Advaitasiddhisarasamgraha

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**Introduction**

If an attempt has to be made to evolve a globalised religion, acceptable to Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus etc., it has to be on the sheet anchor of the commentaries of Sankara Bhagavatpada (508 BC) on the three basic texts on philosophy-Vedanta (Prasthanathraya - Upanishads, Brahma Sutras and Gita) in general and the Adhyasa Bhashya (introduction to his Brahmatsutra Bhashya) in particular. From this flows the different literature on Advaita.

Advaita literature can be broadly classified under two categories. First, those which strengthen the arguments in the Sutra Bhashya. Second, those which are independent works defending the tenets of Advaita involving a debative style.

The first category again contains two important branches. One is by Padmapada (sishya of Bhagavatpada) in Panchapadika, which has a commentary by Prakasatman (1200 AD) in Vivarana which again has a commentary by Akhandananda (1350 AD) in his Tatvadiptana. This is called the Vivarana school. The second is by Vachaspatimishra (840 AD) in his Bhamati, which has a commentary by Amalananda (1260 AD) in his Kalpataru, which again has a commentary by Appayya Dikshita (1600 AD) in his Parimala. This is called the Bhamati school. These two differ in some aspects of reasoning adopted in explaining the multiplicity while strengthening Advaitic point of view.

The second category contains three important independent works defending Advaitic concepts. These are highly dialectical in nature. 1) Khandana -khanda-Khadya by Sri Harsha (1200 AD) 2) Citsukhi by Citsukhacharya (13th century AD) 3) Advaitasiddhi by Madhusudana Saraswati (16th century AD).

Advaitasiddhi, unlike the other independent works, is a verbatim rejoinder to the arguments by Vyasathirtha (16th century AD) of the Dwaita philosophy. There are three other important siddhi works - Brahma siddhi, Naishkarmyasiddhi and Ishtasiddhi, dealing with what, how and why of Brahman.

Madhusudana Saraswati is a Sanyasi, of 16th Century, probably from Bengal and is a great devotee of Sri Krishna as a child. He is said to be contemporary of Gadhadara and Goswami. His important other works are:

1. Siddantabindu
2. Adwaitaratnaraksana
3. Vedantakalpalatika
4. Samksepasarirakasara samgraha
5. Gitagudhartadipika
6. Bhaktirasayana

Advaitasiddhi contains four Paricchedas, nearly 108 topics. The first one with 60 topics and has taken two thirds of the work, dealing mainly with Mithyatva. The second is about Brahman, third Sadana and the fourth Pala.

An attempt has been made in the booklet to give the Siddantas in Madhusudana's own words with the English translation. Page No. in the edition of Parimal Publications has been given at the end of each quotation.

For ready reference, a note on each of Logic and Grammar is given in Appendix I and II.

This is the seventh publication in the Vandana series, previous ones are Sandya Vandanaam, Devata Vandanaam, Guru Vandanaam, Gita Vandanaam, Upanishad Vandanaam and Nama Vandanaam.
This publication was possible only after my full-text study under Dr. R. Krishnamurthy Sastral, Principal Sanskrit College, Mylapore, Chennai, who has spent considerable lot of his precious time in teaching especially as I have not studied separately Grammar and Logic in the traditional detailed way. My thanks are due to him in no small measure. My thanks are also due to Mr. S.V.S. Sastry and Mr. V. Swaminatha Sastral for scrutinising the draft and for suggesting corrections in the translation. I am also indebted to Dr. K. Ramasubramanian for hisd suggestions and the get up and Mr. Sateesha for his help in proof reading. The work would not have been easy but for my newphew Mr. Sivasankar and his son Arun who have made computer literate in a short time and my thanks are due to them.
Stotras of Madhusudana Saraswati

1. Vishnu, who is the substratum for the illusory world of duality such as the character of cogniser, who is Truth, Consciousness and Bliss, who is to be realised by the impartite knowledge derived from the Mahavakyas, excels on his own, as if having attained sole supreme blissful emancipation as a result of severing the non-real bondage and its ramifications.

2. I do not know of Truth other than Krishna, whose hand is adorned with the flute, who shines like the fresh clouds, who wears the yellow cloth, whose lips are red as the Bimba fruit, whose face is attractive as that of the full moon and whose eyes are like that of the lotus.

3. Advaitasiddhi, the fourth is now born, of the other Siddhis, Ishta, Naishkarmya and Brahma.

4. Duality is bondage before Moksha and after realisation it is wisdom. The imaginary duality for the purpose of Bhakti is sweeter than even Non-duality.

Notes:- * The source for this fourth sloka by Madhusudana Sarasvati is not known but is quoted by Sri Gautamananda, head of Ramakrishna Mutt, Madras.
Paricheda I
Beginning of Grantha

First, the non-reality of duality has to be proved., as the accomplishment of non-duality is preceded by the accomplishment of the non-reality of duality.
1. Proof for discussion the sentence with diversity of opinions.

There is diversity of opinions on non-reality.

Whether it is or not?

1. When that cannot be sublated by any knowledge other than that of Brahman,
   it is capable of appearing as "is"
2. It is different from Consciousness,
3. It is the counter-positive which is negated for all time (past, present and future)
   in the locus in which it appears.
4. It is the counter-correlative of the said negation in its absolute form.

2. Discussion of the delimiting adjunct of subject.

1. The subject of dispute is non-real.

2. Because its being is a) Cognisability b) insentience c) limitedness

3. Like the shell-silver.

Notes: To prove the non-reality (Mityata) of the world, the proposition has been brought out in the form of a syllogism.
1 is called Pratijna consisting of the first word (paksha/subject/minor) and the second word Sadya/probandum/to be proved.
2 is called Hetu/reason/proof./probans
3. is called Drishtanta/example
3. Proof Of Non-Reality Of World

(Non-Reality Is Different From Being And Unbeing)

1. The word non-reality means "indeterminability" according to the author of Panchapadika. What is not the locus of being and unbeing (opposite of being) is indeterminable.

2. The character of absolute absence of being as well as the character of absolute absence of unbeing is non-reality. There is no defect in the definition with these two characteristics as intended.

Notes: 1. The above definition also indicates that non-reality is not the combination of both Sat and Sat.
2. Padmapada, the author of Panchapadika, was a student of Sankara.
3. Sat = absolute reality Asat = absolute un-reality (opposite of reality)
4. Definition of Non-reality
   
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<td>Padmapada</td>
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<td>Panchapadika</td>
<td>Vivarana</td>
<td>Tatvapradipika</td>
<td>Nyayadipavali</td>
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5. Being/reality is further classified as follows:
   a) गरजार्थिक = absolute = Brahma
   b) अलापार्थिक = empirical = other than Brahma
   c) प्रतिद्विमाल = phenomenal = objects of erroneous cognition (rope as serpent. shell as silver) and dream objects.
6. Unreality is like hare’s horn, that which does not exist - Thuchha.
7. Compound Sanskrit words have been split with a dash (-) for easier understanding.

4. विद्वान - मिथ्यालक्षणरूप

1. प्रतिप्रतियोगी वैमालक्षण-निषेध-प्रतियोगितेचा च मिथ्यालक्षण || (९४)

2. एवं च प्रकृतेभिष निषेधवाच्येण प्रतियोगिनः ग्राह्यस्य निषेधस्य च वाच्यनात् न निषेधस्य बाध्ये वेदन्प्राग्यस्य तात्सिवकल्लक्षणम || (१०७-१०९).
4. **Second Definition of Non-reality**

1. Non-reality is the character of the counter-positive of the negation for all three times (past, present and future) in an object where it appears.

2. In the present case, the negation of the world (counter-positive) is equally negated, with the negation of the negation, the world does not become real.

   Notes: Pratiyogi = Pot is the Pratiyogi of the absence of Pot.

5. तृतीय-मिथ्यात्मालक्षणम्

   १. ज्ञानिनिर्वचनाम् ब्य मिथ्यात्मम् || (६२६)

   २. वाक्यलक्षणेऽनुसा च उपस्थितम् ।
   तत्त्वस्थानित्य वाक्योत्पत्ति सम्बन्धी जन्मभूतः || अविभा स्वस्वाक्षरेण नासीदितिभविष्यति || (६३८)

5. **Third Definition Of Non-Reality**

1. Non-reality means the character of being sublated by knowledge.
2. It has been said by the Vartikakara:

   As soon as the valid cognition is generated by the statement, "That thou art", nescience with its effects becomes non-existent in the past, does not exist at present and will not exist in the future.

6. चौथौ विपर्ययण्यैः

   १. स्वात्मनिहृत-अत्यन्त-अभाव-प्रति गतिविषयम् । ब्य मिथ्यात्मम् || (६८२)

   २. तच स्वत्त्वात्माभावाधिकरणेऽव विदेश भानल्लभम् || (६८२)

6. **Fourth Definition Of Non-Reality**

1. The non-reality of a thing is its character of being the counter-positive of the absolute negation residing in its own locus.

2. That it appears where it does not exist.
7. Fifth Definition Of Non-Reality

1. Non-reality is being different from the real.

2. Here also, an adjective has to be added - "it has to appear as existent" in order to avoid the defect of extension of definition to absolutely real and absolutely unreal.

8. Non-Reality Of The Non-Reality

1. Objection: When the said non-reality itself is non-real, then the world may become real.--------when the non-reality is real, then also, the world can be real; in both cases, the non-dualism will get affected..

2. Reply: No; They have the same grade of being (existence) and hence along with the sublation of the non-reality, the world also is sublated; so non-dualism does not get affected.

Notes: the logic for the negation of the world and the non-reality is one and the same ie, different from Brahman.
9. Compatibility of Cognisability as cause

1. What is cognisability, the reason for non-reality, has to be explained.

2. Pure Brahman is not cognisable.
3. In fact, the character of being the object of mental states (vrittis) other than those produced by word is cognisability.
4. Or, the character of being the qualified object of a mental state is cognisability.

10. Compatibility of Insentience as cause

1. Insentience is different from Consciousness and Self.

2. Or it has not the character of self-luminosity.

11. Compatibility of Limitedness as cause

1. It is of three kinds, by place, time and thing.
2. Limitedness by place is the character of, being the counter-positive of absolute absence of existence.

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3 Limitedness by time is the character of being the counter-positive of destruction.
4. Limitedness by thing is the character of being the counter-positive of mutual absence.

