[Advaita-l] akdhandaakara vRitti - My mistake
Keshava PRASAD Halemane
k_prasad_h at yahoo.co.in
Mon Jul 6 04:09:44 CDT 2015
namastE Friends. praNAms My Dear Sada ji.
I am at a loss as to why Sri LalitAlAlitaH mentioned that you are wrong, etc. Usually, such things get somehow filtered out from my intake, simply because i consider myself incapable/incompetent of responding to them. However, on having understood that there seems to be a sort of serious discordance among the members w.r.t. the comments being made by Sri LalitAlAlitaH on the basis of whatever disagreements with the details of the concepts being discussed, i decided to drop my own opinion (expressed earlier) about the same and took upon myself the task of understanding whatever has been written by Sri LalitAlAlitaH on these threads, with the equality "akhanDAkAra-vRtti" = "niShprakAraka-vRtti" that is being propounded by him. I have not yet come to any final opinion/understanding on that task, because i am still awaiting the response from Sri LalitAlAlitaH on some of my questions etc.
I really do not know what more to say at this point.
Keshava PRASAD HalemanemOkShakaamaarthadharmahjanmanaa jaayatE jantuḥ | samskaaraat hi bhavEt dvijaḥ || vEda-paaThaat bhavEt vipra | brahma jnaanaat hi braahmaNah ||
On Monday, 6 July 2015 2:00 PM, Venkatraghavan S via Advaita-l <advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
What attributes do attributes have? What is the attribute of blueness
itself? The answer has to be nothing - but still it is possible to perceive
blueness. So it is possible to perceive an attributeless thing.
If not, how can one cognise Brahman, an attributeless thing?
On 6 Jul 2015 09:06, "kuntimaddi sadananda via Advaita-l" <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
> Rameshji - PraNAms
> That was my first post -Here we are referring to jnaana phalam although
> there is no phalavyaapti for the Vedanta jnaanam. I was told that I was
> wrong. I waited to get clarification from Swami Paramarthanadaji. In
> response to my question of what is akhandaakaara vRtti he mentioned (or to
> be more precise I heard) the Vedanta jnaana vRitti that eliminates the
> jiiva-brahma abhinnatvam and makes us understand the ekatvam. It is not
> phalam but the jnaana vRitti that eliminates the bhinnatvam of
> jiiva-brahma. I was told that I am wrong again. I am not sure if I am wrong
> or the definition is incomplete as it is claimed that it applies to
> perception of objects too.
> It can apply in the case of soyam devadattaH since we have two operations-
> 1. Direct perception of the current devadatta where the current attributes
> of Devadatta are involved, and 2. recollection of past perception from
> memory where that devadatta with different attributes are involved. Hence
> in the knowledge of soyam devadattaH, this is that Devadatta, the
> attributes of this and that Devadatta are to be discarded since they are
> contradictory, and only take the essence of Devadatta -The process is
> bhaagatyaga lakshana where part of it rejected and part is retained; the
> contradictory vishshaNaas are rejected and unifying one is filtered since
> there is only one Devadatta.
> Note that in the first perceived Devadatta, we do not perceive him devoid
> of attributes but with current attributes. When we recall, we recall the
> past Devadatta with past attributes. Now we use Viveka that sees
> cognitively the changeless Devadatta in the changing devadattas. Hence it
> is not direct perceptual knowledge, but can only be known by those who have
> the Viveka (who can pick up the changeless ones in the changing ones).
> Hence the example is used to understand tat tvam asi -using baadhyaayam
> samanaadhikaranam or discard the contradictory qualifications while
> retaining the essence. Only a trained mind can do that.
> We also note that in the direct perception, the knowledge is always
> attributive knowledge since senses can only gather attributes. In the
> recollection (internal perceptions) we do not have sense input, but still
> in recollecting a cow or horse we do recollect the viseshnana sahita
> viseshya , the object with attributes the recollection of cow differs from
> that of horse.
> When we see for the first time since we have no memory of the past, then
> the cognized object is stored with a name . Second time perception
> involves direct perception that cause cognition and recollection from
> memory past similar attributive object and matching (sometime if the
> recollection is vague or fuzzy) the attributive content, we say, this is a
> cow or He is Devadatta, etc. Vishishtaadvaita says the first time cognition
> is indeterminate and the second time on the cognition is determinate.
> The point remains however that only without the attributive content the
> object cannot be cognized – In seeing we see form of an object. But in
> hearing we have to go by the attributive sound to compare whether it is a
> cat or dog that is not seen but heard. In the case of lightning we see
> first then we hear later since we have learned that velocity of the light
> is greater than sound – even though both happened at the same time. All
> these aspects are involved in perception shabda, sparsa, ruupa, rasa and
> gandha- where sometime direct contact with the object with sparsa and rasa
> is involved for cognition and recognition.
> Hence I maintain based on our experiences, that there cannot be
> perception of an object without visheshanas since by definition one object
> differs from the others because of visheshanas only. I cannot say I have
> indeterminate perception of cat, cow and horse here – it is like blank
> perception without the attributive content. If theoretically it is
> formulated then it has no relevance to human experience.
> Therefore I am not sure what akhadaakaara vRitti in perception of unitary
> objects is.
> Hari Om!
> Sunday, 5 July 2015 9:49 PM, Ravi Kiran <ravikiranm108 at gmail.com>
> On Sun, Jul
> 5, 2015 at 7:51 PM, Keshava PRASAD Halemane via Advaita-l
> <advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org>
> namastE. praNaams
> My Dear
> I am continuing further on the same line of
> thinking . . .
> Irrespective of the object
> being objectified, the akhanDAkAra-vrtti always
> corresponds to the brahmAkAra-akhanDa-vRtti
> This would
> akhanDAkAra-vrtti is
> of the svayam-prakAsaka Brahma vastu alone, hence get Its
> akhanDAkAra-vrtti on any object does not dispel the ajnAna
> of Brahman
> which illumines the real
> brahma-vastu in any/every/all object(s); that is the vision
> of a brahma-jnAni - even when looking at any object the
> brahma-jnAni sees the brahma-vastu in any/every/all objects
> being objectified.
> Here it is
> understood that, because of the brahma-jnAna alone, one sees
> the real Brahma vastu everywhere ( sarvAtma bhAva) and not
> because of akhanDAkAra-vrtti on that object, uncovered the
> real brahma-vastu, dispelling the ajnAna of Brahman
> So, my understanding about the
> akhanDAkAra-vRtti is that it goes far beyond any/every/all
> viShEShaNas and reaches the real brahma-vastu any illumines
> it, rather than stopping short at the level of the
> viShEShaNas as in the case of other
> Keshava PRASAD
> HalemanemOkShakaamaarthadharmahjanmanaa jaayatE jantuḥ |
> samskaaraat hi bhavEt dvijaḥ || vEda-paaThaat bhavEt
> vipra | brahma jnaanaat hi braahmaNah ||
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