[Advaita-l] Causal Body
srikrishna_ghadiyaram at yahoo.com
Fri Jun 6 11:09:37 CDT 2003
--- Jay Nelamangala <jay at r-c-i.com> wrote:
> Sri sadAnanda,
> >Krishna - My request to you is to keep following
> the discussion between
> >Jay and myself and enter when you find there is
> misrepresentation of
> >dwaita position. Jay wants to get to the bottom of
> this by his series
> >of adhyaasa theories finding fault with the
> advaitic concept. I have no
> >problem if something is wrong in Advaita, but
> before one ventures into
> >the criticism of a well established theory, one
> should understand it
> >correctly too.
> I assume Krishna is Nomadeva Sharma.
> My request to you is to let NomadEva ask these
> relevant questions.
> That is what this email list is all about. Let us
> not kill that spirit.
> Sri Sharma has asked you some very valid questions
> which you need to
> >Object has the qualities that do not mean object is
> the same as
> >qualities? One is an attribute and the other is
> substantive. The
> >relation between the two as Jay has recognized is
> assumed. There is a
> >fundamental problem involved in perception of the
> substantive? That is
> >the reason why epistemology is intimately connected
> to ontology in our
> That brings us to the doctrine of vishEsha.
> You are very correct when you say pramANa-pramEya
> are intimately
> The character of the object of pratyaksha is the
> same as that of the objects
> other pramANas. Every instance of pratyaksha
> reveals its object as "This is
> so and so".
> Here "so-and-so" refers to the property of the
> object which is revealed as
> "This" as
> a substantive. So, the object of pratyaksha is a
> substantive qualified by a
> No pratyakhsa reveals a property independently of
> the substantive, or a
> substantive independently of property. The object
> of pratyaksha under all
> is a qualified entity or "vishishta vastu".
> What is the relation between a substantive and its
> Let us take a piece of white cloth, for instance.
> Cloth is substance and
> whiteness its
> property. But they are not different. Only
> NyAya-vaishEshikas think they
> different. But whiteness itself is not cloth
> either. So they are given as
> This suggests there is a peculiarity in them. This
> peculiarity is called
> It is this peculiarity enables us to talk and think
> as if the two they are
> This peculiarity is not the same as difference.
> "abhEdE bhEdakAree vishEshaha" - vishEsha is that
> which shows difference
> where there is none. The attributes are identical
> with the substance. It
> is vishEsha
> that causes the idea of difference in an identical
> thing. So, vishEsha is
> the core
> of reality. Everything is what it is by means of
> vishEsha. Owing to its
> in the thing, the thing is said to have many
> aspects, properties, and so on.
> To explain as many properties, there must be as many
> vishEshas in the same
> That does not mean adding fresh properties to it.
> The vishEshas are those
> explain the presence of the properties of the thing
> without making them
> from it. The fact that they are, is the necessary
> implication of the fact
> that a thing is
> qualified. So they maintain themselves. To try to
> explain by means of
> vishEshas is to ignore the very starting point.
> The acceptance of peculiarity (vishEsha) is
> inevitable even for advaita,
> advaita ignores it. Advaita regards Brahman as
> partless. This implies that
> partlessness is a property of It. It is akhanda.
> So partlessness is not
> from it. Then the question is, "how can there be
> the thought that
> is a property of Brahman? "
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