ahamkāra is the cause of self-importance. And the case-coordination is used with a desire to point out identity of cause and effect. And it is three-fold—(1) constituted of the Sattva, (2) constituted of the Rajas, and (3) constituted of the Tamās, from the three-fold distinction of the Guṇas that are the cause. The Sattvika itself is spoken of as Vaikṛta and Vaikārika, the Rajasa itself is spoken of by the word Taijasa; the Tamasa by the word Bhūta etc. And from that Sattvika-Ahamkāra (proceeds) the creation of the eleven sense-organs, because that (Sattvika-Ahamkāra) is light and illumining. From the Tamasa-Ahamkāra (proceeds) the creation of the five subtle elements called sound, touch, form, taste and smell, because that (Tamasa is) heavy and constituted of the covering nature. The Rajasa, however, having no independent function, merely acts as the co-operating
agency with the both, because the Rajas (quality) pushes on in respect of their functions the Sattva and Tamas (qualities) that are by themselves inactive. Because it has been stated

'Sattva is desired to be light and illumining, the Rajas strengthening and active, the Tamas alone heavy and screening.'

(Sā. Kā. 13)

And the effect follows in the wake of the cause. And even in the case of these, opposed to one another, their performing the same action is not vitiated, because the oil, wick and fire, although opposed to one another, are seen to produce one activity, viz. light. And that has been stated —

'Like the lamp there is the functioning in effect.'

(Sā. Kā. 13)

Therefore, this is the division. There the sense-organs have the Sāttvika Ahamkāra as the constituent cause; and according to the view no other Prāna apart from the general functioning of the sense-organs being not admitted, there is no over-extension in that case. Because it has been stated

$\Delta ...$ प्राणान्तःकाराणि
‘The general functioning of the sense-organs—five airs, Praṇa etc.’

The subtle elements and the elements are the effect of Tāmasa-Ahamkāra.

[61] I say (says the objector)—In the Śruti-passage, according to the Siddhānta-view—

‘My dear, the mind, verily, is constituted of food (earth); Praṇa, constituted of water; speech of Tejas’

being strengthened by the material food is stated there; and that is possible only when they belong to the same genus; from (the expressions like) ‘constituted of earth’ (in the case of the entities constituted of earth) is seen the strengthening by another piece of clay, and in the passage

‘Speech merges into the Fire, the eye into the Sun, the ear in the Quarters’

the Śruti speaks of the merging in the elements and the merging cannot be accounted for without there being a cause,—and so, it is established that the sense-organs are
made up of the material elements for the manifestation of the qualities of the elements like light etc. As the ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose enable one to grasp respectively sound, touch, form, taste and smell, they belong to those (\textit{Guṇas}) respectively; likewise the mind also is possessed of five attributes, because it enables one to grasp these five attributes because of the invariable concomitance (expressed in the formula) 'which sense-organ enables one to grasp which quality, that sense-organ is possessed of that quality'. Thus likewise, it would follow that the mind is constituted of the five elements, and the others are constituted of one element each.

\textbf{[62]} You cannot say that because the mind is possessed of the qualities of touch etc., there would be the undesirable contingency of its being the cause, because it is admitted to be on the same footing as the eye and others, and also because the \textit{Ārambha}-doctrine is not admitted by us. Further again, there is no proof whatsoever (to admit) the existence of the atom not constituted of the elements and void of all particular qualities, because the inference proving that, are fallacious and that is known by the 'I'.

1  \textit{A} मूतरुणव्यङ्कचेन 2 \textit{A} तत्तदरुणवच्चम  * dropped in I.O.
idea itself, which comes within the province of the self-illumining pure Ātman and pervading the whole body. And all this has been stated in the Vārtika—

‘The sense-organ would be like a lamp, homogeneous with the object to be grasped by it. If it were not like that, on account of the manifestation of the form alone, it would be like grasping the form by the ear.

Here, in the case of each independent sense-organ, there would be the grasping of all the objects, like that of mind and intellect, if there be no homogeneity of objects (to be grasped).

In the case of these two—mind and understanding—as they are constituted of all the elements, the grasping of all the objects is to be understood; otherwise that would be impossible.

