[Advaita-l] Why brahma jnAna is capable of sarva nivritti
svedagarbha at gmail.com
Fri Mar 24 11:40:21 EDT 2017
To begin with a small disclaimer -- my below arguments are purely mine and
not official from Dvaitins. I have not read either nyayAmrita nor
subsequent rejoinders from them.
On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 10:58 AM, Venkatraghavan S via Advaita-l <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
> न च - बाधकधियां भ्रमतद्धेत्वज्ञानदोषाधयस्तद्रष्ट्रादीनामबाधकत्वं
> कथं ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य तद्बाधकत्वं घटतामिति - वाच्यं | To this, the siddhikAra
> says, do not argue thus.
> We see instances where such all encompassing nivritti is possible.
> यत्र हि स्वप्ने द्रष्टारं दुष्टकरणवन्तं कल्पयित्वा तस्य भ्रमं कल्पयति, तत्र
> जागरज्ञानेन सर्वेषां निवृत्तिदर्शनात् | Consider the following example.
> Suppose there is a man who dreams of some person (ie not him) mistaking a
> shell for silver. Here, the dream person who mistakes the shell for silver
> (drashTA), his ignorance of the dream shell (ajnAna), his faulty eyesight
> in the dream that led to the mistake (doSha), his perception of the silver
> (bhrama) and the silver (bhrama viShaya) are all seen in the dream. All
> these are sublated upon the dreamer waking up.
This example is nested brama (brama within brama). One is outer and another
is inner. The inner one itself a viShya of the outer. The entire set of
inner bhrama -- drashTA(dream person undergoing shell-siver brama), the
bhrama viShaya (siver-shell), the brAnti (thinking shell as silver) and the
nivritti-jnAna (correcting knowledge 'this is shell only'); is itself
bhrama viShaya of the outer bhrama (of the dreamer). Even though entire
package of inner bhrama is bhAdita (sarva nivritti), nevertheless it does
not amount to sarva nivritti for the outer bhrama. At the end we still have
drashTa (the dreamer), his pramA, viShya of his bhrama, adhisTana (dreamer
himself) etc. still remains. Where is sarva nivritti here?
This example does not refute anything. In this example, one bhrama itself
is very viShya of another bhrama. By showing nivritti of that viShya of
outer bhrama, it is concluded sarva nivritti of bhrama is possible.
Think like this -- in order to say 'sarva nivritti' of (inner) bhrama is
possible and hence true, the very bhAdha of that (inner) bhrama must
happen to begin with. This bhAdhattva is at the same level of reality of
the outer bhrama and hence remains at last. Where is the question of so
Opponent could easily use this example itself and can argue this example is
its own anti-thesis and proves otherwise.
> जाग्रद्दशायामपि यदा मनुष्यप्रतिकृतौ चैतन्यं कल्पयित्वा
> तत्समीपवर्तिन्यनादर्श एवादर्शत्वं कल्पयित्वा स्वप्रतिबिम्बमयं पश्यतीति
> कल्पयति, तदा नायं चेतनो न चायमादर्श इति परमया सर्वनिवृत्तिदर्शनाच्च
> नेयमदृष्टचरी कल्पना |
> This is also possible in the waking state - take the example of a child
> playing with a toy. Let us assume the toy is shaped like a man looking at
> his reflection in the mirror. Now the child imagines the toy man to be a
> conscious entity and imagines the toy mirror to be a real mirror. He thus
> imagines a non-existent conscious man admiring his non-existent reflection
> in a non-existent mirror.
> The imagined consciousness of the man (drashTA), his seeing (bhrama), the
> reflection seen (bhrama viShaya), his ignorance of his own face that the
> child attributes to the toy man (avidyA), which was made possible due to
> the toy's proximity to the toy mirror (dOSha) - none of these is real.
> When bAdha jnAna of this entire set up takes place, everything that was
> thus imagined is falsified - are shown to be non-existent.
Same here too, this example suffers from the above mentioned flaw.
> Similarly, why is it incorrect to say that brahma jnAna is capable of sarva
> kalpanA nivritti?
It is incorrect to say so.
It is not possible unless if this bhrama of dvaita-prapancha itself a
viShya of Brhman's another outer bhrAnti. Can you say so?