12. Compatibility Of Being An Effect as cause

1. It is said by Chitsukhacharya:

1. This cloth is the counter-positive of the absolute negation resting in this thread.
2. Because it has the character of being a cloth.
3. Like any other cloth.

Notes: This is called Mahā Vidya Anumanam and is flawless.

13. Refutation Of Adventitious Condition

1. Reasons for non-reality do not have the fallacy of adventitious conditions.

2. In the nonreality of the identification of soul-body which is sublated only by the knowledge of Brahman, the upadhi is not concomitant with the probandum. (sadhya).

Notes: Adventitious condition (Upadhi) is one of the five fallacies of reason (Hetu Aabhasa) in a syllogism. It means that the Upadhi while concomitant with the Probandum (sadhya) but is not concomitant with the probans (hetu).
14. Refutation Of Similarity With Pseudo Inferences

1. Objection: (1) The subject is phenomenal, (2) Because it is cognisable (3) Like shell-silver, (1) Brahman is non-real (2) Because it is subject of empirical reality. (3) Like shell-silver.

2. Reply: No. Cognisability etc are not similar to pseudo inferences.

3. Because when the empirical reality of the world is sublated, activity is not possible. If Brahman is the character of non-reality, nihilism will result.

15. Refutation Of "Contradiction By Perception"

1. Objection:- Cognisability etc. is the subject of the sublated perception like "the pot is" etc.

2. Reply: No. The existence which is contradictory to non-reality and which is capable of perception by eyes etc, has not been explained.
3. The character of existence (being) of Brahman is its self-luminosity, non-duality and Consciousness. If the same is so of the sentient world, it is compatible that the world is non-real in its form by its self-luminosity which is contradictory to sentience, just like the silver by the existence of shell which is contradictory to silver.

16. Refutation Of "Superior Validity Of Perception"

1. Objection: Perception which is depended upon is stronger, When it is contradictory it is sublated by perception.

2. Reply: No; it is not contradictory to that which is being depended upon, The form which is depended upon is not sublated, Only its ultimate validity is sublated. That is not depended upon, as it does not enter into the cause.

3. The examination is in the form of (a) of fruitfulness when acted (b) absence of fruitlessness (c) absence of defects,. By that the validity is established of the non-sublation of an object of same place and time - like the fire of same place and time by the smoke.

4. Like wise, only in the empirical state, the non-sublation is established of the ordinary body-Atman identity after examining the means of knowledge. How then can it be not possible for Sruti and inference not to function since they negate the absolute reality of the world.
not be of the ground for Sruti and inference which negates the absolute reality of the world.

5. Therefore, the establishment of the validity and its semblance, as also the duality of Jiva and God are of empirical nature. So it is compatible that the entire world is non-real.

\[91. \text{Pralabdha Anumana - Sambhavatmam} \]

1. किंचि विप्रश्वासन सचिवं अनुमानस्मिः प्रत्यक्षवाप्सिः। (३६४)
2. अपरिभवित्त-प्रत्यक्षं हि परिभवित्त-अनुमान-अपराज्यं दुर्विच्छिन्न। (३६५)
3. "नील नभ" इति प्रत्यक्षमिब नभो-नीत्तप्त-अनुमानपादिः। (३७०)

17. Sublatability Of Perception By Inference

1. Moreover, Inference also sublates cognition when it is supported by the disproval of the counter-example.

2. The cognition that has not been examined is weaker, compared to the examined inference.
3. Just like the cognition, "sky is blue" is weaker, compared to the inference "sky is colourless.

\[91. \text{Pralabdha Agam - Sambhavatmam} \]

1. किंचि परिभवित्त-प्रमाणभव-वान्यवाधयमपि प्रत्यक्षमेऽ। (३७१)
2. तत्तत्त्वविष्णूभूतार्थोद्धार्थक्लाचि मुख्यार्थक्लाचि; न शाक्यार्थमात्राभोधक्लाचि; अन्त्यार्थार्थार्थक्लाचि
   च अमुख्यार्थक्लाचि, न लाङ्कणिक्लाचि- मात्रत्वमेऽ। (३७६)

18. Sublatability Of Perception By Sruti

1. Moreover, perception is sublatable also by Sruti, which has been validated by examination.
2. Giving the import (Tatparya) is called the primary meaning, and not merely the denotation (Sakyartha - direct meaning) . Secondary meaning is that which has other import, and not merely the indicative denotation.
19. Disproof Of The Inequality Of Apaccheda Nyaya

1. Moreover, even by the Apaccheda Nyaya, Sruti is stronger.
2. Therefore alone, the Srutis describing Brahman with qualities and with the world are sublated by the Srutis describing Brahman without qualities and without world
3. It is said by Anandacharya.
   Since it refers to the purport, comes after and Vedic text is free from defect it sublates the former; like the sentence "this is not a snake".

Notes: Apaccheda Nyaya of Poorva Mimamsa Sastra means that what follows is more powerful than what went before.

20. Refutation Of The Equality Of The Inference "Fire Is Cold"

1. Objection: If inference can establish a thing which is sublated by perception, then it can establish" "Fire is cold".
2. Reply: Not so; there is difference as the meaning is contradictory. The person having the character of non-Yajamana and the presence of heat in fire which are perceptions (Pratyaksha) and the person having the character of Yajamana and the absence of heat in fire (sound and probans) - both are empirical (vyavaharika) - so they are sublated. But in the present case, they are empirical reality and non-reality which are not contradictory. It is contradictory to absolute reality.
21. **Refutation Of "Perception Cannot Be Sublated By Inference"**

1. Moreover, greater validity is because of being examined and not because of the character of being depended upon.
2. Thus - the perceptions, "this is silver", "sky is blue", "I am fair", "I am in this house", "the moon disc is the size of six inches", "the conch is yellow", "Jaggery is bitter", etc are sublated by inference, friend's word, verbal testimony etc. This is seen.
3. Where the validity is to be established in the same place, there is no question of the thought of its strength or weakness.

22. **Compatibility Of Future Sublation**

1. Therefore, what was said "because of future sublation" is also compatible.
2. "the six inch-size of the moon" which is not sublated by other means is sublated by scripture. Similarly, the perception "Pot is etc" which is not sublated by other means is sublated by scripture which teaches non-reality. This has been established.
23. Refutation Of Inference Of Absolute Reality Of The Empirical World

1. It is said in Samkshepasarisraka: The indivisible consciousness alone is the locus and object of nescience. What came after nescience cannot be its locus or object.

2. The superimposition due to nescience is not in need of any further superimposition. It is compatible that it is capable of managing itself and all other superimpositions.

3. Like this, the six reasons for the absolute reality of the world have been rejected.

4. Objection: (Sadya) Subject is not different from reality (Hetu) Because it is different from unreal. (Drishtanta) Like the Atman

5. Reply: It is not; In the phenomenal and shell-silver, it strays away. (it is in hetu but not in sadhya)

24. निप्पाले विपिन - अनुसन्धान

1. (सा) विकार मिथ्या, (हेतु) प्राकाश्वल्या (दृष्ट) शुक्लीयतब (४१७)
2. एवं अन्येतो विप्रयोगः कवयिकं आत्मानीया काःशिलातित्रः श्रीतिः श्रीकरुः (४२२)
3. हेतुसर्वोपस्तिश्च तत्त्वस्य समयी वहकरवः न। अतः अर्थाः परर्व दुर्लक्षेयत्वा सम्पत्तिम्यरीततमः। अमभेदिका सक्तिकुसृष्टतकंकल्लोऽथाप्रीत्य चित्तरः। प्रभव्यतो योगश्रुणः। परिपक्वां न स्वाधीनतैव तु मनोभ्रदत्व।। (४२२)
24. Special Syllogisms On Non-Reality

1. (Sadhya) Subject is non-real (Hetu) Because it is different from Brahman (Drish) like the shell-silver.

2. Like this, many other reasoning may be put forward by the learned

3. We have clearly shown that there are many and excellent reasons for establishing our position and the opponent has fewer and defective. Later, will be said the strength and weaknesses after examination for establishing our thesis and the defects of opponents; at present one should not worry.

Notes: there are twenty-seven syllogisms listed by the author.
25. Justification Of Sublation By Srutis

1. Objection: Let there be sublation by Srutis:

1. The universe is real. by the Srutis. - that which is regarded as real is not useless. For eternity, hr created things in reality.

2. They (ill-guided) declare the world to be un-real, unstable and without God.

3. The perception of the world cannot be regarded as dream as there is dissimilarity

By these the reality of the Universe has been established.

1. Reply: The Sruti has not this import. ....(a)... Viswam = all praise, Satyam = exact ...

...since it relates to praise, it has no import on the reality of the world.

(b). What Indra understands to be done now is real and is not a waste.

(c). The sentence is no evidence of the reality of the world. Its meaning is creation according to previous creation and not in the reality of the world or in its creation.

(d). For me who advocates difference from reality and have accepted difference from unreality in the world, there is no contradiction in this Smriti.

(e) Meaning of Sutra. Na Abhavah = "Things (pot etc) have no existence other than knowledge" - This is not valid because in the empirical state, they have their existence for its fruitfulness and action. . Upalabdeh = because they are cognised different from knowledge. The sentence on the difference in nature like dream etc, is to show the adjunct which is sublatable. Therefore the previous logic is defective because of sublatability and also with the adjunct.
26. Non-Real is Capable of Proof

1. Objection: that which prove the reality is stronger than the inferences that prove their non-reality.

2. Reply: No; the subjects for the establishment of the non-reality teach the non-reality; yet there is no contradiction, because they do not relate to the reality which cannot be sublated for all periods of time.

3. In fact, empirical reality, cognised or non-cognised is the criteria for proving. It is not sublatable by any knowledge other than that of Brahman; nor does it necessarily involve non-reality.

27. Sublation of "Non-real cannot prove"

1. In the reflection, the character of establishing the original is there. Although it is existent as the original, it is not there in the form of the reflection; absolute reality is not the criteria for its establishment. Similarly, though things in the dream are not existent, they indicate the oncoming auspiciousness and inauspiciousness.(which are true)

2. There is no contradiction; in the Sruti - How can real come from unreal:- in the Sutra"Not from unreal, because it is seen"-in the Bhashya "From hare's horn etc., creation of reality is not seen". Because their purport is to deny creation from absolute unreality (un-existent)
3. We have not said that absolute unreality can have the character of creation.

