[Advaita-l] An adhyAsa challenge
nomadeva at yahoo.com
Mon Jun 16 00:57:55 CDT 2003
--- S Jayanarayanan <sjayana at yahoo.com> wrote:
> > You have not read the reply. You have missed that
> > portion which makes
> > it compulsory for you to accept that air does not
> > partake any nature of
> > earth. Hope you are not in a hurry to get over this
> > example :-)
> It seems like you're turning a deaf ear to all the
> reasons and cases and arguments I've given as to why
> As to *general arguments* as to whether it is possible
> for *any object* to partake of the "nature of another
> If condition --> then form, is the definition of
> having a flexible form.
> When instead of saying "air has taken up the form of
> the earth", I have said "air has taken up the nature
> of the earth", it was a simple error in terminology on
> my part, and you're basically blowing that up to speak
This is going to be my last posting on this thread. You have not shown
any improvement in understanding that
A. I have accepted the idea that if there exists an upAdhi, air
_appears_ to have a form. (You have persisted in ignoring the word
'appears'). Due to that, all talk of 'flexible form' is irrelevant.
B. The 'general arguments' (on why one object partakes anothers'
properties or not) and their relevance -- are your imagination. I have
not mentioned any general arguments.
C I have turned a deaf ear and eye to your errors, so to speak. Whether
you say air has taken up the form OR nature of earth is same as far as
this context goes. Instead, the issue is that air is still formless
despite its association with earth; it 'appears' to have a form.
You have also ignored the point that in my analogy, earth, not air,
corresponds to consciousness. I can understand that the analogy pinches
the shoe hard.
> > Not necessarily. Even a person who has not
> > identified consciousness with body.
> For a person who has not identified consciousness with
> the body, "incapacity" and "ignorance" are very loaded
> terms and I would definitely ask for a definition.
> Remember: I'm still identified with a body, so your
> earlier self-evident reason ("I cannot move the moon")
> disappears, for no one observes the moon without
> identifying oneself with the body. It's going to be
> difficult to show how such a person can have any
> experience of "other".
A person who does not identify the body with the consciousness, is
aware that the senses are different from consciousness, the body is
different from it, the data that senses provide is different from the
senses and so on. That is the first perception of 'other'. Are you
assuming that the moment one is able to identify the body as separate
from C, there is no experience of body?
As regards the definition of incapacity and ignorance, look up the
dictionary. What all C is 'ignorant of' or 'incapable of' has been
> > I'd like to know why you say it is 'unnecessary' and
> > 'unwarranted'.
> Because your postulate for such a being comes from
> neither logic nor experience.
We have two facts:
(i) C is incapable of associating with non-C. That is, C does not
decide which non-C to associate with, when to associate with non-C,
even if it decides, it cannot do on its own -- All this needs no proof
other than the instances given earlier.
(ii) non-C is capable of forming the association. For, it is non-C.
So, there must be a third entity making the association happen.
> You need to show that there is *no other possibility*
> but to accept such a being. If you're going to claim
> that there is indeed no other possibility, then you're
> falling into the problem of proving the existence of
> Brahman without scripture.
You are mixing up two things: postulation and proof. Postulation is
enough for the solution. Proof needs scripture. The proof of this very
idea is seen from the fact that many people form some idea of God etc,
without having to look up scripture. But all that remains postulation.
I don't need to show that there is no other possibility. My postulation
finds proof in scripture. Other solutions are inconsistent by
themselves and *also* lack proof in scripture.
> > simpler in those terms, without ever bringing
> > 'inexplicability' :-)
> It is most definitely simpler. advaita declares it to
> be an epistemological error of associating
> consciousness with unconsciousness. An absence of
> discrimination between the two.
thereby, discarding one of the premises -- experience. It is definitely
simpler to say that the problem is an illusion and born out of absence
of discrimination, just because we are not able to find a solution. Why
didn't I think of this in school and college (though I wonder if it
would be of any help)?
> According to advaita, establishing the error that is
> adhyAsa does not require scripture, but removing
> adhyAsa does.
Establish adhyAsa first.
> As to the part about deep sleep: how do you know that
> there is a state called "deep sleep"? If there were no
> consciousness at all, one ought to never be able to
> speak of such a state in the first place.
I am not saying there is no conscioussness at all. I am saying - We
don't have any information about it. How is it surmised in the first
place, then? Elimination. Also note that I accept that I cannot
distinguish between mUrchChA and suShupti, except for the
after-reactions. The reactions after deep-sleep is that of happiness
and perception of some time. The same is absent after one gets out of
Getting back to the original point, we never see C independent of
non-C. So, your theory that C cannot get associated with non-C yet is
experienced to happen is absurd to begin with. Read Holmes: "It is
impossible as I state it, and therefore I must in some respect have
stated it wrong".
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