The understanding by the individual agents of knowledge, like the skin etc., is believed to be of a general nature, like that in the case of Prāṇa alone, where the power of activity is spoken of as a general one.
The powers of knowledge — the ear and others are, for the sake of the attainment of the enjoyment of words etc., likewise the powers of action — speech etc., are for the sake of the enjoyment of Karmans.’ (Brha. Vā. II. 4. 364–68).

And also the following —

‘As long as there is the pervasion by blood in the body; so long alone is the pervasion by the understanding, functioning generally, till the destruction of the body.

What functioning is noticed in the case of an appropriate sense-organ or even elsewhere than that, that is to be known belonging to itself and it is not the change in its nature.’ (Brha. Vā. II. 4. 345–346)

etc. Here, though one and the same, the mind and the understanding are mentioned as two, on account of the difference of functioning characterised by thought and decision. In the case of the eye and the sound, it might be feared that there would be the violation of the invariable concomitance mentioned before, if the eye were to perceive

1 A सामान्यविषेषतः स्वाध्यायः... A सामान्यविषेष व्यासिः...
the 'hearing' — so the expression Yogya (appropriate) has been put in. There, in one and the same ball-like object are admitted two sense-organs competent to perform the respective functions — this is the sense. And the difference between the organs of knowledge and the organs of action is stated in conformity with the difference between the powers of knowledge and action. That being the case, persevering in the eleven (sense-organs), possessed of what characteristic is a sense-organ concerned with practical dealings? Because by your honour, verily, is not admitted the Śāttvika Ahamkāra as having the characteristic of the constituent cause.

[ 63 ] (To the above objection it is stated by us in reply) — The definition of the sense-organ in general is — 'being other than Prāṇa, being the state of the constituent cause of the elements not mixed up five-fold'. The first qualifying attribute is there because Prāṇa is not admitted as a sense-organ, in accordance with the Sūtra

'Elsewhere, because of its being the most important'.

(Bra. Sū. II. 4. 17)
As for sound, touch, form, taste, smell, they are not the constituent cause because they have their very nature of the five-fold compounded elements. There, the inner sense-organ is the effect of the five great elements not compounded in its form, with the Sattva-portion prominent. And that is known as two-fold, understanding and mind, on account of the difference in functioning. There, the Prāṇa is the effect of the five great elements not compounded, with the Rajas-portion prominent in it. And that is known as five-fold, Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna and Samāna, on account of the difference in functioning. Even according to the view which admits Prāṇa and the mind to be one, there is no dispute regarding such a division of that; because by the words Jñāna-śakti and Kriyā-śakti, only the qualities Sattva and Rajas are denoted. Thus, the ear is the product of the Ākāśa not compounded five-fold, with Sattva prominent in it; that too, like the eye and others, comprehends, verily, by going out, on account of the actual perception in the form ‘the sound is at a distance’. The Ākāśa, however,
in our view is not eternal as in the view of the Logicians. Thus the skin is the product of that kind of Vāyu. The eye is the product of that kind of Tejas. The tongue is the product of that kind of water. The nose is the product of that kind of earth. The products are the organs of knowledge on account of the Sattva possessing the illumining nature. Thus, Vāk is the sense-organ produced from the Ākāśa not compounded five-fold, with the Sat-quality, mixed up slightly with the Rajas, being prominent. Moreover, in respect of this (Vāk) it is the product of the Ākāśa like the ear, because it is the sense-organ manifesting the sound. Some talk of the Vāk as possessed of the Tejas-element on the strength of the Śruti passage

‘Vāk is constituted of Tejas.’ (Cha. VI. 5. 4)

— That is not so. There the word Tejas denotes an oily earthly substance like ghee etc., because there is the introductory statement

‘Tejas (food) is enjoyed in three ways’ (Cha. VI. 5. 3)
and another Śruti

'Tejas, verily, is ghee because it is impossible to eat what is Tejas; otherwise, even in the case of the Śruti-passage

'O dear, mind is constituted of food' (Chā. VI. 5. 4)

the mind will have to be admitted as having only an earthly nature.

