[Advaita-l] Causal Body

kuntimaddi sadananda kuntimaddisada at yahoo.com
Fri Jun 6 06:49:41 CDT 2003


--- Jay Nelamangala <jay at r-c-i.com> wrote:

> 
> I assume Krishna is  Nomadeva Sharma.
> My request to you is to let NomadEva ask these relevant questions.
> That is what this email list is all about.  Let us not kill that
> spirit.

Jay - I know Krishna enough and I have no intention of killing his or
your spirit in asking questions. 

One can ask lot of questions. The request is intended to focus first on
the central issue that I am posing since answers to the rest of the
questions follow by correctly understanding the perception process. The
questions and answers will become relevant only if we understand the
basic process.  If that is not clear there is no point in building the
castle.  That is the request for. I have also asked him to step in if
there is a misunderstanding of dwaita involved in the discussions.  It
was public mail not to his private address. So there is no intention of
my part to kill any body's spirit. I wanted to focus the one issue
rather than start parallel mails and responses. There is nothing that
stops Krishna to step in anytime he wants to address the central issue. 

>.  Every instance of pratyaksha reveals its object as
> "This is
> so and so".
> Here "so-and-so" refers to the property of the object which is
> revealed as
> "This" as
> a substantive. 


Jay - please stop right there. You have missed the point. Because there
are lot of hidden assumptions that are involved in the above statement
"which is revealed as 'this' as substantive. Let us go step by step that
process - eyes see the form and color, right - therefore for form and
color eyes are the only pramaaNa - for sound, the ears and like wise
each of the senses have their specific fields. But form and color are
only attributes and not the substantive. Each sense can only sense the
qualities but not substantive. 'Which reveals 'this' my fried. Now tell
me how the perception of 'this' occurs - Krishna you can explain to me
if you want how dwaita addresses this issue or is it taken for granted?
Jay, you have also stated that saakshee perceives time and space - but
using what instruments since senses are the only instruments given to us
to perceive anything 'out there' and you already stated that senses
cannot do it. The question boils down to - is it an axiomatic statement
or based on some understanding of the process involved. One can build up
models with axioms and there is nothing wrong in it as along as one is
aware that there is possibility that the foundations of the model could
be shaken too. 

Once these are clear we can go to the next step. The rest of the mail
has no meaning to me when the fundamentals are not clear. 

Hari OM!
Sadananda




 So, the object of pratyaksha is a substantive
> qualified by a
> property.
> No pratyakhsa reveals a property independently of the substantive,  or
> a
> substantive independently of property.  The object of pratyaksha under
> all
> circumstances
> is a qualified entity or "vishishta vastu".
> 
> What is the relation between a substantive and its property?
> Let us take a piece of white cloth, for instance.  Cloth is substance
> and
> whiteness its
> property.  But they are not different.  Only NyAya-vaishEshikas think
> they
> are
> different.  But whiteness itself is not cloth either.  So they are
> given as
> different.
> This suggests there is a peculiarity in them. This peculiarity is
> called
> vishEsha.
> It is this peculiarity enables us to talk and think as if the two they
> are
> different.
> This peculiarity is not the same as difference.
> 
> "abhEdE bhEdakAree vishEshaha" - vishEsha is that which shows
> difference
> where there is none.  The attributes are identical with the substance.
>  It
> is vishEsha
> that causes the idea of difference in an identical thing.  So,
> vishEsha is
> the core
> of reality.   Everything is what it is by means of vishEsha.  Owing to
> its
> presence
> in the thing, the thing is said to have many aspects, properties, and
> so on.
> To explain as many properties, there must be as many vishEshas in the
> same
> thing.
> That does not mean adding fresh properties to it.  The vishEshas are
> those
> that
> explain the presence of the properties of the thing without making
> them
> different
> from it.  The fact that they are, is the necessary implication of the
> fact
> that a thing is
> qualified.  So they maintain themselves.  To try to explain by means
> of
> other
> vishEshas is to ignore the very starting point.
> 
> The acceptance of peculiarity (vishEsha) is inevitable even for
> advaita,
> though
> advaita ignores it.  Advaita regards Brahman as partless.  This
> implies that
> partlessness is a property of It.   It is akhanda.   So partlessness
> is not
> different
> from it.  Then the question is, "how can there be the thought that
> partlessness
> is a property of Brahman? "
> 
> 
> 
> 
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=====
What you have is His gift to you and what you do with what you have is your gift to Him - Swami Chinmayananda.

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