28 द्वापरसंवर्धन - भक्तः

१. दृष्टि-संवधनप्रभुः। (४७६)

२. तस्मात् सत्यवेद संवधनप्रभुः: आङ्ग्याकर एव द्वापरयोः: संवधन इति। (४७८)

28. Refutation Of The Cogniser-Cognised Relation

1. The relation between the cogniser-cognised (seer and seen) is incompatible.

2. Therefore, since in the absolute reality relation is incompatible, the character of superimposition is the relation.

-  

29. अनुकूलताकृ - निरुक्तगमोः

१. तत्वांसंवधनस्य-व्यावहारमय्या यथापति। तथा - तत्वांसंवधनस्य व्यावहारयोऽदेशातिविचारभवः। स च अति-वादिविषयकज्ञानाधीनानां नाभिका एव-इति कथः तत्वांसंवधनस्य संवधनः। (४७३)

२. तस्मात् सत्यवेद द्वापरसंवधनापति। द्वापर। (४७३)

29. Proof Of Favourable Logic

1. There is sublation because of non-cognition of the pervasive reality relation. Hence - the pervasiveness of the reality relation is the absence of difference in time and place. That is not present like knowledge etc., which are of the past things; so, how then can they have reality relation.

2. Therefore, if it is absolutely real, the incompatibility of the relation between cogniser and cognised is strong.

30. प्रतिकृति - व्यवस्था

१. तथाहि अन्तःकरणः चेतुवेद ते जोभविः। तथा इत्यतःतत् तत्वानुप्रवृत्तिः व्याय तदारां भवति। यथा नवाचुतकं प्राणायामी निगृहात्मक ज्ञानार्थः केशद्यातिविचारयति। तत्र जीववेदत्व अविद्योपप्पिकं सत्य संवर्थं अन्तःकरणोपप्पिकं सत्यं परिवेच्छामिति मन द्वारं। तत्र आयं विद्यविभागस्य जीव-वेदत्वम्। उन्नतयोऽविशेषज्ञत्वम्। (४७६-४७८)
30. Pratikarma-vyavastha

1. Just like the eye, the mind also is the effect of fire. It through the sense organs pervades and become the object to which it is connected, just like the water in the river though canals flows out and takes the form of the field; this is called the modification (vritti) of the mind. There are two schools. The Self- Consciousness, nescience as its adjunct, is all pervasive; with mind as its adjunct, it is limited. There the first is the Jiva Chaitanya which illumines objects; in the second it is the Brahman Chaitanya.

2. Here, the clarification is as follows:- Although the consciousness which has its locus in the object and makes the object cognised (1), the mind-adjunct-consciousness is its cogniser (2) and the mind-modification-limited consciousness is the cognition.(3), still one becomes to know that object only, not any other and not anybody else; who by his modification of the mind reaches the object which becomes known by that consciousness and becomes non-different from the cogniser-consciousness. Therefore, the cogniser-cognition-cognised consciousness become one in the form of the modification of the mind. Therefore by the removal of ignorance conditioned by it, the cogniser-consciousness glows and it is called immediate knowledge. In the first case, it is Jiva who illumines the object; in the second, it is Brahman.

3. When the three (cogniser-cognised-cognition) becomes one, it is called immediate.(direct) when two becomes one it is called mediate.(indirect) Therefore, there is no convergence.

३१. प्रतिकृति- निराकरण

१. विद्वेश यदि कलितं स्यात, सत्याशिरां स्यात, न चैवं; सामान्यसे जातले सति अज्ञातविशेषत्वस्य अपिष्टन्त्व-प्रयोजकस्य निरित्वो निस्मान्ये व प्रकारण असंभवात हृति चेतुः; न। (४६४)

२. स्वरूपेण जातले सति विशेषण-अज्ञातत्वस्य अपिष्टन्त्व-प्रयोजकवस्य आज्ञातविशेषत्वस्य अप्रयोजकल्पत भवत। (४६४)

३. न अहंन्यले उपस्थिताद्विषः; अनभवमण्यं कार्यं उपस्थितास्य अपभ्रंशो तदुपाभिक्षुवात्; सत्याशिराः -अनस्तकार्यावं निन्दिते अनिवर्तीकरणवादमवे कार्यकलापं पवित्रस्यात्। तदेवै कृत्स्वयं प्राप्तस्य अहंन्य प्रकारण कल्पय न उपासे। न प्रतिकृति-निराकरतः। (५०४)
31. Refutation Of Counter-Reasoning

1. Objection: If the world is imaginary, then Brahman (sat) must be the substratum; this is not so; that which is known in general, and has unknown special qualities is the character of substratum; and this is not possible in Brahman, as it has neither special nor general qualities.

2. Reply: this is not true. When it is generally known but particularly unknown is the criteria for the nature of the substratum,. and not having the unknown special qualities..

3. There is no incompatibility of creation etc., when there is the character of superimposition. Nowhere the creation is seen when there is no superimposition, its character alone is the cause. By the negation of "real-effect" and "unreal-effect theories" the theory of "indeterminability-effect" only remains true. Thus, the superimposition of the entire world on the non-dual Brahman is compatible and there is no disproof by the opposite logic.

Notes: Real effect means that pot exists in the mud even before its production. Unreal effect means that pot does not exist before production.

32. Compatibility Of The "Non-Reality" Srutis

1. Objection: By depending upon the reality of perception, the non-reality of all other than Brahman is not established.

2. Reply: No,......... perception etc. ...therefore, the reality which is sublated is not depended upon. That which is depended upon and which is the validity for empiricallity which has the capacity for purposeful action is not sublated. So, what and by which there is connection. (your question is irrelevant)

1. Therefore, the srutis "one only which is non-dual" etc., are valid on the non-reality of the world.
33. Refutation Of Sublation Of The "Non-Dual" Srutis

1. By the invalidity of the empirical dual-world, like the "empirical-6 inches moon", there is no contradiction in the non-dual srutis. We have already discussed how the empiricality is sublated by the srutis. Moreover, empiricality relates to particular object; sruti to all objects. Therefore, where difference is not seen, there itself is room for Srutis, which speak of non-difference.

2. The mere sublation of the empirical difference is not the criteria. That which is strong after examining its validity, that is the cause of sublation. That is sublated, which is weak by the doubtful nature of validation. In this state, the dual knowledge is weak and cannot sublate. Non-dual knowledge is strong and can sublate; in the discussion on the strength and weakness of verbal testimony and empiricality, this has been shown.
34. Discussion Of The Meaning Of The Sruti "One And Only Non-Dual" Etc

1. By the six rules of import, the sentence on non-dualism is stronger; the sentences on creation etc. have their import on dualism due to nescience, This has been said by us in Kalpalathika.

2. Here also is laid down by the commentators on the true meaning of six kinds of signals. Therefore, in the beginning, by the promise of all-knowledge by the knowledge of one, in the end, "All this has got That as the Self: That is the truth. That is the Self. Thou art That", Svetaketu. by the overall context, it is of non-duality. From the understanding the meaning of the words in that sentence, in accordance with non-duality, - although it is possible to interpret differently the different words - it has to be fitted into the current context and interpreted accordingly leaving out the different meanings.

3. Therefore, "where there is no second" - the Bahuvihi compound alone - has to be taken.

4. Like this, in the Brahman - the Existence - the three differences are negated by the three words and the sentence "one without second" points to the non-reality which is different from Brahman.

Notes: Three words are, Yeka, Yeva, Advithiyam. Three differences are: same kind, different kind and internal. The six rules of import are - beginning, end, repetition, novelty, euology, compatibility.
35. Sublation by knowledge being otherwise incompatible

1. "He who knows Brahman, he transcends sorrow", "Thus, the wise is liberated from "name and form"", "when that Self which is both high and low is realised, the knot of the heart is untied, all doubts become cleared and one's action dissipated", - By these Srutis and Smritis, the incompatibility of an alternative to knowledge for sublatability is valid for the bondage due to non-reality. If it is absolutely real as Brahman, non-sublatability will result.

2. Thus, it was said by the Vartikakara (Sureswaracharya):

   By the emergence of the correct knowledge arisen from sentences like "Thou art That" etc., the nescience with its effect was not there, is not there, will not be there. The real knowledge of the individual Self alone destroys the individual Self's ignorance. In addition to its birth in itself, it is not in need of anything else to destroy the ignorance.

3. Therefore, by the knowledge of the substratum, the sublatability by knowledge is proof of the non-reality.

36 Compatibility Of "Creation by mere sight"

1. What is this sight-creation........if this is so; No. It is intended that it is existence (due to a defect) which exists only when known or does not exist when not known.

2. The Sruti "from this Atman, all Pranas, all worlds, all Vedas, all elements are born". which maintain the creation of Pranas etc, from the Jiva after waking from sleep are proof.
3. It is said clearly in the "Vasishta Vartika" etc and in Bhashya also: - All these which are from the nescience are like bubbles. After appearing for a second, go away and merge in the ocean of knowledge. Therefore, the entire aggregate of dualities other than the Brahman are cognition-cognised form. The empirical reality is due to nescience. Like the rope-snake, the world is not there when it is not known and is empirical because of "sight-creation while awake and in deep sleep, they disappear.

37. Discussion on One Individual Self

1. Due to nescience, Brahman only gets birth and rebirth. He only is the individual self, Of him only. there is the knowledge of "I" etc.

2. Therefore, it is established that individual self is one only with nescience as his adjunct.

38. Discussion on Ignorance - Definition of Ignorance

1. Objection: What is this ignorance? It cannot be said that it is sublatable by knowledge as well as beginningless positive.
.Reply: We say - , . The ignorance of the material cause of silver is also beginningless because it has its locus in the beginningless Consciousness.

2. Or, ignorance is the material cause of an illusion..

3. Ignorance is negatable directly by the character of knowledge. This definition has been dealt previously

Notes: The following six have been accepted to be beginningless: Jiva, Iswara, Pure Consciousness, difference between Jiva and Iswara, Avidya and its relation with Consciousness. The discussion on Ignorance continues up to 47th title.

39. Compatibility of Perception As Evidence Of Ignorance

1. As regards ignorance, - 'I am ignorant, I don't know me and anything '', (general perception) and I don't know what you said (particular perception), 'So far I had been in deep sleep. I did not know anything (inferential deep sleep perception) - these are evidences.