Therefore, what has been stated by us is correct. Similarly the sense-organ — the hand — is the product of that kind of Vāyu, because the function, grasping etc., is constituted of Vāyu; because in the Śruti-passage

'This triad is the Name, Form and Karman' (Brha. I. 6. 1)

the Prāṇa is mentioned as being constituted of Karman, and Prāṇa and Vāyu are described as one in the Saṁvarga-Vidyā etc. The sense-organ — the foot — is the product of that kind of Tejas, it being known that the treatment meted out to the foot contributes to the health of the eye,
Therefore, there might be subsidiary divisions, but as the general characteristic of being the constituent cause of the elements not compounded five-fold is possible, there is nothing untenable in our view. —Let that go as it is. Therefore, there would not be the unwanted practical dealing associated with the sense-organs even in the case of the Word on the strength of its being the cause of direct knowledge.

Further, it should not be argued that in this way there would be an undesirable mixing up, if the nature of the Word possesses direct as well as indirect nature, because the mixing up of the generalities also, like the mixing up of the limiting adjuncts, is no flaw; and also, there is no possibility of the nature of generality, because the direct nature and the indirect nature are the functions of only one knowledge, as in the case of the nature of right knowledge and the nature of wrong knowledge; and if generality were to be admitted there would be just anarchy, on account of the absence also of a continuing experience impossible to be proved otherwise, characterised by the nature of the effect. Further, it should not be argued by you that the
genus, being indirect, would be established by the limiting adjunct, viz. being produced by the sense-organs, because that is not the limiting adjunct of the nature of effect owing to its being the function of the knowledge of the eternal Isvara according to your view; according to our view it is the function of the eternal Witness, Sentience, manifesting pleasure etc. According to the view of the Mimamsakas, on account of the generality associated with the Guṇas not being admitted, if the knowledge of Isvara is not admitted to be direct, there would not be the establishment itself of that, because that is inferred on account of his being possessed of direct knowledge as being the material cause of the earth etc. Further, you should not say — Let then the direct perception produced be the generality, there being no contradiction. — Let it be there or let it not be there. What loss is there for us? It has been (already) stated that direct perception being common to eternal knowledge is not generality.

[65] Surely, for you also it is difficult to point out to the direct perception referring to an object. To explain the same — Not for the matter of that can there be the
nature of the object of direct perception on account of there being mutual inter-dependence and because, that the knowledge is direct has yet to be proved. There cannot be also the nature of the self-illumining Sentience propounded in the Śruti-passage,

‘What is Brahman, from definite direct perception.’

( Brha. III. 4. 1 )

If it is intended to point out that nature in the nature of things,— all the objects, verily, being possessed of that form as a matter of fact would be associated with direct perception — ( that would be ) an undesirable contingency! And further, a real direct perception cannot produce anything in respect of practical dealings. And if we admit that kind of nature not super-imposed, that is absent in ( the statements like ) ‘You are the tenth’. Nor again could there be the manifestation as not different from Saṁvit; ( if that be the case ) that being absent in jar and others, there would be indirect perception ( in respect of them ) — an undesirable contingency! Further, you cannot say that the direct perception also belongs to jar and others, because it is direct for sentience like Sattā by the Sattā itself of
Sentience. Because the direct perception itself associated with Caitanya cannot be described as apart from its nature. And if that is admitted as its mere nature, as there is everywhere the functioning of the Sattā, there would be the functioning of direct perception also.

