advaita-siddhi -3 (Brief review of nyAya concepts and terms)
anandhudli at HOTMAIL.COM
Fri Aug 13 18:28:06 CDT 1999
A review of some concepts and terms from nyAya is in order before we
proceed further. Please see "Materials for the study of Navya Nyaya Logic"
by Ingalls or "The Navya-Nyaya doctrine of negation" by Bimal Krishna
Matilal for more details.
Process of inference:
Every noneternal entity, according to nyAya, must be a result of
an instrumental cause (karaNa) and an operation (vyApAra).
An inference (anumAna), that is a means to knowledge of man and hence
noneternal, must have an instrumental cause and an operation by which
the cause brings about the inference.
In the process of inference, the operation is called parAmarsha or
consideration, and the instrumental cause is the knowledge of
invariable concomitance (vyApti), also called pervasion. This vyApti
corresponds very roughly to logical implication in Western logic.
In the inference, "the mountain possesses fire because it has smoke",
the instrumental cause, karaNa is the knowledge of the invariable
concomitance, "smoke is the invariable concomitant of fire",
vahni-vyApyo dhUmaH, ie. where there is smoke there is fire.
The operation, vyApAra is the consideration (parAmarsha) that is
a knowledge of the occurrence of the concomitant in the subject (pakshha)
where the inference is being made. In the inference, "the mountain
possesses fire because it has smoke", the parAmarsha will be of the
form, "the mountain possesses smoke which is an invariable concomitant
of fire" - parvato vahni-vyApya-dhUmavAn.h
In polemical treatises and debates, an inference is stated tersely
by listing the inference (conclusion) followed by a single word
representing the application of the consideration and the invariable
concomitance. For example, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain
possesses fire because of smoke."
In every inference, there are evident three terms, called 1) sAdhya
or that which is to be proved, 2) the hetu or linga, the concomitant,
and 3) the subject or pakshha, that in which the hetu is known to occur.
In the inference, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain has fire
because of smoke", the sAdhya is vahni (fire), the hetu is smoke, and
the pakshha is parvata (mountain).
In the standard form of inference, the three terms are placed as
pakshha sAdhya-with-possessive-suffix hetu-in-ablative-case
For example, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, "the mountain has fire
because of smoke."
The definition of vyApti is very important. It is defined by the
bhAshhA-parichchheda (of VishvanAtha) as:
vyAptiH sAdhyavadanyasminn-asaMbandha udAhR^itaH |
Invariable concomitance is said to be the absence of relation of
the (hetu) to anything other than what possesses the sAdhya.
Here the relation should be the same as the relation under consideration
for the vyApti. As per this definition of vyApti, smoke is an invariable
concomitant of fire (or smoke is "pervaded" by fire) because it is not
the case that there is something that has smoke but not fire. However,
fire is not an invariable concomitant of smoke. There are things such
as a red-hot iron rod that has fire but no smoke. So fire is not an
invariable concomitant of smoke.
A relation between two entities is often explained as the superimposition
of one entity on the other. Here, the entity that is superimposed is
called the superstratum or Adheya. The entity on which the Adheya is
superimposed is called substratum or locus. Sanskrit names for
"substratum" is AdhAra or Ashraya or adhikaraNa. In the example,
bhUtale ghaTo vartate, "there is a pot on the ground", the superstratum
is the pot (ghaTa), the ground (bhUtalam.h) is the substratum or locus,
and the relation is "contact", saMyoga.
Another way of looking at relations (saMbandha) is to differentiate
between what Ingalls calls "occurrence-exacting" and "non occurrence
exacting" relations. Relations such as inherence (samavAya) are
always occurrence exacting. samavAya or inherence is the relation
between a whole and its parts, a genus or class (jAti) and a particular
instance of the class, etc. Contact (saMyoga) can sometimes be
occurrence exacting but sometimes not.
In relation between two entities, one of the entities is an adjunct or
pratiyogin, and the other is a subjunct or anuyogin. If a relation is
such that one entity is a locus or substratum (AdhAra) of the other which
must be the superstratum (Adheya), then the AdhAra is the subjunct or
anuyogin. The Adheya is the adjunct or pratiyogin. In the example,
bhUtale ghaTaH, "there is a pot on the ground", ghaTa is the pratiyogin
while bhUtalam.h is the anuyogin.