2. One knowing the ignorance of an object starts discussion to remove it. This is common experience.

40. अज्ञानवाद अनुभव - उपयोगः:

1. (साध्य) - विचारितं प्रमाणांस्य, स्वप्रागमाहोत्तिरिक्तं-स्वविषयावरणं-स्वविषयं-स्वदेशस्य-वस्तितैः उपस्थितस्य (हेतु) - अप्रकाशितार्थं-प्रकाशायनां,
   (उपयोग) - अन्यकारे प्रथमोलनच्य्रोपीयमाभिन्न . (५६ २)
40. Compatibility of Inference On Ignorance

1. (Sadya) - The knowledge defined by mental state under dispute (a) is along with another substance (b) belongs to its own place (c) will be negated by it (d) veils its object and (e) is different from its own antecedent negation.

(Hetu) Because it illuminates a meaning hitherto not illuminated.

(Drishtantha) - Like the light that appears first amidst darkness.

Notes: This anumana is by Vivaranakara.

41. Compatibility of Srutis On Ignorance

1. In the Chandyogya Upanishad (8-3-2), it is said - "As persons who are ignorant about treasures do not get it even though walking over it again and again. So also, all these creatures do not realise Brahman although they reach daily (during sleep) this world of Brahman because they are carried away by untruth.

2. In the Chandyogya Upanishad (8-3-2), it is said they are carried by untruth.

3. They are covered by Nihara (Snow) (Rig.Veda.Adyaya 8-3-17)

4. In the beginning there was darkness. (Rig.Veda Adyaya 8-7-17)

5. Maya is to be understood as Prakriti (Svetssvetara Up, 4-10)

6. There is one unborn being red, white and black (Sve.U.4-5)
7. Those who dwell in nescience (Kato Up. 2-5)

8. There is further cessation at the end of the non-reality of the world. (Sve.Up..1-10)

These are evidences on ignorance in the Srutis.

42. Compatibility of Presumption On Ignorance

1. The otherwise incompatibility of non-illumination of unsurpassed Brahman bliss of Jiva is also evidence for ignorance.

43. Compatibility of Knowledge Of Ignorance

1. That nescience is known through Sakshin and not illuminated by pure Consciousness. Sakshi is Consciousness reflected in nescience.

2. Therefore it is said that nescience like Rahu is illuminated by the Consciousness which it conceals.

3. By this it should not be said that nescience is not known sometime; this is acceptable, since in concentration, this has been accepted.

Notes: The Rahu conceals the sun/moon during an eclipse and it is illuminated by the sun/moon.
44. Compatibility - Consciousness Is The Locus Of nescience

1. Pure consciousness is the locus of nescience.

2. It has been said (Sarvajnatman): Pure Consciousness is the locus and object of nescience. All that come into being after nescience can neither be locus nor object of nescience which exists before them.

3. Therefore, because of the distinction due to nescience, only in Consciousness, the state of being liberation and worldliness and omniscience and limited knowledge can be compatible.

45. Compatibility - Omniscient Brahman Is The Locus Of nescience.

1. What is meant by cogniser of everything is the consciousness that which cognises everything and not the omniscience of the fourth (Brahman) therefore, the omniscience is in the qualified Consciousness and that is not possible without nescience.

46. Compatibility of Jiva As Locus Of nescience according to Vachaspati

1. Vachaspatimishra considers nescience as located in Jiva.

2. Learned men think that Jiva is the locus of nescience just as the pot exists in the space limited by itself.
3. Therefore there is no harm in jiva being the locus of nescience.

47. Proof of Object Of Ignorance

1. It is only the Pure Consciousness which is the object of nescience. Since it is not imposed, there is no mutual dependency. Since it is self-luminous, it is possible for nescience to veil its light: Nothing else is; because everything else is product of nescience and has no light, there is no scope to veil.

48. Compatibility of "I" is non-self.

1. Ahamkara is known to be with desire etc. This is acceptable to both of us. In deep sleep there is no desire etc. and there is no experience of "I". So, Ahamkara is different from the Self, who is experienced as locus of nescience.

2. The Sruti -"Then, therefore, instruction on Ahamkara, then therefore, instruction on Atma - instructs separately. This is evidence for separateness.
49. Compatibility of Superimposition of Agency

1. Ahamkara is in the form of a knot with two parts - one of the sentient and the other insentient.

2. Although in the insentient part - the intellect - there is the agency and with this qualification, the intellect, without superimposition on the sentient part, the cognition "I am the agent" is not possible. Therefore, super-imposition is necessary.

3. Therefore, agency is superimposed on the Self.

50. Compatibility of Superimposition Of Identity between Body and Self

1. Ahamkara has two parts. As in the case of the superimposition of the mind along with agency etc, on the Consciousness part, the body and organs along with Brahminhood, deafness etc is superimposed on the Self. This is possible. Therefore, in Self, the superimposition of body and organs etc. is compatible.

2. Therefore, from the cognition of the common cow-boy onwards of "I am white" etc - the mind is superimposed on the Self. Similarly, the superimposition of the body and its properties is proved.
51. Compatibility of the Definition Of indeterminability

1. Different from (a) existence, (b) absolute nothing and (c) existence and absolute nothing.

2. When it is incapable of being described as existence and absolute nothing, it is also incapable of being described as existence cum absolute nothing.

3. It is sublatable at a given locus. These definitions are possible without doubt.

4. Like in the opinion of Logicians - conjunction and its absence - of Bhatta (Purva Mimamsa - difference and absence of difference, the existence cum absolute nothing and its absence, are not contradictory.

5. Therefore, the common shell-silver indeterminability definition is not incompatible.

52. Proof of Indeterminability by Perception And Inference
1. In perception, "the silver shone as non-real (false)."

2. (Sadhyā) The thing under dispute is different from existence, from absolute nothing and existence cum absolute nothing. (Reason) Because it is subject to sublation or it seems to be the result of defect. (example) Like Brahman. (by negative example)

53. Proof of Indeterminability by Presumption

1. The thing under dispute, shell-silver etc, if it were existence, it would not have been sublated, if it were absolute absence of existence, it would not be cognised. But it is sublated and also is cognised. (by perception) Therefore, it is different from existence and absolute absence of existence and hence it is indeterminable.

54. Justification of indeterminability by the Incompatibility Of Counter-Positive Of Negation

1. Therefore, the incompatibility of being the counter-correlate of negation also is evidence for the existence of indeterminability

55. अनिर्वचिति -उपपत्ति:

1. "नासदासीते सदासीतैः" (अ,व,म. १० (१२९-१२३) इवादि अन्वय: अपि अनिर्वचिते प्रमाणम्। (६४३)
55. Compatibility of Presumption of Srutis

1. The Rigveda Sruti "then there was neither absolute nothing nor existence " etc, are proof of indeterminability.

56. असत्व्यातिभक्षः:

1. तस्मात् अनिर्वाच्यवाच्यिन् प्रमाण समभावतु । न तु असत्न्यात्यवाच्यितः, प्रमाणविरहदातु ।

2. न च असंज्ञाने असंदेश रजतमु अभावत् इति प्रत्यक्षं मानाम्; अनन्तरेकं-चार्केन सन्दङ्कश्चपविक्षष्ट्वात् ।

3. न च शास्त्रमु ज्ञातं असत्व इत्यादि वाच्ये; असत्वपि परोपकारिते: तथा अहंकारं तत् नसत्यसत्यवाच्यायाचितः। तत्र हि न प्रतीति: । किंतु विकल्पात्मकम् इतुमन्त्वात्। तस्मात् न असत्याचितः। (॥ ६४॥)

56. Refutation Of Asatkhyati

1. Therefore, indeterminable erroneous perception is only correct., as there is proof.. The absolute absence of existence or the difference from existence are not correct as there is no proof.

2. It cannot be proof of perception "that silver shone was absolute absence of existence; because of the later sublation; the perception indicates only the difference from existence in the silver.

3. There is no cognition of non-existence through sentences like "rabbit horn - absolute absence of existence." But it is vikalpa..(imagination/fancy) Therefore, there is no asatkhyati.

57 Refutation Of Anyatha-khyati

1. "What is in another place shines here" - this explanation of Anyathakhyati is not proper. Like the absolute absence of existence, it is incompatible for a thing which exists in another place, as conjunction which is essential for immediate perception is not possible.

58 Compatibility Of Birth Of Silver Due To nescience

1. That indeterminable is of the material cause of ignorance. It is destroyed by the knowledge of absolute reality,

2. Objection: Then, "Shell silver is born and is lost" this mental state should arise and also the negation for all the three times will not be there.

3. Reply: No; The character of the counter-positive of the negation for all the three times of the known birth etc is perceived by the incompatibility of other than immediate perception.

4. Or, it is negation for all the three times of the empirical silver.

5. Moreover, the known shell while destroying ignorance also destroys silver. That is not possible if ignorance is not the material cause. Towards the destruction of effect, the destruction of the agency is not relevant. There is no rule that the object should be perceived in the form of its material cause.
59. Compatibility Of Two Mental States (vrittis) In Illusory Knowledge

1. Therefore, in respect of the locus, it is the mental state of Anthakarana and in respect of superimposition, it is of the nescience. In it, as we accept the indiscriminate superimposition between the two, the Akyati theory does not apply.

2. Hence, the Consciousness which is absolute reality is the substratum for the superimposed knowledge. That superimposed knowledge is of two kinds, empirical and phenomenal.

3. It is said "Perception cannot sublate Scripture, since it is of empirical reality.

4. If you take the absolute reality into account, there are three realities - absolute, empirical and phenomenal.

60. Compatibility Of Three Existences (Being)

1. Hence, the character of phenominality is that it appears to be existent. That is common to both waking and dreaming states.
2. Paricheda 2

4. Anukraudd猜想
1. **Definition Of Impartite Knowledge**

1. Impartite knowledge is of two kinds, one of word and the other of sentence. Each one of them is again of two kinds, one is of scripture and the other worldly. Scripture word also is of two kinds, one relating to the the word "it" and the other "thou". "Brahman is existence, knowledge and infinitude" is related to the word "it". "He who dwells in the heart. surrounded by Prana, illuminating others, reflected in the intellect " relates to the word "Thou". 