[66] If it is argued that the removal of the nature of Ajñāna itself is the direct perception of the Caitanya, and that again is in some places by the direct realisation of pleasure etc., of its own accord, and in some places by virtue of the particular functioning due to the means of proof like the realisation of the jar and others so there would not be over-encroachment — (our reply is) — even so, the object manifested as not different from the nature of the Caitanya with the Ajñāna removed does partake of the direct perception in respect of the knowledge concerning it — that would be the ultimate meaning got at; if that be the case, the knowledge concerning it is definitely useless because the result of that (knowledge) has been already produced. In the case of the object screened, how can there be the
removal of the Ajñāna, without the knowledge produced by the means of proof? That the means of proof itself without any direct perception after removing the Ajñāna in respect of an object that is produced afterwards becomes possessed of the direct perception, being the object of that special nature — thus disclosing your wonderful scholarship, if you are asked how in that case do not come in Inference and others, what reply can you give? Being one who agrees to the orthodox doctrine (of Vedaprāmāṇya)— how can you say that it is the very nature? Therefore, it is put forth here that the nature of the functioning characterised by the removal of Ajñāna — that itself is the direct nature. And that cannot be had through the real direct perception of the Caitanya and so some other cause has got to be stated in that connection. The view that direct knowledge is produced by the words directly referring to the oneness of the objects is thus brushed aside, because though being the object of real direct nature is possible in passages like ‘That thou art,’ it is impossible in (passages) like ‘You are the tenth’, and because the removal of Ajñāna is absent prior
संभवात्, निन्द्वचारांनयं च शान्दौरेर्यायुः महाभावात्, यदा कदाचित्, निन्द्वचारान्तविशिष्यार्यं च ‘पर्वतो वशिष्यानु’ इत्यदिवाक्यानामेष्यः, अपरोक्षस्वरूपविषयत्या, अपरोक्ष्यानजनक्तविवालात्।

‘यतो बा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते’ (तैत्ति. तैत्ति. II. १)
‘सत्यं ज्ञानमन्त्तम्’ (तैत्ति. II. १)

इत्यादिश्रवक्यांनांपर्वोत्तरत्या, अपरोक्षस्वरूपविषयत्या, अपरोक्ष्यानजनक्तवेन महावाक्यवैशिष्यपायत। न च प्रमाणमेदविषयत्वेनापरोक्ष्यानजनक्तवं ‘सर्वज्ञेनविभिन्योसि’ इत्यदिवाक्यादापि तथा प्रसंज्ञात। ‘ईश्वरो मदामिनः

to the knowledge from the Word — if the removal of Ajñana is expected to be achieved sometime, then sentences like ‘the mountain is possessed of fire’, would perforce have to be admitted to produce the direct knowledge, because the object possesses the nature of direct perception. And even passages like

‘From whom, verily, these beings are produced.’
(Taitti. III. 1)

‘Truth, Knowledge, Infinite’
(Taitti. II. 1)

etc., producing the direct knowledge being the object of the nature of direct perception, there would perforce be uselessness of the great passages; nor can it be said that they produce the direct knowledge because they are objects not different from the knower; otherwise, that will perforce have to be admitted even in the case of a sentence like
‘You are endowed with omniscient nature’ and likewise the same will have to be admitted from the Inference (as) —

Īśvara is not different from me,
Because of being possessed of sentience,
Like myself.

1 निन्द्वचारान्तविश्यार्यं
2 अ द्रोप्प अपि
3 च शान्दौरेर्यायुः
4 अ द्रोप्प अपि
5 अ सर्वज्ञेनविभिन्योसि...
Therefore, what has been stated by us alone is correct—there is the productive capacity for the direct knowledge on account of the words pointing out to the identity with the object (denoted by the word) 'You' referred to by the appropriate sense of the word.