> To this, the pUrva pakshi asks - your examples are fine, but what is the
> underlying reason for some types of bAdhaka jnAna to do nivritti of only
> the bhrama viShaya, whereas other bAdhaka jnAnas (according to the
> advaitin) are capable of sarva nivritti?
Is this really Dvaitin's questions? or anuvAda of siddhAntin? Can you
please quote the reference for this question from Dvaitin's text?
> तथाचेयं शुक्तिरित्याद्यधिष्ठानज्ञानं रज्ज्वां सर्पभ्रममिव
> द्रष्ट्राद्यध्यासं मा निवीवृतत्, तत्कस्य हेतो:? Why is it that certain
> jnAna like shukti adhishThAna jnAna is incapable of doing a bAdha of ajnAna
> (this is the opponent's view, the siddhAntin says that there is bAdha of
> ajnAna too), and like in the instance of the snake illusion on the rope,
> the seer's nivritti does not happen upon seeing the shell or the snake?
> ब्रह्म ज्ञानं त्वाकाशादिप्रपञ्चभ्रममिव द्रष्टुर्दोषादिभ्रममपि निवर्तयेदेव,
> तत्कस्य हेतो:? -whereas brahma jnAna is able to do a nivritti of everything
> - not just this world consisting of the pancha bhutAs such as space etc,
> but also its seer, his doSha etc. What makes brahma jnAna so special?
> The siddhikAra says - तदधिष्ठानसाक्षात्कारत्वाभावात् | in the case of the
> shell and silver, the shell is the substratum for only the silver, it is
> not the substratum for the seer, or for the defect in the seer's eyes. One
> cannot say that because the shell is unseen, a person walking nearby is
> attributed with "seer"-hood, or that such a seer's develops a fault in his
> eyes leading to the misperception. In this example, the shell is the
> adhishThAna for only the bhrama viShaya (silver), not the doSha or the
> drashTA. As a consequence, the shukti adhishThAna jnAna is able to do
> nivritti of only the silver.
> अशेषभ्रमाधिष्ठानतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारत्वात् |
> Whereas, brahman is the adhishthAna for everything - it is the adhishThAna
> for the entire dvaita prapancha that is seen as existing, the ajnAna
> because of which this prapancha is seen, the person who perceives the
> world, and all the doShAs of the seer such as karma vAsanas etc. Therefore,
> when Brahma jnAna - the sakala adhishThAna jnAna - arises, everything that
> has Brahman as its adhishThAna undergoes nivritti.
When the very topic of prapancha adhyAsa is itself is at the heart of the
dispute here, and not already siddha, how can AV quote and use it to
substantiate the sarva-nivritti concept?
What is established from what? Is sarva-nivrittvaM is used to establish
prapancha-bhAdakatvaM? or prapancha-bhAdakatvaM is used to establish
sarva-nivrittvaM of adhyAsa?
> एवंच बाधबुद्धित्वं न दोषाद्यबाधाकत्वे प्रयोजकम्, अपि
> तु तद्भ्रमाधिष्ठानतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारभिन्नत्वमिति द्रष्टव्यं | Therefore,
> there is no rule that bAdha jnAna is intrinsically unable to sublate doSha,
> etc. On the contrary, a bAdha jnAna's inability to sublate doShas etc.,
> stems from the factors of perception involved having a different substratum
> than the substratum whose knowledge is revealed by the bAdha jnAna.
> ननु - कल्पितत्वादुक्तदृष्टान्तेन तत् बाध्यताम्, इह तु कथमिति चेत् | The
> pUrvapakshi then asks - the sublatability of all the factors involved in
> the bhrama in your examples is because every single one of them is
> imagined. However, that cannot be said to be applicable for the world.
> हन्त ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्य कल्पितत्वमङ्गीकुर्वतामस्माकमिदमनिष्टं
> महादापादितं देवानां प्रियेण To this the siddhikAra says - who says that
> everything is not imagined? The world that I observe is imagined by me - I
> may not be aware of the fact - but whoever observes the bhrAnti is the one
> that imagines it. Everything apart from Brahman is kalpitam according to
That's fine, but that cannot be used to counter opponent. Don't you agree
one can only refute opponent using mutually accepted means?
> Next, the pUrvapakshi asks - are objects revealed by sAkshi sublatable?
I will cover this topic about sAkshi in another mail when I get some time
(it is unfortunate and hard to get time these days).
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