Scriptural sentence is "Thou art that". "This is that Devadatta" is of worldly sentence.

2. Impartite cognition is the character of generating valid cognition produced by words which are not synonymous and are not indicative of anything other than the one suggested by the vritti of the word.

2. **Compatibility of Impartite Knowledge Of Sentence of Satya Etc**

1. (Sadhya) The sentence " Satya" etc is of impartite sense, or the sense only in the stem "Brahman". - (Hetu) Because it is a sentence of definition, or it is an answer to a question on the meaning of the stem, Brahman - (Example) Like the sentence "Moon has profound light." This is the syllogism for impartite knowledge of a word.
3. Compatibility of the Meaning Of sentence "Thou Art That" etc.

1. Similarly, the syllogism having the subject on "Thou art that" is also without defect. (Sadaya) - The sentence "Thou art That" is of impartite sense or is the essential nature alone of Brahman. (Hetu) - Because it is co-existent when it is in a substance which is not of cause-effect, or it is only an answer to a question. (Example) Like "This is that Devadatta". This is the syllogism for sentence - impartite sense.

4. Compatibility of Attributeness Of Brahman

1. कैलय-धृत्या तावत् आत्मा निषुण:। (७१७)

2.ईवः सदा अवाससभस्तकत्वावगुण:। इत्यत्र कालं ज्ञापण आस्तुणल्लव्य अस्माभिः। अपि अज्ञातारां। न हि निमित्तमक्ताद निर्यात्नोऽस्मि। (७१९)

3.तुर्कर्मं अन्तर्विकरण्यं कलंकत्वक्रि:। निविदःपरं भ्राह साधारं कर्तुं अर्न्सःरां। ये मन्दाते अनुकर्मयं संविदेषमिश्रस्यां।।६ तदेवाविवेच्यं साधारं अपेतोपापिक्षल्लम।। (७२०)

4. किं च समुन्वात्नां ओपीपिदुणाविषयप्लं स्वामिविप्लक्तिक्क-निमित्तमक्त्र-शृङ्खः न निरोधः।। (७२१)

5.ननुवः-शर्योविये नैक्प्यः अतिविक-विभक्तिः। शास्त्रविद्वं संस्कृतशिवात्तिना उभ्यश्यावस्य सूचते जन्यलयो च निर्णयत्तात्।।.......इति चेतु:। (७२२)

6. न, तत शास्त्रोऽऽ: प्रामाण्येऽऽ: समायात्ताया एकतर्स्य-अार्यनिन्नर्गाय-अर्पोनातु संहृतोऽऽ: विक्षैलं वा वाच्यात्ताय आशिर्वादम, इह हु एकयस्य तत्तात्त्वं प्रवर्तन्त:। इतरस्य च अतत्तर्लेन दुवन्तत्वं वैष्णवाद।। (७२४)

4. Compatibility of Attributelessness Of Brahman
1. Brahman is attributeless by the Kavalya Sruti.

2. In the sentence "Iswara has always all auspicious qualities", the character of the time bound fulfilled qualities is acceptable to us also. In the stage of attributelessness, there is no relation with time.

3. It is said by the author of Kalpatharu in the Antara Adhikarana. " those who cannot realise attributeless Brahman, are graced by the proof of Brahman with attributes. When the mind is controlled by the Brahman with attributes, It will reveal itself without the imagined adjuncts.

4. Since the sentences of Brahman with attributes are the subject of adjunct, there is no contradiction with the Srutis of natural attributeless Brahman.

5. Objection: When there is contradiction between Srutis, one cannot have a lesser validity. When there is contradiction in the Sastra, and when both are valid in the form of lesser application or alternatively, they are reconciled in the Purvamimasa and Vyakarana.

6. Reply: No. Where, between the two valid Sastras which have equal status and when one is not possible to be sublated, there either by lesser application or alternatively, partial validity has been determined. But here, one is stronger with a real purport and the other with lesser purport is weaker; that is the difference.

5. **Proof Of Attributelessness**

1. In the first (for the purpose of revealing itself), as it is self luminous, there is no necessity for proof.
2. In the second (for the purpose of removing ignorance), Srutis themselves are proof. The question therefore does not arise when the proof is perception and inference.

3. Objection. Since there is no word-meaning connection in the form of class, attribute and action, the Upanishad is not valid in attributelessness:

4. Reply. No. Though there is no possibility of primary/secondary implication, indication is possible.

6. **Compatibility of Brahman's Formlessness**

1. Objection: By the Srutis, "Sunlike Lustre", "Golden colour", "Reddish colour", "Universal eye", "Thousand heads", form is established:.

2. Reply: No. The Sruti "Sunlike lustre etc" deals with the essential nature of self-luminosity, which is different from nescience. It is compatible since it also deals with meditation.

3. The Srutis and Smritis - "Universal eye etc" - are of omniscience and also all-controlling; they are therefore compatible in using their bodies, eyes, hands etc of the controlled.

7. **Brahman's Knowledge**

1. 5th Para (for the purpose of removing ignorance), Srutis themselves are proof. The question therefore does not arise when the proof is perception and inference.

2. Objection. Since there is no word-meaning connection in the form of class, attribute and action, the Upanishad is not valid in attributelessness:

3. Reply. No. Though there is no possibility of primary/secondary implication, indication is possible.
7. Compatibility of Knowledge Etc Of Brahman
1. Objection: If Brahman is formless, then the statements "Brahman is one, knowledge, Bliss, non-dual, eternal, Sakshi" will not be compatible.
2. Reply: No. Consciousness is the character of illuminating objects.

3. Blissfulness is without any adjunct.

4. According to Prabhakaras, the absence of a second has no different locus. Still there is absence of a second.

5. The fourth (pre and post negations) is acceptable (for eternality)

6. Sakshi is different from Pure Brahman and Jiva having intellect as its adjunct. This has been accepted and there is no defect. Sakshi is Consciousness reflected in the vrittis of nescience.

6. Therefore, it is established that Brahman is Knowledge, Bliss, non-dual, eternal and Sakshin.

8. Compatibility of Brahman as Both Material And Efficient Cause
1. Objection: If Brahman is formless, how can it be both material and efficient cause?
   Cause with transformation only can be the material cause. Reply" No
2. Although by transformation (evolution), Brahman is not the material cause, but by being the locus of transfiguration (illusory imagination), Brahman's material cause is possible. The character of locus of transfiguration is the object of ignorance which is the cause of of transfiguration.

3. The same indicated by ignorance is the material cause. By the locus of the desire, action etc, which is the transformation of nescience, it is the efficient cause.

9. Compatibility of Brahman As World Creator

1. Objection: Thus, the creatorship is deemed to have been said like the potter with the effort through the materiality. That is not possible with the effect being imposed.

2. Reply: No. In the potter's effect of the pot, there is no proof of absence of imposition. Absence of creatorship of shell-silver etc is not established; there also Sakshi is the creator. We cannot do away with creatorship on the simple ground that the same is not seen. In that case, in your view also, the omniscient will lose his creatorship.
6. "तत्त्वोपनिदिष्टं" हृदी योनिः-श्रुत्या च उपादानत्वम्। (७६.३)

7. एकविद्यानेष सर्वविद्यान -शुन्तिप्रि उपादानते मानम्। (७६.३)

8(सा), एवं च जगतं अभिविनिमित्तोपादानकस्य। (है) प्रेक्षापूर्वक-जनित कार्यवातः। (४) सुखदुःसारदिवत्
हृदी अभिविनिमित्तोपादानं ब्रह्मा सिद्धति। (७६.४)

9. सर्वकार्यानन्तराकालस्य योग्यस्य उभ्यवादिसंप्रतिपत्तिः दृष्टान्तस्य लाभाः। (७६.४)

10. Compatibility of the proof of Brahman as Both Efficient And Material Cause

1. "From which these elements are born" By the fifth case ending (the prime cause of the agent of the verb jan meaning to be born is called apadana (ablative/fifth case). "To which they return " - by indicating that it is the support for existence and end - by these the material causality is established.

2. "It saw ", "Let me spread" - Brahman is the support of "seeing" etc. By this the efficient causality is established.

3. From Atman, Akasa was born etc. In these also there is the fifth case of materiality.

4. Similarly, "It thought, let me become many" - should be understood as evidence for this..

5. There was nothing before. From it, Sat was born, It created itself. This also is evidence for the said meaning.

6. "It is the birth place of elements. This indicates material causality..

7. When one is known, all are known - this is also evidence for material cause.

8. (Sadhya) World is of a cause which is both material and efficient - (Hetu) Because it is the effect born preceded by thinking. (Exam) Like pleasure and pain.

9. Moreover, there is the advantage of the example which is acceptable to both parties of the conjunction of time and pot which is the cause for all effects.

Thus it is established that Brahman is both (undifferentiated) efficient and material cause.

१४. ब्रह्मण: स्वप्रकाश्यम-वक्ष्यः-उपपति:

१, अवेच्ये सति अपरोपयंवहत्तोपयंप्रत्यावाणानाविद्यकपरणम्। (७६.८)
11. Compatibility of the definition that Brahman Is Self Luminous

1. When it does not have the character of cognisability, it has the character of the capacity for immediate emphirical use. It must not be the locus of the absolute negation.

12. Compatibility of the Self Luminosity Of Brahman

1. (Sadya) Brahman is self luminous (Hetu) Because it does not depend on other luminous object for its existence, (Example) Like the lamp.

13. Compatibility that Brahman Is Not Describable By Words directly.

1. Since Brahman has no attributes and is not cognisable, it is only implied (Lakshyam) by words like Anand etc and cannot be expressed directly, since there is absence of connection between word and meaning as cause for action.

2. It is said: "It is seen that words are correlated to quality, action, kind and relation. These are not in Brahman and therefore, Brahman cannot be expressed with a sense."
14. Refutation Of Difference In General

1. We do not deny the case or the nature of perception of difference; but we say that it is the object of sublation.

15. Refutation Of Difference In Particular

1. In difference, the difference from other than its own has to be stated; this will result in the contradiction of its own location. or there will be an infinite regress. In difference, the character of difference, the character of an adjunct or the character of class have to be stated. There again, difference has to be stated........................then, because of mutual dependence, its own location will result.