[67] This being the case, nor again should it be argued by you—when it is possible for a word to produce direct knowledge even prior to the pondering, and the removal of Ajñāna and its products capable of being removed by that itself, what is the use of any pondering further? — Because, at that time it (pondering) would not be competent to produce its effect, because it is obstructed by (the circumstances like) the impossibility of the same. But when the obstruction is removed by proper pondering, the direct indeterminate knowledge produced by the word, being unhindered would produce its own effect. There, this is the order in which it functions. — From the performance of the prescribed sacrifices etc., aiming at the knowledge of Brahman right up to the fruit, the wrong tendency of the mind acting as an impediment in the way of
the discrimination between permanent and non-permanent is warded off. Thereupon, by the discrimination between permanent and impermanent the wrong tendency of the mind, which obstructs the absence of the greed (for enjoyment of objects) here and hereafter is brushed aside; — then the wrong tendency of the mind obstructing the control and restraint by the absence of greed for the objects of senses; — then, by control, restraint and others, the wrong tendency of the mind which is the cause of perverse activity; — then (is removed) the wrong tendency of the mind entertaining the unauthoritative nature of the Vedānta-passages pointing out to the identity of Atman and Brahman without a second, by logical reasoning involved in ‘hearing’, culminating in concluding the purport and denotation of the Vedānta concerning the oneness of Brahman without a second, or by (understanding) the Hetus (the Vedānta-passages) for the sake of sacrificial activity to be fallacious reasonings; and thus, in the case of Vedānta, the wrong tendency of the mind, obstructing the concentration of the mind, which is the cause of the piling up of the unauthoritative concepts by the reasoning known as ‘thinking’, which results in the proper perspective of (the Brahman) to-be-known. Then is brushed away the wrong
tendency of the mind — the massing together of the impressions produced by the knowledge of the body as Ātman, which is going on continuously without any beginning, — by the mental effort known as ‘meditating’ which results in the functioning of knowledge which is the mass of impressions concerning the oneness of Brahman and Ātman unaffected by anything else. Then in the mind-mirror, naturally clear, void of all the blemishes, the tendency already produced by the Vedānta-passages pointing out to (the Brahman as a) complete whole, turns away the entire Ajñāna and its effects, verily, by virtue of its self-authoritative nature which is without blemishes and obstructions. And after that there can be neither any doubt, nor (any scope for) reply. Thus has been said —

‘The understanding (of a king) soiled by his personal faults although prompted by the blameless eye, does not produce the proper fruit, concerning Bhartṛṣu (his minister) So (is the case of) the idea in respect of the Ātman, although arising from the Śruti passage.

1. ... evaḥ śāṅkhānāmābhikṣaṇe
2. ... sāṁskāravachchitarāḥ...
3. Ā adds सिंहे after ... द्रष्टतये
4. Ā adds या after ...धर्मिष्यता
5. Ā अमतिवधा 6. Ā भव्यविषया
But when the faults of a person are removed, it becomes fruitful again, owing to the driving out of the impediments, as the column of smoke comes out of the fire when the ( antidotes ) jewel and charm are not there.

The Veda-knowers say that all pondering has for its fruit the removal of the faults in a person. And, for this reason, not marring the independent nature of the words, this section would lead to the desired fruit. 

(Samkṣepa. I. 14)

Therefore, in the case of the direct realisation of the knowledge of the one-ness of Atman and Brahman without a second, although self-authoritative, having produced as though an unauthoritative nature, like the indirect perception due to strong blemishes — its being the remover of Ajñāna is thwarted. By the pondering is effected only the removal of blemishes; nothing is imposed (by it) — so, there is no fear of its self-authoritative nature being given up. Therefore, who has gained control etc., who is an ascetic, desireous of salvation, resorting to a teacher, should

1 A drops २ A  ... पराधिनिहित्तिकः  ३ A अनपेक्षातामनुरुष्य
go on with the pondering in accordance with (the study of) the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra containing four parts, right upto the attainment of the fruit. — Dividing (into suitable sections) the consideration thus, we shall propound the same. Therefore, it is established that Ātman himself as characterised by the removal of Avidyā is Salvation. And its means is the realization itself of the oneness of Ātman and Brahman untinged by anything else, produced by the Vedānta-passages, with impediments removed by ‘hearing’ etc., — thus everything is quite reasonable.

Accepting the doctrines of Kapila, Kañāda, Akṣapāda etc., with the blemishes therein smashed down by various reasonings, and resorting to the one Advaita-doctrine, conforming with the Śruti, without any blemish, the door to immortality — (I say) he whom the meritorious ones describe as Salvation, known only from the Vedāntas, constituted of the highest Bliss, knowledge (itself) void of Ajñāna, — he is the very Self of me, all-perfect.
Here ends the 'Bunch' named 'Scrutiny of Mokṣa' along with the means thereof of the 'Śrī Vedāntakalpalatikā' the composition of Paramahamsa-Parivrājaka-Madhusūdanāsarasvatī.

Here ends the Vedāntakalpalatikā.
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