[Advaita-l] An adhyAsa challenge
nomadeva at yahoo.com
Wed Jun 11 12:32:40 CDT 2003
Sorry if this is a duplicate.
> > Rather your explanation serves no purpose in
> > setting aside the analogy as defective. For, it is
> > only in the presence of a container, you are
> > assuming that it has a form. The container is the
> > upAdhi, the conditioning factor. Air, by itself,
> > is formless. No container, no form.
> So you admit that if container --> then form.
Read again Jayna, "For, it is only in the presence of
a container, you are __assuming__ that it has a form".
> Therefore *air that co-exists with earth has form* -
> that of the boundary of the earth. By its contact
> with earth, air assumes the form of the earth's
> boundary. This is precisely why the analogy is
> defective - because consciousness never ever
> partakes of *anything* of the nature of the
> unconscious. Consciousness remains wholly, purely,
> nothing but consciousness.
You are stretching the analogy beyond what it was
meant for. The analogy was given to contradict your
point that two objects with mutually contradictory
attributes cannot co-exist. Now, your reason for
rejecting the analogy is different from your original
point: that one of the two objects is partaking the
nature of other. That is unfair; just the same that
you would react to an objection to your analogy of
light/darkness because 'consciousness is not made of
In any case, you have assumed that vAyu in my analogy
corresponds to consciousness. That is wrong. Just like
the earth co-exists with formless air, yet does not
partake any properties of air, so too does
consciousness not partake *anything* of the nature of
the unconscious. If you were to complain that the
unconscious is still partaking the nature of
conscious; that never was your objection in the first
place (yes, 'direction' of partaking matters).
Moreover, it is also the case your doctrine holds that
it is quite possible that the reflection of chaitanya
in a non-chaitanya medium can act _as if it were_
chaitanya. But it does not mean the non-chaitanya
medium has partaken 'chaitanyatva', right? It's the
same with vAyu in the analogy I gave.
Anyway, what exactly did you mean by 'partaking' the
attributes of container? Are you saying the air
actually obtains, partially or fully, the 'taTastha
laxaNa' of having a form because of its upAdhi? If
yes, it would become incumbent upon you to accept that
Brahman, whose 'taTastha laxaNa' (sic!) is said to be
creatorship of this marvellous universe, actually
'partakes' it. OTOH, if you were to insist that there
is no actual partaking, that serves the case for vAyu
also; it has no actual partaking; thereby entities
with mutually contradictory attributes can co-exist.
Thus, the analogy stands (don't forget again why the
analogy was made).
> Again, this is very closely analogical to that of
> light and darkness - they never partake of the
> of one another. Not a perfect analogy, but close. As
I was just wondering about what happens if one were to
throw a beam of light into a blackhole. Given that
there is absence of 'that' light, wouldn't it be
equivalent to saying the light has partaken the nature
of darkness (i.e., its own absence)?
(Note that I am not advancing this argument seriously;
I am just curious as to see how you'd handle it.)
> > Note that your original contention was between
> > consciousness and rest. That only the rest is an
> > object of consciousness is your postulate.
> Where do you get that postulate?
In your earlier reply to mine.
> > > "Ignorant"? Hardly - being the subject of
> > > knowledge, it is in fact the only entity that
> > > really "knows".
> > It is a bit funny that you first label these terms
> > as loaded, and proceed to disprove me on the basis
> > of meanings you assumed.
> The terms are loaded on account of being highly
> subject to interpretation, and you did not define
> > This very act of yours proves my point that
> > consciousness is incapable and ignorant to a large
> > extent: you did not know what I meant by those
> > terms;
> > nor were you capable of finding out what those
> > according to me, without asking me.
> There are several things that are implicitly assumed
> in order to render a discussion possible. Actions
> Therefore, within the scope of this discussion,
> persons are capable and incapable, knowledgeable and
> ignorant, of several things.
Well, you are agreeing to my point. The need for the
implicit assumption that the disputants will define
terms, arises because we know, we agree, we
understand, we realize the ignorance and incapability
of oneself: one cannot know what the other thinks. And
one is incapable of finding out what it is, without
doing anything abt it (such as issue a warning not to
Btw, I just need to give you instances of ignorance
and incapability (without giving any spl defintion to
those loaded terms) and if you agree that the
instances do convey such aspects, my point is made.
> > independent of how that solution was arrived at.
> > you disagree, I can give the meanings I assumed
> > 'ignorant' and 'incapable'.
> In the manner that I've chosen to interpret the
> "incapable" and "ignorant", the solution has already
> been disproved since they don't apply to
> As I said before, unless you give me the meanings of
> the terms as you've chosen to interpret them, there
> can be no further response from my side.
It is a very artificial condition you are putting on
the debate, Jayna. Why should your evaluation of the
solution be dependent on how it was arrived at? Think
about it. Your evaluation of the solution has not
happened at all.
> > You cannot say that the link between consciousness
> > (C) and un-C is itself not possible, for, that
> > violates your basic premise: experience. In fact,
> > no experience observes C independent of a body.
> The experience of deep sleep does.
Did you observe C in your deep sleep?
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