16. Refutation Of The Particularity

1. If the particularity is accepted as separate from its own nature, it itself is the character of difference. Then it is not possible for the difference to have the attributes of difference.
17. Refutation Of Perception In Five Differences

1. The said experiences are of only Consciousness limited by the mind. They therefore govern difference having the consciousness not qualified by the mind as its counter-correlate and not difference having pure consciousness as the qualified and painlessness etc as the counter-positive.

2. Srutis also restate difference qualified by the consciousness of mind.

3. Therefore, perception is not valid in the five differences.

Notes: The five differences are: 1) between Jiva and Iswara 2) between Insentient and Iswara 3) between Jiva and Insentient 4) between Jivas and 5) between insentients.
18. **Refutation Of Difference Between Jiva And Brahman**

1. Objection: (Sadhya) Jiva and Iswara are different (Hetu) because they have the locus which has contrary nature (Example) Like the fire and Snow.

2. Reply: Here, pain etc is of the nature of mind (not related to Self) and therefore, the hetu is not established......If it is mere difference, it is the establishment of what is already established; (acceptable to advaitins) if it is real difference, there is negation of probandum.

2. The omniscient and non-omniscient states are imposed like the shortness and length on a letter, It is compatible only by the imposition and it is of no criteria for natural difference.

19. **Refutation Of difference Between Jivas**

1 Objection: (Sadhya) Chaitra has difference which will not be sublated by the knowledge of the one having the nature as its counter-positive. (Hetu) because he is not able to recognise the pains suffered by Maitra. (Example) Like the pot.

Reply: Because of the word "one having the nature", it is the fallacy of establishing the established.

20. **Refutation Of Logic On Difference Between Jivas**

1. Objection. If there is unity of atman, Chitra will remember pain of every one. -

   Reply: No; because of the difference in adjunct., it is compatible that he will not.
2. Since the adjunct is non-real, the criteria for non-real difference has already been explained.

21. Refutation Of Five Differences  (Logical)

1. Objection: Brahman or Jiva has difference which is not subject to sublation by knowledge of the one having the nature of anatman as its counter-positive (Hetu) because it is a substance (Example) like the jar.
   Reply: Because it has the fallacy of an adjunct of insentience, limitedness and being born.

2. Objection: (Sadya) Brahman is not without difference (Hetu) because it is a substance (Example) like the pot.
   Reply: Insentience is the fallacy of adjunct.

3. Therefore, the five differences are not the object of inference.

22 Compatibility - Srutis On Differences Are Restatements

1. Objection: The Srutis, 'Two birds, who is in Atman' are valid for real difference.
2. Reply: No It is compatible that mention of differences is based on imposed differences; since difference is not absolute and since it contradicts other Srutis; Not that, because they are contradictory, they have other import; Srutis on difference are weaker because they are restatements of the difference based on empirical perception.

23. Compatibility - Srutis On Differences Are Based On Empiricality

1. Or though they are not restatements, the Srutis are compatible as they take into account the empirical differences.
2. There is no non-contradiction of difference, since non-dual Srutis have their purport only in impartite Consciousness. The contradiction is only taking into account the meaning through which we have to go to.

24. Other Srutis Cannot Establish Difference

1. Although other Srutis with the same empirical reality speak of differences, there is no contradiction on absolute non-difference.
25. Refutation Of The Import of Six Principles In Srutis On Difference

1. In the first chapter of Mundaka (of Atharva veda), it begins only with the non-difference, 2) In the second, in the middle, non-difference is analysed 3) In the third, it ends with the result of non-difference. The three chapters of Mundaka are of identity. There "Not eating etc" are compatible only with imposed difference, as absolute difference is not compatible.

2. Although the characteristics given by you favour the purport of difference, there is no contradiction taking into account the purport of imposed difference.

26. Essential Nature Of Unity

1. Unity is the essential nature indicated by not being the locus of properties which do not exist in Atman.

2. It should not be said - This is not the subject of your Sastra, as it is agreed by others on the nature of Atman which is not sublated and non-dual.

27. Authority On Non-Difference Between Jiva And Brahman
1. Objection: How can Unity be taught when it is qualified by Omniscience and non-omniscience attributes.
Reply:.. As in the case of "This is that" by dropping the contradictory qualifications, the pure substrates are taught in the sense of unity.

28. एक्षण्तर्गुणायाविरोधाभासः

1. शक्तिप्रदाती तपोक्षुज्ञान्यवेदिपि स्वामेयं अनुपज्ञायतात्। तदुक्तं बानस्लेयं। तदुक्तं अपज्ञायतात्। तदुक्तं तवोपज्ञायत्। इति। पथा कष्ठं चिन्त्यं संप्रेषणं अपज्ञायते। नेतरं रजं इत्यवापि इदं रजं इत्यवापि उपज्ञायता आपने।।(८३०)

2. तदा त्वमा च हिति पीयो पदार्थोऽविन्देन। एक्षण्तर्गुणं प्राकृति दिगं दिगं दिगं दिगं।(८३०)

28. Non-Contradiction Of The Evidence Which Is Depended Upon With The Srutis On Unity

1. Although they depend on perception for significative potency, still they (the Unity Srutis) do not depend on perception for the object signified.

2. It is said by Vachaspati: - "That which is depended on is not subject to sublation., and that which is sublated is not depended on. If it is said that the state of depended upon is to be accepted, then in the knowledge "this is not silver", the knowledge "this is silver" will have to be accepted as that which is depended on."

3. By the words of "it and Thou", only the indicated meaning of the two words is unity. This has been explained before.

29. तत्वमसि-वाक्यार्थ-निरूपणम्

1अभेदे तत्त्वेऽवभूतौ तत्त्वविस्ताराभ्यासः अन्द्रोपत्तात्। न हि तत्त्वाविस्ताराभ्यासः अन्द्रोपत्तात्। न हि तत्त्वाविस्ताराभ्यासः अन्द्रोपत्तात्। न हि तत्त्वाविस्ताराभ्यासः अन्द्रोपत्तात्। न हि तत्त्वाविस्ताराभ्यासः अन्द्रोपत्तात्। (८३२)

2. एतेन -( तत्त्वावभूतं --------धृति वा, तत्र: संज्ञाय इति वा, तत्र्य त्वमिति वा, तत्समन् त्वमि इति वीं अर्थे: --------) - निरस्तम्।(८३३)
29 Proof of the Meaning Of the sentence - 'Thou Art That'

1. When it is understood that non-difference is the purport, there is no harm in having many secondary implications to maintain non-difference. The main purport cannot be sacrificed to be in line with secondary implication. It is said in the Nyayachintamani that vritti is for the purport and not the purport for the vritti. By the implication, "quasi-inclusive", when the important purport is possible, it is not proper to invent that its purport is on concomittance.

2. By this, the following (interpretations of "Thou art That) has been refuted. (a) "you stand by him " (b) from him you are born (c) you are of him (d) you are in him.

3. By this, the following is also refuted. - You are of him, as a compound. It is improper to invoke the sixth case compound, as it has to apply to their lakshana/

20. अहें ब्रह्मासी-इत्यादि-अनेकायन्त्र्यं कथनम्

1. ब्रह्मदार्याकस्थितम् (१-४-१०) "श्रव्यो व इत्यम् आशीत। तदाद्वारमयेवेवेदं भ्रामासि। " इति वाक्प्रयत्न अनुपासनाः - प्रकरणास्वतः अभेदप्राध्यायं। (८४१)

2. एवं मुँडकेः (२-९) "स पो है तपः व इत्यद्वेद ब्रह्मविन्तिं।" इति - एतद्वितीय माणसै। (८४१)

3. ब्रह्मवेद सत्य प्रक्षयेति (२०.५-५-५) इति भूतिती ये कस्बिम्। (८४१)

4. परेएः सर्व एकी भवनि (२०.३-२-६) इति एतद्वितीय माणसै। (६५४)

5. तथा अत्यन्तोपि प्रकरणाः (२०.३-७-२३) "नान्योक्षुत्तीयं ग्रहण।" इति वाक्यं, अन्यप्रकरणां (२०.३-८-११) "नामक्षुत्तिति ग्रहण।" इति वाक्यं च ऐसे प्रमाणसै। (८४२)
30. Meaning Of Srutis 'I Am Brahman' Etc

1. In the Brihadaranyaka, the sentence "In the beginning this was verily Brahman and that Brahman knew only itself as I am Brahman" is not in the context of meditation and therefore is of non-difference.

2. In the Mundakopanishad - "He who knows the highest Brahman becomes Brahman himself" The purport of this sentence is non-difference.

3. "Being Brahman. attains Brahman " The purport of this Sruti also is non-difference.

4. "In the Supreme indestructible Brahman, all become one " This also is valid in non-difference".

5. In the Antharyami Brahmana - "There is no other seer than He" and in the Akshara Brahmana "there is nothing that sees but It" are valid in non-difference.

6. "From the second only there is fear " - difference is spurned and therefore, non-difference only is the purport of the Upanashad.

7 "If he makes the smallest distinction in It, there is fear for him. " - non-difference is established as difference is spurned.

31. Inference On Non-Difference Between Jiva And Brahman

1. (Sadhya). Jivas are not in reality different from Brahman (Hetu) because they are Atman (Example) Like Paramatman.
2. (Sadhyā) Atma is not many as it is a class which is less pervasive than the character of Dravya (Hetu) because it is present everywhere (Dris) like Akasa.

3. (Sadhyā) The difference in perception of the subject is non-real, (Hetu) Because of difference in perception (Drish) Like the difference in perception of the moon

32. Compatibility of Non-Difference as Composite

1. In the Sruti "His feet are all beings in the world", in the Smruti "Jiva is part of me in the world" - In these, Jiva is mentioned as part of Brahman. By these also, non-difference results.

2. By the Srutis, although non-difference between Jiva and Brahman is meant, still for explaining the difference between the meditator and who is meditated upon, difference is assumed as a part. From this also, non-difference is the result.

33. By Logic Of Original And Reflection Non-Difference is proved.

1. Non-difference is to be understood as in the case of an original and reflection, as Brahman is the original and Jiva its reflection.

2. When the reflection is non-different from the original, Jiva by its reflection of Brahman is non-different from it.
34. Refutation that Jiva Is Atomic (Minute)

1. Objection: How can Jiva which is atomic be non-different from Iswara who is omnipresent.

2. Reply.: By the Srutis, "Eternal all pervading", "He is that great unborn Atma" and by the inferences, (Sadya) Jiva is not atomic, (Hetu) because he is the locus of perceptible properties (Example) like a jar, (2nd Hetu) because he is Atman, he is not matter (2nd Example) like Iswara, Jiva is not atomic. If Jiva were atomic, it will not be possible for him to feel pain or pleasure pervading the whole body.

