bhaskar.yr at in.abb.com
Tue Jul 7 23:19:37 CDT 2015
praNAms Sri Ananda Hudli prabhuji
Would you please clarify this loukika 'devadatta' example within the concept of vedAntic akhadAkAra vrutti prabhuji?? So that things will be clear to the extent atleast from my perspective.
Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!
From: Advaita-l [mailto:advaita-l-bounces at lists.advaita-vedanta.org] On Behalf Of Anand Hudli via Advaita-l
Sent: Tuesday, July 07, 2015 11:11 PM
To: advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org
Subject: [Advaita-l] akhanDaakara-vRtti
On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 1:09 PM, kuntimaddi sadananda via Advaita-l < advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
> Chandramouli ji - PraNAms
> In the case of soyam devadattaH - as Sadananda yogi illustrates as an
example of jadajahallakshNa. Lakshana involves not vaachyaartha but lakshyaartha and jahat ajahat involves bhaga tyaaga - where contradictory parts have to be rejected and only equate the non-contradictory - here unchanging entity. How fast this is done is of no consequence. Viveka involves nithya anitya vastu viveka. In this example the buddhi does instantly or slowly by remembering that devadatta depending on how sharp that memory is - some times more prodding may be required to recapitulate that devadatta. It can be instant process but the mind has to drop the two contradictory attributes to arrive at oneness of this and that devadattas or aham and tat -In the case of Devadatta mind may do fast but in the case of tat tvam asi - the previous notions inhibit seeing that equation. Soyam devadattaH is classical example to illustrate the jahdajahallakshaNa - in illustrating the viveka
> required to appreciate the tat tvam asi
> Yes I know Shree Aandaji - Not sure if he is particularly interested
join. One can try. I am ccing this to Him, if he cares to comment.
> Hari Om!
I am not sure what exactly is being discussed, so I'll just say this. I remember seeing comments to the effect that anything with attributes cannot be the object of "nirvikalpaka" or indeterminate perception. However, we have the example of "this is that Devadatta". Both the Devadatta seen now as "this" and the Devadatta seen earlier as "that" have attributes. They are both men, with parts such as hands, feet, etc. What is going on here?
Although Devadatta is very much a perceivable person with attributes, the crucial point here is that the perception "this is that Devadatta" does not involve any of those attributes. It is exactly expressing an identity between two objects, this Devadatta and that Devadatta, nothing less, nothing more. So there is no "appeal" made to any attribute in the knowledge "this is that Devadatta", although Devadatta does have attributes. Obviously, the same Devadatta could be an object of determinate perception, "Devadatta is stout", "Devadatta is short", etc.
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