advaita-siddhi - 9 (Partial redundancy? No way!)
MadhusUdana set the sAdhya, what is to be established, as the mithyAtva of duality, the unreality of duality. In defining mithyAtva, one of the definitions taken up was the one from the panchapAdikA of PadmapAda. MithyAtva is defined here as anirvachanIya, that which cannot be categorized as sat or asat. More specifically, this was defined to be sadasadanadhikaraNatva, which was clarified by MadhusUdana to be the absolute absence of sattva and the absolute absence of asattva.
The opponent had raised the objection of arthAntara against the definition of mithyAtva or sadasadanadhikaraNatva, not being a substratum of either existence or non-existence. MadhusUdana refuted these objections. He also offered an alternative definition of sadasadanadhikaraNatva, namely the absolute difference from existence and the absolute difference from nonexistence which rules out any possibility of arthAntara (proving something other than what is intended).
The opponent could, however, level another charge against MadhusUdana's definition. By defining sadasadanadhikaraNatva as the difference from existence and difference from nonexistence, there is at least a defect of proving something a part of which has already been proved. For example, if you seek to prove A AND B, when you know that one of the two, say B, is already proved, your proof will have the defect of partial siddha-sAdhana, ie. aMshataH siddha-sAdhana. Your proof will be partially redundant and one of the worst mistakes a logician can commit is being redundant! Here, the opponent claims, the partial siddha-sAdhana arises from the fact that the realists, including the navya-naiyAyikas and the mAdhvas, already have accepted the world's absolute difference from nonexistence, in the sense that the world is absolutely real. So the part of the advaitin's proof which establishes absolute difference from nonexistence is redundant.
But, MadhusUdana explains, the sAdhya in this case CANNOT be split into two terms A and B, such that each can be independently proved. We HAVE to consider the combined difference from existence and nonexistence. Why? Because, the hetu, dR^ishyatva (perceptiblity), in this case is the hetu for the CONJUNCTION (or combination) of absolute difference from existence AND absolute difference from nonexistence. (Recall that the sAdhya is to be inferred from the invariable concomitance of the hetu with the sAdhya.)
Without further ado, let us hear the unassailable reply of MadhusUdana:
nacha - asattvavyatireka-aMshasya-asadbhedasya cha prapaJNche
siddhattvena-aMshataH siddha-sAdhanamiti - vAchyam.h | "guNAdikaM
guNyAdinA bhinnAbhinnaM samAnAdhikR^itatvAt.h" iti bhedAbhedavAdiprayoge
tArkikAdyaN^gIkR^itasya bhinnatvasya siddhAvapi uddeshya-pratItyasiddher-
yathA na siddha-sAdhanaM, tathA prakR^ite .api militapratIteruddeshyatvA-
nna siddha-sAdhanam.h | yathA tattvAbhede ghaTaH kuMbha iti sAmAnAdhi-
karaNya-pratIteradarshanena militasiddhiruddeshyA, tathA prakR^ite .api
sattvarahite tuchchhe dR^ishyatva-adarshanena militasya tatprayojakatayA
militasiddhiruddeshyeti samAnam.h |
(And you) cannot charge that there is the defect of partial siddha-sAdhana (aMshataH siddha-sAdhana) because the part (of the proof) consisting of (establishing) the absence of asattva (nonexistence) and the difference from nonexistence (in the alternative definition) is already established regarding the world. The (mAdhvas) hold that a quality and the substance that possesses that quality are different AND non-different from each other. In arguing with the tArkikas (the naiyAyikas, sAnkhyas, the bhATTas, etc.) who accept the difference (of a quality from the possessor of the quality), they (the mAdhvas) say: "the quality and its possessor are different and non-different from each other because they can be cognized to be related by a relation of non-difference." (So, they say,) there is no siddha-sAdhana because the intended cognition (CONJUNCTION of difference and nondifference of a quality and its possessor) is NOT proved , even though the difference (of a quality from its possessor) is already proved. Similarly, in (our) present case (of establishing absence of sattva AND the absence of asattva) too, the cognition that is intended (to be proved) is CONJUNCTION (combination of absence of sattva and absence of asattva). So (we) cannot (be charged with) siddha-sAdhana (redundancy in reasoning). (You may say that the CONJUNCTION of ours is not justified. But we say, no!) In the case of identical things such as a "pot" and a "jar" (which are terms that stand for the same thing), there is no cognition of difference and nondifference of the form "The pot is the jar." (Therefore,) the conjunction of difference and nondifference is intended to be established. (This is your stand.) Similarly, in the present case (ie. of absence of sattva and absence of asattva), perceptibility is not (a characteristic of) a totally nonexistent thing that lacks existence (sattva). (Therefore,) conjunction (of absence of sattva and absence of asattva, or equivalently, difference from sattva and difference from asattva) is a prayojaka (a necessary factor) for dR^ishyatva, perceptibility (which is the hetu) and (so) the establishing of that CONJUNCTION is what is intended.
ViTThalesha describes that the hetu dR^ishyatva is an invariable concomitant (vyApya) of ubhayatva ("both-ness" or conjunction) of sadbheda and asadbheda.
dR^ishyatvasya sadbheda-asadbhedobhayatva-avachchhinnaM vyApyatvam.h
The vyApyatva (invariable concomitance) of perceptibility (the hetu in this case) is delimited (characterized) by the conjunction of difference from sat and difference from asat (or equivalently the absence of sattva and absence of asattva, in which case the proper term would be "sattva-abhAva-asattva-abhAvobhayatva-avachchhinnaM").
And as BrahmAnanda explains, such "ubhayatva" is the prayojaka in establishing dR^ishyatva:
tatprayojakatA- ubhayatva-vishishhTasya dR^ishyatvopapAdakatA