3. (Sadhya) Jiva is atomic (Hetu) Because it has the characteristic of being the locus of conjunction which is the nonconcomitant cause of knowledge. (Drish) Like the mind. Here insentience is an adjunct.

Notes: In Laghu Chandrika (by Brahmananda Saraswati) which is a rejoinder to Tarangani (By Ramathirtha of Madwa school) which is a rejoinder to Advaitasiddhi, the following sloka is quoted at the end of second Parichheda in support of Jiva-Brahma non-duality: जीवं वै तथाकारस्याय नित्यही देव लिङ्ग। जीवणभरणसाधिते साधिते वै जीवम्।
২. তুলোয়পরিচ্ছেদ:

PARICHEDA 3
1. Thinking And Meditating Are Subsidiary To Hearing

1. Thus when the oneness of Atman is established, those wishing realisation should have hearing as primary with thinking and meditation as secondary means. It is said in the Vivarana - "Hearing is primary, as there is no gap between the means and the object, whereas thinking and meditation are secondary for the realisation and become the cause for Brahman realisation by the concentration of the mind purified by the samskara of direction towards Self.

2. Ordained Injunction Of Vivarana

1. Hearing etc are the means for realisation of Brahman by positive and negative reasonings. The injunction is not "Aputra" but of ordained injunction only.

Notes: Vidhis are of three kinds. a) Aputra vidhi = not known for all times by any way. Example: Vrihin prokashati = Sprinkles the grains. (b) Niyama vidhi = Partly known to be done and partly not known to bedone.. Example: Vrihin avahanti = strikes grains. (c) Parisanka vidhi = when an effect can result in more than one way, ordaining of one. Example. Pancha Pancha naka Bhakshyah. Only five fingered five animals should be eaten.
3. Compatibility of Hearing Etc As An Injunction

1. The first can be accepted (understanding the purport of the potency.) There is no harm that the potency of the words is not possible. Although this is not possible in pure Brahman, the qualified potency's usefulness in understanding is possible. Although the doubtful aspects have been decided and it is not possible there, still it is possible in the pure Brahman by the indication of the doubtful aspects. - thus discussion is not unnecessary.

2. Therefore, injunction of hearing etc. are compatible as they are of mental state and different from knowledge.

4. Compatibility - Hearing Is The Root Cause For Discussion

1. The root cause for Jignsa Sutra is the injunction for hearing which is the case for the injunction for discussion.

2. Or hearing is the repetitive thinking of the reasons like beginning etc. which decide the purport, as said in the Samanvaya Adyaya, Reflection is the repetitive thinking of the reasons for clearing doubts and impossibilities etc, as said in the Second Chapter.
3. Therefore, the injunction of hearing is the cause for injunction for discussion of the Jignasa Sutra and not the injunction for reflection.

5. शाश्वस्युक्तं-श्वायथविषि-विचार-आयोपकल्व-उपागितः:

1. प्रस्थानान्तरे तु आध्यात्मिकविशेषार्थाःसमारणसत्वात्। काण्डवितताराज्यकल्वम्। अवश्यादिषु च न विषि:। (८७०)

5. Compatibility of the presumptive discussion by the injunction of Adyayana according to Vachaspati’s View

1. In the other Prastana, the injunction for reciting is upto the understanding of the meaning and which applies to both the Khandas, there is no injunction for hearing.

6. ज्ञानस्य युक्तात्मतः - भक्तः:

1. न च शास्त्रविशेषाः नियमेन पुनःतन्त्रदर्शनात्। भ्रमणरुपः शास्त्रविशेषाः। तत्त्वां ज्ञानसाधनस्य पुनःतन्त्रवत्। यथा प्राप्तं। अभ्यासं। ज्ञानां। विद्यितमपर्दर्शिनं। तदर्श ज्ञानकारणविशेषकः। यथा। इत्यदिनं। ज्ञातिनिरूपः। अनुभवः। सूत्रियं कर्णव्यापारविशेषकः। (८७३)

2. न हि अन्यतन्त्रार्थाच्छेदः अविवेचलं ब्रूमः। किं तु पुमिच्छाभिः। यतौ कारणेऽसति। अन्यथा। कर्तृत्वात्। अशक्यत्वात्। (८७४)

6. Refutation Of Man’s Effort For Knowledge

1 Objection: It should not be said : - Since the knowledge of the meaning of the Sastra is always seen as an effort of man and since Brahman is the meaning of Sastra, Brahman knowledge is also of man's effort.

Reply: There also the human effort is with reference to the instruments of knowledge. The good which are enjoined and bad which are prohibited pertain only to the instruments of knowledge. The experience of pain etc, which are born or eradicated also pertain to instruments of knowledge.
2. We do not say that it is non-injunction by other effort alone, but when there is cause by human desire, it is not possible to do it otherwise.

7. \textit{Refutation Of Injunction Of Knowledge}

1. Therefore, in "Ghee seen by wife" etc. also, knowledge is not an ordained injunction; in the case of concentration also, since it is separate from knowledge, injunction is possible. In understanding the subtle meaning of Sastra there is an injunction, by induction and deduction of reasoning and it does not relate to knowledge but to instruments of knowledge. and therefore, knowledge of the Atman is not possible to be enjoined. Likewise, hearing if it is defined as knowledge is incompatible to be enjoined. Sravana is discussion to find out the methods to get immediate knowledge from the Sabda. Therefore, hearing is different from knowledge. Thinking and meditation are subsidiaries to hearing. It is the principal means for realisation of Brahman and is enjoined.

8. \textit{Immediate Knowledge From Verbal Testimony}

1. Objection: How can word produce immediate knowledge as there is no authority?
   Reply: The authority is the \textit{Sruti}: "Those with knowledge of the Vedanta have the determination of the identity (Jiva-Brahma)
2. It is not: (sadhya) Word is not cause of immediate knowledge (Hetu) Because it is a word. Because it strays in "you are the tenth" etc.

3. Therefore, sentences like "Thou art That" generate immediate knowledge. It is in the form of release of nescience, a means for Liberation for Brahman realisation. Hearing is principal, meditation etc, are subsidiaries, it is the subject of Niyama Vidhi. This is established.

चतुर्थ: परिच्छेद:

PARICHEDA 4
1. Proof Of Eradication Of nescience

1. The Atman who is indicated as knowledge is eradication of ignorance. Even though the indicator is destroyed, release will be there like the cook etc. (even when the action of cooking ceases, the cook remains,

2. Release is in the nature of what one gets that which he already has. In its nature of Bliss, although it is not possible to be a Sadhya, still it can be established by the mental
state of ignorance which veils Bliss. It is similar to one getting the necklace which he already has. Therefore, eradication of ignorance is the essential nature of Atman or of a mental state in that form.

2. अविभाविभवतंके -निरुपणम्

1. अविभाविभवतंके च यथापि न स्त्रयोदशस्त्रयुपप्रज्ञानमात्रम् ; तथय तत्साधकत्वादू; तथापि अवणादिसाध्य-अपरोक्षवृत्ति-समारूढं तदेव। (८८५)

2. तदुक्तं - तृणादेवोलिसिद्धे पूर्दीसिद्धूणं देतेत। सुष्कान्तमुपारुह्य तत्वायं विनिन्योपेतु।। (८८५)

2. Proof of Eradicator Of nescience

1. The realisation of the self luminous Brahman cannot be the eradicator of ignorance because it is by realisation that ignorance comes to be known to be. However, Brahman reflected in the the perceptual mental state attained by hearing etc. cannot but be the eradicator of ignorance.

2. It is said: Sunlight, by itself illumines grass etc: the same will burn grass. through a lense. That logic should be applicable here.

3. सुक्तोरोदन्दरुपाण्युणेन पुरुषाधीनिरुपणम्

1. नन्तु - तवमद् मुक्ती ..........................अद्वैतात्मता-सृष्टिच्यः ; सुव्यूप स्यामितिवृत्त सुरं स्यामितिरङ्गाय अद्वैतात्मा तदात्मातु; न; सुर्वादी हि पुनर्वत्ने नानाकृत्यत्वायुक्ता। नानां स्वकृत्यत्वायुक्ता। गौरवाद् किंतु साध्वान्निर्भरणामालायु, तदस्य भौतिकताः।। (८८६)

3. Proof - Moksha Is Bliss And Man's Goal

1. Objection: In your opinion,,,,,,,,man's goal is not the nature of happiness; Because no wish is seen that "let me be happiness" like the one "Let me be happy".
Reply: In happiness etc the goal is desired neither because it is not related to others nor is it because it is related to one's own self. as it is round about. But it is to be experienced without a veil.
4. Compatibility - Consciousness Alone gets the release

1. Objection: Whose is this man's goal of liberation? Is it of the "I" or "Consciousness alone"?
Reply: Man's goal of liberation is possible as Consciousness which continues in its state of liberation is a part of "I".

2. Therefore, bliss which is non-different from self-illuminous Consciousness is the goal of man.

5. Compatibility Of Jivanmukthi

1. Thar Bliss is experienced by a Jivanmukta. There is no question of the fall of the body immediately real knowledge is realised. Because of the continuance of residue, although relieved of illusion, the resultant body is possible to be continued, like the continuance of fear and shaking after an illusion of a serpent and also like the circling of the potter's wheel even after taking away the stick.
6. Refutation of presence of Gradation in Mukti

1. There are also no high or low grades in mukti., as the question of degrees arise only in duality which does not exist in Moksha. "he obtains absolute equality" says Sruti. If there are grades in Moksha like Swarga, it will become non-eternal.

2. Attainment of bliss in its form in the self-luminous form of Atman is moksha. Since there is no question of grades whatsoever.

3. Therefore Liberation is attaining the form of self-luminosity which is the nature of bliss. There is no gradation there whatsoever.

