vsundaresan at HOTMAIL.COM
Thu Sep 12 21:23:37 CDT 2002
>. On the other hand, anupalabdhi is based partly on the
>> that a perception should have been there and it involves at least
>> premise that is not directly perceived.
>Vidya - I agree with most of your comments. However, don't you think
>the expected absence (saadhya) is based on some hetu ( I gave example
>of the absence shoes) and there has to be vyaapti based on prior
>perceptual knowledge or experince.
The following is a quick response, and I have to check some of my premises
before I can be quite sure of its correctness, but here goes.
I believe, in your example of the "absence of shoes" leading to "absence of
woman inside temple", there are two different pramANa-s involved. Firstly,
the perception of the "absence of shoes" is anupalabdhi. Based on this, one
then says that the woman is not inside the temple. This is anumAna, which
may or may not be validly constructed, and therefore calls for hetu and
vyApti. As far as anupalabdhi itself is concerned, what is under debate is
the basic perception of the absence of shoes. This anupalabdhi is based on
the expectation, "If she is inside the temple, her shoes must be outside,"
and occurs independent of directly perceiving her presence inside the
If I remember right, when mImAMsakas and advaitins talk of anupalabdhi as a
pramANa, they are referring to this perception of an absence per se and not
to any further inferential argument that follows from that perception. The
perception of the absence cannot be an inference from the perception of the
presence of other shoes. The perception of the absence has to be
distinguished from pratyakSha too, because pratyakSha is, by definition,
perception of things that are, not of things that are absent. Hence the
acceptance of anupalabdhi as a separate pramANa.
The case with arthApatti is different, but I won't get into it now, without
brushing up on fundamentals.
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