[Advaita-l] Causal Body

Nomadeva Sharma nomadeva at yahoo.com
Mon Jun 9 00:46:36 CDT 2003

--- kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada at yahoo.com>
> > > > Your question presumes that (i) there exists
> > > > something called object and that (ii) object 
> > > > is different from qualities.
> Krishna - these are presumptions. VisheshaNa and
> visheshya are different
> and they are not identical - VisheshaNa may not
> exist independent of the
> visheshya. That does not mean they are identical.

This is a key place where we differ. We say the
visheShaNa and visheShya are not [absolutely]
identical, they are [visheShataH] identical. Your
objection that the idea of an object is an assumed or
inferred one does not apply to us, as we hold that
object and its properties (again, not all) are
[visheShataH] identical. Any well-meaning school would
do that, for, in the end, 'dravyatva' is also an

> Substance is what is referred to as dravya. Hence
> that they  are identical is only a postulation and
> factual. 

That they are factual is also known by perception
(with a bit of anumAna-toppings), as you have yourself
said below: 

> It is true that VisheshaNa or attribute
> should have a locus or ashraya. The 

Is this need for Ashraya perceived or inferred? If

> substantive is the dravya. These are
> some essential visheshaNa-s and there 
> are non-essential visheshaNa-s for an 
> object. In mathematicas we call them 
> as incidental qualifications (tatasta
> lakshaNa-s), necessory and the necessory 
> and sufficient qualifications, etc.  

There is a different idea that dvaitins follow:
yAvad-dravya-bhAvi (that which are co-eval with the
substance) and a-yAvad-dravya-bhAvi.

> > Your question ("How does one perceive the
> > substantive?") is different from mine. You made 2
> > statements (i) that senses grasp qualities only
> > and (ii) qualities are different from substantive.
> > question is regarding these 2 statements. If (i)
> > were to be true, the term 'substantive' in (ii)
> > not arise at all. 
> Not really - evey object has visheshanas and the
> substantive is visheshya or draya or dharmi.  Fact 
> of the matter is no way you can grasp the
> with senses. The rest are assumtions and
> inferences.  This should be understood clearly. We
> take things for granted and there lies the problem. 

> There is nothing false in the statements. Senses can
> only grasp the form, color,sound,smell etc. Hence
> are called maatra-s as they only measure the degrees
- eyes can measure the degree of
> shades in red or
> green etc as diverget colors. 

I had misunderstood your position, that you considered
the concept of substantive an illogical one. Hence all

Now, coming to the point on whether substantive can be
grasped or not, it depends on the relation one assigns
to the object and its attributes. A school holding
'colorful identity' (as BNK Sharma puts it; though I
don't understand what is colorful about it) would say
every sense is perceiving the object or an aspect of

> I am trying to draw your attention what actually
> happens in perception and what is concluded, 
> since conclusions involves further assumptions -
> drawing the line between facts and
> postulations/inferences/conclusions etc. 

As I mentioned earlier, all that I wrote was in
apprehension that you are denying the very idea of
substantive as illogical.

> I will present my postulations later!.  But first
> the problem is to be understood.  That 
> visheshana and visheshya are interrelated is 
> known. Tarkika-s have brought in 'samavaayu', 
> a glueing factor, to account the inseparatability 
> of these two. Bhagavan Ramanuja and Shree Vedanata
> Deshika have also postulated that one need not
> bringin unnecessorily glueing factor  to account 
> interdependency of the two. They called it
> 'inherency'.  Shree Madhva also rejected the
> glueiing factor and used a differt term for the 
> same thing.  

visheSha is not same as samavAya. Two key differences:

1. tArkikAs hold that there is only one samavAya:
samavAyastveka eva | We say there are
ananta-visheShA-s. That brings in an essential
difference in the way they operate.
2. samavAya and inherency [I think they call it
'apR^ithaksiddha'] assume differences between object
and its attributes. visheSha is different: abhede
bhedavyavahAra sAdhako visheShaH.

Thus, you should note that while tArkikas and [going
by your words] vishiShTadvaita others have accepted
some notion of 'thing in itself', while we reject the
possibility of such a notion. This, in a way, also
leads to our rejection of nirvikalpa-pratyabhij~nA
(and if you ask me, anybody accepting nirvikalpa
pratyabhij~nA is not far off from getting to either
advaita or buddhism).

> But the fact remains that in perception senses 
> can only grasp the qualities not the substantive. 

Just to clarify what I have said: there is no
difference between substantive and attributes. Their
identity is not absolute, but through visheShas. So,
all perceptions involve the substantive, finally.

> The rest are all postulations.  


> If this is not clear, the rest has no relavence. 

Actually I have lost the relevance of this thread. Can
you pls enlighten?


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