Books

1. Sanskrit

   1. Advaitasiddhi (with Vittaleshiyam and Laghuchandrika - edited by Pandit Sri N.S, Ananthakrishna Sastri ) Parimal Publications, Delhi
   2. Advaitasiddhi with Balabhodhini - Ratna Publications, Varanasi
   3. Advaitasiddhisiddhantasara by Sadananda Vyasa - Vidya Vilas, Varanasi

2. English
1. Advaitasiddhi First chapter translation by Dr, Ganganath Jha - Satguru Publications, Delhi,

2. Advaitasiddhi - Translation on Mityatva by Karuna Bhattacharya - ICPR, New Delhi


Appendix I

1. Prof. S, Kuppuswamy Sastris English translation and notes on the Tarka Sangraha (Primer of Indian Logic) gives a good working knowledge of the methodology of Indian Logic, with its introduction on the origin and development of Indian logic. It is published by the Kuppusway Sastry Research Institute, Mylapore, Madras 4.

2. To understand the new School of Logic, a study of the Karikavali (Bhasha Pariccheda) with the commentary of Mukthavali is necessary. An English translation by Swami Madhavanda is available, published by Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta.

3. As a ready reckoner, the following terms and explanations are given. These are not exhaustive but only indicative.

4. The new school of Indian logic lays much stress on the means of valid knowledge (Pramana), particularly to inference (reasoning). The terms are defined very accurately. The methodology is unique in its brevity without sacrificing clarity.

5. It deals with four Pramanas - Perception (Pratyaksha), Inference (Anumana), Similarity (Upamana) and Verbal Testimony (Sabda). Vedanta has accepted two more - Presumption (Arthapatti) and Non-cognition (Anupalabdhi).

6. Perception is the knowledge through the sense organs.

7.1. Inference is in the form of a syllogism -(1) The Mountain is with fire (पर्वतो वन्हिमान्), Because it has smoke (कृष्णल्लात्) Like the hearth (महानस्वहन). In this syllogism, Mountain is called Paksha (subject)." With fire" is Probandum (Sadya), Fire is the reason (Hetu) and Hearth is the example (Drishtanta). The sadya is established by the knowledge of the invariable concomitance between fire and smoke.
7.2. A defective probans (fallacious reason) (Hetyavbhasa) will obstruct the inferential knowledge and they are of five kinds. (1) Reason that strays away (Savyabhichara) (2) the adverse reason (viruddha) (3) the opposite reason (Satpratipaksha) (4) the unestablished reason (asiiddha) and the stultified reason (bhadita).

7.3. The straying reason (savyabhichara) is otherwise known as anaikantika (literally not unfailing in its association with the probandum) It is of three kinds - viz, common (sadharana), uncommon (asadharana) and non-conclusive (anupasamharin).

7.4. The common strayer (asadharana) is that variety of straying reason which is present in a place where the probandum (sadhya) is not present; as in the argument - "The mountain has fire, because it is knowable". In this argument, knowability is found in a tank where fire is not present. The uncommon strayer (asadharana) is that reason which is present in the subject (paksha) and not present in any similar example (sapaksa) or counter-example (vipaksa); as soundness (sabdatva), in the argument - "Sound is eternal, because it is sound", sabdatva (sound-ness) being present only in sound, and nowhere else, eternal or non-eternal. The non-conclusive strayer (anupasamharin) is that reason which has no affirmative or negative example (anvayadrishtha or vyathirekadrishanta); as knowableness (premeyatva) in the argument - "All things are non-eternal, because they are knowable". Here, no example is available since all things are treated as paksa.

7.5. The adverse reason (viruddha) is one which is invariably concomitant with the non-existence of the probandum; as producibility (kritakatva), in the argument - "Sound is eternal, because it is produced". Here producibility is invariably concomitant with non-eternity, which amounts to the non-existence of eternity.

7.6. The opposite reason (satpratipaksa) is one which admits of being counter-balanced by another reason that proves the non-existence of the probandum; as audibility in the argument - "Sound is eternal, because it is audible, like soundness (Sabdatva). The counter - reason in this case is producibility (Kritakatva) in the argument - "Sound is non-eternal, because it is producible;".

7.7. The unestablished reason (asiiddha) is of three kinds; viz, unestablished in respect of abode (asrayasiddha), unestablished in respect of itself (swarupaasiddha) and unestablished in respect of its concomitance (vyapyatvasiddha). The reason is asrayasiddha in the argument - "Sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is lotus, like the lotus of a pond." Here, sky - lotus is the abode or subject and it never exists. The reason swarupasiddha in the argument - "Sound is a quality, because it is visible, like colour". Here, visibility cannot be predicated of sound, which is only audible. The reason is said to be an adventitious condition (upadhi) which is pervasive of the probandum but not pervasive of the probans. In the argument - "The mountain has smoke, because it has fire", contact with wet fuel is the adventitious condition (upadhi). "Where there is smoke, there is contact with wet fuel" - thus it is pervasive of the probandum. There is no contact with wet fuel in every place where there is fire; for instance, a red-hot iron ball has no contact with wet fuel; thus the upadhi is non-pervasive of the probans. In this
manner, contact with wet fuel is the upadhi in the present instance, because it is pervasive of the probandum but not pervasive of the probans. And fire, in the argument under reference, is vyapyaatvaasiddha, since it is associated with an adventitious condition (upadhi).

7.8 The stultified reason (bhadita) is one which is put forward to prove a probandum whose non-existence is established by another proof. "Fire is not hot, because it is a substance", the probandum is "not being hot"; its reverse - "being hot" is perceived through tactile perception; so the probans is stultified (badhita).

8. Similarity (Upamana). Analogical cognition consists in the knowledge of relation between a name and the object.

9. Verbal testimony (Sabda). Verbal expectancy (Akanksha) congruity (Yogyata) and proximity (Sannidhi) these are causes that bring about verbal cognition.

10. Presumption (Arthapatti) is of an explanatory fact (upapadaka) from a knowledge of the thing to be explained (upapadya). Stoutness of a man who does not eat at day time is inexplicable unless we assume his eating at night.

11. Non-cognition (Anupalabdhi) is the distinctive cause of that experience of non-existence which is not generated by an instrument of cognition, If on a brightly lit ground, there existed a pot, it should be known. Now it is not known. Therefore there is non-existence of the pot on the ground.

12. Definition (lakshana): The usual method is to give a simple definition and examine the purpose of each word included in it (Dala-prayojana-chinta). Definition is susceptible to three faults. (Dosha). If we define a cow an animal with horns, it extends to non-cows (ativyapti-over-applicability), it does not include cows which have no horns (avyapti-non-inclusiveness) If we define cow as "a single hoofed animal", it is not applicable to any cow at all (Asambava-non-applicability).

13. The cause and effect relationship (Karya-karana bhava) is established by the copresence (anvaya) and co-absence (vyatireka) (Yatsattve yatsatvam yadabhava yadabhavah).

14. Causes are three. (1) Material cause (Samavayi karana) is a substance e, thread for the cloth. (2) Non-material cause (asamavayi Karana) is quality or action. eg conjunction of thread (Tantusamyoga) (3) Others. Nimitta karana - the weaver -

15. In order to point out the difference between the various cognitions, perceptual, inferential, verbal etc, an attribute is assumed in each. objectness (vishayata), subjectness (Vishayita), Causality (Karanata) effectness (Karyata) etc.

16. Avacchedaka and avacchinna: That which delimits a thing or an attribute is called avacchedaka, while the delimited is avachinna. Gatatva is avacchedaka and Gata is avachinna.
17. Abhava" Non-existence is a positive entity and it is of four kinds. Prior non-existence (Pragabhava) annihilative non-existence (Dwamsabhava), absolute non-existence (atyantabhava) and mutual non-existence (anyonyabhava).

18. Pratiyogin: A thing of which the non-existence is predicated is the pratiyogin. The pot is the pratiyogin of the non-existence of the pot.

19. Vyapya and Vyapaka: That which has narrower extension is vyapya and that which has wider extension is vyapaka. Smoke is vyapya and fire is vyapaka.

20. Upajivya and upjivaka: That which is depended upon is upajivya and that which depends upon is upajivaka. Perception is upajivya and inference, sabda etc. is upajivaka.

21. Defects in Anumana (1): Siddasadana is establishing what has already been established. (2) Arthanthara Probhundun (Sadya) will not be there while Probans (Hetu) is there. (3) Sadana Vaikalaya: Probans (Hetu) is not established in example (Drishtanta) (4) Baghaasiddha: Probans (Hetu) partially non-established in Paksha (subject).
Appendix II

1. Siddanta Kaumudi (By Bhattoji Dikshita) with a commentary "Balamanorama" by Vasudeva Dikshita is the standard text book for the study of Sanskrit grammar. English translations are available. Siddanta Kaumudi is a detailed explanation of the Sutras of Panini in a subjectwise order.

2. Panini has formulated Sanskrit Grammar in "Ashtadhyayi" with 8 chapters of four Padas each - total 3983 Sutras. In addition, he has given a list of verb roots (Dhatupata) under ten categories classified into Atmanepada and Parasmaipada - total 1943 roots.

3. Panini's Ashtadhyayi is a masterpiece in the field of Philology. It has been commented upon by Vararuchi in a vartika and by Patanjali in his Maha Bhasya.

4. In the methodology of the Paninian Grammar, the most important and the unique is the Pratyahara Sutras.

5. Based on these 14 Sutras, Pratyaharas which are grammatical symbols or abbreviates are formed. For example, the Pratyahara अच् (beginning letter in Sutra 1 and the last letter in Sutra 4) denote all the vowels. Similarly हल्क् (the first letter of Sutra 5 and the last letter of Sutra 14) denote all consonants. There are 43 Pratyaharas for different combinations. The last letter at the end of each Sutra is the indicating letter.

6. The technical terms numbering about 100, the interpreting and injunction rules have been clearly defined at the outset.

7. Another scientifically designed feature is the rules for conjunction of words, (Sandhi). This is based on the concept of Savarna, - letters which have the same place of utterance in our vocal system and which in uttering have the same amount of effort.
8. Another important feature is the large number of Pratayyas - affixes - to be added to nouns and verbs and a great variety of derivatives are obtained. For example, for nouns, 21 affixes are given - called फ़ुर्ती - (7 case ending each for Singular, Dual and Plural). Similarly, 18 Suffixes are given for verbs called - तिद्दृ - There are also number of suffixes for noun and verb derivatives.

9. Amarakosa is a Sanskrit dictionary, a separate work by Amarakosa, giving synonyms of Sanskrit words.