[Advaita-l] An adhyAsa challenge

S Jayanarayanan sjayana at yahoo.com
Sat Jun 14 13:53:22 CDT 2003

--- Nomadeva Sharma <nomadeva at yahoo.com> wrote:
> Dear Jayna,
> Sorry for the late reply.

This will be the last posting on this thread. We're
both saying the same things over and again, but
without an agreement and coming to a point. 

> --- S Jayanarayanan <sjayana at yahoo.com> wrote:
> > So you admit that air partakes of the form of the
> > earth's boundary? 
> You have not read the reply. You have missed that
> portion which makes
> it compulsory for you to accept that air does not
> partake any nature of
> earth. Hope you are not in a hurry to get over this
> example :-)

It seems like you're turning a deaf ear to all the
reasons and cases and arguments I've given as to why
air has *flexible form*, and DOES take the form of the
container. You're still coming to grips with the fact
of air taking up the container's form, and therefore
is NOT completely formless. 

As to *general arguments* as to whether it is possible
for *any object* to partake of the "nature of another
object" is absolutely side-tracking from the issue and
is of no relevance to the matter at hand. No doubt,
the nature of air is independent of the nature of the
earth -- for air has "flexible form" and earth has
"spherical form". The two natures are absolutely
separate and not related. But the very nature of
"flexible form" implies that it can take up a form
dependent on conditions such as proximity to earth.
Here, it takes up the form of earth's boundary. You're
forever trying to avoid countering 
my objection that air has a "flexible form". 

If condition --> then form, is the definition of
having a flexible form. 

When instead of saying "air has taken up the form of
the earth", I have said "air has taken up the nature
of the earth", it was a simple error in terminology on
my part, and you're basically blowing that up to speak
of the nature of an object and how one object cannot
take up another's. I wanted to make myself as clear as
possible to explain the nature of air as having
"flexible form", but you still refuse to either
understand and give reasonable objections. 

> > ----------
> > "If you are asking how the link between
> consciousness
> > and body happens, noting that the consciousness
> is, to
> > a great extent, incapable and ignorant, I'd
> postulate
> > another being, who has inconceivable powers, whose
> > ichChA shakti can by itself move the world."
> > ----------
> > 
> > Now, if I understand rightly what you're saying:
> since
> > a person (who has identified consciousness with
> the
> Not necessarily. Even a person who has not
> identified consciousness
> with body.

For a person who has not identified consciousness with
the body, "incapacity" and "ignorance" are very loaded
terms and I would definitely ask for a definition.
Remember: I'm still identified with a body, so your
earlier self-evident reason ("I cannot move the moon")
disappears, for no one observes the moon without
identifying oneself with the body. It's going to be
difficult to show how such a person can have any
experience of "other". 


> I'd like to know why you say it is 'unnecessary' and
> 'unwarranted'.

Because your postulate for such a being comes from
neither logic nor experience. 

You need to show that there is *no other possibility*
but to accept such a being. If you're going to claim
that there is indeed no other possibility, then you're
falling into the problem of proving the existence of
Brahman without scripture. 

> It
> might be unnecessary depending on whether a simpler
> solution to it can
> exist without contradicting experience.
> I just hope
> your solution is
> simpler in those terms, without ever bringing
> 'inexplicability' :-)

It is most definitely simpler. advaita declares it to
be an epistemological error of associating
consciousness with unconsciousness. An absence of
discrimination between the two. 

> On a parallel thread, I'd like you to continue your
> adhyAsa series, so
> that we can evaluate that solution too. But we are
> not to forget the
> premises :-)

The premises of logic and experience ended for the
first part. The second part is going to involve
scripture, as I mentioned at the end of the first. 

According to advaita, establishing the error that is
adhyAsa does not require scripture, but removing
adhyAsa does. 


As to the part about deep sleep: how do you know that
there is a state called "deep sleep"? If there were no
consciousness at all, one ought to never be able to
speak of such a state in the first place. 


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