Two types of absences (abhAva) are distinguished in navya-nyAya. One
is called anyonya-abhAva that is essentially a denial of identity
between to entities. The other is saMsarga-abhAva or relational absence.
Here, there are three kinds: 1) prAgabhAva, the absence of a thing before
it is brought into being, 2) dhvamsAbhAva, the absence of a thing after
it is destroyed, and 3) atyanta-abhAva, eternal absence.
The terms pratiyogin and anuyogin are also used in the context of
absences. When we say "bhUtale ghaTo nAsti", "there is no pot on the
ground", the pratiyogin of the absence is "ghaTa", pot, and the
anuyogin is "bhUtalam.h", ground. The pratiyogin of this type should
be called "abhAvIya-pratiyogin" to distinguish it from the relational
adjunct, but naiyAyikas often write "pratiyogin" for both relational
and absential adjuncts.
>From ADVAITA-L at LISTS.ADVAITA-VEDANTA.ORG Sun Aug 15 18:11:13 1999
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Date: Sun, 15 Aug 1999 18:11:13 +0000
Reply-To: List for advaita vedanta as taught by Shri Shankara
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To: List for advaita vedanta as taught by Shri Shankara
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From: "Anand V. Hudli" <anandhudli at HOTMAIL.COM>
Subject: advaita-siddhi - 4 (avachchhedaka & avachchhinna)
Some of the properties that are commonly used in
naiyAyika literature are those that correspond to
the terms sAdhya, hetu, pakshha, adhikaraNa (locus), vishhayin
(knowledge), vishhaya (content of knowledge), visheshhya
(qualificand), visheshhaNa (qualifier), prakAra (chief qualifier),
The abstract properties or relational abstracts of these
are formed by simply adding the suffix, "tva" or "tA" to
each term. For example, one may write sAdhyatva to mean
"the property of being a sAdhya" or "sAdhya-ness", hetutva
or "the property of being a hetu" or "hetu-ness", etc.
A sentence of the form, parvato vahnimAn.h, "the mountain
(parvata) has fire (vahni)", can be first rewritten as parvato
vahnyadhikaraNam.h, "the mountain is a locus or substratum of
fire". This is then analyzed by the naiyAyika as follows:
parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nirUpitA |
The adhikaraNatA resident in parvata is described by vahni.
parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nishhThAdheyatA nirUpitA |
The adhikaraNatA resident in parvata is described by the
AdheyatA (superstratum-ness) resident in fire.
The most characteristic terms of navya-nyAya are
"avachchhedaka" (limitor) and "avachchhinna" (limited).
These terms are used in the context of relational abstracts or
abstract properties. An entity, such as a pot (ghaTa), is said to
be qualified by a qualifier, but a relational abstract is said
to be limited by a limitor.
Let us take the same sentence, parvato vahnimAn, "the mountain
has fire." Here, the mountain is a substratum (adhikaraNa) of
fire which is the superstratum (Adheya). The adhikaraNatA in
parvata is described by vahni (fire), but this adhikaraNatA is
said to be limited (avachchhinna) by parvatatva. Similarly, the
AdheyatA in vahni (fire) is said to be described by parvata but
this AdheyatA is said to be limited (avachchhinna) by vahnitva
So a navya-naiyAyika would write:
parvata-nishhTha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nirUpita-parvatatva-
avachchhinna-adhikaraNatA, vahni-nishhThAdheyatA sA
The adhikaraNatA in mountain is described by fire and limited
by parvatatva (mountain-ness), and the AdheyatA in fire is
described by mountain and limited by vahnitva (fire-ness).
A generic relational abstract may also be limited. In the
sentence, "a stick is the instrumental cause of a pot",
daNDo nimitta-kAraNaM ghatasya, the assertion is not with
respect to a specific pot and stick. The assertion is generally
about all sticks and pots.
So the naiyAyika writes:
daNDatvaM ghaTa-nirUpita-nimitta-kAraNatva-avachchhedakam.h |
Stick-ness is the limitor of instrumental-cause-ness described
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